# CRESCENTHARVEST — Iranian IRGC-Aligned Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting Protestors & Dissidents via DLL Sideloading with Signed Google Executable

> Acronis Threat Research Unit (TRU) uncovered CRESCENTHARVEST, a cyberespionage campaign targeting supporters of Iran's ongoing protests. The attack delivers a dual-module malware payload — a RAT and infostealer — via DLL sideloading using a signed Google Chrome Software Reporter Tool executable, with initial access through malicious .LNK files disguised as protest-related media bundled in RAR archives.

- **Published:** 2026-02-28T20:25:06Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-02-28T20:25:06Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0159
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-crescentharvest-campaign-tl-2026-0159.webp?v=ad8ea0b3 (Threadlinqs threat intel: CRESCENTHARVEST Iran DLL Sideloading: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0159) — High severity, 23 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0159
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 23 (3 shown free below)

## Description

CRESCENTHARVEST is a targeted cyberespionage campaign discovered by Acronis TRU in early 2026, designed to surveil and compromise Farsi-speaking Iranians sympathetic to the ongoing anti-IRGC protests. The campaign leverages geopolitical developments to deliver malware through social engineering, bundling malicious .LNK files alongside authentic protest images, videos, and a Farsi-language report titled 'the rebellious cities of Iran.'

The infection chain begins with spear-phishing or protracted social engineering, delivering a RAR archive containing decoy media and two malicious .LNK shortcuts disguised as video and image files. When clicked, the .LNK files invoke nested conhost.exe processes with --headless switches to obscure execution, spawning cmd.exe then PowerShell to extract a ZIP payload embedded within the .LNK to the user's %TEMP% folder.

Persistence is established through a novel scheduled task mechanism: instead of traditional startup triggers, the task fires on Windows NetworkProfile EventID 10000, executing the payload whenever the system establishes network connectivity — including after reboot or offline-to-online transitions.

The payload uses DLL sideloading via software_reporter_tool.exe, a legitimate Google-signed binary (Chrome's deprecated Software Reporter Tool, removed in 2023). The executable loads two malicious DLLs using LoadLibraryExA without path restrictions, enabling search order hijacking.

Module 1 (urtcbased140d_d.dll) is a C++ implant that bypasses Chrome's app-bound encryption by instantiating the browser's COM elevation broker (IElevator interface) to decrypt the master key from the Local State file. The decrypted key is saved to APPDATA\decrypted_appbound_key.txt and shared with Module 2 via a named pipe. This module shows heavy code overlap with the open-source ChromElevator project. PDB path artifact: E:\new\stealer\Stealer\x64\Release.

Module 2 (version.dll) is the main RAT/infostealer with extensive capabilities: keylogging via WH_KEYBOARD_LL hooks (logging to C:\Windows\System32\spool\Drivers\color\daT.txt), browser credential harvesting (Chrome, Firefox, Edge), Telegram Desktop session theft, user enumeration, shell command execution, directory traversal, DLL loading, WMI-based security product detection, and system profiling. It uses PEB walking to resolve APIs dynamically and XOR decryption with key '!@#$6756' for string obfuscation. Anti-analysis employs Windows Job Objects to restrict process memory ('Process on a Diet' technique).

C2 communications use JSON over HTTPS via WinHTTP APIs. The implant registers with {"Identifier":"admin"} and receives commands like KeyLog, Tel_s, F_log, Cook, GetUser, shell. A notable bug causes the malware to send the C2 domain as its User-Agent instead of the intended Chrome UA string, reducing evasion effectiveness. Multiple predefined C2 endpoints (/register_agent, /info, /Out, /upload, etc.) exist but most operations route through /Out and /upload.

Infrastructure centers on servicelog-information[.]com resolving to 185.242.105.230 hosted in Riga, Latvia on ASN AS42532 (VEESP-LV-AS), with historical Cloudflare CDN proxying via AS13335. The code shows methodological similarities to campaigns attributed to Iranian threat groups documented by Check Point Research (Educated Manticore, Nimbus Manticore), including similar LNK unpacking scripts, JSON-based C2 communication, and WinHTTP exfiltration patterns.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1546 Event Triggered Execution
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1622 Debugger Evasion
- T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1056.001 Keylogging
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1087.001 Local Account
- T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1560 Archive Collected Data
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography
- T1132.001 Standard Encoding
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
- T1583.003 Virtual Private Server
- T1587.001 Malware
- T1588.002 Tool

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**CRESCENTHARVEST Post-Exploitation — NetworkProfile EventID 10000 Persistence + Keylogging + Chrome Encryption Bypass** (`TL-2026-0159-SPL-002`)

Detects CRESCENTHARVEST post-exploitation: (1) Novel scheduled task persistence triggered by NetworkProfile EventID 10000 (fires on any network connectivity change, including after reboot). (2) Keylogger output file daT.txt in spool\Drivers\color\ directory. (3) Chrome app-bound encryption bypass via COM IElevator broker — decrypted key saved to decrypted_appbound_key.txt. (4) Telegram Desktop tdata session theft staged to C:\Windows\Temp	data.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1053.005, T1546, T1056.001, T1555.003, T1528
- **Data sources:** sysmon, edr_telemetry, file_monitoring, scheduled_task_logs, named_pipe_monitoring
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
| search (
    (EventCode=1 AND Image="*schtasks*" AND CommandLine="*NetworkProfile*" AND CommandLine="*10000*")
    OR (EventCode=11 AND TargetFilename="*spool\\Drivers\\color\\daT.txt")
    OR (EventCode=11 AND TargetFilename="*decrypted_appbound_key*")
    OR (EventCode=11 AND TargetFilename="*\\Temp\\tdata*")
    OR (EventCode=17 AND Image="*software_reporter_tool*")
    OR (EventCode=1 AND Image="*powershell*" AND CommandLine="*IElevator*")
)
| eval indicator=case(
    match(CommandLine, "NetworkProfile.*10000|10000.*NetworkProfile"), "eventid_10000_persistence",
    match(TargetFilename, "daT\.txt"), "keylogger_output",
    match(TargetFilename, "decrypted_appbound_key"), "chrome_encryption_bypass",
    match(TargetFilename, "Temp.*tdata"), "telegram_session_theft",
    EventCode=17, "named_pipe_credential_share",
    match(CommandLine, "IElevator"), "com_elevation_broker",
    1=1, "unknown"
)
| stats count by Computer, User, indicator, Image, TargetFilename, CommandLine, _time
| sort _time
| table _time, Computer, User, indicator, Image, TargetFilename, CommandLine
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
union
(
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
    | where ProcessCommandLine has "NetworkProfile" and ProcessCommandLine has "10000"
    | extend Indicator = "eventid_10000_persistence"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Indicator, ProcessCommandLine
),
(
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName =~ "daT.txt" and FolderPath has "spool\\Drivers\\color"
    | extend Indicator = "keylogger_output"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Indicator, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName
),
(
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName has "decrypted_appbound_key"
    | extend Indicator = "chrome_encryption_bypass"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Indicator, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName
),
(
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FolderPath has "\\Temp\\tdata"
    | extend Indicator = "telegram_session_theft"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Indicator, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName
)
| sort by Timestamp asc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: CRESCENTHARVEST — NetworkProfile EventID 10000 Scheduled Task Persistence
id: b2c3d4e5-f6a7-4b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
status: experimental
description: Detects novel CRESCENTHARVEST persistence — scheduled task triggered by NetworkProfile EventID 10000 (fires on any network connectivity change). Also detects keylogger output and Chrome encryption bypass artifacts.
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/02/28
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1546
    - attack.t1056.001
    - attack.t1555.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'NetworkProfile'
            - '10000'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate scheduled tasks using NetworkProfile EventID 10000 triggers (extremely unusual)
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate NetworkProfile EventID 10000 scheduled task triggers (extremely unusual in enterprise)
- Legitimate Chrome diagnostic tools writing to appbound key paths (none known)

**Tuning notes:** NetworkProfile EventID 10000 as schtasks trigger is CRESCENTHARVEST signature — novel persistence technique not seen in other campaigns. daT.txt in spool\Drivers\color is definitive keylogger output. decrypted_appbound_key.txt is Chrome encryption bypass artifact. Telegram tdata in Windows\Temp is session theft staging.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- CRESCENTHARVEST Exploitation — Chrome App-Bound Encryption Bypass via COM IElevator Broker (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CRESCENTHARVEST Post-Exploitation — Keylogger daT.txt + Browser Credential Harvest + Telegram tdata Theft (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CRESCENTHARVEST Kill Chain Correlation — LNK Delivery to DLL Sideload to JSON C2 Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CRESCENTHARVEST Exploitation — RAR Archive with Malicious .LNK Files + conhost --headless Nesting (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CRESCENTHARVEST DLL Sideloading — Deprecated [indicator] Loading Unsigned Modules (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CRESCENTHARVEST C2 Infrastructure + Anti-Analysis — JSON HTTPS + XOR Deobfuscation + Job Object Anti-Debug (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CRESCENTHARVEST Exploitation — LNK conhost --headless Chain + [indicator] DLL Sideloading (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CRESCENTHARVEST C2 — JSON HTTPS to [indicator] + Multipart Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 23)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.242.105[.]230`
- Domain: `servicelog-information[.]com`
- File hash: `0fbc1f9cbacf076d2ced458e2d1afff0c615640a4647996bca2b651b80f90a6e`

Full set of 23 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Acronis TRU: CRESCENTHARVEST — Iranian Protestors and Dissidents Targeted in Cyberespionage Campaign](https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/crescentharvest-iranian-protestors-and-dissidents-targeted-in-cyberespionage-campaign/)
- [Check Point Research: Educated Manticore — Iran-Aligned Threat Actor Targeting Israel](https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/educated-manticore-iran-aligned-threat-actor-targeting-israel-via-improved-arsenal-of-tools/)
- [Check Point Research: Iranian Educated Manticore Targets Leading Tech Academics](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/iranian-educated-manticore-targets-leading-tech-academics/)
- [Check Point Research: Nimbus Manticore Deploys New Malware Targeting Europe](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/nimbus-manticore-deploys-new-malware-targeting-europe/)
- [Google TAG: Untangling Iran APT42 Operations](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/untangling-iran-apt42-operations)
- [Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: Iran's Social Engineering and Spear-Phishing Campaigns](https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/targeted-manipulation-irans-social-engineering-and-spear-phishing-campaigns)
- [Harfang Lab: RedKitten AI-Accelerated Campaign Targeting Iranian Protests](https://harfanglab.io/insidethelab/redkitten-ai-accelerated-campaign-targeting-iranian-protests/)
- [Unit 42: LNK Malware Execution Techniques](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/lnk-malware/)
- [Iran International: IRGC Monitoring and Suppression of Dissent](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602028998)
- [BBC: IRGC Suppression of Protests](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg5gegrdq3go)
- [DW: How Dangerous Are Iranian Secret Services in Germany](https://www.dw.com/en/how-dangerous-are-iranian-secret-services-in-germany/a-75538204)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0159
