# Vshell C2 Framework — Chinese-Language Cobalt Strike Alternative in APT Campaigns (UNC5174/SNOWLIGHT, Operation DRAGONCLONE)

> Vshell is a Go-based command-and-control framework marketed as a Cobalt Strike alternative within Chinese-speaking offensive-security ecosystems. Active since 2021 with 5 major versions, Vshell provides full post-compromise host management, network pivoting, and in-memory execution. Censys identified 850+ active listeners and exposed panels with 286+ connected client agents. Confirmed in APT campaigns: UNC5174/SNOWLIGHT (targeting US/UK/Canada government and research), Operation DRAGONCLONE (Chinese telecom targeting), and AhnLab-reported incidents using Discord Bot backdoors.

- **Published:** 2026-02-24T21:25:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-02-24T21:25:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0141
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-vshell-cobalt-strike-alternative-tl-2026-0141.webp?v=ad59db10 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Vshell C2 in UNC5174 SNOWLIGHT: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0141) — High severity, 26 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0141
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** UNC5174 (China)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 26 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Vshell is a mature Go-based command-and-control (C2) platform that has evolved from a simple remote access tool into a full-featured adversary simulation framework used by Chinese-speaking threat actors. Originally released in 2021, Vshell's tagline reads 'CobaltStrike难用？来试试vshell吧' (Is Cobalt Strike difficult to use? Try Vshell instead). The framework follows Cobalt Strike's architecture: centralized teamserver managing implants with an operator web interface.

Vshell has undergone 5 significant development milestones: v1 (2021) — teamserver controlled via AntSword; v2 (2022) — local web interface added; v3 (2022) — rebased on NPS (intranet penetration proxy) with forked frontend; v4 (2023) — licensing system, nginx impersonation for C2 evasion, additional protocols; v4.6 (2024) — end of public releases, suspected private/commercial development.

The framework supports multiple listener types: TCP, KCP/UDP, WebSocket, DNS, DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH), DNS-over-TLS (DoT), and Object Storage System (S3). Default listener port is TCP/8084. Both Windows and Linux clients are supported including x86_64 and ARM variants. The interface is natively Mandarin.

Censys scanning reveals over 850 active Vshell listeners and exposed panels with up to 286 connected client agents that can serve as traffic relays for lateral movement and operational proxying. Newer versions use digest authentication to reduce fingerprinting surface.

Confirmed APT usage includes:

1. UNC5174/SNOWLIGHT Campaign (Sysdig TRT, 2025): Chinese state-sponsored contractor targeting US, Canada, UK government organizations, research institutions, and critical infrastructure. SNOWLIGHT dropper deploys fileless VShell payload via memfd (in-memory execution on Linux). WebSocket-based C2 communication. Domain squatting impersonating Google, Cloudflare, Telegram, and Huione Pay. Also deploys Sliver and Cobalt Strike. Uses crontab and systemd for persistence. C2 domains: gooogleasia[.]com, sex666vr[.]com, c1oudf1are[.]com, telegrams[.]icu, huionepay[.]me.

2. Operation DRAGONCLONE (Seqrite Labs, 2025): Targeting Chinese telecom (China Mobile Tietong subsidiary). DLL sideloading via trojanized Wondershare Repairit installer. VELETRIX loader uses IPFuscation (shellcode encoded as IPv4 addresses), anti-sandbox via Sleep/Beep/NtDelayExecution, VirtualAllocExNuma, and EnumCalendarInfoA callback execution. Decrypts VShell implant (tcp_windows_amd64.dll) in memory. Salt: qwe123qwe. 44 implants identified with same salt. Infrastructure overlaps with Earth Lamia and SAP NetWeaver CVE-2025-31324 exploitation.

3. AhnLab ASEC (Nov 2025): UNC5174 deploying Discord Bot backdoor using discordgo library after initial VShell compromise. Bot uses Discord API as C2 channel (MessageCreate events). Capabilities: command execution (bash -c), file upload/download, system info collection. AES-encrypted bot tokens. VirusTotal detection: 1/64 (AhnLab only).

Vshell's growing adoption signals a shift in Chinese offensive ecosystems away from Cobalt Strike toward purpose-built, lower-detection alternatives. The framework's cross-platform support, multiple protocol options, and in-memory execution make it a significant threat to defenders.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Domains
- T1587.001 Malware
- T1588.002 Tool
- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1059.004 Unix Shell
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1569.002 Service Execution
- T1053.003 Cron
- T1543.002 Systemd Service
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File
- T1497.003 Time Based Checks
- T1055.012 Process Hollowing
- T1070.004 File Deletion
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1071.004 DNS
- T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**SNOWLIGHT memfd Fileless VShell Deployment on Linux, crontab/systemd Persistence, and Discord Bot AES-Token C2 Backdoor** (`TL-2026-0141-SPL-002`)

Detects post-exploitation: SNOWLIGHT dropper (dnsloger) deploying VShell via memfd_create for fileless in-memory execution on Linux with process name [kworker/0:2] masquerading as kernel worker, crontab and systemd service persistence for SNOWLIGHT and Sliver (system_worker), download_backd.sh bash script downloading payloads, Discord Bot backdoor using discordgo library with AES-encrypted bot tokens for C2 via Discord API MessageCreate events (1/64 VT detection), bash -c command execution, file upload/download via Discord.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1102.002, T1059.004, T1053.003, T1543.002, T1620, T1036.005, T1070.004
- **Data sources:** sysmon, linux_sysmon, edr_process_logs, edr_network_logs
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=linux_sysmon sourcetype="linux:sysmon"
| search (
    (EventCode=1 (Image="*dnsloger*" OR Image="*system_worker*" OR Image="*download_backd*"))
    OR (EventCode=1 CommandLine="*memfd*" OR CommandLine="*/proc/*/fd/*")
    OR (EventCode=1 Image="*kworker*" CommandLine!="*")
    OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*/crontab*" OR TargetFilename="*systemd*")
)
| append [
    search index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
    (EventCode=3 (DestinationHostname="*discord.com" OR DestinationHostname="*discordapp.com") NOT Image="*discord*" NOT Image="*browser*" NOT Image="*chrome*")
    | eval alert_type="discord_api_non_discord_process"
]
| eval alert_type=coalesce(alert_type, case(
    match(Image, "dnsloger"), "snowlight_dropper",
    match(Image, "system_worker"), "sliver_implant",
    match(CommandLine, "memfd|/proc/.*/fd"), "memfd_fileless_exec",
    match(Image, "kworker"), "kworker_masquerade",
    1=1, "linux_persistence"
))
| table _time, Computer, User, Image, CommandLine, TargetFilename, DestinationHostname, alert_type
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let snowlight = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName has_any ("dnsloger", "system_worker", "download_backd")
| extend AlertType = "snowlight_dropper_or_sliver";
let memfd = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("memfd", "/proc/self/fd")
| extend AlertType = "memfd_fileless_execution";
let kworker = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName has "kworker" and not(FolderPath startswith "/usr/")
| extend AlertType = "kworker_masquerade_userspace";
let discord_c2 = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("discord.com", "discordapp.com")
| where not(InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("Discord", "discord", "chrome", "msedge", "firefox", "brave", "electron"))
| extend AlertType = "discord_api_from_non_client";
let cron_persist = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FolderPath has_any ("crontab", "/etc/systemd/system")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !has_any ("apt", "dpkg", "yum", "dnf", "systemctl")
| extend AlertType = "unauthorized_cron_systemd_persist";
union snowlight, memfd, kworker, discord_c2, cron_persist
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AlertType, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, FolderPath
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Discord API Connection from Non-Discord Process (Discord Bot C2 Backdoor)
id: 949eb8fe-a2a7-49d2-bc23-75a07e619071
status: experimental
description: Detects connections to Discord API (discord.com/discordapp.com) from processes other than Discord client or web browsers. UNC5174 deploys Discord Bot backdoor with AES-encrypted tokens as fallback C2 channel after VShell compromise. 1/64 VT detection.
references:
    - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/91419/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/02/24
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1102.002
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.t1053.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|endswith|any:
            - 'discord.com'
            - 'discordapp.com'
        Initiated: 'true'
    filter:
        Image|endswith|any:
            - '\\Discord.exe'
            - '\\chrome.exe'
            - '\\msedge.exe'
            - '\\firefox.exe'
            - '\\brave.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Discord bots or integrations running from custom applications
    - Developer tools interacting with Discord API
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate Discord bots or integrations
- Developer tools interacting with Discord API

**Tuning notes:** dnsloger and system_worker are definitive SNOWLIGHT/Sliver IOCs. memfd execution with [kworker] name is fileless masquerade. Discord API from non-Discord/browser process = bot C2. Cross-platform: Linux + Windows detections combined. AES-encrypted Discord token is 1/64 VT evasion.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- VShell C2 Framework Multi-Signal Detection: VELETRIX Sideload + SNOWLIGHT Fileless + WebSocket C2 + Discord Bot + Domain IOCs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- IPFuscation Shellcode Decoding via RtlIpv4StringToAddressA, VirtualAllocExNuma Memory Allocation, and EnumCalendarInfoA Callback Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UNC5174 Campaign IOCs: Domain Squatting Infrastructure, C2 IPs, SNOWLIGHT/VELETRIX SHA256 Hashes, and VShell Configuration Artifacts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SNOWLIGHT memfd Fileless Execution with kworker Process Name Masquerade on Linux Systems (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- NPS Intranet Penetration Proxy Agent Communication and VShell Multi-Protocol C2 (WebSocket, DNS-over-HTTPS, KCP) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- VShell Go-Based Implant Artifacts: Configuration Salt qwe123qwe, Go Binary Execution Patterns, and Shenzhen Thunder Certificate Abuse (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- VELETRIX DLL Sideloading via Wondershare Repairit (drstat.exe) with IPFuscation Shellcode and EnumCalendarInfoA Callback Injection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- VShell C2 Communication: WebSocket Port 8084, Multi-Protocol C2 (TCP/KCP/DNS/DoH/DoT/S3), NPS Agent Relay Pivoting, and Campaign Domain IOCs (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 26)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `34.96.239[.]183`
- Domain: `gooogleasia[.]com`
- File hash: `fef69f8747c368979a9e4c62f4648ea233314b5f41981d9c01c1cdd96fb07365`

Full set of 26 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Censys: Vshell — A Chinese-Language Alternative to Cobalt Strike](https://censys.com/blog/vshell/)
- [Sysdig TRT: UNC5174's Evolution — From SNOWLIGHT to VShell](https://www.sysdig.com/blog/unc5174-chinese-threat-actor-vshell)
- [Seqrite Labs: Operation DRAGONCLONE — Chinese Telecom Veletrix VShell Malware](https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-dragonclone-chinese-telecom-veletrix-vshell-malware/)
- [NVISO: VShell Analysis Report](https://blog.nviso.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/VShell.pdf)
- [AhnLab ASEC: UNC5174 Group Discord Bot Backdoor Malware](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/91419/)
- [Trellix: The Silent Fileless Threat of VShell](https://www.trellix.com/blogs/research/the-silent-fileless-threat-of-vshell/)
- [ANSSI: French Cyber Threat Overview 2024 — UNC5174 Activity](https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/CERTFR-2025-CTI-004.pdf)
- [Mandiant: Initial Access Brokers Exploit F5 ScreenConnect — UNC5174](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/initial-access-brokers-exploit-f5-screenconnect)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0141
