Threat reportAPTTL-2026-0168
GRIDTIDE Backdoor — PRC-Nexus UNC2814 Global Telecom & Government Espionage via Google Sheets C2
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant disrupted a global cyber espionage campaign by PRC-nexus threat actor UNC2814. The actor deployed GRIDTIDE, a novel C-based backdoor abusing Google Sheets API as command-and-control infrastructure, compromising 53 victims across 42 countries targeting telecommunications providers and government organizations.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0168 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | GRIDTIDE Campaign, Operation GRIDTIDE |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| Affected products | Multiple Linux Servers (CentOS, RHEL, Debian-based); Google Google Sheets API (abused, not vulnerable) |
| Attribution | UNC2814 (high confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | China |
| Malware | GRIDTIDE |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1021.004 SSH, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1132.001 Standard Encoding and 7 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | telecommunications, government, intelligence, critical-infrastructure |
| Target regions | Africa, Asia, Americas, Europe, Global — 42 confirmed countries |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 10 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-03-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0168 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 16 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: GRIDTIDE C2/Lateral — Google Sheets API C2 + SoftEther VPN + Fragmented Exfiltration + SSH Lateral Movement
Detects GRIDTIDE C2 and exfiltration: (1) Google Sheets API calls from non-browser processes — sheets.googleapis.com connections with batchUpdate/batchClear/FORMULA endpoints. (2) URL-safe Base64 encoded payloads (- and _ replacing + and /). (3) SoftEther VPN Bridge deployment — encrypted tunnel for lateral movement (infra since July 2018). (4) Data exfiltration in 45KB fragments to spreadsheet cells. (5) SSH lateral movement from compromised host to telecom DB/NMS/VoIP systems using harvested service account credentials.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1102.002, T1573.001, T1132.001, T1572, T1105, T1021.004, T1567.002, T1030, T1005, T1027
- Data sources: proxy_logs, dns_logs, sysmon_linux, network_flow, auditd
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=proxy OR index=dns OR index=sysmon OR index=network sourcetype="proxy" OR sourcetype="dns" OR sourcetype="sysmon:linux" OR sourcetype="bro:conn"
| search (
(url="*sheets.googleapis.com*" AND (url="*batchUpdate*" OR url="*batchClear*" OR url="*FORMULA*") AND NOT process_name IN ("chrome", "firefox", "msedge", "google-chrome", "chromium"))
OR (dns_query="sheets.googleapis.com" AND NOT process_name IN ("chrome", "firefox", "google-chrome", "chromium"))
OR (process_name="vpnbridge" OR process_name="vpnserver" OR cmdline="*softether*" OR cmdline="*vpnbridge*")
OR (process_name="xapt" AND bytes_out>40000)
OR (process_name="xapt" AND dest_port=443)
)
| eval indicator=case(
match(url, "sheets.googleapis.com.*(batchUpdate|batchClear|FORMULA)"), "gridtide_sheets_c2",
match(dns_query, "sheets.googleapis.com"), "sheets_api_dns_nonbrowser",
match(process_name, "vpnbridge|vpnserver") OR match(cmdline, "softether"), "softether_vpn_bridge",
match(process_name, "xapt") AND bytes_out>40000, "gridtide_data_exfil_fragment",
match(process_name, "xapt") AND dest_port=443, "gridtide_c2_https",
1=1, "c2_indicator"
)
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen sum(bytes_out) as total_bytes_out by host, indicator, dest_ip
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")
| eval total_MB=round(total_bytes_out/1048576,2)
| table first_seen, host, indicator, dest_ip, count, total_MBMicrosoft KQL
union
(
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where RequestURL has "sheets.googleapis.com"
| where RequestURL has_any ("batchUpdate", "batchClear", "FORMULA")
| where SourceUserName !has_any ("chrome", "firefox", "edge")
| extend Indicator = "gridtide_google_sheets_c2"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, SourceIP, RequestURL, Indicator
),
(
DnsEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where Name == "sheets.googleapis.com"
| extend Indicator = "sheets_api_dns_resolution"
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ClientIP, Indicator
),
(
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("vpnbridge", "vpnserver", "softether", "SoftEther")
| extend Indicator = "softether_vpn_deployment"
| project TimeGenerated, HostName, Indicator, SyslogMessage
),
(
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where SyslogMessage has "xapt" and SyslogMessage has_any ("connect", "443", "https")
| extend Indicator = "gridtide_outbound_c2"
| project TimeGenerated, HostName, Indicator, SyslogMessage
),
(
Syslog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where SyslogMessage has "Accepted publickey"
| extend SourceIP = extract(@"from (\S+)", 1, SyslogMessage)
| extend User = extract(@"for (\S+)", 1, SyslogMessage)
| where User has_any ("svc_", "service", "nms", "voip", "telecom")
| extend Indicator = "lateral_ssh_service_account"
| project TimeGenerated, HostName, SourceIP, User, Indicator
)
| sort by TimeGenerated ascSigma
title: GRIDTIDE C2 — Google Sheets API Calls from Non-Browser Process
id: c3030003-0168-4003-c003-000000000003
status: experimental
description: Detects GRIDTIDE (UNC2814) command-and-control via Google Sheets API — non-browser processes connecting to sheets.googleapis.com with batchUpdate/batchClear/FORMULA endpoints. Also detects SoftEther VPN Bridge deployment and SSH lateral movement using service accounts. Cell-based C2 protocol uses A1 for commands, A2-An for data, V1 for fingerprint. Data exfiltrated in 45KB fragments.
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/03/02
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1102.002
- attack.t1573.001
- attack.t1132.001
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1105
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.004
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1567.002
- attack.t1030
- attack.collection
- attack.t1005
logsource:
product: linux
category: network_connection
detection:
selection_sheets_api:
DestinationHostname: 'sheets.googleapis.com'
Image|endswith|not:
- '/chrome'
- '/firefox'
- '/chromium'
- '/google-chrome'
selection_softether:
Image|endswith|any:
- '/vpnbridge'
- '/vpnserver'
CommandLine|contains|any:
- 'softether'
- 'vpnbridge'
selection_xapt_network:
Image|endswith: '/xapt'
DestinationPort: 443
condition: selection_sheets_api or selection_softether or selection_xapt_network
falsepositives:
- Legitimate Google Sheets API integration from server-side applications (verify application identity)
- Authorized SoftEther VPN installations for remote access
level: criticalKnown false positives:
- Legitimate server-side Google Sheets API integrations (whitelist known application service accounts)
- Authorized SoftEther VPN installations for remote access (should be documented in asset inventory)
Tuning notes: sheets.googleapis.com from non-browser Linux processes is high-fidelity GRIDTIDE indicator. batchUpdate+batchClear+FORMULA endpoint pattern is GRIDTIDE-specific C2 protocol. SoftEther VPN Bridge on Linux servers is rare — investigate any installation. Monitor for 45KB transfer patterns to Google API endpoints (fragmented exfil). SSH lateral movement using service accounts (svc_*, nms, voip) from compromised hosts indicates UNC2814 telecom pivot. URL-safe Base64 (- and _ chars) in HTTPS payloads is GRIDTIDE encoding.
- GRIDTIDE Exploitation — xapt Process Creation + /var/tmp Execution + Systemd Service Install (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- GRIDTIDE Post-Exploitation — Fingerprint Recon Burst + SSH Key Access + Encrypted Config Artifacts (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- GRIDTIDE C2/Lateral — Google Sheets API Non-Browser + SoftEther VPN + 45KB Fragment Exfil (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- GRIDTIDE Exploitation — nohup /var/tmp Execution + Masquerade Binary + Encrypted Config Artifacts (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- GRIDTIDE Post-Exploitation — xapt Shell Spawning + Fingerprint Pattern + Service Account SSH (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- GRIDTIDE C2/Lateral — Sheets API Polling Pattern + SoftEther VPN Binary + PII Database Queries (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
- GRIDTIDE Exploitation — xapt Binary Deployment + /var/tmp Execution + apt Masquerade + Systemd Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
- GRIDTIDE Post-Exploitation — LotL Reconnaissance + SSH Private Key Harvesting + Base64 Command Execution · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-03-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 16 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0168.
Technical analysis
UNC2814 is a suspected PRC-nexus cyber espionage group tracked by GTIG since 2017 with confirmed intrusions in 42 countries across four continents and suspected targeting in 20+ additional nations. The campaign leverages GRIDTIDE, a sophisticated C-based backdoor that abuses Google Sheets API as a high-availability C2 platform, treating spreadsheet cells as communication channels for command execution, file upload/download, and data exfiltration.
GRIDTIDE's C2 mechanism is cell-based: cell A1 serves as the command polling channel where the backdoor checks for attacker instructions using a <type>-<command_id>-<arg_1>-<arg_2> syntax. Commands include C (execute Base64-encoded bash), U (upload files from spreadsheet to endpoint), and D (download files from endpoint to spreadsheet in 45KB fragments). Cell V1 stores victim system fingerprint data. The malware sanitizes the spreadsheet on execution by clearing 1000 rows using the batchClear API method.
GRIDTIDE uses AES-128-CBC encryption with a 16-byte key stored in a separate file to decrypt Google Drive configuration data containing the service account credentials and spreadsheet ID. All data transfer uses URL-safe Base64 encoding (replacing + and / with - and _) for evasion. The polling mechanism starts at 1-second intervals, backing off to random 5-10 minute intervals after 120 empty polls.
Post-compromise activity includes lateral movement via SSH using service accounts, SoftEther VPN Bridge deployment for encrypted outbound connections (infrastructure dating to July 2018), systemd persistence (/etc/systemd/system/xapt.service), and living-off-the-land reconnaissance. The binary masquerades as 'xapt' (mimicking Debian's apt tool) deployed to /var/tmp/xapt and /usr/sbin/xapt. PII exfiltration targeted telecom subscriber data including names, phone numbers, national IDs, and voter IDs — consistent with surveillance-oriented espionage targeting persons of interest.
Google disrupted the campaign by terminating attacker Cloud Projects, disabling accounts, revoking Sheets API access, and sinkholing infrastructure. UNC2814 has no observed overlap with Salt Typhoon and uses distinct TTPs. Initial access vector was not determined but the actor historically exploits web servers and edge systems.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
collection
discovery
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery
lateral-movement
defense-evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
exfiltration
T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits; T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
execution
command-and-control
T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1132.001 Standard Encoding; T1572 Protocol Tunneling; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
initial-access
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
persistence
credential-access
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Hunt for GRIDTIDE indicators: /var/tmp/xapt, /usr/sbin/xapt, xapt.service systemd unit
- Monitor for Google Sheets API connections from non-browser processes
- Block known UNC2814 infrastructure IPs and domains
- Audit SSH authorized_keys and service accounts for unauthorized entries
- Review SoftEther VPN Bridge installations on Linux endpoints
Workarounds
- Block outbound HTTPS to sheets.googleapis.com from non-browser processes
- Monitor systemd service creation for suspicious service units
- Disable SoftEther VPN if not operationally required
Longer-term hardening
- Implement application whitelisting to prevent execution from /var/tmp/
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for cloud API C2 patterns
- Restrict Google Sheets API access to authorized applications only
- Implement network segmentation for telecom subscriber data systems
- Enable centralized logging with SIEM forwarding for all Linux endpoints
Affected and fixed versions
- Multiple — Linux Servers (CentOS, RHEL, Debian-based)
Vulnerable versions: All - Google — Google Sheets API (abused, not vulnerable)
Vulnerable versions: N/A — legitimate API abuse
Timeline
- GTIG begins tracking UNC2814 as PRC-nexus cyber espionage group targeting telecoms and governments globally.
- VPN configuration metadata indicates UNC2814 leveraging SoftEther VPN infrastructure since July 2018.
- IOCs released by GTIG linked to UNC2814 infrastructure active since at least 2023.
- Mandiant Threat Defense investigation discovers GRIDTIDE backdoor during incident response on CentOS server.
- GTIG investigation confirms 53 victims in 42 countries across four continents, with suspected targeting in 20+ additional nations.
- GTIG publicly releases IOCs linked to UNC2814 infrastructure active since 2023 to help organizations identify activity.
- GTIG publishes detailed technical analysis of GRIDTIDE backdoor and UNC2814 campaign. Source: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/disrupting-gridtide-global-espionage-campaign/
- GTIG, Mandiant, and partners execute coordinated disruption: terminate Cloud Projects, disable accounts, revoke Sheets API access, sinkhole domains.
- SOCRadar and SentinelOne publish threat intelligence coverage referencing GRIDTIDE and UNC2814 campaign.
- ThreadLinqs Intelligence Platform publishes full threat profile TL-2026-0168 with detections and simulations.
- As of 2026-05-29, the GRIDTIDE campaign by PRC-nexus UNC2814 is no longer actively exploited: GTIG/Mandiant disrupted it on 2026-02-25 by terminating attacker Cloud Projects, revoking Sheets API C2 access, sinkholing infrastructure, and releasing IOCs. No CVE is involved (legitimate API abuse) and no post-disruption GRIDTIDE activity or successor is reported, though the long-running actor (tracked since 2017) remains intact and could re-tool.
Sources cited
- SOC Prime — CVE-2026-20127 Detection Content socprime.com · Advisory · 2026-02-26
- GTIG/Mandiant: Disrupting the GRIDTIDE Global Cyber Espionage Campaign Google Cloud · Research · 2026-02-25
- Google Threat Intelligence Group — UNC2814 IOC Release Google Cloud · Research · 2026-02-25
- Mandiant Threat Defense — GRIDTIDE Detection via Google SecOps Google Cloud · Vendor report · 2026-02-25
- Google Cloud Shared Fate Security Model Google Cloud · Vendor report · 2026-02-25
- Google Service Account Authentication Documentation Google Cloud · Vendor report · 2026-02-25
- MITRE ATT&CK — Web Service C2 (T1102) MITRE · Research · 2026-02-25
- Google Sheets API batchClear Documentation developers.google.com · Vendor report · 2026-02-25
- SOCRadar Coverage — UNC2814 GRIDTIDE Campaign socradar.io · Blog · 2026-03-01
- SentinelOne Intelligence Brief — Regional Cyber Threat Landscape SentinelOne · Blog · 2026-02-28
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.