# UNC2814 GRIDTIDE Backdoor — China-Nexus Telecom & Government Espionage Campaign Exploiting Google Sheets API for C2

> China-nexus threat actor UNC2814 (Gallium) conducted a massive espionage campaign breaching 53 telecommunications and government organizations across 42 countries using the GRIDTIDE backdoor, a C-based implant that abuses Google Sheets API for covert command-and-control. Google GTIG disrupted the campaign on February 25, 2026, after confirming suspected operations in over 70 countries total.

- **Published:** 2026-03-07T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-03-07T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0195
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-unc2814-gridtide-backdoor-tl-2026-0195.webp?v=af79f972 (Threadlinqs threat intel: UNC2814 (Gallium) China-Nexus GRIDTIDE: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0195) — Critical severity, 24 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0195
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** MONITORING
- **Actor:** UNC2814 (China)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 24 (3 shown free below)

## Description

UNC2814 is a suspected People's Republic of China (PRC)-nexus cyber espionage group tracked by Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) since at least 2017. The group has a long history of targeting international governments and global telecommunications organizations across Africa, Asia, and the Americas.

The campaign's centerpiece is GRIDTIDE, a novel C-based backdoor that weaponizes the Google Sheets API as a high-availability command-and-control platform. Rather than using traditional C2 servers, GRIDTIDE treats Google Sheets spreadsheets as bidirectional communication channels, disguising malicious traffic as legitimate Google API calls. The backdoor uses a locally stored 16-byte AES-128 CBC cryptographic key file (xapt.cfg) to decrypt its Google Drive configuration, which contains the threat actor's service account credentials, spreadsheet IDs, and private keys.

GRIDTIDE's C2 protocol operates through a cell-based polling mechanism: cell A1 is monitored every second for attacker commands, cell V1 stores victim fingerprint data (username, endpoint name, OS details, local IP, working directory, language settings, timezone), and cells A2-An facilitate data transfer. The backdoor encodes all communications using URL-safe Base64 and transfers files in 45KB fragments. Upon initialization, GRIDTIDE sanitizes its operational spreadsheet by deleting the first 1,000 rows across columns A-Z using the batchClear method to erase prior activity traces. After 120 consecutive failed command polling attempts, GRIDTIDE implements anti-detection jitter by randomizing polling intervals to 5-10 minutes.

The malware binary is deployed as /var/tmp/xapt, deliberately named to masquerade as the legacy xapt Debian/Ubuntu package management utility. Initial execution uses the command 'nohup ./xapt' to ensure process persistence across session termination. For boot persistence, UNC2814 creates a systemd service at /etc/systemd/system/xapt.service that spawns new instances from /usr/sbin/xapt.

Lateral movement is achieved via SSH using compromised service accounts, supplemented by living-off-the-land binaries for reconnaissance and privilege escalation. UNC2814 also deploys SoftEther VPN Bridge to establish encrypted outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure, with VPN configuration metadata indicating this specific infrastructure has been in use since July 2018.

The campaign's targeting is consistent with telecommunications espionage operations: UNC2814 targets systems containing personally identifiable information (full names, phone numbers, dates and places of birth, voter ID numbers, national ID numbers) to identify, track, and monitor persons of interest. Access to telecom infrastructure enables interception of call data records, SMS messages, and lawful interception systems.

As of February 18, 2026, GTIG confirmed 53 victims across 42 countries with suspected infections in at least 20 additional nations, making this one of the most far-reaching espionage campaigns encountered in recent years. Google's disruption actions included terminating all attacker-controlled Google Cloud Projects, disabling GRIDTIDE C2 infrastructure, revoking Google Sheets API access, sinkholing known domains, and issuing formal victim notifications. The campaign is distinct from the Salt Typhoon campaign, involving separate victims and tradecraft.

---

**Revalidated on 2026-03-12**

No substantive changes required to the current description. All technical details (GRIDTIDE C2 mechanics, xapt binary masquerading, cell-based polling protocol, AES-128 CBC key file, SoftEther VPN bridge, systemd persistence, 45KB file fragmentation, 120-attempt jitter threshold) are fully corroborated by the Google Cloud Blog primary source and independent reporting. One contextual enhancement could be added: noting that UNC2814/Gallium's operational history extends to at least 2012 per Brandefense and ESET tracking (predating the 2017 GTIG tracking start date in the current description), and that this campaign is part of a broader wave of concurrent PRC-nexus telecom espionage operations including UNC3886 (Singapore), UAT-7290 (South Asia), and UAT-9244 (South America). Additionally, the Gallium alias is well-documented by Microsoft (2019), Palo Alto Unit 42 (PingPull, 2022), and ESET (2024) as the same cluster, which the current entry correctly notes.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1543 Create or Modify System Process
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1070 Indicator Removal
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1102 Web Service
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1565 Data Manipulation

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GRIDTIDE SoftEther VPN Tunneling and UNC2814 C2 Infrastructure — Lateral Movement Phase** (`TL-2026-0195-SPL-003`)

Detects SoftEther VPN Bridge artifacts (hamcore.se2, vpn_bridge.config), connections to known UNC2814 infrastructure IPs (130.94.6.228, 38.60.194.21), dynamic DNS domains (ddnsfree.com, freeddns.org), and anomalous SSH lateral movement patterns consistent with GRIDTIDE campaign tradecraft.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1572, T1573, T1021.004, T1041
- **Data sources:** sysmon, firewall, dns, edr
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="sysmon:linux" OR index=network sourcetype="pan:traffic" OR sourcetype="cisco:asa"
(
  (EventCode=11 (TargetFilename="*hamcore.se2" OR TargetFilename="*vpn_bridge.config"))
  OR (EventCode=3 (DestinationIp="38.60.194.21" OR DestinationIp="130.94.6.228"))
  OR (EventCode=3 (DestinationHostname="*ddnsfree.com" OR DestinationHostname="*freeddns.org"))
  OR (dest_ip="38.60.194.21" OR dest_ip="130.94.6.228")
  OR (query="1cv2f3d5s6a9w.ddnsfree.com" OR query="admina.freeddns.org")
)
| eval indicator_type=case(
    like(TargetFilename, "%hamcore.se2") OR like(TargetFilename, "%vpn_bridge.config"), "softether_vpn_artifact",
    DestinationIp="38.60.194.21" OR dest_ip="38.60.194.21", "vpn_c2_server",
    DestinationIp="130.94.6.228" OR dest_ip="130.94.6.228", "payload_staging_server",
    like(DestinationHostname, "%ddnsfree.com") OR like(DestinationHostname, "%freeddns.org") OR like(query, "%ddnsfree.com") OR like(query, "%freeddns.org"), "ddns_c2_domain",
    1=1, "other"
)
| stats count by indicator_type, src_ip, DestinationIp, dest_ip, TargetFilename, query, _time
| sort - _time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let network_iocs = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIP in ("38.60.194.21", "130.94.6.228")
    or RemoteUrl has_any ("1cv2f3d5s6a9w.ddnsfree.com", "admina.freeddns.org", "ddnsfree.com", "freeddns.org")
| extend IndicatorType=case(
    RemoteIP == "38.60.194.21", "vpn_c2_server",
    RemoteIP == "130.94.6.228", "payload_staging_server",
    RemoteUrl has "ddnsfree.com" or RemoteUrl has "freeddns.org", "ddns_c2_domain",
    "other")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, IndicatorType;
let file_iocs = DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where FileName in ("hamcore.se2", "vpn_bridge.config")
| extend IndicatorType="softether_vpn_artifact"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, IndicatorType;
let ssh_lateral = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RemotePort == 22
| summarize SSHTargets=dcount(RemoteIP), TargetIPs=make_set(RemoteIP, 20) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where SSHTargets > 3
| extend IndicatorType="ssh_lateral_movement";
union network_iocs, file_iocs, ssh_lateral
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: GRIDTIDE SoftEther VPN and UNC2814 Network Infrastructure — C2/Lateral Movement
id: c5a9b0e3-6d4f-4a8c-b12e-3f4a5b6c7d8e
status: experimental
description: Detects SoftEther VPN Bridge artifacts, connections to known UNC2814 infrastructure IPs (130.94.6.228, 38.60.194.21), and dynamic DNS domains associated with GRIDTIDE campaign C2 and lateral movement
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/disrupting-gridtide-global-espionage-campaign
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/03/07
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1572
    - attack.t1573
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1021.004
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1041
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: any
detection:
    selection_ioc_ip:
        dst_ip:
            - '38.60.194.21'
            - '130.94.6.228'
    selection_ddns:
        dst_host|endswith:
            - '.ddnsfree.com'
            - '.freeddns.org'
    selection_ddns_specific:
        dst_host:
            - '1cv2f3d5s6a9w.ddnsfree.com'
            - 'admina.freeddns.org'
    condition: selection_ioc_ip or selection_ddns or selection_ddns_specific
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of SoftEther VPN in the environment
    - Legitimate connections to dynamic DNS services from non-server systems
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate SoftEther VPN deployment in the environment
- Legitimate connections to dynamic DNS services from non-server systems (unlikely from production infrastructure)

**Tuning notes:** Remove IOC IPs if confirmed sinkholed by Google. Add internal SSH bastion hosts to exclusion list for SSH lateral movement detection. Adjust SSHTargets threshold (>3 unique targets/hour) based on environment norms.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- GRIDTIDE Process-Level Google Sheets API C2 — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE [indicator] Persistence Artifacts on Linux — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE SSH Lateral Movement and VPN Tunnel Establishment — C2 Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE Google-API-Java-Client User-Agent C2 — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE [indicator] Process Execution and nohup Persistence — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- SoftEther VPN Bridge Deployment and DDNS C2 Infrastructure — C2/Lateral Movement Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE Google Sheets API C2 Polling — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GRIDTIDE Systemd Persistence and [indicator] Binary Masquerading — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 24)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `130.94.6[.]228`
- Domain: `1cv2f3d5s6a9w[.]ddnsfree[.]com`
- URL: `hxxps://sheets[.]googleapis[.]com:443/v4/spreadsheets//values/A1?valueRenderOption=FORMULA`

Full set of 24 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Google Cloud Blog: Disrupting the GRIDTIDE Global Cyber Espionage Campaign](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/disrupting-gridtide-global-espionage-campaign)
- [Google GTIG UNC2814 Disruption Report](https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/unc2814-disruption/)
- [Mandiant/GTIG: UNC2814 GRIDTIDE - Telecom Espionage at Scale](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc2814-gridtide-telecom-espionage)
- [BleepingComputer: Chinese Cyberspies Breached Dozens of Telecom Firms, Govt Agencies](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/chinese-cyberspies-breached-dozens-of-telecom-firms-govt-agencies/)
- [The Hacker News: Google Disrupts UNC2814 GRIDTIDE Campaign After 53 Breaches](https://thehackernews.com/2026/02/google-disrupts-unc2814-gridtide.html)
- [SecurityWeek: Google Disrupts Chinese Cyberespionage Campaign](https://www.securityweek.com/google-disrupts-chinese-cyberespionage-campaign-targeting-telecoms-governments/)
- [Security Affairs: Google GTIG Disrupted China-Linked APT UNC2814](https://securityaffairs.com/188521/apt/google-gtig-disrupted-china-linked-apt-unc2814-halting-attacks-on-53-orgs-in-42-countries.html)
- [The Register: Google and Friends Disrupt Suspected Beijing Espionage Op](https://www.theregister.com/2026/02/25/google_and_friends_disrupt_unc2814/)
- [CyberInsider: Google Disrupts Campaign Spying on Telecom Providers in 70 Countries](https://cyberinsider.com/google-disrupts-campaign-spying-on-telecom-providers-in-70-countries/)
- [CSO Online: China-Linked Hackers Used Google Sheets to Spy on Telecoms](https://www.csoonline.com/article/4137834/china-linked-hackers-used-google-sheets-to-spy-on-telecoms-and-governments-across-42-countries.html)
- [VirusTotal IOC Collection: UNC2814 GRIDTIDE](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/collection/5ff573f02433c41ead328396131c5567be798fa755ca8b66db659cb4ddf68ebe/iocs)
- [Industrial Cyber: UNC2814 Exploited Google Sheets API for Stealth C2](https://industrialcyber.co/ransomware/china-linked-unc2814-exploited-google-sheets-api-for-stealth-c2-targeting-telecom-government-networks/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0195
