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Threat reportAPTTL-2026-0113

CSVDE.exe LOLBIN for Active Directory Reconnaissance — FIN7 + APT10/menuPass Documented Usage, Bulk LDAP Export, Kerberoasting Precursor

highMONITORING

CSVDE.exe (csvde.exe) is a legitimate Windows Server utility for importing/exporting Active Directory data via LDAP to CSV format, weaponized as a Living-off-the-Land Binary (LOLBIN) for AD reconnaissance and directory dumping by nation-state APTs and financial cybercrime groups. Documented usage by FIN7 (financial crime) and APT10/menuPass (China-nexus espionage via Operation Cloud Hopper).

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0113
SeverityHIGH
AttributionFIN7, APT10 (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
ToolsCSVDE
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036.003 Rename Legitimate Utilities, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1069.002 Domain Groups, T1074.001 Local Data Staging, T1087.001 Local Account, T1087.002 Domain Account, T1110.003 Password Spraying and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE|FINANCIAL
Target sectorsFinancial Services, Technology, Government, Managed Service Providers, Healthcare, Energy, Retail
Target regionsNorth America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-02-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0113 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 24 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: AD LOLBIN Ecosystem Detection — csvde + dsquery + ldifde + nltest Reconnaissance Chain

Detects execution of multiple AD reconnaissance LOLBINs within a short timeframe, indicating systematic Active Directory enumeration. Attackers rarely use just one tool — FIN7 used csvde.exe alongside PowerShell scripts and net commands; APT10 used csvde as part of a broader toolset. Multiple AD recon tools from the same host within 1 hour = active post-exploitation reconnaissance phase.

Splunk SPL

index=windows sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 (Image="*\\csvde.exe" OR Image="*\\dsquery.exe" OR Image="*\\dsget.exe" OR Image="*\\ldifde.exe" OR Image="*\\nltest.exe" OR Image="*\\AdFind.exe" OR (Image="*\\net.exe" AND CommandLine="*domain*") OR (Image="*\\net1.exe" AND CommandLine="*domain*")) | bucket _time span=1h | stats count dc(Image) as unique_tools values(Image) as tools values(CommandLine) as commands earliest(_time) as first_event latest(_time) as last_event by host, User | where unique_tools >= 2 | eval risk=case(unique_tools >= 4, "CRITICAL — Extensive AD reconnaissance (4+ LOLBIN tools in 1 hour)", unique_tools >= 3, "HIGH — Multi-tool AD reconnaissance chain", unique_tools >= 2, "HIGH — AD tool pair detected (investigate immediately)") | sort -unique_tools

Known false positives:

  • AD migration projects using multiple built-in tools sequentially
  • AD health assessment scripts running multiple query tools

Tuning notes: The key discriminator is MULTIPLE tools within a short window. A single net group /domain might be routine; csvde + dsquery + nltest in the same hour from the same host = active reconnaissance. Whitelist specific admin workstations if they regularly run AD health checks. The 1-hour window catches deliberate enumeration while avoiding cross-day false positives.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • [indicator] Execution via Defender for Endpoint — AD LOLBIN Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • CSV File Creation After [indicator] Execution — AD Data Staging Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • First-Time [indicator] Execution per Host — LOLBIN Anomaly Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Execution — Active Directory LOLBIN Reconnaissance · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] with Export Flag and LDAP Filter — Targeted AD Data Extraction · unlock with TL Creds
  • AD Reconnaissance Tool Chain — Multiple LOLBIN Execution Within Timeframe · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Process Creation Detection — Active Directory LOLBIN Reconnaissance · unlock with TL Creds
  • Bulk LDAP Query Detection — High-Volume Directory Queries from Non-DC Hosts · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-02-16, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 24 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0113.

24 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Ships with Windows Server as part of AD DS/AD LDS tools.

CSVDE.exe is a command-line utility built into Windows Server (located in %windir%\system32) that imports and exports Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) data using LDAP and CSV file format. It has been weaponized as a Living-off-the-Land Binary (LOLBIN) by sophisticated threat actors for Active Directory reconnaissance and bulk directory data exfiltration.

**V1 ASSESSMENT: The v1 title 'CSVDE.exe LDAP Directory Dumping Campaign' frames this as a specific campaign. There is NO single 'CSVDE campaign' — rather, csvde.exe is a TECHNIQUE used across multiple unrelated campaigns by different threat actors. The tool itself and its abuse are REAL and well-documented. This entry covers csvde.exe as an AD reconnaissance LOLBIN technique with documented APT usage.**

**DOCUMENTED APT USAGE (MITRE ATT&CK verified):**

1. **FIN7 (Carbanak Group)** — Financial cybercrime group. MITRE ATT&CK T1087.002 documents: 'FIN7 has also used csvde.exe, which is a built-in Windows command line tool, to export Active Directory information.' Used alongside net group, 3CF9.ps1 PowerShell scripts, and WsTaskLoad executable. FIN7 targets US automotive, retail, hospitality, and financial sectors. Source: BlackBerry April 2024 report on FIN7 targeting US automotive industry.

2. **menuPass / APT10 (Stone Panda, CVNX)** — China-nexus espionage group. MITRE ATT&CK T1087.002 documents: 'menuPass has used the Microsoft administration tool csvde.exe to export Active Directory data.' Used during Operation Cloud Hopper (2016-2017), a massive campaign targeting managed IT service providers (MSPs) to access their customers' networks. Source: PwC UK 'Operation Cloud Hopper Technical Annex' April 2017.

**CSVDE.exe CAPABILITIES (as LOLBIN):** - **Bulk AD Export:** `csvde -f output.csv` exports ALL Active Directory objects to CSV - **Targeted LDAP Queries:** `-r` flag allows LDAP filter (e.g., `csvde -r (objectClass=User) -f users.csv` exports all users) - **Attribute Selection:** `-l` flag selects specific attributes (e.g., `csvde -l sAMAccountName,CN,distinguishedName -f admins.csv`) - **Scope Control:** `-p` flag controls search scope (Base, OneLevel, SubTree) - **Remote DC Targeting:** `-s` flag targets specific domain controllers - **Alternative Credentials:** `-a` and `-b` flags allow authentication with different credentials - **Binary Value Handling:** `-n` omits binary values for cleaner output - **Port Selection:** `-t` flag allows targeting LDAP (389) or Global Catalog (3268)

**WHY CSVDE IS EFFECTIVE AS A LOLBIN:** 1. **Microsoft-signed:** Ships with Windows Server, signed by Microsoft. Not flagged by default AV/EDR. 2. **Legitimate use:** AD administrators use csvde for user provisioning, auditing, migrations. Hard to distinguish malicious from legitimate use. 3. **No download required:** Already present on Windows Server systems with AD DS/AD LDS role. 4. **Comprehensive output:** Single command exports entire directory — user accounts, groups, OUs, computers, service accounts. 5. **LDAP native:** Direct LDAP queries mean results include all queryable attributes including those not visible in GUI tools. 6. **CSV format:** Output is easily parseable for automated processing — attacker pipelines can immediately extract high-value targets (Domain Admins, service accounts with SPNs).

**ATTACK CHAIN CONTEXT:** csvde.exe is typically used in the DISCOVERY phase after initial access is established: 1. **Initial Access** (phishing, VPN compromise, MSP pivot) 2. **Privilege Escalation** (credential theft, Kerberoasting) 3. **AD Reconnaissance** ← csvde.exe HERE — dump entire directory structure 4. **Lateral Movement** (use discovered accounts/groups to pivot) 5. **Objective** (data theft, ransomware deployment, persistent access)

**RELATED AD RECON TOOLS IN LOLBIN ECOSYSTEM:** - **dsquery** — LDAP query tool (also built-in, used by APT41, Ke3chang) - **dsget** — AD object attribute retrieval - **ldifde** — LDAP Data Interchange Format export (companion to csvde) - **net group /domain** — Group enumeration (used by 20+ APT groups) - **nltest** — Domain trust enumeration - **AdFind** — Third-party AD query tool (most popular, used by Ryuk, FIN6, BlackByte, Bumblebee) - **BloodHound/SharpHound** — AD relationship mapping

csvde.exe is LESS common than AdFind or net commands but MORE dangerous because it provides BULK export capability — a single command dumps the entire directory, not just targeted queries.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1069.002 Domain Groups; T1087.001 Local Account; T1087.002 Domain Account; T1482 Domain Trust Discovery

lateral-movement

T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares

defense-evasion

T1036.003 Rename Legitimate Utilities; T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution

exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

execution

T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

collection

T1074.001 Local Data Staging; T1213 Data from Information Repositories

credential-access

T1110.003 Password Spraying; T1558.003 Kerberoasting; T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting

Remediation

Patches

  • N/A — csvde.exe is a legitimate Microsoft tool, not a vulnerability to patch

Immediate actions

  • MONITOR: Deploy detection rules for csvde.exe execution — process creation events with csvde.exe as the image/process name
  • ALERT: Any csvde.exe execution with -f flag (file export) should generate a HIGH alert — legitimate AD admins rarely use csvde interactively
  • AUDIT: Check Windows event logs and Sysmon for historical csvde.exe execution — may indicate prior compromise
  • REVIEW: Identify which systems have csvde.exe installed (only Windows Servers with AD DS/AD LDS role)

Workarounds

  • Rename or remove csvde.exe from systems where it is not needed (note: may break legitimate AD provisioning workflows)
  • Use Software Restriction Policies or AppLocker to block csvde.exe for non-admin users
  • Monitor LDAP query volume from individual hosts — bulk queries indicate reconnaissance

Longer-term hardening

  • APPLICATION CONTROL: Use Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker to restrict csvde.exe execution to authorized admin accounts only
  • LDAP AUDITING: Enable LDAP query logging on domain controllers to detect bulk directory queries regardless of tool used
  • LEAST PRIVILEGE: Restrict which accounts can perform LDAP searches against the entire directory — most users need only limited AD query access
  • TIERED ACCESS: Implement tiered administration model — Tier 0 (DC admin), Tier 1 (server admin), Tier 2 (workstation admin) to limit AD reconnaissance value
  • AD MONITORING: Deploy Microsoft ATA/Azure ATP/Defender for Identity to detect LDAP reconnaissance patterns
  • LOLBIN BASELINE: Establish baseline for all built-in AD administration tools (csvde, dsquery, dsget, ldifde, nltest) — alert on first-time use by non-admin accounts

Timeline

  • Microsoft introduces locked-ioc-1 as part of Windows Server 2003 Active Directory administration tools. Ships in %windir%\system32 on systems with AD DS role installed. Designed for bulk import/export of AD objects in CSV format. Source: Microsoft documentation.
  • APT10/menuPass launches Operation Cloud Hopper targeting managed IT service providers (MSPs) globally. Campaign uses MSP access to pivot into customer networks. locked-ioc-1 used for Active Directory reconnaissance after gaining access. Source: PwC UK Cloud Hopper report.
  • PwC UK publishes 'Operation Cloud Hopper Technical Annex' documenting APT10/menuPass tools and techniques. Report specifically identifies locked-ioc-1 usage for AD data export during MSP compromise operations. Source: https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/pwc-uk-operation-cloud-hopper-technical-annex-april-2017.pdf
  • BlackBerry publishes report on FIN7 targeting US automotive industry. Documents FIN7's use of locked-ioc-1 alongside 3CF9.ps1 PowerShell scripts and WsTaskLoad for Active Directory enumeration. Source: BlackBerry blog April 2024.
  • MITRE ATT&CK T1087.002 (Account Discovery: Domain Account) formally documents locked-ioc-1 usage by both FIN7 and menuPass. Establishes csvde as a known LOLBIN for AD reconnaissance. Source: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/002/
  • locked-ioc-1 recognized as part of the broader AD LOLBIN ecosystem alongside dsquery, dsget, ldifde, nltest, and net commands. All are Microsoft-signed, all ship with Windows Server, all are abused for AD reconnaissance. Source: LOLBAS Project, MITRE ATT&CK.
  • locked-ioc-1 abuse continues as a persistent AD reconnaissance technique. Unlike CVE-based threats that can be patched, LOLBIN abuse requires behavioral detection — the tool is legitimate, only the context of use is malicious. Organizations must monitor for unauthorized locked-ioc-1 execution.
  • As of 2026-05-29, locked-ioc-1 AD-recon abuse remains a live LOLBIN technique (no CVE, nothing to patch); FIN7 stays operational despite 2018 arrests and APT10/menuPass (threat card updated Aug 2025) is still active. Defense is behavioral detection only, so the posture is ongoing monitoring rather than incident-driven ACTIVE per Sigma/MITRE T1087.002 coverage.

Sources cited

More from FIN7

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Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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