# SURXRAT Android RAT — LLM Module Downloads from Hugging Face, MaaS via Telegram, ArsinkRAT Evolution

> SURXRAT is an actively developed Android RAT commercially distributed via Telegram-based MaaS with structured reseller/partner licensing (200K-500K one-time payment). Built on ArsinkRAT code (1,216 APK hashes, 317 Firebase C2 endpoints, 45,000 victims across 143 countries), SURXRAT V5 operates as a full surveillance and device-control platform. Latest samples conditionally download a 23GB+ LLM module from Hugging Face, signaling experimentation with AI-assisted capabilities. Includes ransomware-style screen locker for device extortion.

- **Published:** 2026-02-24T22:19:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-02-24T22:19:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0142
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-surxrat-android-rat-tl-2026-0142.webp?v=44624d25 (Threadlinqs threat intel: SURXRAT Android RAT LLM Module: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0142) — High severity, 16 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0142
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** SURXRAT Operator (Indonesia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 16 (2 shown free below)

## Description

SURXRAT is a next-generation Android Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that represents the convergence of mobile surveillance malware, AI experimentation, and commercial malware-as-a-service (MaaS) distribution. Uncovered by Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs (CRIL) in February 2026, SURXRAT has evolved from ArsinkRAT code into a feature-rich platform with novel capabilities.

The malware is marketed through a dedicated Telegram channel under the 'SURXRAT V5' branding, created in late 2024 with active development since early 2025. Over 180 related samples have been identified. The MaaS model offers two tiers: Reseller Plan (200K one-time, 3 builds/day, reselling rights) and Partner Plan (500K one-time, 10 builds/day, own reseller networks). As of January 2026, the platform reports 1,318 registered operator accounts.

SURXRAT evolved from ArsinkRAT, a cloud-native Android RAT previously tracked by Zimperium. ArsinkRAT used Firebase Realtime Database, Firebase Storage, Google Apps Script (uploading to Google Drive), and Telegram Bot API for C2/exfiltration. The predecessor campaign was massive: 1,216 unique APK hashes, 317 Firebase RTDB endpoints, and approximately 45,000 victim IPs across 143 countries. Largest victim concentrations in Egypt (~13K), Indonesia (~7K), Iraq (~3K), Yemen (~3K), and Türkiye (~2K). Distributed via Telegram, Discord, MediaFire links, impersonating 50+ brands (Google, YouTube, WhatsApp, Instagram, TikTok).

SURXRAT's key innovation is the conditional download of a large LLM module (>23GB) from Hugging Face. This download triggers when specific gaming applications are active (Free Fire MAX, Free Fire x JUJUTSU KAISEN) or when the C2 server sends target package names dynamically. The LLM module serves multiple purposes: deliberately introducing network latency during gameplay (paid cheating/disruption services), masking malicious background activity by degrading device performance, and enabling future AI-driven capabilities (automated interactions, adaptive social engineering).

The malware's C2 infrastructure uses Firebase Realtime Database (hxxps://xrat-sisuriya-default-rtdb.firebaseio[.]com) with the database reference labeled 'arsinkRAT', confirming the code lineage. Device registration uses random UUID for victim tracking.

SURXRAT provides comprehensive surveillance: SMS monitoring, contact/call log collection, Gmail account data, location tracking, notification interception, clipboard monitoring, browser history, cellular tower intelligence, WiFi scanning, file manager access. Remote control includes: device unlock, phone call initiation, wallpaper modification, audio playback, push notifications, forced URL opening, flashlight/vibration control, on-screen text overlays, and storage wipe.

The ransomware-style screen locker enables device locking with attacker-defined PIN and customizable lock message. Wrong PIN attempts are logged and transmitted to the operator in real-time. The lock can be remotely removed, giving complete control over device availability. This enables hybrid monetization: surveillance, fraud, or direct extortion based on victim value.

The Indonesian threat actor operates the platform, targeting aspiring cybercriminals rather than conducting attacks directly. The structured pricing, operational announcements, and feature updates demonstrate mature commercialization similar to underground SaaS platforms.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1660 Phishing
- T1476 Deliver Malicious App via Other Means
- T1575 Native API
- T1624.001 Event Triggered Execution: Broadcast Receivers
- T1541 Foreground Persistence
- T1628.001 Hide Artifacts: Suppress Application Icon
- T1516 Input Injection
- T1517 Access Notifications
- T1414 Clipboard Data
- T1426 System Information Discovery
- T1422 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1420 File and Directory Discovery
- T1430 Location Tracking
- T1636.004 Protected User Data: SMS Messages
- T1636.002 Protected User Data: Call Log
- T1636.003 Protected User Data: Contact List
- T1429 Audio Capture
- T1533 Data from Local System
- T1513 Screen Capture
- T1437.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1481.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
- T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1639 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
- T1471 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1630.002 File Deletion
- T1643 Generate Traffic from Victim

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**SURXRAT Full Surveillance Suite (SMS/Contacts/Calls/Location/Audio/Notifications), 23GB LLM Module from Hugging Face, and Ransomware Screen Locker** (`TL-2026-0142-SPL-002`)

Detects post-exploitation: comprehensive Android surveillance — SMS monitoring and sending (OTP interception, fraud), contact/call log exfiltration, Gmail account theft, location tracking, notification interception (2FA tokens), clipboard monitoring, browser history, cellular tower intelligence, WiFi scanning, audio recording, camera capture, file enumeration. Conditional 23GB+ LLM download from Hugging Face triggered by Free Fire MAX/JUJUTSU KAISEN gaming apps or remote C2 command. Ransomware-style screen locker with attacker-defined PIN, customizable lock message, wrong PIN attempt logging to Firebase. Device Admin abuse for storage wipe.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1636.004, T1636.002, T1636.003, T1429, T1533, T1513, T1471, T1630.002
- **Data sources:** proxy_logs, firewall_logs, mtd_logs, firebase_logs
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy sourcetype="proxy_logs"
| search (
    (url_domain="xrat-sisuriya-default-rtdb.firebaseio.com" (http_method="PUT" OR http_method="PATCH"))
    OR (url_domain="*huggingface.co" bytes_out>5368709120)
    OR (url_domain="*googleapis.com" url_path="*script*macros*" http_method="POST")
    OR (url_domain="api.telegram.org" url_path="*bot*" http_method="POST")
    OR (url_domain="*firebasestorage.googleapis.com" http_method="POST")
)
| eval alert_type=case(
    match(url_domain, "xrat-sisuriya") AND (http_method="PUT" OR http_method="PATCH"), "surxrat_data_exfil_firebase",
    match(url_domain, "huggingface") AND bytes_out>5368709120, "surxrat_llm_module_download",
    match(url_path, "script.*macros"), "surxrat_apps_script_exfil",
    match(url_domain, "api.telegram.org") AND match(url_path, "bot"), "surxrat_telegram_bot_exfil",
    match(url_domain, "firebasestorage"), "surxrat_firebase_storage_upload",
    1=1, "surxrat_post_exploit"
)
| table _time, src_ip, url_domain, url_path, http_method, bytes_out, alert_type
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let firebase_exfil = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has "xrat-sisuriya-default-rtdb.firebaseio.com"
| extend AlertType = "surxrat_firebase_rtdb_exfil";
let llm_download = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has "huggingface.co"
| where SentBytes > 1073741824 or ReceivedBytes > 1073741824
| extend AlertType = "surxrat_llm_huggingface_download";
let apps_script = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has "script.google.com" or RemoteUrl has "googleapis.com/macros"
| where not(InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("chrome", "msedge", "firefox", "sheets", "docs"))
| extend AlertType = "apps_script_exfil_non_browser";
let telegram_bot = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has "api.telegram.org" and RemoteUrl has "bot"
| where not(InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("Telegram", "telegram"))
| extend AlertType = "telegram_bot_exfil_non_client";
let firebase_storage = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has "firebasestorage.googleapis.com"
| where not(InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("chrome", "firebase"))
| extend AlertType = "firebase_storage_upload";
union firebase_exfil, llm_download, apps_script, telegram_bot, firebase_storage
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AlertType, RemoteUrl, SentBytes, ReceivedBytes, InitiatingProcessFileName
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Large File Download from Hugging Face (>1GB) — SURXRAT LLM Module Indicator
id: 3a06a301-0fdd-46a5-a216-4b610f7a6564
status: experimental
description: Detects large file downloads (>1GB) from Hugging Face — SURXRAT conditionally downloads 23GB+ LLM module triggered by gaming app detection (Free Fire) or C2 command. LLM used for network latency manipulation, performance degradation masking, and AI-driven capability experimentation.
references:
    - https://cyble.com/blog/surxrat-downloads-large-llm-module-from-hugging-face/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/02/24
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1533
    - attack.t1471
    - attack.t1630.002
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection:
        url.domain|contains: 'huggingface'
        bytes_out|gt: 1073741824
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate ML/AI researchers downloading models from Hugging Face (verify device type — mobile downloads are suspicious)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate ML researchers downloading Hugging Face models (verify mobile vs desktop)
- Legitimate Firebase RTDB usage by enterprise apps

**Tuning notes:** Firebase RTDB PUT/PATCH from mobile = data exfiltration. 23GB+ Hugging Face download from mobile device is definitive SURXRAT LLM. Google Apps Script POST from non-browser = exfil via Google Drive. Telegram Bot API from non-Telegram client = bot-based exfil. 4 exfil channels: RTDB, Storage, Apps Script, Telegram Bot.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- SURXRAT Android RAT Multi-Signal Detection: Firebase C2 + Hugging Face LLM + Telegram Bot Exfil + Apps Script + Brand Impersonation APK (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SURXRAT Credential Harvesting: OTP/SMS Interception, Notification Access (2FA Tokens), Clipboard Monitoring, and Gmail Account Theft (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SURXRAT/ArsinkRAT Campaign IOCs: Firebase C2 Endpoint, Hugging Face LLM Source, Free Fire Gaming Triggers, and MaaS Distribution Channels (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Android RAT Persistence Pattern: BOOT_COMPLETED Receiver, Foreground Service, Launcher Icon Suppression, and Accessibility Service Abuse (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Android Comprehensive Surveillance: SMS Read+Send, Contact/Call Log Exfiltration, Location Tracking, Audio Recording, and Notification Interception (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SURXRAT Ransomware Screen Locker: Device Admin PIN Lock, Wrong Attempt Logging to Firebase, Remote Storage Wipe, and Hybrid Monetization (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SURXRAT MaaS APK Sideloading via Telegram/Discord/MediaFire, Brand Impersonation (50+ Brands), and BOOT_COMPLETED Persistence (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SURXRAT Firebase RTDB C2 Infrastructure (14 Commands), 4 Exfiltration Channels, and Remote Device Control (Unlock/Wipe/Lock) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (2 of 16)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `xrat-sisuriya-default-rtdb[.]firebaseio[.]com`
- URL: `hxxps://huggingface[.]co/`

Full set of 16 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Cyble: SURXRAT — From ArsinkRAT Roots to LLM Module Downloads Signaling Capability Expansion](https://cyble.com/blog/surxrat-downloads-large-llm-module-from-hugging-face/)
- [Zimperium: The Rise of ArsinkRAT — Cloud-Native Android RAT](https://zimperium.com/blog/the-rise-of-arsink-rat)
- [Zimperium ArsinkRAT IOC Repository](https://github.com/Zimperium/IOC/tree/master/2026-01-ArsinkRAT)
- [MITRE ATT&CK Mobile: Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1437/)
- [Hugging Face Model Repository (LLM module source)](https://huggingface.co/)
- [Google Play Protect — Automatic Malware Protection](https://developers.google.com/android/play-protect)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0142
