# GoPix Banking Trojan: Memory-Only Implants with PAC-Based MITM and Malvertising Delivery

> GoPix is a sophisticated Brazilian banking trojan actively targeting financial institution customers and cryptocurrency users via malvertising campaigns. It employs memory-only execution, PAC file manipulation for MITM attacks, direct syscalls for defense evasion, and browser process injection to intercept Pix transactions, Boleto slips, and crypto wallets.

- **Published:** 2026-03-16T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-03-16T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0235
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-gopix-pix-banking-trojan-tl-2026-0235.webp?v=dc132058 (Threadlinqs threat intel: GoPix Banking Trojan via PAC MITM: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0235) — High severity, 23 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0235
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 23 (3 shown free below)

## Description

GoPix is an advanced banking trojan originating from Brazilian cybercriminal groups, active since December 2022 and continuing through March 2026. The malware represents a significant evolution in Latin American financial crime tooling, adopting techniques historically associated with nation-state APT groups.

## Delivery and Initial Access

GoPix spreads through malvertising campaigns leveraging Google Ads that impersonate popular services including WhatsApp, Google Chrome, and Correios (the Brazilian postal service). Victims clicking these ads are directed to malicious landing pages that employ legitimate anti-fraud IP scoring services to screen targets and filter out security researchers and sandboxes. The landing page checks for the presence of Avast Safe Banking by probing localhost port 27275, then returns a JSON response with two URLs depending on detection results.

If Avast is not detected, the victim receives an NSIS installer executable digitally signed with a stolen code-signing certificate issued to PLK Management Limited (the same certificate legitimately signs Driver Easy Pro software). The installer creates and runs an obfuscated batch file that launches PowerShell for next-stage download. If Avast is detected, the victim instead receives a ZIP archive containing a LNK shortcut with an obfuscated PowerShell command that bypasses browser download restrictions.

## Multi-Stage Memory-Only Infection Chain

The infection proceeds through multiple memory-only stages designed to leave minimal disk artifacts:

1. An initial PowerShell script collects system information and contacts C2 for a JSON configuration containing folder/file names for %APPDATA%, an obfuscated PowerShell script, an encrypted PowerShell script (ps), encrypted malicious code (sc), and a GoPix configuration file (pf).

2. The obfuscated PowerShell script decrypts the encrypted PowerShell payload and launches a new PowerShell instance via stdin, keeping decrypted content memory-only.

3. The decrypted PowerShell performs in-memory decryption of GoPix dropper shellcode, main payload shellcode, and the main implant. It creates a small shellcode piece within the PowerShell process and jumps to the GoPix dropper shellcode.

4. The shellcode (architecture-specific x86/x64) uses API hashing via CRC32 in newer versions (stack strings in older versions) and erases MZ signatures from loaded modules to evade memory scanning tools.

5. The GoPix dropper verifies execution within Explorer.exe, detects installed browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Opera), uses direct syscalls to launch the chosen browser in a suspended state, and injects the main shellcode and parameters into the browser process.

## Main Implant Capabilities

The GoPix main implant operates entirely in memory within the injected browser process and provides three core capabilities:

**Clipboard Hijacking:** Monitors clipboard content for Pix instant payment transaction keys, Boleto bancario typeable lines (e.g., 23790.12345 60000.123456...), and Bitcoin/Ethereum wallet addresses. Pix and Boleto data is exfiltrated to C2, while cryptocurrency wallet addresses are silently replaced with attacker-controlled addresses.

**PAC-Based Man-in-the-Middle:** GoPix deploys a malicious Proxy AutoConfig (PAC) file and local HTTP server to intercept and manipulate banking traffic in real-time. Unlike traditional PAC-based phishing redirects, GoPix manipulates traffic while the user navigates the legitimate financial website. The PAC file uses CRC32 hashing of domain names to hide targeted banking sites. The local proxy enumerates network connections, identifies the originating process, and compares the process executable CRC32C checksum against a hardcoded browser list, terminating non-browser connections. Multiple Brazilian financial institutions are targeted including state government banking portals and major commercial banks.

**Root Certificate Injection:** GoPix injects a trusted root certificate directly into the browser process memory, enabling HTTPS traffic interception and manipulation without triggering browser certificate warnings. Two certificates have been identified: Root CA 2024 (expired January 2025) and Root CA 2025 (created February 2025, expires February 2027).

## Evasion Techniques

GoPix employs sophisticated evasion across its entire kill chain: anti-fraud service abuse for victim screening, stolen code-signing certificates, memory-only execution with no disk artifacts, direct syscalls to bypass API hooks, unique per-string encryption algorithms in the dropper, CRC32-based API hashing, MZ signature erasure to defeat memory scanners, stdin-based PowerShell delivery, and extremely short-lived C2 infrastructure (online only for hours). These techniques make traditional YARA-based hunting ineffective.

## Attribution

GoPix is attributed to Brazilian cybercriminal groups with moderate confidence. The operators demonstrate operational security awareness through short-lived infrastructure, victim handpicking rather than mass distribution, and adoption of APT-grade evasion techniques. The campaign has been continuously active since December 2022 with ongoing evolution of TTPs.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1204 User Execution
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1553 Subvert Trust Controls
- T1480 Execution Guardrails
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1112 Modify Registry
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1049 System Network Connections Discovery
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
- T1007 System Service Discovery
- T1614 System Location Discovery
- T1115 Clipboard Data
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1090 Proxy
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1565 Data Manipulation
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GoPix PAC File Registry Modification for Browser MITM Proxy** (`TL-2026-0235-SPL-002`)

Detects modification of the AutoConfigURL registry key to point to a local PAC file or localhost proxy, a technique used by GoPix to intercept banking traffic via PAC-based man-in-the-middle. GoPix sets the proxy auto-config to route Brazilian banking domains through a local HTTP server on port 18080.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1090.001, T1557, T1112
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=13 TargetObject="*\Internet Settings\AutoConfigURL" (Details="*file:///*" OR Details="*127.0.0.1*" OR Details="*localhost*") | eval attack_vector=case(match(Details, "file:///"), "local_pac_file", match(Details, "127\.0\.0\.1"), "localhost_proxy", 1=1, "unknown") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(Details) as pac_urls values(Image) as modifying_processes by Computer, User, attack_vector | table Computer, User, first_seen, last_seen, count, attack_vector, pac_urls, modifying_processes
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where RegistryKey has "Internet Settings" and RegistryValueName == "AutoConfigURL" | where RegistryValueData has_any ("file:///", "127.0.0.1", "localhost") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: GoPix PAC File Registry Modification for Browser MITM Proxy
id: 0df90621-22de-443b-b6dd-6f3e59d41196
status: experimental
description: Detects modification of Internet Settings AutoConfigURL registry key to local file or localhost proxy indicative of GoPix PAC-based MITM attack on banking traffic
references:
    - https://securelist.com/gopix-banking-trojan/119173/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/03/16
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1090.001
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1557
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1112
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Internet Settings\AutoConfigURL'
        Details|contains:
            - 'file:///'
            - '127.0.0.1'
            - 'localhost'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Corporate proxy auto-configuration deployments via GPO
    - VPN software modifying proxy settings
    - Web development proxy tools (Fiddler, Charles)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Corporate proxy auto-configuration deployments via Group Policy
- VPN software that modifies proxy settings during connection
- Web development proxy tools such as Fiddler or Charles Proxy

**Tuning notes:** Whitelist known corporate PAC file URLs and GPO-deployed proxy configurations. Filter on specific modifying processes approved for proxy management. Add alert for any PAC URL pointing to file:/// paths specifically.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- GoPix Avast Safe Banking Port Probe and Suspicious File Download (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoPix Suspended Browser Process Creation for Shellcode Injection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoPix Clipboard Monitoring and Financial Data Pattern Theft (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoPix NSIS Installer Execution from Browser Download with Suspicious Signing (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoPix Malicious Root Certificate Installation for HTTPS Interception (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoPix Local MITM Proxy Listener and Banking Traffic Interception (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoPix PowerShell Stdin-Based Encrypted Payload Delivery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GoPix C2 Communication to Known Threat Infrastructure (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 23)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `paletolife[.]com`
- File hash: `EB0B4E35A2BA442821E28D617DD2DAA2`
- Domain: `correioez0ubcfht9i3[.]lovehomely[.]com`

Full set of 23 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Securelist: Free real estate — GoPix, the banking Trojan living off your memory](https://securelist.com/gopix-banking-trojan/119173/)
- [The Hacker News: Malvertising Campaign Targets Brazil PIX Payment System with GoPIX Malware](https://thehackernews.com/2023/10/malvertising-campaign-targets-brazils.html)
- [RH-ISAC: GoPIX Infostealer Targeting PIX Payment System in Brazil](https://rhisac.org/threat-intelligence/gopix-infostealer-targeting-pix-payment-system-in-brazil/)
- [Hive Pro: Attackers Exploit Brazil PIX System with GoPIX Malware Campaign](https://hivepro.com/threat-advisory/attackers-exploit-brazils-pix-system-with-gopix-malware-campaign/)
- [Malware News: GoPix banking Trojan analysis](https://malware.news/t/free-real-estate-gopix-the-banking-trojan-living-off-your-memory/104953)
- [PCRisk: GoPIX Malware Removal Guide](https://www.pcrisk.com/removal-guides/28184-gopix-malware)
- [MITRE ATT&CK: Subvert Trust Controls - Code Signing T1553.002](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0235
