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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-0214

Lotus Blossom APT Supply Chain Compromise of Notepad++ Update Infrastructure (CVE-2025-15556)

criticalPATCHED

Chinese state-sponsored group Lotus Blossom (Spring Dragon) compromised Notepad++ update infrastructure from June to December 2025 to deliver the previously undocumented Chrysalis backdoor and Cobalt Strike Beacon via trojanized NSIS installers. The campaign targeted government, telecommunications, aviation, energy, and software development organizations across Southeast Asia, South America, the United States, and Europe for espionage and persistent network access.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0214, CVE-2025-15556
Also known asNotepad++ Supply Chain Attack, Operation Chrysalis
SeverityCRITICAL
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2025-15556 (added )
EPSSCVE-2025-15556: 1.7% (77.5th percentile)
Affected productsNotepad++ Notepad++; Notepad++ WinGUp (Generic Updater)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-494
AttributionLotus Blossom (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusChina
MalwareChrysalis
ToolsCobalt Strike, metasploit
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1049 System Network Connections Discovery, T1055 Process Injection, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1074 Data Staged and 15 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment, telecommunications, aviation, energy, financial, manufacturing, software-development, cloud-hosting, critical-infrastructure, defense
Target regionsSoutheast Asia, South America, North America, Europe, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources12 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-03-12, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0214 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 38 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Chrysalis Backdoor — DLL Sideloading and Registry Persistence

Detects the post-exploitation phase where the Chrysalis backdoor establishes persistence through DLL sideloading (BluetoothService.exe loading log.dll from %APPDATA%\Bluetooth) and registry Run key creation (BluetoothSvc, SvcUpdate). The renamed Bitdefender Submission Wizard binary executing from a user-writable directory with a co-located malicious DLL is a high-fidelity indicator of Lotus Blossom Chrysalis infection chain 3.

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
(EventCode=7 ImageLoaded="*\\log.dll" Image="*\\BluetoothService.exe" NOT Image="C:\\Program Files*")
OR
(EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\BluetoothSvc" OR TargetObject="*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\SvcUpdate")
OR
(EventCode=1 Image="*\\BluetoothService.exe" CurrentDirectory="*\\AppData\\Roaming\\Bluetooth\\*")
| eval detection_phase=case(
    EventCode=7, "dll_sideload",
    EventCode=13, "registry_persistence",
    EventCode=1, "sideload_execution"
)
| stats count values(detection_phase) as phases values(Image) as images values(ImageLoaded) as loaded_dlls values(TargetObject) as registry_keys by Computer, User
| where count > 0
| table Computer, User, phases, images, loaded_dlls, registry_keys, count

Microsoft KQL

let dll_sideload = DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "BluetoothService.exe"
| where FileName =~ "log.dll"
| where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, FolderPath, Phase="DLL_Sideload";
let reg_persistence = DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RegistryKey has_any ("BluetoothSvc", "SvcUpdate")
| where RegistryKey has "CurrentVersion\\Run"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName="", FolderPath=RegistryKey, Phase="Registry_Persistence";
let sideload_exec = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "BluetoothService.exe"
| where FolderPath contains "AppData\\Roaming\\Bluetooth"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, FolderPath, Phase="Sideload_Execution";
union dll_sideload, reg_persistence, sideload_exec
| summarize Count=count(), Phases=make_set(Phase), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp) by DeviceName, AccountName

Sigma

title: Chrysalis Backdoor — DLL Sideloading and Registry Persistence
id: 6282673e-f55a-4313-921f-26354c54382b
status: experimental
description: Detects Chrysalis backdoor persistence via BluetoothService.exe DLL sideloading of log.dll from non-standard paths and registry Run key creation for BluetoothSvc/SvcUpdate.
references:
    - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/03/12
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1574.002
    - attack.t1547.001
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1036.005
    - cve.2025.15556
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: image_load
detection:
    selection_image:
        Image|endswith: '\BluetoothService.exe'
    selection_dll:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\log.dll'
    filter_legitimate_path:
        Image|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files\'
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
    condition: selection_image and selection_dll and not filter_legitimate_path
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate Bluetooth management software using a binary named BluetoothService.exe with a log.dll dependency installed outside Program Files
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Legitimate Bluetooth management software using a binary named BluetoothService.exe with a log.dll dependency installed outside of Program Files directories

Tuning notes: Allowlist verified Bluetooth management applications by publisher signature. Add additional sideloading pair detection for ProShow.exe + malicious DLL in %APPDATA%\ProShow\. Monitor for service creation events (EventCode 4697) referencing user-writable paths.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Lotus Blossom Supply Chain — NSIS Installer and Lua Script Injection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Chrysalis Backdoor — Mutex Creation and Service Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lotus Blossom Multi-Stage Loader — Non-Standard Port C2 and Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lotus Blossom Supply Chain — Notepad++ Updater Spawning Suspicious Process · unlock with TL Creds
  • Chrysalis Backdoor — Hidden Staging Directory and Encrypted Payload Artifacts · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lotus Blossom C2 — Chrysalis DNS Query and Cobalt Strike Beacon Traffic · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lotus Blossom Supply Chain — Trojanized Notepad++ Update Execution · unlock with TL Creds
  • Lotus Blossom C2 — Chrysalis Beacon and Exfiltration Activity · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-03-12, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 38 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0214.

Sample indicators (3 of 38)

  • IP address: 95.179.213[.]0
  • Domain: api[.]skycloudcenter[.]com
  • File hash: a511be5164dc1122fb5a7daa3eef9467e43d8458425b15a640235796006590c9

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 38 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

38 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Between June and December 2025, the Chinese state-sponsored advanced persistent threat group Lotus Blossom (also tracked as Spring Dragon, Billbug, Thrip, Lotus Panda, and Raspberry Typhoon) conducted a sophisticated supply chain attack by compromising the hosting infrastructure used to distribute updates for Notepad++, one of the most widely used open-source text editors globally.

The attackers gained access to the hosting provider's server managing Notepad++ updates and selectively redirected update traffic for targeted users to attacker-controlled servers. Rather than conducting a mass compromise, the group employed surgical targeting — intercepting update requests from specific IP ranges or organizational networks and serving trojanized NSIS installers (update.exe) while allowing other users to receive legitimate updates unmodified.

Three distinct infection chains were identified:

Chain 1 (Cobalt Strike via Lua Injection): The malicious NSIS installer executes a compiled Lua script (alien.ini) that injects shellcode via the EnumWindowStationsW API, ultimately deploying a Cobalt Strike HTTPS Beacon for command-and-control operations. Artifacts are staged in %appdata%\Adobe\Scripts\.

Chain 2 (ProShow DLL Sideloading): A legitimate but vulnerable ProShow executable is dropped and used to sideload a malicious DLL, establishing persistence and delivering secondary payloads. Artifacts are staged in %appdata%\ProShow\.

Chain 3 (Chrysalis Backdoor via Bluetooth DLL Sideloading): The NSIS installer drops BluetoothService.exe (a renamed legitimate Bitdefender Submission Wizard binary) alongside a malicious log.dll. When BluetoothService.exe calls the exported functions LogInit and LogWrite, log.dll loads an encrypted shellcode blob, decrypts it using the XOR key 'CRAZY', and executes the Chrysalis backdoor. The backdoor creates a hidden directory at %appdata%\Bluetooth\ and establishes persistence via Windows services (T1543.003) and registry run keys (T1547.001).

The Chrysalis backdoor represents a significant evolution in Lotus Blossom's capabilities. It features custom API hashing using FNV-1a constants (base 0x811C9DC5, prime 0x1000193), RC4 encryption for configuration data (key: qwhvb^435h&*7) and C2 response decryption (key: vAuig34%^325hGV), and integration with Microsoft Warbird — an undocumented code protection framework — to cloak malicious shellcode via NtQuerySystemInformation with the SystemCodeFlowTransition operation (WbHeapExecuteCall). The backdoor supports a comprehensive command set including interactive shell access, file operations, process creation, drive enumeration, and data exfiltration over encrypted HTTPS channels.

C2 infrastructure was rotated throughout the campaign across multiple servers: 59.110.7.32:8880, 124.222.137.114:9999, api.skycloudcenter.com, and api.wiresguard.com. Additional infrastructure included domains cdncheck.it.com, safe-dns.it.com, and self-dns.it.com for payload staging and DNS-based communication. Data exfiltration was observed via temp.sh file upload service.

The vulnerability was assigned CVE-2025-15556 (CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check) reflecting the absence of cryptographic signature validation in the WinGUp update mechanism. Notepad++ released version 8.9.1 with XML signature validation (XMLDSig) and plans for enhanced signing enforcement in version 8.9.2.

Attribution to Lotus Blossom is assessed with high confidence based on infrastructure overlap with previously documented campaigns, the group's established use of DLL sideloading techniques, targeting patterns consistent with Chinese state espionage interests in Southeast Asian government and telecommunications sectors, and code-level similarities between the Chrysalis backdoor and the group's previously documented Sagerunex implant family.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1074 Data Staged

discovery

T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1049 System Network Connections Discovery; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery

defense-evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1055 Process Injection; T1070 Indicator Removal; T1134 Access Token Manipulation; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1480 Execution Guardrails; T1620 Reflective Code Loading

exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1106 Native API; T1204 User Execution

command-and-control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1573 Encrypted Channel

initial-access

T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

persistence

T1543 Create or Modify System Process; T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

stealth

T1574 Hijack Execution Flow

Remediation

Patches

  • Notepad++ 8.9.1 — adds XMLDSig signature validation for updates
  • Notepad++ 8.9.2 — enhanced signing enforcement (upcoming)

Immediate actions

  • Update Notepad++ to version 8.9.1 or later manually — do NOT use the built-in updater on older versions
  • Block known C2 IPs at perimeter: 95.179.213.0, 45.76.155.202, 45.32.144.255, 45.77.31.210, 61.4.102.97, 59.110.7.32, 124.222.137.114
  • Block known C2 domains: api.skycloudcenter.com, api.wiresguard.com, cdncheck.it.com, safe-dns.it.com, self-dns.it.com
  • Hunt for Global\Jdhfv_1.0.1 mutex creation events across endpoints
  • Search for BluetoothService.exe or log.dll in %appdata%\Bluetooth\ directories
  • Monitor for gup.exe (Notepad++ updater) spawning unusual child processes

Workarounds

  • Disable automatic updates in Notepad++ and apply updates manually from verified sources
  • Block execution of gup.exe via application control policies until updated
  • Use network-level controls to block access to Notepad++ update servers from sensitive environments

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for DLL sideloading and shellcode injection
  • Implement application allowlisting to prevent renamed legitimate binaries from executing
  • Enforce software update signature validation across all third-party applications
  • Segment networks to limit lateral movement from compromised developer workstations
  • Monitor for Cobalt Strike Beacon traffic patterns on egress
  • Implement DNS sinkholing for known Lotus Blossom infrastructure domains

Affected and fixed versions

  • Notepad++ — Notepad++
    Vulnerable versions: 8.9 and earlier
    Fixed in: 8.9.1 (XMLDSig validation); 8.9.2 (enhanced signing enforcement)
  • Notepad++ — WinGUp (Generic Updater)
    Vulnerable versions: All versions prior to 8.9.1 update
    Fixed in: Patched in 8.9.1 with certificate/signature verification

Timeline

  • Lotus Blossom gains initial access to Notepad++ hosting provider infrastructure, beginning the supply chain compromise
  • Attackers begin selectively redirecting Notepad++ update traffic to attacker-controlled servers delivering trojanized NSIS installers
  • C2 communication observed to locked-ioc-26 for Cobalt Strike Beacon delivery via Lua script injection chain
  • C2 infrastructure shifted to locked-ioc-29; Lua script injection variant and EnumWindowStationsW API exploitation observed
  • Chrysalis backdoor deployment via BluetoothService.exe DLL sideloading chain begins targeting organizations in Southeast Asia and South America
  • October variant shifts to DLL sideloading via renamed Bitdefender utility (BluetoothService.exe) loading malicious log.dll with XOR-encrypted shellcode
  • Active payload delivery from compromised infrastructure ceases
  • Hosting provider reports attacker credential-based redirection access terminated
  • Notepad++ creator Don Ho alerts users to traffic hijacking incidents affecting update infrastructure
  • Rapid7 publishes full technical analysis of Chrysalis backdoor and Lotus Blossom attribution; CVE-2025-15556 assigned
  • IOC repository published on GitHub with Falcon LogScale queries, YARA/Sigma rules, and MITRE ATT&CK mappings
  • Notepad++ 8.9.1 released with XMLDSig signature validation for update mechanism
  • Palo Alto Unit 42 publishes expanded analysis identifying additional infrastructure and targets in US and European organizations
  • ASEC AhnLab includes Lotus Blossom Notepad++ campaign in February 2026 APT Group Trend Report
  • As of 2026-05-29, CVE-2025-15556 is patched (Notepad++ v8.8.9 added signature verification; v8.9.2 adds XMLDSig) and is in CISA KEV, while the Lotus Blossom campaign concluded after access ended ~Dec 2 2025 with infra dead and no ongoing exploitation reported. The actor stays active broadly, but this specific campaign is over and remediated.

Sources cited

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 12 sources; published ; last updated —.

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