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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-0024

GlassWorm VS Code Extension Supply Chain Attack - Open VSX Hijack

highDORMANT

GlassWorm is a supply chain attack campaign targeting VS Code extension registries — primarily the Open VSX Registry and to a lesser extent the official VS Code Marketplace — through malicious extensions that masquerade as popular developer tools.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0024
Also known asGlassWorm, VS Code Supply Chain, Open VSX Hijack
SeverityHIGH
CVSS8.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N)
Affected productsOpen VSX VS Code Extensions
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-829, CWE-494
AttributionGlassWorm (medium confidence)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1204 User Execution and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsSoftware Development, Technology, Open Source, DevOps, All Sectors with VS Code Users
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules13 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-02-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 13 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0024 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: VS Code Extension Spawning Suspicious Process

Detects VS Code or extension host spawning suspicious child processes

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL
  • Data sources: sysmon, edr
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| where match(ParentImage, "(?i)(code\.exe|code-insiders\.exe|extensionHost)")
| where match(Image, "(?i)(cmd|powershell|wscript|cscript|mshta|certutil|bitsadmin|curl|wget)\.exe$")
   OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)(invoke-|downloadstring|downloadfile|webclient|http|base64)")
| stats count values(CommandLine) as commands by ParentImage, Image, Computer, User
| eval alert_severity="HIGH"
| eval alert_reason="VS Code spawned suspicious process - possible malicious extension"
| table Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, commands, count, alert_severity

Microsoft KQL

// VS Code Extension Spawning Suspicious Process
// Detects VS Code or extension host spawning suspicious child processes
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName has "(?i)(code\.exe|code-insiders\.exe|extensionHost)"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "(?i)(invoke-|downloadstring|downloadfile|webclient|http|base64)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| summarize Count=count(), Commands=make_set(ProcessCommandLine) by DeviceName, AccountName, FileName
| where Count > 1

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate extensions with terminal/shell functionality

Tuning notes: Whitelist known legitimate extension behaviors

12 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • VS Code Extension Spawning Shell Process — GlassWorm Post-Install Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • VS Code Extension Accessing SSH Private Keys — Credential Theft · unlock with TL Creds
  • VS Code Extension C2 Beacon — Periodic HTTP to Unknown Domain · unlock with TL Creds
  • VS Code Extension Accessing SSH Keys on Linux — GlassWorm Credential Theft · unlock with TL Creds
  • VS Code Extension Network Callback with Hostname in URL — C2 Tracking · unlock with TL Creds
  • VS Code Extension Spawning Shell on Linux · unlock with TL Creds
  • VS Code Extension Installing Additional Software — GlassWorm Payload Delivery · unlock with TL Creds
  • VS Code Extension Reading Git Credentials — Developer Token Theft · unlock with TL Creds
  • VS Code Extension Using eval() with Network-Fetched Data — Remote Code Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • VS Code Extension Network Callback · unlock with TL Creds
  • VS Code Extension Modification After Install · unlock with TL Creds
  • Recently Installed VS Code Extension Audit · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-02-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0024.

28 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The campaign leverages VS Code's lack of sandboxing (extensions run with full user privileges), weak identity verification ('Verified' badge only proves domain ownership), and permissive naming policies (displayName can exactly replicate popular extensions) to distribute credential stealers, reverse shells, and data exfiltration payloads to software developers. Extensions activate on install and every VS Code startup, executing attacker-controlled code via eval() from remote C2 servers. The campaign is particularly dangerous because VS Code is used by 74%+ of developers (StackOverflow survey) and extensions have access to the full file system, SSH keys, Git credentials, source code repositories, and the ability to install additional malware. GlassWorm specifically targeted the Open VSX Registry which serves as the extension marketplace for VSCodium, GitPod, Eclipse Theia, and other open-source VS Code alternatives with less rigorous review processes.

GlassWorm represents an escalation in the IDE supply chain attack surface, combining the well-documented risks of package manager poisoning (npm/PyPI) with the uniquely dangerous permission model of VS Code extensions.

**VS Code Extension Security Model (or Lack Thereof):**

VS Code extensions run with the FULL privileges of the user that opened VS Code — there is NO sandbox. This means any extension can: - Read, write, and delete any file accessible to the user - Access SSH keys (~/.ssh/) and Git credentials (~/.gitconfig, credential helpers) - Execute arbitrary shell commands via Node.js child_process - Install additional software including ransomware, wipers, and backdoors - Access and modify source code in all open repositories - Read environment variables containing API keys and secrets - Make network connections to any endpoint - Access browser cookies and credential stores

This permission model makes VS Code extensions among the highest-impact supply chain attack vectors in the modern development ecosystem.

**The GlassWorm Campaign:**

The GlassWorm campaign deployed malicious extensions across the Open VSX Registry (open-vsx.org) and VS Code Marketplace through several attack techniques:

1. **Typosquatting:** Extensions published under names with subtle misspellings of popular extensions (e.g., 'pretier-vscode' instead of 'prettier-vscode', single-letter variations). When developers mistype extension names, they install the malicious variant.

2. **DisplayName Spoofing:** VS Code Marketplace and Open VSX allow arbitrary values in the 'displayName' field without uniqueness requirements. GlassWorm extensions used identical display names and icons to popular extensions (Prettier, Python, Jupyter), making them visually indistinguishable from legitimate versions.

3. **Verified Badge Abuse:** The VS Code Marketplace 'Verified' badge only confirms domain ownership — not publisher identity. GlassWorm operators registered cheap domains to obtain verified status, then changed their displayName to match popular publishers, creating convincing impersonation.

4. **Open VSX Targeting:** The Open VSX Registry (used by VSCodium, GitPod, Eclipse Theia, and other open-source VS Code alternatives) has less rigorous review processes than the Microsoft Marketplace. GlassWorm specifically targeted Open VSX as an easier ingress point for malicious extensions.

5. **Remote Code Execution via C2:** Malicious extensions included an activate() function that executed on installation and every VS Code startup. This function called out to attacker-controlled URLs (using hostname-specific subdomains for tracking: http://$HOSTNAME.attacker.com/vscode) and executed the response via eval(). This enabled: - Dynamic payload delivery (attacker changes server response to update malware) - Hostname-based targeting (deliver different payloads to different victims) - Anti-analysis evasion (benign response to researchers, malicious to targets)

6. **Credential Harvesting:** Extensions harvested: - SSH private keys from ~/.ssh/ - Git credentials from credential helpers and .gitconfig - Environment variables containing AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, GITHUB_TOKEN, NPM_TOKEN - Browser cookies and stored passwords - VS Code settings containing API keys and service tokens

**Aqua Nautilus Research Context:**

Aqua Nautilus researchers demonstrated the viability of this attack vector by uploading a POC extension masquerading as Prettier (one of the top 10 most installed extensions with 27M+ installations). Within 48 hours, their POC received over 1,000 installations from active developers worldwide — demonstrating the scale of potential impact.

Aqua's research also identified existing suspicious extensions in the Marketplace, including 'API Generator Plugin' and 'code-tester', which contained code that contacted external C2 servers and executed responses via eval() every 30 seconds over unencrypted HTTP.

**Impact on Software Supply Chain:**

GlassWorm-compromised developers become vectors for downstream supply chain attacks: - Stolen SSH keys enable direct commits to any repository the developer has access to - Stolen NPM/PyPI tokens enable malicious package publication - Modified source code on developer machines propagates to production - Stolen cloud credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure) enable infrastructure compromise - Lateral movement through Git organizations and CI/CD pipelines

This creates a cascading supply chain effect: compromise one developer → access all their repositories → inject malicious code → distribute to thousands of downstream consumers.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1213 Data from Information Repositories

defense-evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1070 Indicator Removal

exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

command-and-control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol

discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery

initial-access

T1195 Supply Chain Compromise; T1199 Trusted Relationship

credential-access

T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552 Unsecured Credentials; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

privilege-escalation

T1546 Event Triggered Execution

persistence

T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Audit installed VS Code extensions against known-good list
  • Remove any recently updated extensions from Open VSX pending verification
  • Check for indicators of GlassWorm execution
  • Review VS Code extension directory for suspicious files

Workarounds

  • Disable auto-update for extensions
  • Review extension changes before updating
  • Run VS Code in container or sandbox for untrusted code

Longer-term hardening

  • Implement extension allowlisting in enterprise environments
  • Use VS Code's built-in extension verification features
  • Monitor for unusual VS Code process behavior
  • Consider using official Microsoft marketplace over Open VSX for critical environments

Affected and fixed versions

  • Open VSX — VS Code Extensions
    Vulnerable versions: Four compromised extensions (names pending disclosure)
    Fixed in: Removed from registry

Timeline

  • StackOverflow Developer Survey confirms VS Code as the dominant IDE with 74.48% developer usage. Over 40,000 extensions in the VS Code Marketplace with top extensions exceeding 50M installations. Source: https://survey.stackoverflow.co/2022/#section-most-popular-technologies-integrated-development-environment
  • Aqua Nautilus publishes research on VS Code extension security: demonstrates typosquatting, displayName spoofing, and verified badge abuse. POC Prettier impersonation extension gets 1,000+ installs in 48 hours. Discovers existing suspicious extensions ('code-tester') with C2 callbacks via eval(). Source: https://www.aquasec.com/blog/can-you-trust-your-vscode-extensions/
  • GlassWorm campaign identified targeting Open VSX Registry specifically — exploiting less rigorous review processes compared to Microsoft Marketplace. Malicious extensions distributed to VSCodium, GitPod, Eclipse Theia, and other open-source VS Code alternative users.
  • Security researchers document the full GlassWorm campaign: credential stealers, reverse shells, and C2 beacon extensions deployed across both Open VSX and VS Code Marketplace. Dynamic payload delivery via eval() with hostname-specific tracking subdomains enables targeted exploitation.
  • Impact assessment reveals cascading supply chain effect: compromised developer SSH keys used to inject malicious code into upstream repositories, stolen NPM/PyPI tokens used to publish malicious packages. Single developer compromise → thousands of downstream consumers affected.
  • Microsoft and Open VSX implement enhanced review processes. VS Code Workspace Trust feature restricts extension capabilities in untrusted workspaces. Enterprise extension allowlists recommended as primary defense. However, fundamental issue — no extension sandbox — remains unresolved.
  • As of 2026-05-29, GlassWorm's self-propagating Open VSX/npm/GitHub worm was operationally disrupted on 2026-05-26 by CrowdStrike, Google and Shadowserver, who sinkholed all four C2 channels (Solana, BitTorrent DHT, Google Calendar, VPS) to 164.92.88.210. The likely Russia-based operators remain at large with proven ability to rebuild, so it is dormant rather than fully resolved (CrowdStrike, BleepingComputer, The Hacker News).

Sources cited

More from GlassWorm

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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