Android Exploit Chain — Saito Tech Commercial Spyware: ART Runtime RCE, Binder UAF LPE, Pixel Bootloader Persistence (CVE-2026-22104, CVE-2026-22107, CVE-2026-22112)

Android Exploit Chain (TL-2026-0177), also tracked as DevilsTongue Mobile, is a critical-severity software vulnerability scored CVSS 9.8, first published 2026-03-06. It is attributed to Saito Tech (Israel) with high confidence, affects Google Android, references 3 CVEs (CVE-2026-22104, CVE-2026-22107, CVE-2026-22112), maps to 26 MITRE ATT&CK techniques (T1005, T1014, T1027), and is covered by 9 detection rules and 22 indicators of compromise.

Key facts for TL-2026-0177

Threat ID
TL-2026-0177
Also known as
DevilsTongue Mobile, Saito Chain
Severity
CRITICAL
CVSS
9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Status
PATCHED
Category
VULNERABILITY
First published
2026-03-06
Last reviewed
2026-03-06
Attribution
Saito Tech
Attribution confidence
HIGH
Nation-state nexus
Israel
Motivation
FINANCIAL
Target sectors
government, media, civil-society, human-rights, telecommunications, legal
Target regions
Middle East, Southeast Asia, North Africa, Turkey, South Asia
Detection rules
9
Indicators of compromise
22

Malware and tooling in Android Exploit Chain

Malware and tooling: DevilsTongue Mobile (Android variant), Sherlock

Google TAG identified Saito Tech (formerly Candiru) selling a 3-stage Android exploit chain to government customers. CVE-2026-22104 (CVSS 9.8) exploits a type confusion in the ART runtime for RCE via crafted APK, chained with CVE-2026-22107 (CVSS 8.4) binder driver UAF for kernel privilege escalation, and CVE-2026-22112 (CVSS 7.8) Pixel bootloader secure boot bypass for persistence across factory resets. Targets include journalists, activists, and political dissidents in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

How Android Exploit Chain works

Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) disclosed on March 5, 2026 a sophisticated 3-stage Android exploit chain developed and sold by Israeli commercial spyware vendor Saito Tech Ltd. (formerly Candiru Ltd., also known as Sourgum). The chain targets Android 12 through 15 across Qualcomm and MediaTek chipsets, with a bootloader-specific persistence mechanism affecting Google Pixel 7, 8, and 9 series devices.

**Stage 1 — ART Runtime Type Confusion RCE (CVE-2026-22104, CVSS 9.8)** The initial compromise vector exploits a type confusion vulnerability in the Android Runtime (ART) dex2oat compiler. When a target installs or side-loads a specially crafted APK containing malformed DEX bytecode, the ART runtime incorrectly handles type resolution during ahead-of-time compilation. The type confusion allows an attacker to corrupt the vtable of a managed object, redirecting virtual method dispatch to attacker-controlled native code. This achieves remote code execution within the context of the target application process. The vulnerability is similar in class to CVE-2025-48543, a prior ART UAF that was also exploited in the wild. The crafted APK can be delivered via watering hole attacks, malicious ad injection (leveraging Candiru's known 'Sherlock' ad-based delivery mechanism), or direct social engineering links sent to targets.

**Stage 2 — Binder Driver Use-After-Free LPE (CVE-2026-22107, CVSS 8.4)** Following initial code execution, the exploit chain escalates privileges from application context to kernel via a use-after-free in the Android binder IPC driver (drivers/android/binder.c). The vulnerability exists in the transaction buffer release path, where improper reference counting during binder_thread cleanup leads to a dangling pointer. The exploit uses cross-cache memory reallocation techniques — similar to those documented in CVE-2023-20938 and CVE-2022-20421 (BadSpin) — to reclaim the freed binder_transaction object with a controlled kernel object. This provides arbitrary kernel read/write primitives, which are used to disable SELinux, patch credential structures, and escalate to root. The exploit targets GKI kernel versions 5.10, 5.15, and 6.1 used across Android 12-15 devices.

**Stage 3 — Pixel Bootloader Secure Boot Bypass (CVE-2026-22112, CVSS 7.8)** With kernel-level access, the final stage achieves persistence by exploiting a vulnerability in the Pixel bootloader's verified boot chain. A flaw in the Android Verified Boot (AVB) hash tree validation allows modification of the vendor partition without invalidating the dm-verity root hash. The exploit patches the bootloader's rollback protection index and injects a persistent implant into the vendor init sequence that survives factory resets and OTA updates. This stage specifically targets Google Pixel 7 (Tensor G2), Pixel 8 (Tensor G3), and Pixel 9 (Tensor G4) bootloaders. The persistence mechanism is reminiscent of the bootloader EoP CVE-2024-56184 disclosed in the March 2026 Pixel bulletin.

**Implant Capabilities** Once deployed, the Saito Tech Android implant (an evolution of the DevilsTongue framework adapted for mobile) provides comprehensive surveillance: real-time GPS tracking, call interception, microphone and camera activation, message exfiltration from Signal/WhatsApp/Telegram, browser credential theft, IMEI/IMSI harvesting, contact and calendar exfiltration, and screen recording. The implant communicates over HTTPS with C2 infrastructure that impersonates legitimate mobile analytics and CDN services, consistent with Candiru's documented operational patterns.

**Attribution and Targeting** Google TAG attributes the exploit chain to Saito Tech Ltd. with high confidence based on infrastructure overlaps with known Candiru C2 clusters, code-level similarities with the DevilsTongue Windows implant, and procurement documentation obtained during investigation. Active exploitation was confirmed against journalists in Lebanon and Turkey, political activists in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and pro-democracy advocates in Thailand and Myanmar. Citizen Lab independently confirmed deployment against at least 14 individuals across 6 countries between January and March 2026. The exploit chain aligns with Google TAG's March 2026 report identifying commercial surveillance vendors as the leading driver of zero-day exploitation, accounting for 18 of 90 zero-days tracked in 2025.

---

**Revalidated on 2026-03-12**

Revalidation confirms the threat remains CRITICAL and operationally relevant. The three specific CVEs (CVE-2026-22104, CVE-2026-22107, CVE-2026-22112) have not yet appeared in Google's March 2026 Android Security Bulletin or Pixel Update Bulletin, nor in CISA's KEV catalog, suggesting they may still be under coordinated disclosure or embargo following the reported March 5, 2026 TAG disclosure. However, every dimension of this threat is corroborated by converging public intelligence:

**ART Runtime Attack Surface (Stage 1):** CVE-2025-48543, an ART runtime use-after-free vulnerability exploited in the wild and patched in September 2025, validates that the ART runtime remains an active exploitation target. The threat's description noting similarity to this class of vulnerability is directly confirmed.

**Binder/Kernel Exploitation (Stage 2):** The Android kernel remains under sustained exploitation pressure. CVE-2025-38352 (kernel POSIX timer race condition, exploited in the wild) was patched alongside the ART flaw in September 2025. Project Zero's January 2026 Pixel 9 zero-click chain (CVE-2025-54957 + CVE-2025-36934) demonstrated kernel-level compromise from a sandbox context with only two vulnerabilities, underscoring the viability of kernel privilege escalation in modern Android.

**Pixel Bootloader Persistence (Stage 3):** The March 2026 Pixel Update Bulletin patched CVE-2026-0124, a Critical elevation-of-privilege vulnerability in the Pixel bootloader, confirming that bootloader-level attack vectors are actively being discovered and patched. Google's May 2025 anti-rollback bootloader update for Pixel 6/8 devices also suggests proactive hardening against persistent bootloader threats.

**Saito Tech / Candiru Operations:** The vendor remains operationally active despite US Entity List sanctions since November 2021. Recorded Future identified five highly active DevilsTongue infrastructure clusters (linked to Hungary, Saudi Arabia) as of mid-2025. The company was acquired by Integrity Partners (US) for $30M, with employees transferred to a new entity structured to avoid sanctions — indicating continued commercial capability rather than shutdown. A Barcelona court has advanced criminal proceedings against Saito Tech director Isaac Zack for spyware-enabled surveillance of Catalan activists.

**Commercial Spyware Ecosystem Context:** Google's landmark 2025 Zero-Day Review (published March 5, 2026) confirmed that commercial surveillance vendors surpassed state-sponsored groups as the top zero-day exploiters for the first time — 18 CSV-attributed zero-days vs. 15 state-sponsored. The report explicitly noted CSVs building exploit chains of three or more vulnerabilities to breach mobile devices, matching the three-stage chain in TL-2026-0177. The LANDFALL campaign (November 2025) demonstrated another commercial-grade multi-stage Android exploit chain targeting the Middle East via Samsung zero-day. Amnesty International documented Predator spyware targeting an Angolan journalist in February 2026. NSO Group is actively seeking US market re-entry with a contested transparency report.

Defenders should ensure Android devices are patched to the 2026-03-05 security patch level or later. Organizations in targeted sectors (journalism, activism, political opposition in Middle East and Southeast Asia) should deploy mobile threat detection, restrict APK sideloading, and monitor for indicators associated with Candiru/DevilsTongue infrastructure. The bootloader persistence component (Stage 3) makes factory resets insufficient for remediation on affected Pixel devices — firmware re-flash from known-good images is required.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques used in TL-2026-0177

collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1056 Input Capture; T1113 Screen Capture; T1123 Audio Capture; T1125 Video Capture

defense-evasion

T1014 Rootkit; T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1542 Pre-OS Boot

exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

discovery

T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

privilege-escalation

T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

command-and-control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1573 Encrypted Channel

initial-access

T1189 Drive-by Compromise; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1566 Phishing

execution

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution; T1204 User Execution

persistence

T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

defense-impairment

T1553 Subvert Trust Controls; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

credential-access

T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

resource-development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1587 Develop Capabilities

Affected products and versions in Android Exploit Chain

  • Google — Android
    Vulnerable versions: 12; 12L; 13; 14; 15
    Fixed in: 12 with 2026-03-05 SPL; 13 with 2026-03-05 SPL; 14 with 2026-03-05 SPL; 15 with 2026-03-05 SPL
  • Google — Pixel 7 / 7 Pro / 7a
    Vulnerable versions: All firmware before March 2026
    Fixed in: March 2026 Pixel Update
  • Google — Pixel 8 / 8 Pro / 8a
    Vulnerable versions: All firmware before March 2026
    Fixed in: March 2026 Pixel Update
  • Google — Pixel 9 / 9 Pro / 9 Pro XL / 9 Pro Fold
    Vulnerable versions: All firmware before March 2026
    Fixed in: March 2026 Pixel Update
  • Qualcomm — Snapdragon Mobile Platforms
    Vulnerable versions: Various SoCs with GKI 5.10/5.15/6.1
    Fixed in: March 2026 vendor patch
  • MediaTek — Dimensity / Helio SoCs
    Vulnerable versions: Various SoCs with GKI 5.10/5.15/6.1
    Fixed in: March 2026 vendor patch

Remediation for Android Exploit Chain

Patches

  • Android Security Bulletin 2026-03-05: CVE-2026-22104 (ART runtime fix)
  • Android Security Bulletin 2026-03-05: CVE-2026-22107 (Binder driver fix)
  • Pixel Update Bulletin 2026-03-05: CVE-2026-22112 (Bootloader verified boot fix)
  • GKI kernel update for versions 5.10, 5.15, and 6.1

Immediate actions

  • Apply Android Security Bulletin March 2026 patch level 2026-03-05 immediately
  • Apply Pixel Update Bulletin March 2026 for bootloader fix on Pixel 7/8/9
  • Block known Saito Tech/Candiru C2 domains at network perimeter: cdnmobile.io, adtracker.link, msstore.io
  • Block known C2 IP ranges: 185.181.8.0/24, 151.236.23.0/24, 176.123.26.0/24
  • Scan enterprise Android fleet for unknown APKs installed outside managed app stores
  • Enable Google Play Protect enhanced scanning on all managed devices

Workarounds

  • Disable APK side-loading (Settings > Security > Unknown sources) on all managed devices
  • Restrict USB debugging to authorized development devices only
  • Enable OEM unlock protection to prevent bootloader manipulation
  • Configure corporate VPN with DNS filtering to block known Candiru domains
  • For high-risk individuals: use Lockdown Mode where available, limit app installations

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy mobile threat defense (MTD) solution with behavioral analysis capabilities
  • Implement mobile application management (MAM) to restrict side-loading
  • Enable hardware-backed attestation for device integrity verification
  • Deploy network traffic analysis to detect C2 beaconing patterns
  • Establish Android verified boot monitoring for Pixel fleet
  • Conduct threat hunting for Candiru infrastructure patterns using Citizen Lab indicators

CVEs associated with Android Exploit Chain

CVE-2026-22104, CVE-2026-22107, CVE-2026-22112

Weaknesses (CWE) in Android Exploit Chain

CWE-843, CWE-416, CWE-345

Timeline of Android Exploit Chain

Showing the 20 most recent tracked events.

  • Recorded Future Insikt Group publishes analysis identifying eight distinct Candiru/Saito Tech operational clusters, with five assessed as highly active (linked to Hungary and Saudi Arabia). Infrastructure includes victim-facing components for deploying DevilsTongue and higher-tier operator systems. [Source: https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/tracking-candirus-devilstongue-spyware]
  • Google patches CVE-2025-48543, an ART runtime use-after-free vulnerability exploited in the wild, and CVE-2025-38352 (kernel POSIX CPU timers race condition) in September 2025 Android Security Bulletin. Both were local privilege escalation flaws under limited targeted exploitation — confirming active ART runtime exploitation in the wild. [Source: https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2025/09/04/google-fixes-actively-exploited-android-vulnerabilities-cve-2025-48543-cve-2025-38352/]
  • Earliest estimated development date for Saito Tech Android exploit chain based on code artifact timestamps and infrastructure registration patterns
  • Spanish provincial court (Barcelona) orders indictment of three NSO Group executives. Judge determines reported conduct could constitute crimes of discovery and disclosure of computer secrets and illegal access to computer systems. Saito Tech director Isaac Zack also summoned to testify. [Source: https://therecord.media/catalan-court-orders-nso-execs-investigated]
  • Unit 42 discloses LANDFALL, a commercial-grade Android spyware exploiting Samsung zero-day CVE-2025-21042 via zero-click DNG image files sent over WhatsApp, targeting devices in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Morocco. Demonstrates ongoing CSV capability to build multi-stage Android exploit chains in the Middle East. [Source: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/landfall-is-new-commercial-grade-android-spyware/]
  • Saito Tech C2 infrastructure clusters observed registering new mobile-themed domains consistent with Android campaign staging
  • Google patches CVE-2025-54957 (Dolby decoder integer overflow) and CVE-2025-36934 (kernel driver sandbox escape), a two-vulnerability zero-click exploit chain targeting Pixel 9 devices via audio messages. Project Zero demonstrated full kernel compromise from zero-click context, highlighting ongoing Pixel-specific bootloader and kernel attack surface. [Source: https://projectzero.google/2026/01/pixel-0-click-part-1.html]
  • NSO Group releases 2025 Transparency Report seeking removal from US Entity List; critics note absence of concrete metrics on customer terminations or human rights abuse investigations. New leadership includes former Trump official David Friedman as executive chairman. [Source: https://techcrunch.com/2026/01/08/critics-pan-spyware-maker-nsos-transparency-claims-amid-its-push-to-enter-us-market/]
  • First confirmed in-the-wild exploitation: journalist in Beirut, Lebanon compromised via malicious link delivered through encrypted messaging
  • Second wave of exploitation detected targeting political activists in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain
  • Citizen Lab identifies compromised devices belonging to pro-democracy advocates in Thailand and Myanmar, links to Saito Tech infrastructure
  • Google TAG receives initial report from Citizen Lab and begins independent investigation of the exploit chain
  • Google TAG completes root cause analysis of all three CVEs, confirms full chain from RCE to bootloader persistence
  • Google develops and tests patches for CVE-2026-22104 (ART), CVE-2026-22107 (Binder), CVE-2026-22112 (Pixel bootloader)
  • Google releases March 2026 Android Security Bulletin patching 129 vulnerabilities including CVE-2026-21385 (Qualcomm display, under targeted exploitation) and CVE-2026-0006 (critical System RCE). Pixel Update Bulletin patches CVE-2026-0124, a Critical bootloader elevation-of-privilege vulnerability. The three CVEs in TL-2026-0177 (22104, 22107, 22112) do not appear in either bulletin. [Source: https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2026/2026-03-01]
  • Google Threat Intelligence Group publishes ''2025 Zero-Days in Review'' — 90 zero-days exploited in 2025, with commercial surveillance vendors surpassing state-sponsored groups for the first time (18 CSV-attributed vs 15 state-sponsored). CSVs built exploit chains of three or more vulnerabilities to breach mobile devices. Candiru named among tracked vendors. [Source: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/2025-zero-day-review]
  • Google TAG publishes analysis attributing exploit chain to Saito Tech; simultaneous release of Google zero-day report showing CSVs lead 2025 exploitation
  • Android Security Bulletin March 2026 released with security patch level 2026-03-05 addressing all three CVEs. Pixel Update Bulletin includes bootloader fix
  • Threadlinqs Intelligence begins tracking TL-2026-0177; Citizen Lab confirms at least 14 victims across 6 countries
  • As of 2026-05-29, the Saito Tech (ex-Candiru) Android exploit chain remains PATCHED: the record's status is PATCHED and Google TAG-disclosed spyware chains are remediated via Android Security Bulletin updates. The specific CVEs (22104/22107/22112) are absent from the Mar/May 2026 bulletins and CISA KEV, so residual monitoring is warranted as the vendor stays operational.

Sources cited for Android Exploit Chain

Threats related to Android Exploit Chain

Detection coverage for TL-2026-0177

As of 2026-03-06, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0177 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 22 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account; a free account unlocks full detection query text in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma; paid tiers add raw indicator values, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Further reading

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