# Larva-26002 Threat Actor Targeting MS-SQL Servers with Go-Based ICE Cloud Scanner Suite

> Turkish-speaking threat actor Larva-26002 (also tracked as RE#TURGENCE) continues actively targeting internet-exposed MS-SQL servers with weak credentials, deploying a new Go-based ICE Cloud scanner suite for mass reconnaissance and brute-force attacks. The actor has historical ties to Trigona and Mimic ransomware campaigns dating back to 2023.

- **Published:** 2026-03-20T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-03-20T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0253
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-larva-26002-ms-sql-scanner-tl-2026-0253.webp?v=2e8c3040 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Larva-26002 Go-Based ICE Cloud Scanner: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0253) — High severity, 24 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0253
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Larva-26002 (Turkey)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 24 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Larva-26002 is a financially motivated, Turkish-speaking threat actor that has been persistently targeting poorly managed Microsoft SQL Server instances since at least April 2023. The actor's latest campaign, documented by AhnLab ASEC on March 20, 2026, introduces the ICE Cloud scanner suite — a pair of Go-language tools designed for mass MS-SQL server reconnaissance and credential brute-forcing. The attack chain begins with brute-force or dictionary attacks against MS-SQL servers exposed to the internet with weak credentials. Upon gaining access, the actor leverages the Bulk Copy Program (BCP) utility — a legitimate Microsoft tool — to extract malware payloads stored in database tables (notably a table named 'uGnzBdZbsi') to the local filesystem, typically writing to C:\ProgramData\. Alternative delivery methods include curl, bitsadmin, and PowerShell downloads from the C2 server at 109.205.211.13. The ICE Cloud suite consists of two components: the ICE Cloud Launcher, a Go-based downloader that authenticates to the C2 infrastructure and retrieves the scanner payload; and the ICE Cloud Client, a Go-based scanner containing Turkish-language strings that performs mass MS-SQL authentication testing against target lists distributed by the C2 server. The Client supports a '-show9' argument for execution logging. Post-exploitation activities include installation of AnyDesk and Teramind remote management tools for persistent access, system reconnaissance commands (hostname, whoami, ifconfig, netstat, tasklist), and port forwarding utilities for lateral movement. The actor creates local administrator accounts and has been observed deploying Mimikatz for credential harvesting. Historically, Larva-26002's campaigns culminate in ransomware deployment. The actor has deployed both Trigona ransomware (first observed April 2023) and Mimic ransomware (first observed January 2024, using Everything by VoidTools for file enumeration, encrypting with .QUIETPLACE extension). The RE#TURGENCE campaign tracked by Securonix documented a typical timeline of approximately one month from initial MS-SQL compromise to domain-wide ransomware deployment. Attribution to Turkish-speaking operators is supported by Turkish-language strings in the ICE Cloud Client binary, intercepted communications referencing locations in Turkey (Kayseri), Turkish Lira exchange rate discussions, and the actor's use of Turkish hosting infrastructure. The Securonix investigation identified potential operator details including the username 'atseverse' linked to Steam and hacking forum profiles. The campaign represents a significant threat to organizations running internet-exposed MS-SQL servers, particularly in the United States, European Union, and Latin America. The evolution from direct ransomware deployment to a dedicated scanning infrastructure (ICE Cloud) suggests the actor is scaling operations and potentially selling access to compromised hosts.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1110 Brute Force
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1505 Server Software Component
- T1136 Create Account
- T1098 Account Manipulation
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1112 Modify Registry
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1049 System Network Connections Discovery
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL)

**Larva-26002 MS-SQL Server xp_cmdshell Exploitation via Child Process Spawning** (`TL-2026-0253-SPL-001`)

Detects SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe) spawning command shell or PowerShell child processes, a key indicator of Larva-26002 initial exploitation via xp_cmdshell on brute-forced MS-SQL servers. The actor uses xp_cmdshell to execute reconnaissance commands and download the ICE Cloud scanner payload.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL
- **ATT&CK:** T1059.003, T1059.001, T1078
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\sqlservr.exe" (Image="*\\cmd.exe" OR Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe") | eval risk_score=case(like(CommandLine,"%DownloadString%"),"critical",like(CommandLine,"%109.205.211.13%"),"critical",like(CommandLine,"%bcp%"),"high",1=1,"high") | table _time, Computer, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine, User, risk_score | sort -_time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "sqlservr.exe" | where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") | extend RiskScore = case(ProcessCommandLine has "DownloadString", "critical", ProcessCommandLine has "109.205.211.13", "critical", ProcessCommandLine has "bcp", "high", "high") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, RiskScore | sort by Timestamp desc
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate SQL Server maintenance scripts using xp_cmdshell for scheduled backups or ETL jobs
- Database administrators manually running diagnostics via sqlcmd

**Tuning notes:** Whitelist known DBA accounts and scheduled maintenance windows. Add exclusions for approved backup scripts by CommandLine pattern. Monitor for xp_cmdshell being re-enabled after being disabled (sp_configure changes).

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Larva-26002 MS-SQL xp_cmdshell Exploitation and Reconnaissance Chain (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Larva-26002 Registry Persistence and Suspicious File Drops in ProgramData (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Larva-26002 ICE Cloud MS-SQL Brute Force Scanning and Credential Dumping (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Larva-26002 SQL Server PowerShell Download Cradle Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Larva-26002 Suspicious File Creation in ProgramData by Database Processes (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Larva-26002 Credential Dumping and Lateral Movement via Remote Desktop (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Larva-26002 BCP Payload Extraction and Local Admin Account Creation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Larva-26002 C2 Communication and Remote Access Tool Deployment (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 24)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `109.205.211[.]13`
- Domain: `hostroids[.]com`
- File hash: `0a9f2e2ff98e9f19428da79680e80b77`

Full set of 24 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [ASEC: Attack case against MS-SQL server installing ICE Cloud scanner (Larva-26002)](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/92988/)
- [ASEC: Trigona Ransomware Threat Actor Uses Mimic Ransomware](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/61000/)
- [ASEC: Analysis of Trigona Threat Actor Latest Attack Cases](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/90793/)
- [ASEC: Trigona Ransomware Attacking MS-SQL Servers](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/51343/)
- [Securonix: RE#TURGENCE Campaign - Turkish Hackers Target MSSQL Servers](https://www.securonix.com/blog/securonix-threat-research-security-advisory-new-returgence-attack-campaign-turkish-hackers-target-mssql-servers-to-deliver-domain-wide-mimic-ransomware/)
- [BleepingComputer: Hackers target Microsoft SQL servers in Mimic ransomware attacks](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-target-microsoft-sql-servers-in-mimic-ransomware-attacks/)
- [SecurityWeek: Turkish Hackers Target Microsoft SQL Servers in Americas, Europe](https://www.securityweek.com/turkish-hackers-target-microsoft-sql-servers-in-americas-europe/)
- [Dark Reading: Trigona Ransomware Trolling for Poorly Managed MS-SQL Servers](https://www.darkreading.com/remote-workforce/trigona-ransomware-trolling-for-poorly-managed-ms-sql-servers-)
- [BankInfoSecurity: Turkish Hackers Exploit MS SQL Servers to Deliver Ransomware](https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/turkish-hackers-exploit-mssql-servers-to-deliver-ransomware-a-24086)
- [Decipher: Threat Actors Target Microsoft SQL Servers to Deliver Mimic Ransomware](https://duo.com/decipher/threat-actors-target-microsoft-sql-servers-to-deliver-mimic-ransomware)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0253
