# ResidentBat — Belarusian KGB Android Spyware at Internet Scale (ADB Sideloading, Custom HTTPS C2, Journalist & Civil Society Targeting)

> ResidentBat is an Android spyware implant attributed to the Belarusian KGB (State Security Committee), used for targeted surveillance against journalists and civil society. Deployed via physical access and ADB sideloading during KGB interrogations, it exfiltrates SMS, call logs, encrypted messenger data, microphone recordings, screen captures, and files. C2 infrastructure uses HTTPS with self-signed certificates (CN=server) on port range 7000-7257 with a distinctive banner fingerprint. Censys identified 10 active C2 nodes across Netherlands (5), Germany (2), Switzerland (2), and Russia (1). Development dates back to at least 2021. Includes remote wipe via DevicePolicyManager.wipeData.

- **Published:** 2026-02-25T02:42:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-02-25T02:42:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0143
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-residentbat-belarusian-spyware-tl-2026-0143.webp?v=8f722d62 (Threadlinqs threat intel: ResidentBat Belarusian KGB Spyware: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0143) — High severity, 16 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0143
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Belarusian KGB (Belarus)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 16 (2 shown free below)

## Description

ResidentBat is a nation-state Android spyware implant attributed to the Belarusian KGB, representing a serious threat to press freedom and civil liberties. First publicly documented in December 2025 by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and RESIDENT.NGO, with internet-scale C2 infrastructure analysis published by Censys in February 2026.

The malware was detected on the smartphone of a journalist who had been questioned by the KGB. During interrogation at KGB premises, the journalist was required to place the smartphone in a locker and show content on the device, unlocking the phone in an officer's presence. RSF and the journalist believe that security forces observed the PIN entry, retrieved the phone during questioning, and installed the spyware via ADB sideloading.

Distribution model is entirely physical-access based — ResidentBat is NOT distributed via the C2. Installation requires: (1) physical access to the target device, (2) ADB (Android Debug Bridge) sideloading of the APK, (3) manual granting of permissions by the attacker, (4) Google Play Protect disabled by the attacker. This hands-on deployment model limits scale but enables highly targeted, persistent surveillance against specific individuals.

Once installed, ResidentBat provides operators comprehensive surveillance capabilities: exfiltration of SMS messages and call logs, access to encrypted messenger data (Signal, Telegram, WhatsApp), real-time and on-demand microphone recording, screen capture, file access and exfiltration, remote command execution, device status queries, and critically — remote wipe via DevicePolicyManager.wipeData to erase evidence.

Configuration is delivered via JSON and includes parameters: server address (sars), upload period (spd), and 'upload data ASAP' flag (asp). The malware masquerades as a regular system app to avoid detection.

C2 infrastructure analysis by Censys reveals distinctive technical characteristics: HTTPS protocol with self-signed certificates (CN=server, typically 3-year validity), narrow port range 7000-7257 for control traffic (some endpoints on 4022), consistent TLS/HTTP banner hash (SHA-256: 6f6676d369e99d61ce152e1e2b2eb6f5e26a4331f4008b5d6fe567edefdbeaca). C2 servers employ hardening: catch-all 200 OK responses with empty bodies for all HTTP paths, static or fake Date headers for anti-forensics, likely client certificate authentication embedded in APK, and server-side device allowlisting.

As of February 2026, Censys identified 10 ResidentBat C2 hosts: Netherlands (5), Germany (2), Switzerland (2), Russia (1). Infrastructure is concentrated in European VPS/datacenter providers and Russian ASNs. Dominant AS: AS29182 (RU-JSCIOT), with AS210976 (TWC-EU), AS44812, AS51395, AS44051 also represented. 5 distinct certificate SHA-256 fingerprints observed with certificate reuse across IP:port endpoints enabling infrastructure clustering.

Code analysis suggests development dates back to at least 2021, with additional variants identified via antivirus platform sample comparison. Parts of the code contain English-language strings, suggesting possible third-party development or design for use beyond Belarus. RSF shared findings with Google, which issued 'government-backed attack' threat notifications to identified targets.

Belarus currently ranks 166th of 180 countries in the 2025 RSF World Press Freedom Index. 32 journalists are currently imprisoned. ResidentBat is part of systematic repression of independent journalism in Belarus under Lukashenko's regime.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1476 Deliver Malicious App via Other Means
- T1474 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1541 Foreground Persistence
- T1655 Masquerading
- T1628.001 Hide Artifacts: Suppress Application Icon
- T1517 Access Notifications
- T1426 System Information Discovery
- T1422 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1636.004 Protected User Data: SMS Messages
- T1636.002 Protected User Data: Call Log
- T1429 Audio Capture
- T1513 Screen Capture
- T1533 Data from Local System
- T1636.003 Protected User Data: Contact List
- T1437.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1481.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
- T1509 Non-Standard Port
- T1646 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1630.002 File Deletion
- T1464 Network Denial of Service

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**ResidentBat Full Surveillance: SMS/Calls/Audio/Screen/Files, Signal/Telegram/WhatsApp Database Extraction, and DevicePolicyManager.wipeData Evidence Destruction** (`TL-2026-0143-SPL-002`)

Detects post-exploitation: comprehensive surveillance — SMS and call log exfiltration, ambient microphone recording, screen capture, file system access, notification interception. Critical: encrypted messenger data access — Signal, Telegram, WhatsApp database extraction (5 E2E bypass methods using root/accessibility). Remote evidence destruction via DevicePolicyManager.wipeData called by non-MDM sideloaded app. JSON config with sars (server), spd (upload period), asp (upload ASAP).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1533, T1636.004, T1636.002, T1636.003, T1429, T1513, T1630.002, T1517
- **Data sources:** mtd_logs, mdm_logs, android_audit_logs
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=mtd sourcetype="mobile_threat_defense"
| search (
    (event_type="data_exfiltration" data_type IN ("sms", "call_log", "contacts", "audio", "screen_capture", "files", "messenger_data"))
    OR (event_type="messenger_access" app IN ("org.thoughtcrime.securesms", "org.telegram.messenger", "com.whatsapp"))
    OR (event_type="device_wipe" source="non_mdm")
    OR (event_type="device_admin" action="activated" source="sideloaded")
)
| eval alert_type=case(
    event_type="messenger_access", "encrypted_messenger_extraction",
    event_type="device_wipe" AND source="non_mdm", "evidence_destruction_wipe",
    event_type="device_admin" AND source="sideloaded", "device_admin_abuse_sideloaded",
    event_type="data_exfiltration" AND data_type="audio", "ambient_audio_recording",
    event_type="data_exfiltration", "surveillance_exfil_".data_type,
    1=1, "residentbat_post_exploit"
)
| table _time, device_id, app_package, data_type, alert_type
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let messenger_access = IntuneDeviceComplianceOrg
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Result has_any ("signal_database", "telegram_database", "whatsapp_database", "messenger_extraction")
| extend AlertType = "encrypted_messenger_data_extraction";
let device_wipe = IntuneDeviceComplianceOrg
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Result has_any ("wipeData", "factory_reset", "device_wipe") and Result has "non_mdm"
| extend AlertType = "evidence_destruction_remote_wipe";
let audio_record = IntuneDeviceComplianceOrg
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Result has "audio_recording" and Result has "background"
| extend AlertType = "ambient_audio_surveillance";
let screen_capture = IntuneDeviceComplianceOrg
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where Result has "screen_capture" and Result has "background"
| extend AlertType = "screen_capture_surveillance";
union messenger_access, device_wipe, audio_record, screen_capture
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AlertType, Result
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Encrypted Messenger Database Access by Non-Messenger App (Signal/Telegram/WhatsApp Extraction)
id: b50d082e-b2b9-44b3-acc3-e0da7b9adb56
status: experimental
description: Detects access to encrypted messenger databases (Signal, Telegram, WhatsApp) by non-messenger apps. ResidentBat extracts E2E encrypted messenger data using 5 bypass methods — root access, accessibility service, backup extraction, content provider abuse, and shared storage access.
references:
    - https://censys.com/blog/residentbat-belarusian-kgb-android-spyware/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/02/25
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1533
    - attack.t1636.004
    - attack.t1630.002
logsource:
    product: android
    category: data_access
detection:
    selection_signal:
        accessed_path|contains: 'org.thoughtcrime.securesms'
    selection_telegram:
        accessed_path|contains: 'org.telegram.messenger'
    selection_whatsapp:
        accessed_path|contains: 'com.whatsapp'
    filter:
        accessing_package|any:
            - 'org.thoughtcrime.securesms'
            - 'org.telegram.messenger'
            - 'com.whatsapp'
    condition: (selection_signal or selection_telegram or selection_whatsapp) and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate backup apps with explicit user consent
    - Enterprise archival solutions for regulated communications
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate backup apps with explicit consent
- Enterprise communication archival

**Tuning notes:** Signal/Telegram/WhatsApp database access by non-messenger = definitive spyware. DevicePolicyManager.wipeData from sideloaded app = evidence destruction. Ambient audio from background = surveillance. JSON config (sars/spd/asp) is ResidentBat-specific. Correlate with C2 on ports 7000-7257.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- ResidentBat Multi-Signal Detection: ADB Sideload + Play Protect Disabled + CN=server C2 + Messenger Extraction + Remote Wipe (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ResidentBat C2 TLS Fingerprinting: Banner Hash, JA3S/JA4S/JARM Signatures, Certificate Reuse Clustering, and Anti-Forensics Detection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ResidentBat Campaign IOCs: C2 IP Addresses, ASN Infrastructure (AS29182/AS210976), Banner Hash, and Censys THREAT-240 Indicators (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ResidentBat System App Masquerading (com.android.*), 5-Layer Persistence, and Launcher Icon Suppression on Android (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ResidentBat JSON C2 Configuration (sars/spd/asp Parameters), Periodic HTTPS Upload Pattern, and Client Certificate Authentication (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ResidentBat Comprehensive Surveillance: System/Network Discovery, Remote Command Execution, Device Status Queries, and File System Enumeration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ResidentBat ADB Sideloading During Physical Access, Google Play Protect Disabled, and System App Masquerading with 15+ Permissions (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- ResidentBat Custom HTTPS C2: Self-Signed CN=server Certificates, Ports [indicator], Banner Hash Fingerprint, and 10 Active C2 Hosts (NL/DE/CH/RU) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (2 of 16)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `5.129.230[.]104`
- File hash: `6f6676d369e99d61ce152e1e2b2eb6f5e26a4331f4008b5d6fe567edefdbeaca`

Full set of 16 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Censys: ResidentBat — Belarusian KGB Android Spyware at Internet Scale](https://censys.com/blog/residentbat-belarusian-kgb-android-spyware/)
- [RSF: Exclusive — RSF Uncovers New Spyware in Belarus](https://rsf.org/en/exclusive-rsf-uncovers-new-spyware-belarus)
- [RESIDENT.NGO Technical Report (PDF)](https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/medias/file/2025/12/report1.pdf)
- [Censys Platform — ResidentBat Threat (THREAT-240)](https://platform.censys.io/explore/threats/THREAT-240)
- [Android Advanced Protection Mode](https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/advanced-protection-mode)
- [RESIDENT.NGO — Digital Security for Civil Society](https://resident.ngo/)
- [RSF Digital Security Lab — Resources for Journalists](https://resources.rsf.org/digital-security-and-spyware-guide/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0143
