# Magecart

> As of 2026-07-02, Magecart is a N/A-nexus threat actor tracked by Threadlinqs Intelligence across 4 threats spanning malware, supply chain. Also known as Magecart Group, Server-side Magecart. ATT&CK coverage spans 52 techniques across 12 tactics in 4 of 4 tracked threats. Most-observed techniques: T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information), T1041 (Exfiltration Over C2 Channel), T1056 (Input Capture).

- **Nation:** N/A
- **Tracked threats:** 4
- **Categories:** MALWARE, SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Also known as:** Magecart Group, Server-side Magecart
- **As of:** 2026-07-02

## ATT&CK techniques observed

52 techniques observed across 4 of 4 tracked threats. Tactics: Stealth (formerly Defense Evasion) (14), Command and Control (8), Collection (5), Persistence (5), Execution (4), Resource Development (4).

- [T1027](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1027) Obfuscated Files or Information — Stealth (formerly Defense Evasion) — observed in 4 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1041](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1041) Exfiltration Over C2 Channel — Exfiltration — observed in 4 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1056](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1056) Input Capture — Credential Access — observed in 4 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1059](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1059) Command and Scripting Interpreter — Execution — observed in 4 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1005](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1005) Data from Local System — Collection — observed in 3 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1036](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1036) Masquerading — Stealth (formerly Defense Evasion) — observed in 3 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1071](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1071) Application Layer Protocol — Command and Control — observed in 3 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1140](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1140) Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information — Stealth (formerly Defense Evasion) — observed in 3 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1190](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1190) Exploit Public-Facing Application — Initial Access — observed in 3 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1505](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1505) Server Software Component — Persistence — observed in 3 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1583](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1583) Acquire Infrastructure — Resource Development — observed in 3 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1105](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1105) Ingress Tool Transfer — Command and Control — observed in 2 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1185](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1185) Browser Session Hijacking — Collection — observed in 2 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1195](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1195) Supply Chain Compromise — Initial Access — observed in 2 of 4 tracked threats
- [T1564](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/technique/T1564) Hide Artifacts — Stealth (formerly Defense Evasion) — observed in 2 of 4 tracked threats

## Tracked threats

- [Magecart Skimmer Abuses Stripe API + Google Tag Manager for Payload Hosting, C2 & Card Exfiltration](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0699) — HIGH
- [Magecart SVG Pixel Onload Skimmer Campaign Targeting 99 Magento Stores](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0338) — HIGH
- [Active Magecart Campaign Targets Spain via Hijacked WooCommerce eStores for Bank Fraud Using WebSocket Exfiltration](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0296) — HIGH
- [NginRAT/CronRAT Server-Side Magecart Campaign — NGINX LD_PRELOAD Process Parasitism, Impossible Cron Date Persistence (February 31st), Fileless Payment Card Skimming, Dropbear SSH C2 Impersonation, Chinese-Nexus eCommerce Targeting](https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0095) — HIGH

## Full data

Infrastructure, IOC values and detection queries (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) require the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple tier): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/actor/Magecart