# 25 Zero-Knowledge Bypass Vulnerabilities in Cloud Password Managers (Bitwarden/LastPass/Dashlane) — ETH Zurich Research, Key Escrow, AES-CBC Malleability, KDF Downgrade (300Kx Brute-Force), Unauthenticated Public Keys, 60M+ Users

> ETH Zurich researchers discovered 25 vulnerabilities across Bitwarden (12), LastPass (7), and Dashlane (6) that bypass zero-knowledge encryption claims, enabling malicious servers to access, modify, and recover plaintext vault data for 60M+ users.

- **Published:** 2026-02-17T03:14:07Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-02-17T03:14:07Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0122
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-password-manager-zero-knowledge-bypass-tl-2026-0122.webp?v=1c5bd08f (Threadlinqs threat intel: Bitwarden, LastPass, Dashlane Flaws: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0122) — High severity, 26 IOCs, 12 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0122
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** VULNERABILITY
- **Status:** MONITORING
- **Detections:** 12 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 26

## Description

Researchers from ETH Zurich's Applied Cryptography Group (Matilda Backendal, Matteo Scarlata, Kenneth Paterson, Giovanni Torrisi) systematically audited the cryptographic architectures of three leading cloud-based password managers — Bitwarden, LastPass, and Dashlane — which collectively serve over 60 million users with a 23% combined market share. Under a fully malicious server threat model (server deviates arbitrarily from expected protocols), they demonstrated 25 attacks that bypass the 'zero-knowledge encryption' claims all three vendors advertise.

The 25 vulnerabilities span four attack categories:

**1. Key Escrow Attacks (BW01-BW03, LP01) — Full Vault Compromise:**
These target account recovery and SSO login mechanisms. Bitwarden's BW01 allows malicious auto-enrollment where unauthenticated organization public keys enable key substitution and full vault compromise upon joining any group — requiring just 1 join interaction. BW02 exploits key rotation for full vault compromise (1 rotation). BW03 uses KC conversion dialog for key substitution (1 dialog). LastPass LP01 exploits password reset flaws for full vault compromise (1 login). These are the most severe: a compromised server can replace encryption keys during routine operations, gaining complete access to all stored credentials.

**2. Item-Level Encryption Flaws (BW04-BW07, LP02-LP06, DL01) — Integrity Violations, Metadata Leaks, KDF Downgrades:**
Per-item encryption implementations contain critical weaknesses. BW04 exposes unprotected metadata (no client interaction needed). BW05 enables field/item swapping due to lack of key separation. BW06 leaks confidentiality through icon URL decryption (1 open). BW07 removes brute-force protection via KDF iteration downgrade (1 login) — accelerating brute-force by up to 300,000x. LastPass LP02 enables field swapping, LP03 leaks confidentiality via icon URLs (1 open), LP04 downgrades KDF (1 login), LP05 compromises vault integrity via AES-CBC malleability, LP06 allows metadata read/modification. Dashlane DL01 enables transaction replay due to shared keys across transactions. Root causes: lack of authenticated encryption (AES-CBC without integrity), missing key separation between item types, and unprotected metadata.

**3. Sharing Feature Exploits (BW08-BW09, LP07, DL02) — Organization/Team Compromise:**
Unauthenticated public keys in sharing features enable organization-wide attacks. BW08 allows adding users to organizations (1 sync). BW09 enables full organization compromise via key substitution (1 join). LP07 allows shared vault compromise (1 join). DL02 overwrites sharing keys upon joining (1 join). The fundamental flaw: public keys used for vault sharing are not authenticated, allowing a malicious server to inject attacker-controlled keys.

**4. Backwards Compatibility Issues (BW10-BW12, DL03-DL06) — CBC Downgrades:**
Legacy code support enables downgrade attacks to insecure AES-CBC mode. BW10 downgrades key hierarchy. BW11 causes confidentiality loss (2 logins). BW12 achieves full vault compromise via CBC support (2 logins). DL03 compromises vault integrity (10^4 syncs). DL04 removes brute-force protection (10^4 syncs). DL05 causes confidentiality loss (10^5 syncs). DL06 removes brute-force protection (10^4 syncs) — the 'Lucky 64' attack. Root cause: maintaining backwards compatibility with cryptographic technologies from the 1990s to avoid customer data loss risks.

Disclosure followed responsible timelines: Bitwarden notified January 27, 2025; LastPass June 4, 2025; Dashlane August 29, 2025 — all with 90-day remediation windows. Bitwarden advanced fixes including minimum KDF iterations and CBC removal. LastPass addressed LP03. Dashlane mitigated some CBC issues via extension 6.2544.1. However, not all vulnerabilities have been patched across all vendors.

The researchers recommend four fundamental mitigations: Authenticated Encryption (AE) to replace AES-CBC, Full Key Separation (KS) between item types, Public Key Authentication (PKA) for sharing features, and Ciphertext Signing (SC) for integrity. They advocate formal security models for password managers equivalent to those used for E2EE cloud storage. The ETH Zurich team noted providers' reluctance to update systems due to risk of customer data loss, resulting in continued use of obsolete 1990s-era cryptographic technologies.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1555.005 Password Managers
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1556 Modify Authentication Process
- T1600 Weaken Encryption
- T1600.001 Reduce Key Space
- T1553 Subvert Trust Controls
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation
- T1531 Account Access Removal
- T1098 Account Manipulation
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1689 Downgrade Attack
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1110.001 Password Guessing
- T1584.004 Server
- T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates

## Free detection (Splunk SPL)

**Password Manager KDF Iteration Downgrade — Brute-Force Amplification Detection** (`TL-2026-0122-SPL-001`)

Detects indicators of KDF (Key Derivation Function) iteration downgrade attacks against password managers (BW07, LP04). A malicious or compromised server can reduce PBKDF2/Argon2 iterations from configured values (e.g., 600,000) to minimum (e.g., 1), accelerating master password brute-force by up to 300,000x. Monitor for password manager configuration changes that reduce iteration counts, unexpected re-encryption events, or server-side parameter modifications during authentication flows.

- **Language:** Splunk SPL
- **ATT&CK:** T1600.001, T1110, T1555.005
- **Data sources:** web_proxy, tls_inspection, network_traffic
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy OR index=web sourcetype=stream:http OR sourcetype=access_combined
| search (host="*vault.bitwarden*" OR host="*lastpass.com*" OR host="*dashlane.com*" OR uri_path="*api/accounts/prelogin*" OR uri_path="*iterations*" OR uri_path="*kdf*")
| eval kdf_response=if(match(response_body, "(\"kdf\":|\"iterations\":|\"KdfIterations\")"), 1, 0)
| eval low_iterations=if(match(response_body, "(\"iterations\":\s*[0-9]{1,4}[^0-9]|\"KdfIterations\":\s*[0-9]{1,4}[^0-9])"), "CRITICAL_KDF_DOWNGRADE", "normal")
| where kdf_response=1
| eval severity=case(
    low_iterations="CRITICAL_KDF_DOWNGRADE", "CRITICAL — KDF iterations below safe threshold. Possible BW07/LP04 downgrade attack. Brute-force amplified up to 300,000x.",
    1=1, "INFO — Normal KDF parameter exchange")
| where low_iterations="CRITICAL_KDF_DOWNGRADE"
| table _time, src_ip, dest, host, uri_path, severity
| sort -_time
```

**Known false positives:**

- Newly created accounts with default low iterations before user configuration. Test/development password manager instances with intentionally low iterations.

**Tuning notes:** Requires TLS inspection to see response bodies from password manager APIs. Safe KDF iteration thresholds: Bitwarden ≥600,000 (PBKDF2) or Argon2id; LastPass ≥600,000. Any value below 100,000 is suspicious. Below 10,000 is almost certainly an attack. Monitor the /api/accounts/prelogin endpoint specifically for Bitwarden.

### 11 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Password Manager Vault Integrity Anomaly — Unexpected Credential Changes or Metadata Modifications (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Password Manager Icon/Favicon URL Leak — Service Enumeration via Client Requests (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Password Manager Emergency Access or Recovery Key Change — Key Escrow Attack Indicator (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Password Manager KDF Parameter Downgrade in Server Response (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Password Manager Organization Join with Key Exchange — Potential Key Escrow via BW01/BW09 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Password Manager AES-CBC Encryption Mode in Vault Operations — Downgrade Attack Indicator (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Password Manager Sim Sigma — Linux (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Password Manager Sim Sigma — Python (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Password Manager Sim Sigma — Windows (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Password Manager Organization Key Injection — Unauthenticated Public Key Substitution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Password Manager CBC Downgrade — Legacy Encryption Mode Forced by Server (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [ETH Zurich: Password managers less secure than promised](https://ethz.ch/en/news-and-events/eth-news/news/2026/02/password-managers-less-secure-than-promised.html)
- [Cyber Security News: 25 Vulnerabilities in Cloud Password Managers](https://cybersecuritynews.com/password-managers-vulnerability/)
- [CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/327.html)
- [CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html)
- [CWE-757: Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/757.html)

## Full data

The other 11 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0122
