Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-0217
Malicious Packagist Packages Deliver Cross-Platform PHP RAT via Fake Laravel Utilities (nhattuanbl Campaign)
Six Packagist packages published by threat actor nhattuanbl masquerade as Laravel utilities while deploying a cross-platform PHP RAT with full C2 capabilities including shell execution, screenshot capture, file operations, and PowerShell access. The RAT connects to helper.leuleu.net:2096 via persistent TCP socket and activates at application boot through Laravel service provider auto-loading.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0217 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Fake Laravel RAT Campaign, nhattuanbl Supply Chain Attack |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | nhattuanbl lara-helper; nhattuanbl simple-queue; nhattuanbl lara-swagger |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-506, CWE-829 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1113 Screen Capture, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution and 3 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | technology, software-development, web-development, saas, e-commerce, enterprise |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 12 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-03-12, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0217 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 18 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: nhattuanbl PHP RAT — Outbound TCP Connection to Non-Standard Port 2096
Detects outbound TCP connections to port 2096, the command-and-control communication port used by the nhattuanbl PHP RAT. The RAT establishes a persistent TCP socket via stream_socket_client() to helper.leuleu.net:2096 and retries every 15 seconds indefinitely on connection failure. Internal/private IP ranges are excluded. Port 2096 is uncommonly used by legitimate applications, making this a high-fidelity indicator.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1571, T1095, T1041
- Data sources: sysmon, firewall, netflow
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=3
Initiated="true" DestinationPort=2096
NOT (DestinationIp="10.*" OR DestinationIp="172.16.*" OR DestinationIp="192.168.*" OR DestinationIp="127.*")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(SourceIp) as src_ips values(DestinationIp) as dst_ips by Image Computer User
| table first_seen last_seen Computer User Image src_ips dst_ips countMicrosoft KQL
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RemotePort == 2096
| where ActionType in ("ConnectionSuccess", "ConnectionAttempt", "ConnectionRequest")
| where not(RemoteIP startswith "10." or RemoteIP startswith "172.16." or RemoteIP startswith "192.168." or RemoteIP startswith "127.")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, LocalIP, RemoteIP, RemotePort, ActionType
| summarize Count=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIPSigma
title: Outbound TCP Connection to Non-Standard Port 2096 — nhattuanbl RAT C2
id: 6b4a9f2d-c817-4e3a-85d1-f0e7b3c9a6d2
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound TCP connections to port 2096, the C2 communication port used by the nhattuanbl PHP RAT via stream_socket_client()
references:
- https://socket.dev/blog/malicious-packagist-packages-disguised-as-laravel-utilities
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/03/12
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1571
- attack.t1095
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
DestinationPort: 2096
Initiated: 'true'
filter_internal:
DestinationIp|startswith:
- '10.'
- '172.16.'
- '192.168.'
- '127.'
condition: selection and not filter_internal
falsepositives:
- Legitimate applications using TCP port 2096
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate applications using TCP port 2096 (uncommon — cPanel alternate HTTPS uses this port)
- Internal services or VPN connections routed through port 2096
Tuning notes: If cPanel or WHM is in use, exclude known cPanel server IPs as destinations on port 2096. Correlate with DNS resolution of leuleu.net for higher confidence. Consider adding process-level filtering to focus on PHP process origins.
- nhattuanbl PHP RAT — Malicious Packagist Package File Artifacts Detected · unlock with TL Creds
- nhattuanbl PHP RAT — PowerShell EncodedCommand from Web Application Process · unlock with TL Creds
- nhattuanbl PHP RAT — Persistent TCP Reconnect Beacon Pattern from PHP Process · unlock with TL Creds
- nhattuanbl PHP RAT — Payload File Hash Match (SHA256) in Vendor Directory · unlock with TL Creds
- nhattuanbl PHP RAT — File Upload with 0777 Permissions in Web/Temp Directory · unlock with TL Creds
- nhattuanbl PHP RAT — PHP Process Screen Capture via imagegrabscreen · unlock with TL Creds
- nhattuanbl PHP RAT — DNS/Network Resolution of C2 Domain [indicator] · unlock with TL Creds
- nhattuanbl PHP RAT — PHP/Web Process Spawning Shell Commands · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-03-12, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 18 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0217.
Sample indicators (2 of 18)
- Domain:
leuleu[.]net - File hash:
a493ce9509c5180e997a04cab2006a48202afbb8edfa15149a4521067191ead7
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 18 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
A sophisticated supply chain attack targeting the PHP/Composer ecosystem was discovered in March 2026, involving six packages published on Packagist by a threat actor operating under the handle nhattuanbl. The campaign employed a credibility-building strategy: three packages (lara-media, snooze, syslog) were completely clean and served to establish author legitimacy, while two packages (lara-helper and simple-queue) contained an identical malicious payload hidden in src/helper.php. A sixth package (lara-swagger) acted as a dependency-chain carrier, listing lara-helper as a hard Composer dependency so that installing it automatically pulled in the RAT.
The Packagist account was created in December 2015 but remained dormant until June 2024, when the threat actor began publishing packages over a six-month window ending in December 2024. The lara-helper package accumulated 37 installs, simple-queue had 29, and lara-swagger reached 49 downloads before discovery.
The malicious payload in src/helper.php is a fully-featured cross-platform remote access trojan (RAT) functional on Windows, macOS, and Linux. It employs multiple obfuscation techniques to complicate static analysis: control flow obfuscation, encoded domain names and command identifiers, and randomized variable and function naming. The RAT establishes a persistent TCP connection to the C2 server at helper.leuleu.net on port 2096 using PHP stream_socket_client(). If the connection drops, it automatically retries every 15 seconds indefinitely. The operator can redirect it to a new host without modifying the on-disk payload.
Before executing commands, the RAT probes the PHP environment for disabled_functions and selects the first available execution method from: popen, proc_open, exec, shell_exec, system, or passthru. The supported command set includes: ping (60-second heartbeat), info (system reconnaissance transmission), cmd (shell command execution), powershell (PowerShell command execution), run (background shell execution), screenshot (screen capture via imagegrabscreen()), download (file reading from disk), upload (file writing with universal read/write/execute permissions 0777), and stop (socket termination and exit).
Activation occurs at application boot via Laravel service provider registration or during class autoloads, meaning the RAT runs in the same PHP process as the web application with identical filesystem permissions and full access to environment variables including database credentials, API keys, and .env contents. This makes credential harvesting trivial without any additional exploitation.
The campaign was discovered and publicly disclosed on March 4, 2026 by Socket security researcher Kush Pandya. The packages were flagged as malware by Aikido security analysis on Packagist. At time of initial disclosure, the C2 server at helper.leuleu.net:2096 was not responding, though the RAT remains on disk and retries connections indefinitely. All versions of the three malicious packages are compromised with no safe iteration available.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1113 Screen Capture
defense-evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading
exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
discovery
T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery
command-and-control
T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1571 Non-Standard Port
initial-access
persistence
T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
resource-development
Remediation
Immediate actions
- Audit all Composer dependencies for nhattuanbl packages: grep -r 'nhattuanbl/lara-helper\|nhattuanbl/simple-queue\|nhattuanbl/lara-swagger' --include='composer.*'
- Remove malicious packages: composer remove nhattuanbl/lara-helper nhattuanbl/simple-queue nhattuanbl/lara-swagger
- Delete vendor directory contents for affected packages and run composer install from clean lock file
- Block outbound connections to helper.leuleu.net and port 2096 at network perimeter
- Monitor network traffic for TCP connections to helper.leuleu.net:2096
- Rotate ALL credentials accessible from the application environment: database passwords, API keys, .env secrets
Workarounds
- If removal is not immediately possible, add helper.leuleu.net to hosts file pointing to 127.0.0.1
- Disable PHP functions used by the RAT in php.ini: popen, proc_open, exec, shell_exec, system, passthru
- Restrict imagegrabscreen() in PHP configuration if screenshot capability is a concern
Longer-term hardening
- Implement Composer dependency scanning in CI/CD pipelines using tools like Socket, Snyk, or Aikido
- Enforce composer.lock pinning and audit dependency changes in code review
- Deploy network segmentation between development and production environments
- Restrict outbound server connections to known-good destinations via egress filtering
- Monitor for PHP processes spawning shell commands or network connections to unusual ports
- Implement Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tooling for all package managers
Affected and fixed versions
- nhattuanbl — lara-helper
Vulnerable versions: all versions: 5.2, 5.2.1, 5.3, 5.4, 5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, 5.4.5, 5.4.6, 5.4.7, 5.4.8, 5.5, 5.5.1, dev-master - nhattuanbl — simple-queue
Vulnerable versions: all versions - nhattuanbl — lara-swagger
Vulnerable versions: 1.4, 2.0, dev-master
Timeline
- nhattuanbl Packagist account created, remaining dormant for nearly a decade
- Threat actor begins publishing packages on Packagist, starting with clean credibility-building packages (lara-media, snooze, syslog)
- lara-swagger v2.0 published on Packagist with hard dependency on malicious lara-helper, acting as dependency-chain carrier
- lara-helper v5.5.1 published (latest malicious version), containing PHP RAT payload in locked-ioc-5
- Six-month package publishing window concludes with all six packages live on Packagist
- C2 server at locked-ioc-4:2096 observed as non-responsive, though RAT on disk retries connection every 15 seconds indefinitely
- Packages flagged as malware by Aikido security analysis on Packagist
- The Hacker News, CybersecurityNews, GBHackers, SecurityArsenal, and SC Media publish coverage of the supply chain attack
- Socket security researcher Kush Pandya discovers and publicly discloses the malicious packages, triggering broad industry coverage
- Jamaica CIRT publishes formal advisory with IOCs and remediation guidance for affected organizations
- Socket publishes expanded analysis linking campaign to broader trojanized jQuery and FUNNULL redirect payload distribution
- As of 2026-05-29, the nhattuanbl Packagist RAT campaign is contained: packages were Aikido-flagged and taken down, the actor's publishing window closed Dec 2024 with no new packages, and the locked-ioc-4:2096 C2 remains non-responsive. It is not active or spreading, but indefinitely-retrying on-disk RATs on unremediated hosts justify continued MONITORING (no CVE/KEV to patch).
Sources cited
- Jamaica CIRT Advisory: Fake Laravel Packages Deploy RAT cirt.gov.jm · Advisory · 2026-03-04
- Socket: 6 Malicious Packagist Themes Ship Trojanized jQuery and FUNNULL Redirect Payloads socket.dev · Research · 2026-03-12
- Socket: Malicious Packagist Packages Disguised as Laravel Utilities socket.dev · Research · 2026-03-04
- Packagist: nhattuanbl/lara-helper packagist.org · Vendor report · 2024-12-02
- Packagist: nhattuanbl/lara-swagger packagist.org · Vendor report · 2024-10-17
- SecurityArsenal: Cross-Platform RAT via Malicious Laravel Packages securityarsenal.com · Blog · 2026-03-04
- SecuriTricks: Malicious Packagist Packages Deploy Encrypted RAT securitricks.com · Blog · 2026-03-04
- The Hacker News: Fake Laravel Packages on Packagist Deploy RAT The Hacker News · News · 2026-03-04
- CybersecurityNews: Malicious Packages Disguised as Laravel Utilities cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-03-04
- CyberPress: Malicious Laravel Packages Deploy PHP RAT cyberpress.org · News · 2026-03-05
- GBHackers: Malicious Laravel Packages Deploy PHP RAT gbhackers.com · News · 2026-03-04
- SC Media: Malicious PHP packages deliver cross-platform RAT scworld.com · News · 2026-03-04
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Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 12 sources; published ; last updated —.