Threadlinqs IntelligenceStart free

Weakness · BaseCWE-601

CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')

Likelihood of exploit: LowKEV-linkedBase

As of 2026-10-05, CWE-601 (Open Redirect) underlies 12 CVEs tracked by Threadlinqs, 1 of them in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and is cited by 23 tracked threats. MITRE rates its likelihood of exploit as Low.

CVEs
12Mapped to CWE-601
CISA KEV
1Exploited in the wild
Critical
2CVSS v3 critical CVEs
Threats
23Tracked campaigns citing it
Likelihood
LowMITRE likelihood of exploit

Last updated:

What is CWE-601?

The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect.

CWE-601 is a base-level weakness in MITRE’s Common Weakness Enumeration, with a MITRE likelihood of exploit of Low. Applicable platforms: Language: Not Language-Specific; Technology: Web Based; Technology: Web Server.

Source: MITRE CWE (CWE-601 definition, reproduced verbatim). Counts and linkage below are Threadlinqs data.

Consequences

  • Access Control — Bypass Protection Mechanism, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity. The user may be redirected to an untrusted page that contains malware which may then compromise the user's system. In some cases, an open redirect can also enable the immediate download of a file without the user's permission, because the redirection to an external site may lead to endpoints on those sites that automatically trigger a download action ("drive-by download" [REF-1478]). This will expose the user to extensive risk. The user's interaction with the web server may also be compromised…
  • Access Control, Confidentiality, Other — Bypass Protection Mechanism, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Other. By modifying the URL value to a malicious site, an attacker may successfully launch a phishing scam. The user may be subjected to phishing attacks by being redirected to an untrusted page. The phishing attack may point to an attacker controlled web page that appears to be a trusted web site. The phishers may then steal the user's credentials and then use these credentials to access the legitimate web site. Because the server name in the modified link is identical to the original site, phishing…

Source: MITRE CWE, common consequences.

How CWE-601 is exploited in the wild

Threadlinqs maps 12 CVEs to CWE-601, published between 2021-11-23 and 2026-09-27. 1 is listed in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, the authoritative record of exploitation in the wild. By CVSS v3 severity the set splits into 2 critical, 3 high, 5 medium, 2 low. The highest EPSS score in the set is 4.5% (CVE-2021-38000), the modelled probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. 23 tracked threats reference CWE-601 directly or through a CVE it covers; the most recent is “Microsoft September 2026 Cloud Disclosure: 18 Elevation-of-Privilege, Information-Disclosure, and Spoofing Flaws Across Azure and Copilot AI Products, Plus a Windows Secure Kernel EoP (CVE-2026-85921)” (2026-09-18). Affected products concentrate in Capgo (2), Apple (1), Cacti (1), among 12 vendors in total.

Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

All 12 CVEs mapped to CWE-601, CISA KEV first, then by CVSS score.

Affected vendors

Threat activity

23 tracked threats cite CWE-601:

Mitigations

  • Implementation / Input Validation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected…
  • Architecture and Design: Use an intermediate disclaimer page that provides the user with a clear warning that they are leaving the current site. Implement a long timeout before the redirect occurs, or force the user to click on the link. Be careful to avoid XSS problems (CWE-79) when generating the disclaimer page.
  • Architecture and Design / Enforcement by Conversion: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "/login.asp" and ID 2 could map to "http://www.example.com/". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that no externally-supplied requests are honored by requiring that all redirect requests include a unique nonce generated by the application [REF-483]. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330).
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation / Attack Surface Reduction: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls. Many open redirect problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, such as cookies and hidden form fields.
  • Operation / Firewall: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Source: MITRE CWE, potential mitigations.

Detection methods (MITRE CWE)

  • Manual Static Analysis (effectiveness: High): Since this weakness does not typically appear frequently within a single software package, manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all potentially-vulnerable operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
  • Automated Dynamic Analysis: Automated black box tools that supply URLs to every input may be able to spot Location header modifications, but test case coverage is a factor, and custom redirects may not be detected.
  • Automated Static Analysis: Automated static analysis tools may not be able to determine whether input influences the beginning of a URL, which is important for reducing false positives.
  • Automated Static Analysis (effectiveness: High): Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)
  • Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode (effectiveness: High): According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
  • Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation (effectiveness: High): According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Web Application Scanner Web Services Scanner Database Scanners
  • Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation (effectiveness: High): According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Fuzz Tester Framework-based Fuzzer
  • Manual Static Analysis - Source Code (effectiveness: High): According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: Highly cost effective: Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Source: MITRE CWE, detection methods. Threadlinqs detection rules for the threats above are Blue tier and higher.