Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0141
Vshell C2 Framework — Chinese-Language Cobalt Strike Alternative in APT Campaigns (UNC5174/SNOWLIGHT, Operation DRAGONCLONE)
Vshell is a Go-based command-and-control framework marketed as a Cobalt Strike alternative within Chinese-speaking offensive-security ecosystems. Active since 2021 with 5 major versions, Vshell provides full post-compromise host management, network pivoting, and in-memory execution. Censys identified 850+ active listeners and exposed panels with 286+ connected client agents.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0141 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Vshell, VShell C2, SNOWLIGHT Campaign |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Multiple Windows Operating Systems; Multiple Linux Operating Systems |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-506, CWE-912 |
| Attribution | UNC5174, SNOWLIGHT (high confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | China |
| Tools | Vshell |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol, T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.003 Cron, T1055.012 Process Hollowing, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1070.004 File Deletion, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1071.004 DNS and 18 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government, telecommunications, research, critical-infrastructure, defense, technology, healthcare |
| Target regions | North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, United Kingdom, France, China |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-02-24, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0141 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 26 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: SNOWLIGHT memfd Fileless VShell Deployment on Linux, crontab/systemd Persistence, and Discord Bot AES-Token C2 Backdoor
Detects post-exploitation: SNOWLIGHT dropper (dnsloger) deploying VShell via memfd_create for fileless in-memory execution on Linux with process name [kworker/0:2] masquerading as kernel worker, crontab and systemd service persistence for SNOWLIGHT and Sliver (system_worker), download_backd.sh bash script downloading payloads, Discord Bot backdoor using discordgo library with AES-encrypted bot tokens for C2 via Discord API MessageCreate events (1/64 VT detection), bash -c command execution, file upload/download via Discord.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1102.002, T1059.004, T1053.003, T1543.002, T1620, T1036.005, T1070.004
- Data sources: sysmon, linux_sysmon, edr_process_logs, edr_network_logs
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=linux_sysmon sourcetype="linux:sysmon"
| search (
(EventCode=1 (Image="*dnsloger*" OR Image="*system_worker*" OR Image="*download_backd*"))
OR (EventCode=1 CommandLine="*memfd*" OR CommandLine="*/proc/*/fd/*")
OR (EventCode=1 Image="*kworker*" CommandLine!="*")
OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*/crontab*" OR TargetFilename="*systemd*")
)
| append [
search index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
(EventCode=3 (DestinationHostname="*discord.com" OR DestinationHostname="*discordapp.com") NOT Image="*discord*" NOT Image="*browser*" NOT Image="*chrome*")
| eval alert_type="discord_api_non_discord_process"
]
| eval alert_type=coalesce(alert_type, case(
match(Image, "dnsloger"), "snowlight_dropper",
match(Image, "system_worker"), "sliver_implant",
match(CommandLine, "memfd|/proc/.*/fd"), "memfd_fileless_exec",
match(Image, "kworker"), "kworker_masquerade",
1=1, "linux_persistence"
))
| table _time, Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, TargetFilename, DestinationHostname, alert_typeMicrosoft KQL
let snowlight = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName has_any ("dnsloger", "system_worker", "download_backd")
| extend AlertType = "snowlight_dropper_or_sliver";
let memfd = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("memfd", "/proc/self/fd")
| extend AlertType = "memfd_fileless_execution";
let kworker = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName has "kworker" and not(FolderPath startswith "/usr/")
| extend AlertType = "kworker_masquerade_userspace";
let discord_c2 = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("discord.com", "discordapp.com")
| where not(InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("Discord", "discord", "chrome", "msedge", "firefox", "brave", "electron"))
| extend AlertType = "discord_api_from_non_client";
let cron_persist = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FolderPath has_any ("crontab", "/etc/systemd/system")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !has_any ("apt", "dpkg", "yum", "dnf", "systemctl")
| extend AlertType = "unauthorized_cron_systemd_persist";
union snowlight, memfd, kworker, discord_c2, cron_persist
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AlertType, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, FolderPath
| sort by Timestamp descSigma
title: Discord API Connection from Non-Discord Process (Discord Bot C2 Backdoor)
id: 949eb8fe-a2a7-49d2-bc23-75a07e619071
status: experimental
description: Detects connections to Discord API (discord.com/discordapp.com) from processes other than Discord client or web browsers. UNC5174 deploys Discord Bot backdoor with AES-encrypted tokens as fallback C2 channel after VShell compromise. 1/64 VT detection.
references:
- https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/91419/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/02/24
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1102.002
- attack.t1059.004
- attack.t1053.003
logsource:
product: windows
category: network_connection
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|endswith|any:
- 'discord.com'
- 'discordapp.com'
Initiated: 'true'
filter:
Image|endswith|any:
- '\\Discord.exe'
- '\\chrome.exe'
- '\\msedge.exe'
- '\\firefox.exe'
- '\\brave.exe'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Discord bots or integrations running from custom applications
- Developer tools interacting with Discord API
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate Discord bots or integrations
- Developer tools interacting with Discord API
Tuning notes: dnsloger and system_worker are definitive SNOWLIGHT/Sliver IOCs. memfd execution with [kworker] name is fileless masquerade. Discord API from non-Discord/browser process = bot C2. Cross-platform: Linux + Windows detections combined. AES-encrypted Discord token is 1/64 VT evasion.
- VShell C2 Framework Multi-Signal Detection: VELETRIX Sideload + SNOWLIGHT Fileless + WebSocket C2 + Discord Bot + Domain IOCs · unlock with TL Creds
- IPFuscation Shellcode Decoding via RtlIpv4StringToAddressA, VirtualAllocExNuma Memory Allocation, and EnumCalendarInfoA Callback Execution · unlock with TL Creds
- UNC5174 Campaign IOCs: Domain Squatting Infrastructure, C2 IPs, SNOWLIGHT/VELETRIX SHA256 Hashes, and VShell Configuration Artifacts · unlock with TL Creds
- SNOWLIGHT memfd Fileless Execution with kworker Process Name Masquerade on Linux Systems · unlock with TL Creds
- NPS Intranet Penetration Proxy Agent Communication and VShell Multi-Protocol C2 (WebSocket, DNS-over-HTTPS, KCP) · unlock with TL Creds
- VShell Go-Based Implant Artifacts: Configuration Salt qwe123qwe, Go Binary Execution Patterns, and Shenzhen Thunder Certificate Abuse · unlock with TL Creds
- VELETRIX DLL Sideloading via Wondershare Repairit (drstat.exe) with IPFuscation Shellcode and EnumCalendarInfoA Callback Injection · unlock with TL Creds
- VShell C2 Communication: WebSocket Port 8084, Multi-Protocol C2 (TCP/KCP/DNS/DoH/DoT/S3), NPS Agent Relay Pivoting, and Campaign Domain IOCs · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-02-24, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 26 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0141.
Sample indicators (3 of 26)
- IP address:
34.96.239[.]183 - Domain:
gooogleasia[.]com - File hash:
fef69f8747c368979a9e4c62f4648ea233314b5f41981d9c01c1cdd96fb07365
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 26 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Confirmed in APT campaigns: UNC5174/SNOWLIGHT (targeting US/UK/Canada government and research), Operation DRAGONCLONE (Chinese telecom targeting), and AhnLab-reported incidents using Discord Bot backdoors.
Vshell is a mature Go-based command-and-control (C2) platform that has evolved from a simple remote access tool into a full-featured adversary simulation framework used by Chinese-speaking threat actors. Originally released in 2021, Vshell's tagline reads 'CobaltStrike难用?来试试vshell吧' (Is Cobalt Strike difficult to use? Try Vshell instead). The framework follows Cobalt Strike's architecture: centralized teamserver managing implants with an operator web interface.
Vshell has undergone 5 significant development milestones: v1 (2021) — teamserver controlled via AntSword; v2 (2022) — local web interface added; v3 (2022) — rebased on NPS (intranet penetration proxy) with forked frontend; v4 (2023) — licensing system, nginx impersonation for C2 evasion, additional protocols; v4.6 (2024) — end of public releases, suspected private/commercial development.
The framework supports multiple listener types: TCP, KCP/UDP, WebSocket, DNS, DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH), DNS-over-TLS (DoT), and Object Storage System (S3). Default listener port is TCP/8084. Both Windows and Linux clients are supported including x86_64 and ARM variants. The interface is natively Mandarin.
Censys scanning reveals over 850 active Vshell listeners and exposed panels with up to 286 connected client agents that can serve as traffic relays for lateral movement and operational proxying. Newer versions use digest authentication to reduce fingerprinting surface.
Confirmed APT usage includes:
1. UNC5174/SNOWLIGHT Campaign (Sysdig TRT, 2025): Chinese state-sponsored contractor targeting US, Canada, UK government organizations, research institutions, and critical infrastructure. SNOWLIGHT dropper deploys fileless VShell payload via memfd (in-memory execution on Linux). WebSocket-based C2 communication. Domain squatting impersonating Google, Cloudflare, Telegram, and Huione Pay. Also deploys Sliver and Cobalt Strike. Uses crontab and systemd for persistence. C2 domains: gooogleasia[.]com, sex666vr[.]com, c1oudf1are[.]com, telegrams[.]icu, huionepay[.]me.
2. Operation DRAGONCLONE (Seqrite Labs, 2025): Targeting Chinese telecom (China Mobile Tietong subsidiary). DLL sideloading via trojanized Wondershare Repairit installer. VELETRIX loader uses IPFuscation (shellcode encoded as IPv4 addresses), anti-sandbox via Sleep/Beep/NtDelayExecution, VirtualAllocExNuma, and EnumCalendarInfoA callback execution. Decrypts VShell implant (tcp_windows_amd64.dll) in memory. Salt: qwe123qwe. 44 implants identified with same salt. Infrastructure overlaps with Earth Lamia and SAP NetWeaver CVE-2025-31324 exploitation.
3. AhnLab ASEC (Nov 2025): UNC5174 deploying Discord Bot backdoor using discordgo library after initial VShell compromise. Bot uses Discord API as C2 channel (MessageCreate events). Capabilities: command execution (bash -c), file upload/download, system info collection. AES-encrypted bot tokens. VirusTotal detection: 1/64 (AhnLab only).
Vshell's growing adoption signals a shift in Chinese offensive ecosystems away from Cobalt Strike toward purpose-built, lower-detection alternatives. The framework's cross-platform support, multiple protocol options, and in-memory execution make it a significant threat to defenders.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
collection
discovery
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery
lateral-movement
T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol
defense-evasion
T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1055.012 Process Hollowing; T1070.004 File Deletion; T1497.003 Time Based Checks; T1620 Reflective Code Loading
exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
execution
T1053.003 Cron; T1059.004 Unix Shell; T1204.002 Malicious File; T1569.002 Service Execution
command-and-control
T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1071.004 DNS; T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy; T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1219 Remote Access Tools; T1572 Protocol Tunneling; T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography
initial-access
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
persistence
stealth
resource-development
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Block known Vshell C2 domains at DNS/proxy: gooogleasia.com, sex666vr.com, c1oudf1are.com, telegrams.icu, huionepay.me
- Hunt for TCP/8084 listeners and WebSocket connections to unknown infrastructure
- Scan for NPS-based intranet proxying indicators on endpoints
- Block Discord Bot API traffic from non-approved endpoints
- Hunt for memfd-based fileless execution on Linux systems
Workarounds
- Restrict outbound WebSocket connections to known services
- Monitor for discordgo library usage in unauthorized Go binaries
- Alert on EnumCalendarInfoA callback execution from non-standard processes
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy behavioral detection for DLL sideloading via signed binaries loading unsigned DLLs
- Monitor for IPFuscation patterns (RtlIpv4StringToAddressA API abuse)
- Implement DNS-over-HTTPS/DoT monitoring to detect alternative C2 channels
- Audit crontab and systemd services for unauthorized persistence
- Block traffic to Censys-identified Vshell listener IPs
Affected and fixed versions
- Multiple — Windows Operating Systems
Vulnerable versions: All versions (x86_64) - Multiple — Linux Operating Systems
Vulnerable versions: All versions (x86_64, ARM)
Timeline
- Vshell v1 released on GitHub by Chinese developer. Teamserver component controlled via AntSword (蚁剑). No web UI.
- Vshell v2 adds local web interface. v3 rebases on NPS (intranet penetration proxy) with forked frontend, significantly expanding capabilities.
- Vshell v4 introduces licensing system, nginx impersonation for C2 evasion, interface redesign, and additional protocols. Tagline: 'CobaltStrike难用?来试试vshell吧'.
- Vshell v4.6 marks end of public releases. Development goes private, suspected commercial sale to threat actors.
- First samples of SNOWLIGHT dropper deploying fileless VShell payload detected on VirusTotal. UNC5174 campaign targeting government and research institutions via domain squatting (locked-ioc-11).
- Seqrite Labs discovers Operation DRAGONCLONE targeting China Mobile Tietong. VELETRIX loader uses DLL sideloading via Wondershare Repairit, IPFuscation shellcode encoding, and in-memory VShell deployment.
- AhnLab ASEC reports UNC5174 deploying Discord Bot backdoor using discordgo library as fallback C2 channel after initial VShell compromise. 1/64 VT detection rate.
- Censys publishes comprehensive Vshell analysis. 850+ active listeners detected via internet scanning. Exposed panels with 286+ connected agents. Framework now considered mature post-exploitation capability. Source: https://censys.com/blog/vshell/
- As of 2026-05-29, Vshell remains an active, growing threat: Censys (Feb 2026) tracks 850+ live listeners and a panel with 286 agents, and 2026 reporting shows widening adoption. UNC5174/Earth Lamia (China espionage) is still operating with no takedown; no CVE applies (offensive C2 tool, not a vuln) and no successor supersedes it.
Sources cited
- ANSSI: French Cyber Threat Overview 2024 — UNC5174 Activity cert.ssi.gouv.fr · Advisory · 2025-03-01
- Censys: Vshell — A Chinese-Language Alternative to Cobalt Strike censys.com · Research · 2026-02-24
- Sysdig TRT: UNC5174's Evolution — From SNOWLIGHT to VShell sysdig.com · Research · 2025-04-01
- Seqrite Labs: Operation DRAGONCLONE — Chinese Telecom Veletrix VShell Malware seqrite.com · Research · 2025-05-01
- NVISO: VShell Analysis Report blog.nviso.eu · Research · 2025-11-03
- AhnLab ASEC: UNC5174 Group Discord Bot Backdoor Malware asec.ahnlab.com · Research · 2025-11-26
- Trellix: The Silent Fileless Threat of VShell trellix.com · Research · 2025-08-01
- Mandiant: Initial Access Brokers Exploit F5 ScreenConnect — UNC5174 Google Cloud · Research · 2024-03-01
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.