# ClickFix Evolution — nslookup DNS Smuggling + CrashFix Browser DoS + ModeloRAT Python RAT, KongTuke Actor, Enterprise Domain-Joined Targeting

> ClickFix social engineering campaigns have evolved with two major developments in early 2026: (1) nslookup DNS smuggling — abusing the built-in Windows DNS lookup tool to smuggle encoded payloads via DNS TXT records, bypassing mshta/PowerShell blocks, and (2) CrashFix — a malicious Chrome extension ('NexShield') that deliberately crashes the browser then baits users into running ClickFix commands to 'fix' it. Both chains deliver ModeloRAT, a previously undocumented Python-based RAT targeting domain-joined corporate hosts. Campaign attributed to KongTuke threat actor tracked since early 2025.

- **Published:** 2026-02-16T13:24:51Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-02-16T13:24:51Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0118
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-kongtuke-clickfix-nslookup-modelorat-tl-2026-0118.webp?v=e672477a (Threadlinqs threat intel: KongTuke ModeloRAT via ClickFix Evolution: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0118) — High severity, 26 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0118
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** KongTuke
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 26 (3 shown free below)

## Description

ClickFix is a social engineering attack paradigm where victims are tricked into infecting their own machines by copying and pasting malicious commands. The technique has been evolving rapidly since 2024, and in early 2026 two significant new variants emerged:

**EVOLUTION 1 — NSLOOKUP DNS SMUGGLING (February 2026):**
Microsoft Security Intelligence documented ClickFix campaigns now using nslookup, the built-in Windows DNS resolution tool, to smuggle malware payloads. The innovation: mshta.exe and PowerShell are increasingly blocked by EDR/AV solutions, so attackers pivoted to nslookup — a trusted, ubiquitous LOLBIN that is rarely monitored or blocked.

The attack chain:
1. Victim encounters fake CAPTCHA, browser crash, or update prompt
2. Social engineering instructs victim to copy-paste a command into Windows Run dialog
3. Command executes nslookup queries against attacker-controlled DNS server
4. DNS TXT records return encoded payloads/commands instead of normal DNS data
5. Downloaded ZIP archive contains malicious Python scripts
6. Scripts perform reconnaissance and discovery
7. VBS dropper deploys ModeloRAT (Python-based RAT)

Why nslookup works: It's signed by Microsoft, present on every Windows installation, typically whitelisted by EDR solutions, and its network traffic (DNS queries) blends with normal operations. Security teams rarely monitor nslookup execution or DNS TXT record content.

**EVOLUTION 2 — CRASHFIX BROWSER EXTENSION (January 2026):**
Huntress documented a new ClickFix variant dubbed 'CrashFix' deployed by the KongTuke threat actor. The attack uses a malicious Chrome extension called 'NexShield' that impersonates the legitimate uBlock Origin Lite ad blocker. The extension was distributed through the official Chrome Web Store, lending false legitimacy.

The CrashFix attack chain:
1. Victim searches for ad blocker, encounters malicious Google ad
2. Ad directs to Chrome Web Store listing for 'NexShield – Advanced Web Protection'
3. Extension is a near-exact clone of uBlock Origin Lite with 3,276 bytes of added malicious code
4. After 60-minute delay (Chrome Alarms API), extension triggers browser DoS
5. DoS loop creates billions of chrome.runtime port connections, exhausting resources
6. Browser becomes unresponsive and crashes
7. On restart, fake 'CrashFix' security warning appears
8. User is instructed to open Win+R, paste clipboard, press Enter to 'fix' the issue
9. Clipboard contains malicious command using finger.exe (LOLBIN) to fetch payload from C2
10. Payload chain: finger.exe → ROT-encoded PowerShell → script.ps1 → anti-analysis checks → domain-join check → ModeloRAT (domain-joined) or test payload (standalone)

**MODELORAT — NEW PYTHON RAT:**
ModeloRAT is a previously undocumented Python-based Remote Access Trojan reserved exclusively for domain-joined (corporate) hosts. Key capabilities:
- RC4 encrypted C2 communications over HTTP port 80
- Adaptive beaconing: 5min normal → 150ms active → 15min backoff
- System reconnaissance: OS version, processes, services, storage, ARP, network, privileges, TCP connections
- Persistence via HKCU\...\Run registry key with mimicked legitimate software names (e.g., 'Spotify47', 'Adobe2841')
- Payload execution: EXE, DLL, and Python script support
- Bundled WinPython for Python-independent execution
- Anti-analysis: verbose/misleading class names, string concatenation for IOCs, junk code padding, hidden window execution
- C2 servers: 170.168.103[.]208 and 158.247.252[.]178

**KONGTUKE THREAT ACTOR:**
KongTuke has been tracked by Huntress since early 2025. Key characteristics:
- Targets corporate/enterprise environments (domain-joined machines get RAT, standalone get test payloads)
- SocGholish-inspired multi-layer obfuscation (Base64, XOR, ROT cipher, CharCode blobs)
- Started using finger.exe LOLBIN in December 2025
- Anti-analysis: checks for 50+ analysis tools (Wireshark, IDA, Ghidra, etc.) and VM indicators
- Progressive evolution: fake CAPTCHAs → fake updates → instruction videos → browser crashes → nslookup smuggling

**CLICKFIX ATTACK PARADIGM — BROADER CONTEXT:**
ClickFix represents a paradigm shift in social engineering: instead of delivering malware through traditional infection vectors (exploit kits, malicious attachments), attackers trick victims into infecting themselves. This bypasses many security controls because the 'malware delivery' is the user executing a trusted system tool. Previous ClickFix campaigns delivered DarkGate, Lumma Stealer, and various info-stealers. The nslookup and CrashFix variants represent the continued evolution as defenders block earlier techniques.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1204.001 Malicious Link
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.005 Visual Basic
- T1059.006 Python
- T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
- T1569.002 Service Execution
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1176 Software Extensions
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
- T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
- T1071.004 DNS
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
- T1132.001 Standard Encoding
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1559 Inter-Process Communication
- T1129 Shared Modules
- T1070.004 File Deletion
- T1564.003 Hidden Window
- T1115 Clipboard Data
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1087.002 Domain Account
- T1583.001 Domains

## Free detection (Splunk SPL)

**nslookup DNS TXT Record Smuggling — ClickFix Payload Delivery Detection** (`TL-2026-0118-SPL-001`)

Detects nslookup.exe querying DNS TXT records, the core technique of the ClickFix nslookup smuggling variant. Legitimate nslookup usage overwhelmingly queries A/AAAA records for troubleshooting. TXT record queries are rare in normal operations and are the primary mechanism for smuggling encoded payloads via attacker-controlled DNS servers. The attacker configures DNS TXT records to contain encoded commands or pointers to malware, which nslookup retrieves and passes to the next stage of the infection chain.

- **Language:** Splunk SPL
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.004, T1218, T1059.003
- **Data sources:** sysmon
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=endpoint sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 Image="*\\nslookup.exe" | eval has_txt_query=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)(\-type=txt|\-q=txt|\-querytype=txt|set type=txt)"), "YES", "NO") | eval has_external_server=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)\b(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|[a-z0-9\-]+\.[a-z]{2,})\b") AND NOT match(CommandLine, "(?i)(127\.0\.0\.1|localhost|10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.|192\.168\.)"), "YES", "NO") | eval risk=case(has_txt_query="YES" AND has_external_server="YES", "CRITICAL — nslookup TXT query to external DNS server (ClickFix DNS smuggling pattern)", has_txt_query="YES", "HIGH — nslookup TXT query detected (rare in legitimate usage)", has_external_server="YES", "MEDIUM — nslookup querying external DNS server", 1=1, "LOW") | where risk!="LOW" | table _time host User ParentImage Image CommandLine risk | sort -risk
```

**Known false positives:**

- IT administrators troubleshooting DNS (check ParentImage — admin tools vs explorer.exe)
- Automated DNS health checks querying TXT records (SPF/DKIM/DMARC verification)

**Tuning notes:** CRITICAL tier: nslookup TXT query to EXTERNAL server from a user-initiated context (ParentImage=explorer.exe or cmd.exe spawned from explorer). IT admin usage typically comes from administrative shells or scheduled tasks, not from Run dialog. The external server filter excludes RFC1918 ranges — internal DNS servers for TXT queries are less suspicious but should still be reviewed. DNS logging (Sysmon Event 22) can supplement process creation for full DNS query visibility.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- ModeloRAT C2 Beacon Detection — HTTP Port 80 Adaptive Beaconing Pattern (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Malicious Chrome Extension Behavior — NexShield/CrashFix Browser DoS Pattern (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ModeloRAT Registry Persistence — Legitimate Software Name Mimicry Detection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- nslookup DNS TXT Record Query — ClickFix DNS Smuggling Technique (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- finger.exe Execution or Rename — KongTuke LOLBIN Payload Delivery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ModeloRAT Persistence and Anti-Analysis Indicators — Python RAT Registry + Recon Pattern (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- finger.exe LOLBIN Execution — KongTuke Payload Delivery Chain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ClickFix Self-Infection Chain — Windows Run Dialog to Suspicious Process Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 26)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `199.217.98[.]108`
- Domain: `nexsnield[.]com`
- File hash: `6b6676267c70fbeb3257f0bb9bce1587f0bdec621238eb32dd9f84b2bcd7e3ea`

Full set of 26 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Malwarebytes — ClickFix nslookup DNS Smuggling](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2026/02/clickfix-added-nslookup-commands-to-its-arsenal-for-downloading-rats)
- [Huntress — Dissecting CrashFix: KongTuke's New Toy](https://www.huntress.com/blog/malicious-browser-extention-crashfix-kongtuke)
- [Microsoft Security Intelligence — nslookup ClickFix](https://x.com/MsftSecIntel/status/2022456612120629742)
- [Malwarebytes — ClickFix vs DarkGate Campaign](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2025/01/clickfix-vs-traditional-download-in-new-darkgate-campaign)
- [Malwarebytes — CrashFix Browser Extension](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2026/01/fake-extension-crashes-browsers-to-trick-users-into-infecting-themselves)
- [Huntress — Finger.exe LOLBIN Data Exfiltration](https://www.huntress.com/blog/cant-touch-this-data-exfiltration-via-finger)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0118
