Skip to navigation

Threat reportAPTTL-2026-0170

Dust Specter APT — Iran-Nexus Targeting Iraqi Government Officials with TWINTASK/GHOSTFORM Malware

highACTIVE

Zscaler ThreatLabz discovered a suspected Iran-nexus threat actor dubbed Dust Specter targeting government officials in Iraq with previously undocumented malware including SPLITDROP dropper, TWINTASK worker module, TWINTALK C2 orchestrator, and GHOSTFORM consolidated backdoor. The campaign uses password-protected RAR archives, VLC DLL sideloading, file-based command polling, and Arabic-language Google Form lures masquerading as Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs surveys.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0170
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMultiple Windows endpoints
AttributionDust Specter (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusIran
MalwareGHOSTFORM, SPLITDROP, TWINTALK, TWINTASK
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1132.001 Standard Encoding, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder and 6 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment, diplomatic, military, foreign-affairs
Target regionsIraq, Middle East
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources8 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-03-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0170 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 21 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Dust Specter Initial Access — SPLITDROP .NET Dropper + VLC DLL Sideloading + TWINTASK PowerShell Execution

Detects Dust Specter Attack Chain 1 exploitation phase: (1) Password-protected RAR 'mofa-Network-code.rar' delivery targeting Iraqi MoFA officials. (2) SPLITDROP 32-bit .NET dropper executing from user temp/downloads — masquerades as WinRAR, decrypts CheckFopil.PolGuid.zip via AES-256-CBC + PBKDF2 (10k iterations) to C:\ProgramData\PolGuid\. (3) VLC.exe DLL sideloading from ProgramData — legitimate VLC loads malicious libvlc.dll (TWINTASK) from non-standard directory. (4) TWINTASK spawns PowerShell child processes from VLC.exe — 15-second polling loop reads in.txt, strips leading anti-analysis character, Base64 decodes, executes with 600s timeout. Critical: VLC.exe should never run from ProgramData or spawn PowerShell.

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
(
  (EventCode=1 Image="*\\VLC.exe" Image="*\\ProgramData\\*" NOT Image="*\\Program Files*\\VideoLAN\\*")
  OR (EventCode=1 Image="*\\powershell.exe" ParentImage="*\\VLC.exe")
  OR (EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\libvlc.dll" ImageLoaded="*\\ProgramData\\*" NOT ImageLoaded="*\\Program Files*\\VideoLAN\\*")
  OR (EventCode=1 Image="*\\*.exe" CommandLine="*CheckFopil*" OR CommandLine="*PolGuid*")
  OR (EventCode=11 TargetFilename="*\\ProgramData\\PolGuid\\*")
)
| eval detection_phase=case(
    EventCode=1 AND match(Image,"(?i)vlc\.exe") AND match(Image,"(?i)ProgramData"), "VLC_SIDELOAD_FROM_PROGRAMDATA",
    EventCode=1 AND match(Image,"(?i)powershell\.exe") AND match(ParentImage,"(?i)vlc\.exe"), "TWINTASK_POWERSHELL_SPAWN",
    EventCode=7 AND match(ImageLoaded,"(?i)libvlc\.dll") AND match(ImageLoaded,"(?i)ProgramData"), "MALICIOUS_LIBVLC_DLL_LOAD",
    EventCode=1 AND (match(CommandLine,"(?i)CheckFopil") OR match(CommandLine,"(?i)PolGuid")), "SPLITDROP_DROPPER_EXECUTION",
    EventCode=11 AND match(TargetFilename,"(?i)ProgramData\\PolGuid"), "POLGUID_STAGING_DIRECTORY",
    true(), "OTHER"
)
| stats earliest(_time) as first_seen latest(_time) as last_seen values(detection_phase) as phases values(Image) as processes values(ParentImage) as parent_processes values(CommandLine) as commands dc(detection_phase) as phase_count by Computer, User
| where phase_count >= 2
| eval risk_score=case(phase_count>=4, "CRITICAL", phase_count>=3, "HIGH", phase_count>=2, "MEDIUM", true(), "LOW")
| table Computer, User, first_seen, last_seen, phase_count, risk_score, phases, processes, parent_processes, commands

Microsoft KQL

union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceImageLoadEvents, DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where
    (ActionType == "ProcessCreated" and FileName =~ "vlc.exe" and FolderPath contains "ProgramData" and FolderPath !contains "Program Files")
    or (ActionType == "ProcessCreated" and FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "vlc.exe")
    or (ActionType == "ImageLoaded" and FileName =~ "libvlc.dll" and FolderPath contains "ProgramData" and FolderPath !contains "Program Files")
    or (ActionType == "ProcessCreated" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "CheckFopil" or ProcessCommandLine contains "PolGuid"))
    or (ActionType == "FileCreated" and FolderPath contains @"ProgramData\PolGuid")
| extend DetectionPhase = case(
    FileName =~ "vlc.exe" and FolderPath contains "ProgramData", "VLC_SIDELOAD",
    FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "vlc.exe", "TWINTASK_PS_SPAWN",
    FileName =~ "libvlc.dll" and FolderPath contains "ProgramData", "MALICIOUS_DLL_LOAD",
    ProcessCommandLine contains "CheckFopil" or ProcessCommandLine contains "PolGuid", "SPLITDROP_EXEC",
    FolderPath contains @"ProgramData\PolGuid", "POLGUID_STAGING",
    "OTHER")
| summarize FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), Phases=make_set(DetectionPhase), PhaseCount=dcount(DetectionPhase), Processes=make_set(FileName) by DeviceName, AccountName
| where PhaseCount >= 2

Sigma

title: Dust Specter SPLITDROP Dropper + VLC DLL Sideloading + TWINTASK PowerShell Spawn
id: d8a1f3e7-4b2c-4d9e-a5f6-1c3b7e8d9a0f
status: experimental
description: Detects Dust Specter exploitation chain - SPLITDROP .NET dropper extracting to ProgramData\PolGuid, VLC.exe DLL sideloading from non-standard directory, and TWINTASK PowerShell execution from VLC process tree
references:
    - https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threats/TL-2026-0170
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/03/02
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.execution
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1574.002
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1027.013
    - attack.t1140
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_vlc_sideload:
        Image|endswith: '\VLC.exe'
        Image|contains: 'ProgramData'
    filter_legitimate_vlc:
        Image|contains: 'Program Files\VideoLAN'
    selection_ps_from_vlc:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\VLC.exe'
    selection_splitdrop:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'CheckFopil'
            - 'PolGuid'
    condition: (selection_vlc_sideload and not filter_legitimate_vlc) or selection_ps_from_vlc or selection_splitdrop
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate VLC portable installations in ProgramData (extremely rare in enterprise)
    - Software packaging tools that bundle VLC in non-standard locations
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate VLC portable installations in ProgramData (extremely rare in enterprise — VLC installs to Program Files\VideoLAN)
  • Software packaging tools that temporarily place VLC binaries in ProgramData during deployment

Tuning notes: Whitelist any legitimate VLC portable installations by hash. The PowerShell-from-VLC rule has near-zero FP and should not be tuned down. PolGuid directory name is campaign-unique — high confidence indicator.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Dust Specter Initial Access — SPLITDROP Dropper + VLC DLL Sideloading + TWINTASK Execution via Defender/Sentinel · unlock with TL Creds
  • Dust Specter Post-Exploitation — WingetUI Sideloading + Dual Registry Persistence + GHOSTFORM Detection via Defender/Sentinel · unlock with TL Creds
  • Dust Specter C2/Exfiltration — TWINTALK JWT Beacon + Data Collection + Chunked Upload via Defender/Sentinel · unlock with TL Creds
  • Dust Specter Exploitation — SPLITDROP Extraction + VLC/[indicator] Sideloading + TWINTASK PowerShell Command Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • Dust Specter Post-Exploitation — WingetUI/[indicator] Sideloading + Registry Run Key Persistence + GHOSTFORM Indicators + File-Based C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Dust Specter C2/Exfiltration — JWT Bearer Beacon with Chrome/135 UA + Non-Browser HTTPS from Sideloaded Processes + Data Staging · unlock with TL Creds
  • Dust Specter Post-Exploitation — WingetUI Sideloading + Registry Persistence + GHOSTFORM Invisible Form + File-Based C2 Polling · unlock with TL Creds
  • Dust Specter C2/Exfiltration — TWINTALK JWT Beacon + Chrome/135 UA Anomaly + Diplomatic Data Collection + Chunked Exfil · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-03-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 21 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0170.

21 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Dust Specter is a previously unreported, suspected Iran-nexus advanced persistent threat actor discovered by Zscaler ThreatLabz targeting government officials in Iraq. The campaign deploys four previously undocumented malware components — SPLITDROP, TWINTASK, TWINTALK, and GHOSTFORM — through two distinct attack chains that demonstrate sophisticated operational security and stealth.

Attack Chain 1 begins with a password-protected RAR archive named 'mofa-Network-code.rar' (password: 92,110-135_118-128) containing a 32-bit .NET binary disguised as a WinRAR application. This binary, dubbed SPLITDROP, functions as an AES-256-CBC encrypted dropper that prompts the victim for a password, then decrypts an embedded resource (CheckFopil.PolGuid.zip) using PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA1 (10,000 iterations, 256-bit key) derived from the entered password. Upon successful decryption, SPLITDROP extracts contents to C:\ProgramData\PolGuid\ and displays a deceptive error message ('The download did not complete successfully') while operating in the background.

SPLITDROP then launches a legitimate VLC media player binary (VLC.exe) from the extracted directory, which sideloads a malicious DLL named libvlc.dll — the TWINTASK component. TWINTASK is a worker module that enters an infinite polling loop every 15 seconds, checking C:\ProgramData\PolGuid\in.txt for Base64-encoded commands. It strips the first character (an anti-analysis measure), decodes the remaining Base64, and executes the result via PowerShell with a 600-second timeout. Output and errors are captured to C:\ProgramData\PolGuid\out.txt.

TWINTASK's initial in.txt comes prepopulated with commands that establish persistence via HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry keys for both VLC.exe and WingetUI.exe, and launches the second sideloading chain. WingetUI.exe (a legitimate graphical package manager interface) sideloads hostfxr.dll — the TWINTALK C2 orchestrator.

TWINTALK is a 32-bit .NET DLL that implements the C2 communication protocol. It generates unique bot IDs stored in programTemp.log, constructs requests with runtime-generated URI paths using random hex strings with checksums (seeded 0xABCDEF), and authenticates using JSON Web Tokens (JWT) signed with HS256 and a single underscore character as the secret. The JWT iat field stores bot ID and version, camouflaging the beacon as a standard timestamp. TWINTALK uses randomized beaconing delays (108-180 seconds base, with -10% to +50% jitter) and the C2 server randomizes JSON response key names on each response to evade pattern-matching detection. TWINTALK supports three command types: command execution (type 0, via file-based coordination with TWINTASK), file download (type 1), and file upload (type 2 with Base64 encoding plus random character prepend).

Attack Chain 2 consolidates all functionality into a single binary called GHOSTFORM. Key differences include: use of Arabic-language Google Forms masquerading as Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs official surveys as decoy lures; creative delayed execution via invisible Windows forms (opacity 0.001, size 10x15, hidden from taskbar) instead of sleep APIs; bot ID derived from the .NET assembly creation timestamp rather than random generation; and a Global\_ mutex for single-instance enforcement. GHOSTFORM eliminates the filesystem footprint of file-based polling by using in-memory PowerShell execution.

The campaign reflects established Iran-nexus tradecraft — targeting Iraqi government officials aligns with Iran's strategic intelligence collection priorities in its sphere of influence. The malware family names, C2 architecture, and operational patterns suggest a well-resourced team with software development discipline. The split worker/orchestrator architecture in Attack Chain 1 and the consolidated approach in Attack Chain 2 may represent an evolution in the actor's tooling or parallel development tracks for different operational requirements.

The UK's NCSC issued a concurrent warning about heightened Iranian cyberattack risks amid Middle East conflict, providing additional geopolitical context for this campaign's timing. No CVEs are associated with this threat — exploitation relies entirely on social engineering and DLL sideloading of legitimate applications.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1560 Archive Collected Data

defense-evasion

T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1564.003 Hidden Window

exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

execution

T1059.001 PowerShell; T1204.002 Malicious File

command-and-control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1132.001 Standard Encoding

discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery

persistence

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

initial-access

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

stealth

T1574.001 DLL

resource-development

T1587.001 Malware; T1608.001 Upload Malware

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block known Dust Specter IOCs (file hashes, C2 domains) at perimeter and endpoint
  • Hunt for SPLITDROP artifacts: C:\ProgramData\PolGuid\ directory structure, PolGuid.zip
  • Hunt for TWINTASK file-based C2: in.txt and out.txt in ProgramData\PolGuid\
  • Audit HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for unexpected VLC or WingetUI entries
  • Search for anomalous VLC.exe or WingetUI.exe execution from ProgramData directories
  • Block password-protected RAR archives with 'mofa' or ministry-related filenames at email gateway

Workarounds

  • Disable macro execution and script execution from untrusted sources
  • Restrict PowerShell execution policy to signed scripts only
  • Block VLC.exe and WingetUI.exe execution from C:\ProgramData directories via AppLocker
  • Monitor and restrict outbound HTTP/HTTPS from non-browser processes

Longer-term hardening

  • Implement application whitelisting to prevent DLL sideloading from non-standard directories
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for PowerShell execution from sideloaded DLLs
  • Monitor for JWT-authenticated C2 beaconing with randomized URI paths and response key names
  • Implement DLL sideloading protection — enforce DLL loading from trusted directories only
  • Train government personnel on spear-phishing with password-protected archives and fake government surveys
  • Monitor for invisible Windows forms with near-zero opacity as delayed execution technique
  • Implement network segmentation for government endpoints handling sensitive communications

Affected and fixed versions

  • Multiple — Windows endpoints
    Vulnerable versions: Windows 10; Windows 11; Windows Server

Timeline

  • ThreadLinqs Intelligence Platform publishes TL-2026-0170 with full MITRE mapping, IOCs, detections, and simulation coverage.
  • Two attack chains identified: Chain 1 (split worker/orchestrator with SPLITDROP→VLC sideload→TWINTASK→WingetUI sideload→TWINTALK) and Chain 2 (consolidated GHOSTFORM with in-memory execution).
  • GHOSTFORM variant identified using Arabic-language Google Forms impersonating Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs official surveys as social engineering decoys.
  • ThreatLabz maps Dust Specter TTPs to MITRE ATT&CK framework — DLL sideloading (T1574.002), PowerShell execution (T1059.001), registry persistence (T1547.001), JWT-based C2 authentication.
  • Zscaler ThreatLabz publishes IOCs including malware hashes, C2 infrastructure, and file-based artifacts for Dust Specter campaign.
  • UK NCSC issues warning about heightened Iranian cyberattack risks amid ongoing Middle East conflict, providing geopolitical context for Dust Specter campaign timing.
  • Zscaler ThreatLabz publishes first public disclosure of Dust Specter APT campaign targeting Iraqi government officials with TWINTASK, TWINTALK, GHOSTFORM, and SPLITDROP malware. Source: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/dust-specter-apt-targets-government-officials-iraq
  • As of 2026-05-29, this Iran-nexus Dust Specter espionage campaign (SPLITDROP/TWINTASK/TWINTALK/GHOSTFORM, no CVE) remains ACTIVE, disclosed by Zscaler ThreatLabz in March 2026 from January 2026 activity against Iraqi officials. No reporting shows the actor disrupted, the campaign concluded, or a successor superseding it, and Iran-nexus APTs persist with custom AI-assisted malware.

Sources cited

Previous and next in apt

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.

Threadlinqs Intelligence — Real-Time Threat Detection Platform

// threat_feed
$ sort --newest
Showing all threats

Live intelligence console

Threat level

Latest Threats