# GRIDTIDE Backdoor — PRC-Nexus UNC2814 Global Telecom & Government Espionage via Google Sheets C2

> Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant disrupted a global cyber espionage campaign by PRC-nexus threat actor UNC2814. The actor deployed GRIDTIDE, a novel C-based backdoor abusing Google Sheets API as command-and-control infrastructure, compromising 53 victims across 42 countries targeting telecommunications providers and government organizations.

- **Published:** 2026-03-02T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-03-02T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0168
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-gridtide-google-sheets-c2-tl-2026-0168.webp?v=2f50183e (Threadlinqs threat intel: UNC2814 GRIDTIDE via Google Sheets C2: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0168) — Critical severity, 16 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0168
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** DORMANT
- **Actor:** UNC2814 (China)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 16

## Description

UNC2814 is a suspected PRC-nexus cyber espionage group tracked by GTIG since 2017 with confirmed intrusions in 42 countries across four continents and suspected targeting in 20+ additional nations. The campaign leverages GRIDTIDE, a sophisticated C-based backdoor that abuses Google Sheets API as a high-availability C2 platform, treating spreadsheet cells as communication channels for command execution, file upload/download, and data exfiltration.

GRIDTIDE's C2 mechanism is cell-based: cell A1 serves as the command polling channel where the backdoor checks for attacker instructions using a <type>-<command_id>-<arg_1>-<arg_2> syntax. Commands include C (execute Base64-encoded bash), U (upload files from spreadsheet to endpoint), and D (download files from endpoint to spreadsheet in 45KB fragments). Cell V1 stores victim system fingerprint data. The malware sanitizes the spreadsheet on execution by clearing 1000 rows using the batchClear API method.

GRIDTIDE uses AES-128-CBC encryption with a 16-byte key stored in a separate file to decrypt Google Drive configuration data containing the service account credentials and spreadsheet ID. All data transfer uses URL-safe Base64 encoding (replacing + and / with - and _) for evasion. The polling mechanism starts at 1-second intervals, backing off to random 5-10 minute intervals after 120 empty polls.

Post-compromise activity includes lateral movement via SSH using service accounts, SoftEther VPN Bridge deployment for encrypted outbound connections (infrastructure dating to July 2018), systemd persistence (/etc/systemd/system/xapt.service), and living-off-the-land reconnaissance. The binary masquerades as 'xapt' (mimicking Debian's apt tool) deployed to /var/tmp/xapt and /usr/sbin/xapt. PII exfiltration targeted telecom subscriber data including names, phone numbers, national IDs, and voter IDs — consistent with surveillance-oriented espionage targeting persons of interest.

Google disrupted the campaign by terminating attacker Cloud Projects, disabling accounts, revoking Sheets API access, and sinkholing infrastructure. UNC2814 has no observed overlap with Salt Typhoon and uses distinct TTPs. Initial access vector was not determined but the actor historically exploits web servers and edge systems.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1059.004 Unix Shell
- T1543.002 Systemd Service
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1552.004 Private Keys
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1021.004 SSH
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication
- T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
- T1132.001 Standard Encoding
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GRIDTIDE C2/Lateral — Google Sheets API C2 + SoftEther VPN + Fragmented Exfiltration + SSH Lateral Movement** (`TL-2026-0168-SPL-003`)

Detects GRIDTIDE C2 and exfiltration: (1) Google Sheets API calls from non-browser processes — sheets.googleapis.com connections with batchUpdate/batchClear/FORMULA endpoints. (2) URL-safe Base64 encoded payloads (- and _ replacing + and /). (3) SoftEther VPN Bridge deployment — encrypted tunnel for lateral movement (infra since July 2018). (4) Data exfiltration in 45KB fragments to spreadsheet cells. (5) SSH lateral movement from compromised host to telecom DB/NMS/VoIP systems using harvested service account credentials.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1102.002, T1573.001, T1132.001, T1572, T1105, T1021.004, T1567.002, T1030, T1005, T1027
- **Data sources:** proxy_logs, dns_logs, sysmon_linux, network_flow, auditd
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy OR index=dns OR index=sysmon OR index=network sourcetype="proxy" OR sourcetype="dns" OR sourcetype="sysmon:linux" OR sourcetype="bro:conn"
| search (
    (url="*sheets.googleapis.com*" AND (url="*batchUpdate*" OR url="*batchClear*" OR url="*FORMULA*") AND NOT process_name IN ("chrome", "firefox", "msedge", "google-chrome", "chromium"))
    OR (dns_query="sheets.googleapis.com" AND NOT process_name IN ("chrome", "firefox", "google-chrome", "chromium"))
    OR (process_name="vpnbridge" OR process_name="vpnserver" OR cmdline="*softether*" OR cmdline="*vpnbridge*")
    OR (process_name="xapt" AND bytes_out>40000)
    OR (process_name="xapt" AND dest_port=443)
)
| eval indicator=case(
    match(url, "sheets.googleapis.com.*(batchUpdate|batchClear|FORMULA)"), "gridtide_sheets_c2",
    match(dns_query, "sheets.googleapis.com"), "sheets_api_dns_nonbrowser",
    match(process_name, "vpnbridge|vpnserver") OR match(cmdline, "softether"), "softether_vpn_bridge",
    match(process_name, "xapt") AND bytes_out>40000, "gridtide_data_exfil_fragment",
    match(process_name, "xapt") AND dest_port=443, "gridtide_c2_https",
    1=1, "c2_indicator"
)
| stats count earliest(_time) as first_seen sum(bytes_out) as total_bytes_out by host, indicator, dest_ip
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")
| eval total_MB=round(total_bytes_out/1048576,2)
| table first_seen, host, indicator, dest_ip, count, total_MB
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
union
(
    CommonSecurityLog
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
    | where RequestURL has "sheets.googleapis.com"
    | where RequestURL has_any ("batchUpdate", "batchClear", "FORMULA")
    | where SourceUserName !has_any ("chrome", "firefox", "edge")
    | extend Indicator = "gridtide_google_sheets_c2"
    | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, SourceIP, RequestURL, Indicator
),
(
    DnsEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
    | where Name == "sheets.googleapis.com"
    | extend Indicator = "sheets_api_dns_resolution"
    | project TimeGenerated, Computer, ClientIP, Indicator
),
(
    Syslog
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
    | where SyslogMessage has_any ("vpnbridge", "vpnserver", "softether", "SoftEther")
    | extend Indicator = "softether_vpn_deployment"
    | project TimeGenerated, HostName, Indicator, SyslogMessage
),
(
    Syslog
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
    | where SyslogMessage has "xapt" and SyslogMessage has_any ("connect", "443", "https")
    | extend Indicator = "gridtide_outbound_c2"
    | project TimeGenerated, HostName, Indicator, SyslogMessage
),
(
    Syslog
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
    | where SyslogMessage has "Accepted publickey"
    | extend SourceIP = extract(@"from (\S+)", 1, SyslogMessage)
    | extend User = extract(@"for (\S+)", 1, SyslogMessage)
    | where User has_any ("svc_", "service", "nms", "voip", "telecom")
    | extend Indicator = "lateral_ssh_service_account"
    | project TimeGenerated, HostName, SourceIP, User, Indicator
)
| sort by TimeGenerated asc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: GRIDTIDE C2 — Google Sheets API Calls from Non-Browser Process
id: c3030003-0168-4003-c003-000000000003
status: experimental
description: Detects GRIDTIDE (UNC2814) command-and-control via Google Sheets API — non-browser processes connecting to sheets.googleapis.com with batchUpdate/batchClear/FORMULA endpoints. Also detects SoftEther VPN Bridge deployment and SSH lateral movement using service accounts. Cell-based C2 protocol uses A1 for commands, A2-An for data, V1 for fingerprint. Data exfiltrated in 45KB fragments.
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/03/02
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1102.002
    - attack.t1573.001
    - attack.t1132.001
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1105
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1021.004
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567.002
    - attack.t1030
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection_sheets_api:
        DestinationHostname: 'sheets.googleapis.com'
        Image|endswith|not:
            - '/chrome'
            - '/firefox'
            - '/chromium'
            - '/google-chrome'
    selection_softether:
        Image|endswith|any:
            - '/vpnbridge'
            - '/vpnserver'
        CommandLine|contains|any:
            - 'softether'
            - 'vpnbridge'
    selection_xapt_network:
        Image|endswith: '/xapt'
        DestinationPort: 443
    condition: selection_sheets_api or selection_softether or selection_xapt_network
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Google Sheets API integration from server-side applications (verify application identity)
    - Authorized SoftEther VPN installations for remote access
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate server-side Google Sheets API integrations (whitelist known application service accounts)
- Authorized SoftEther VPN installations for remote access (should be documented in asset inventory)

**Tuning notes:** sheets.googleapis.com from non-browser Linux processes is high-fidelity GRIDTIDE indicator. batchUpdate+batchClear+FORMULA endpoint pattern is GRIDTIDE-specific C2 protocol. SoftEther VPN Bridge on Linux servers is rare — investigate any installation. Monitor for 45KB transfer patterns to Google API endpoints (fragmented exfil). SSH lateral movement using service accounts (svc_*, nms, voip) from compromised hosts indicates UNC2814 telecom pivot. URL-safe Base64 (- and _ chars) in HTTPS payloads is GRIDTIDE encoding.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- GRIDTIDE Exploitation — xapt Process Creation + /var/tmp Execution + Systemd Service Install (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE Post-Exploitation — Fingerprint Recon Burst + SSH Key Access + Encrypted Config Artifacts (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE C2/Lateral — Google Sheets API Non-Browser + SoftEther VPN + 45KB Fragment Exfil (KQL) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE Exploitation — nohup /var/tmp Execution + Masquerade Binary + Encrypted Config Artifacts (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE Post-Exploitation — xapt Shell Spawning + Fingerprint Pattern + Service Account SSH (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE C2/Lateral — Sheets API Polling Pattern + SoftEther VPN Binary + PII Database Queries (Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE Exploitation — xapt Binary Deployment + /var/tmp Execution + apt Masquerade + Systemd Persistence (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE Post-Exploitation — LotL Reconnaissance + SSH Private Key Harvesting + Base64 Command Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [GTIG/Mandiant: Disrupting the GRIDTIDE Global Cyber Espionage Campaign](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/disrupting-gridtide-global-espionage-campaign/)
- [Google Threat Intelligence Group — UNC2814 IOC Release](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/disrupting-gridtide-global-espionage-campaign/#iocs)
- [Mandiant Threat Defense — GRIDTIDE Detection via Google SecOps](https://cloud.google.com/security/products/mandiant-managed-threat-hunting)
- [Google Cloud Shared Fate Security Model](https://cloud.google.com/security/shared-fate)
- [Google Service Account Authentication Documentation](https://docs.cloud.google.com/iam/docs/service-account-overview)
- [SOCRadar Coverage — UNC2814 GRIDTIDE Campaign](https://socradar.io/blog/cyber-reflections-us-israel-iran-war/)
- [SentinelOne Intelligence Brief — Regional Cyber Threat Landscape](https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/sentinelone-intelligence-brief-iranian-cyber-activity-outlook/)
- [SOC Prime — CVE-2026-20127 Detection Content](https://socprime.com/blog/cve-2026-20127-vulnerability/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK — Web Service C2 (T1102)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/)
- [Google Sheets API batchClear Documentation](https://developers.google.com/sheets/api/reference/rest/v4/spreadsheets.values/batchClear)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0168
