# Japanese-Language Phishing Campaign — Coordinated Brand Impersonation (ANA, DHL, myTOKYOGAS) via .cn Domains, Foxmail X-Mailer Fingerprint, Chinese Infrastructure

> SANS ISC documented an ongoing coordinated phishing campaign targeting Japanese-speaking users through brand impersonation of ANA (All Nippon Airways), DHL, and myTOKYOGAS. All emails originate from Chinese .cn domains, use the identical X-Mailer fingerprint 'Foxmail 6, 13, 102, 15 [cn]' (Tencent's Chinese email client), and direct victims to credential-harvesting pages hosted on .cn TLD infrastructure. All three sending IPs (150.5.129.136, 101.47.78.193, 150.5.130.42) resolve to Hong Kong on AS150436 (Byteplus Pte. Ltd. — ByteDance cloud infrastructure), confirming a single coordinated operator. The campaign uses large-scale list-based distribution reaching non-Japanese speakers, suggesting broad reconnaissance via purchased or scraped email lists.

- **Published:** 2026-02-22T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-02-22T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0129
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-foxmail-japanese-phishing-tl-2026-0129.webp?v=2fb01a6b (Threadlinqs threat intel: Foxmail Japanese Phishing Campaign: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0129) — Medium severity, 21 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0129
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** MONITORING
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 21 (3 shown free below)

## Description

## Overview

On February 21, 2026, Brad Duncan at the SANS Internet Storm Center published analysis of a coordinated Japanese-language phishing campaign that impersonates multiple major brands including ANA (All Nippon Airways), DHL Express, and myTOKYOGAS (Tokyo Gas utility service). The campaign has been active for at least one year, targeting Japanese-speaking users with credential-harvesting emails and phishing pages.

## Infrastructure Analysis

### Sending Infrastructure

All three documented phishing emails originate from Hong Kong-based infrastructure on AS150436, operated by Byteplus Pte. Ltd. (a subsidiary of ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok). The three sending IPs — 150.5.129.136, 101.47.78.193, and 150.5.130.42 — all geolocate to the Yau Tsim Mong District of Hong Kong and share the same ASN. This indicates the campaign operator is renting cloud infrastructure from Byteplus to send phishing emails, leveraging the platform's reputation to bypass email filtering.

The sending domains are randomly generated .cn domains:
- ncqjw.cn (sending ANA phish)
- obpwnrl.cn (sending DHL phish)
- cwqfvzp.cn (sending myTOKYOGAS phish)

These domains follow a pattern of short, random-character .cn registrations — a hallmark of Chinese-origin phishing infrastructure designed for disposability. Each domain is used briefly before being burned and replaced.

### Foxmail X-Mailer Fingerprint

The most significant attribution indicator is the consistent X-Mailer header across all samples: 'Foxmail 6, 13, 102, 15 [cn]'. Foxmail is a freeware email client developed by Tencent Holdings, with dominant market share in China. Version 6.x is a legacy release — the current version is 7.2.25 (September 2022). The use of this specific legacy version across all campaign emails confirms:

1. A single operator or coordinated group using the same email sending toolkit
2. Chinese-origin operation (Foxmail is predominantly used in China)
3. The [cn] locale tag confirms Chinese-language Foxmail installation
4. Legacy version suggests either an older automated sending setup or deliberate version pinning for compatibility with bulk-sending scripts

### Phishing Page Infrastructure

Phishing pages are hosted on .cn domains with randomized subdomain prefixes:
- branchiish.aayjlc.cn/amcmembr_Loginam/ (ANA credential harvest)
- decideosity.ykdyrkye.cn/portal_login_exp/getQuoteTab/ (DHL credential harvest)
- impactish.rexqm.cn/mtgalogin/ (myTOKYOGAS credential harvest)

The URL path patterns are customized per brand but follow a consistent structure: randomized English-sounding subdomain + short random .cn domain + brand-specific path mimicking legitimate login endpoints.

## Brand Impersonation Analysis

### ANA (All Nippon Airways)
Japan's largest airline by revenue. The phishing email impersonates ANA communications, likely targeting ANA Mileage Club members with messages about account verification, mileage expiration, or booking confirmations. The credential-harvesting page mimics ANA's AMC member login portal.

### DHL Express
Global logistics and shipping company with significant operations in Japan. DHL phishing typically uses delivery notification lures — package tracking, customs clearance, or delivery scheduling. The URL path 'portal_login_exp/getQuoteTab/' suggests a shipping portal impersonation.

### myTOKYOGAS
Tokyo Gas utility service portal. Targets Japanese residents who use Tokyo Gas for home energy. Phishing lure likely involves billing, account verification, or payment update notifications. The path 'mtgalogin/' directly references the myTOKYOGAS login abbreviation.

## Campaign Characteristics

### Scale and Distribution
The campaign uses bulk distribution reaching non-Japanese speakers, as documented by the SANS researcher who received multiple phishing emails despite not being Japanese. This indicates:
- Large email lists purchased or scraped without language filtering
- High-volume, low-precision approach (spray and pray)
- Willingness to burn sending domains quickly due to spam filter catches

### Operational Consistency
Despite impersonating different brands, all emails share:
- .cn sending domains (randomly generated)
- .cn phishing page domains (randomly generated with English-sounding subdomains)
- Identical X-Mailer: Foxmail 6, 13, 102, 15 [cn]
- Same ASN (AS150436) for sending infrastructure
- +0800 timezone in Date headers (UTC+8, consistent with China/Hong Kong)
- Japanese language content with brand-specific lures

### Attribution Assessment
The campaign is attributed with MEDIUM confidence to a Chinese-speaking threat group based on:
- Foxmail Chinese-language client with [cn] locale
- All infrastructure on .cn TLD
- Sending IPs in Hong Kong (Byteplus/ByteDance cloud)
- +0800 timezone in email headers
- Operational pattern consistent with Chinese phishing-as-a-service ecosystems

The motivation is FINANCIAL — credential harvesting for ANA loyalty accounts (mileage fraud), DHL shipping accounts (logistics fraud), and utility accounts (payment card theft).

## Defensive Recommendations

### Immediate Actions
- Block sending IPs: 150.5.129.136, 101.47.78.193, 150.5.130.42 at email gateway
- Block .cn TLD in email sending domains for organizations not doing business with Chinese entities
- Add X-Mailer 'Foxmail 6, 13, 102, 15' to email header-based detection rules
- Block phishing domains: aayjlc.cn, ykdyrkye.cn, rexqm.cn, ncqjw.cn, obpwnrl.cn, cwqfvzp.cn

### Long-Term Defenses
- Implement DMARC enforcement for impersonated brands (ANA, DHL, TOKYOGAS)
- Deploy email gateway rules matching .cn TLD + Foxmail X-Mailer combination
- User awareness training for Japanese-language phishing indicators
- Monitor for new .cn domain registrations matching random-character patterns
- Implement certificate transparency monitoring for brand domains

### Detection Opportunities
- Email header analysis: X-Mailer fingerprint matching across diverse brand lures
- URL pattern analysis: randomized English subdomain + short .cn domain + brand-specific path
- Timezone analysis: +0800 offset in Date headers from non-Chinese-branded senders
- ASN correlation: multiple phishing campaigns from AS150436 (Byteplus)

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589.002 Email Addresses
- T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains
- T1583.001 Domains
- T1583.003 Virtual Private Server
- T1588.002 Tool
- T1608.005 Link Target
- T1585.002 Email Accounts
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1566.003 Spearphishing via Service
- T1204.001 Malicious Link
- T1056.003 Web Portal Capture
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1552.001 Credentials In Files
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1598.003 Spearphishing Link
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1531 Account Access Removal
- T1550.004 Web Session Cookie

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Credential Harvesting on .cn Domain with Brand Login Path and Form POST** (`TL-2026-0129-SPL-002`)

Detects browser navigation to .cn domains with brand-specific login paths (amcmembr, portal_login, mtgalogin), HTTP POST with credential fields, and post-harvest redirect to legitimate brand sites. Covers ANA/DHL/myTOKYOGAS phishing pages.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1056.003, T1598.003, T1204.001, T1539
- **Data sources:** proxy_logs, url_click_events, web_filter_logs
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy sourcetype="proxy:access"
| search (url_domain="*.cn" AND (url_path="*login*" OR url_path="*Login*" OR url_path="*member*" OR url_path="*portal*" OR url_path="*account*"))
| eval brand=case(match(url_path, "(?i)amcmembr|ana"), "ANA", match(url_path, "(?i)portal_login|dhl|getQuote"), "DHL", match(url_path, "(?i)mtga|tokyogas"), "myTOKYOGAS", 1=1, "unknown_brand")
| eval is_post=if(http_method="POST", 1, 0)
| eval risk=if(is_post=1, "critical", "high")
| table _time, src_ip, user, url_domain, url_path, http_method, brand, risk
| sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
UrlClickEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Url has ".cn" and (Url has_any ("login", "Login", "member", "portal", "account", "amcmembr", "mtgalogin"))
| extend Brand = case(Url has_any ("amcmembr", "ana"), "ANA", Url has_any ("portal_login", "dhl", "getQuote"), "DHL", Url has_any ("mtga", "tokyogas"), "myTOKYOGAS", true, "unknown")
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, DeviceName, Url, Brand
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Browser Navigation to .cn Domain with Brand Login Path (Credential Harvesting)
id: 1396e78b-eb6e-4e9d-9172-9b3768f0df62
status: experimental
description: Detects browser access to .cn domains with credential harvesting URL paths targeting ANA, DHL, and myTOKYOGAS.
references:
    - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/31710
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/02/22
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1056.003
    - attack.t1598.003
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_domain:
        url.domain|endswith: '.cn'
    selection_path:
        url.path|contains|any:
            - 'login'
            - 'Login'
            - 'member'
            - 'portal'
            - 'amcmembr'
            - 'mtgalogin'
    condition: selection_domain and selection_path
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate access to Chinese web portals
    - Chinese SaaS platforms with .cn domains
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate Chinese web portal access
- Chinese SaaS platforms with .cn login pages

**Tuning notes:** Whitelist legitimate .cn domains. Add brand-specific path keywords. Correlate with email click events.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Japanese Phishing Campaign Email Multi-Signal Scoring — Foxmail + Timezone + .cn + AS150436 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- .cn Phishing Infrastructure with Pseudo-English Subdomains and Credential Harvest (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Multi-Brand Phishing from Same ASN and Bulk Distribution Pattern (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Foxmail Legacy X-Mailer Header in Phishing Email (Campaign Fingerprint) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HTTP POST to .cn Domain with Credential Parameters (Phishing Harvest) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Account Contact Change Within Minutes of New-Geography Login (Account Takeover) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Foxmail X-Mailer Fingerprint with SPF Failure and .cn Sending Domain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Post-Compromise Account Takeover from AS150436 and Credential Fraud (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 21)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `150.5.129[.]136`
- Domain: `ncqjw[.]cn`
- IP address: `101.47.78[.]193`

Full set of 21 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [SANS ISC: Japanese-Language Phishing Emails (Brad Duncan)](https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/32734)
- [SANS ISC: Phishing Email Screenshot — ANA Impersonation](https://isc.sans.edu/diaryimages/images/2026-02-21-ISC-diary-image-02a.jpg)
- [SANS ISC: Phishing Email Screenshot — DHL Impersonation](https://isc.sans.edu/diaryimages/images/2026-02-21-ISC-diary-image-03a.jpg)
- [SANS ISC: Phishing Email Screenshot — myTOKYOGAS Impersonation](https://isc.sans.edu/diaryimages/images/2026-02-21-ISC-diary-image-04a.jpg)
- [Wikipedia: Foxmail (Tencent Email Client)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foxmail)
- [IPinfo: AS150436 Byteplus Pte. Ltd. — Sending IP Geolocation](https://ipinfo.io/150.5.129.136)
- [OWASP: Phishing Attack Techniques](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Phishing)
- [ANA Official Website](https://www.ana.co.jp/)
- [DHL Express Official](https://www.dhl.com/)
- [myTOKYOGAS Official Portal](https://members.tokyo-gas.co.jp/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0129
