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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-0266

Zimbra Collaboration Suite Stored XSS via CSS @import Active Exploitation (CVE-2025-66376) — Operation GhostMail

criticalACTIVE

A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite Classic UI (CVE-2025-66376) allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript via malicious CSS @import directives in HTML emails. Added to CISA KEV on March 18, 2026, the flaw is actively exploited by APT28 in Operation GhostMail targeting Ukrainian government entities for credential theft, session hijacking, and 90-day email exfiltration.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0266, CVE-2025-66376
Also known asOperation GhostMail
SeverityCRITICAL
CVSS7.2 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N)
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2025-66376 (added )
EPSSCVE-2025-66376: 20.2% (97.4th percentile)
Affected productsZimbra Zimbra Collaboration Suite
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-79
AttributionAPT28 (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareSpyPress.ZIMBRA variant
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1001 Data Obfuscation, T1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.010 Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation, T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File, T1027.017 Obfuscated Files or Information: SVG Smuggling, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol, T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter and 62 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsgovernment, critical-infrastructure, education, defense
Target regionsEastern Europe, Ukraine
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-11-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0266 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 66 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Operation GhostMail Dual-Channel Exfiltration — DNS Tunneling and HTTPS Beacons to APT28 C2

Detects dual-channel exfiltration associated with Operation GhostMail: DNS tunneling via Base32-encoded subdomain queries to i.zimbrasoft.com.ua and HTTPS POST requests to /v/p (structured data) and /v/d (binary uploads) endpoints on APT28 C2 infrastructure. Also detects bulk email archive export via Zimbra /home/~/?fmt=tgz endpoint.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1071.004, T1071.001, T1041, T1048, T1114.002
  • Data sources: dns_logs, proxy_logs, zimbra_audit_log, network_traffic
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=dns sourcetype="stream:dns" OR sourcetype="bro:dns:json" OR sourcetype="infoblox:dns" query="*.i.zimbrasoft.com.ua" OR query="*zimbrasoft.com.ua" | eval subdomain_length=len(mvindex(split(query,"."),0)) | eval is_base32=if(match(mvindex(split(query,"."),0),"^[A-Z2-7]+=*$"),1,0) | where subdomain_length > 20 OR is_base32=1 OR query="*zimbrasoft.com.ua" | stats count AS dns_queries dc(query) AS unique_queries values(query) AS queried_domains values(src_ip) AS source_hosts earliest(_time) AS first_seen latest(_time) AS last_seen by src_ip | append [search index=proxy sourcetype="bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog" OR sourcetype="squid:access" (url="*/v/p" OR url="*/v/d") dest="*zimbrasoft.com.ua" | stats count AS http_posts values(url) AS urls values(src_ip) AS source_hosts by dest] | table first_seen last_seen source_hosts queried_domains dns_queries unique_queries urls

Microsoft KQL

let dns_exfil = DnsEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Name has "zimbrasoft.com.ua"
| extend SubdomainLength = strlen(tostring(split(Name, ".")[0]))
| where SubdomainLength > 20 or Name has "i.zimbrasoft.com.ua"
| summarize DNSQueryCount = count(), UniqueQueries = dcount(Name), Queries = make_set(Name, 50) by ClientIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h);
let https_exfil = CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has "zimbrasoft.com.ua" and (RequestURL has "/v/p" or RequestURL has "/v/d")
| summarize HTTPPostCount = count(), URLs = make_set(RequestURL) by SourceIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h);
let email_export = ZimbraAuditLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has "/home/" and RequestURL has "fmt=tgz"
| summarize ExportCount = count() by SourceIP, TargetUser, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h);
dns_exfil
| join kind=fullouter (https_exfil) on $left.ClientIP == $right.SourceIP
| join kind=fullouter (email_export) on $left.ClientIP == $right.SourceIP
| project TimeGenerated, ClientIP, DNSQueryCount, UniqueQueries, HTTPPostCount, ExportCount, Queries, URLs

Sigma

title: Operation GhostMail C2 Communication — DNS Tunneling to zimbrasoft.com.ua
id: c3e5f7a9-2d4b-6e8f-0a1c-3e5f7a9b1c3d
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries to APT28 C2 domain zimbrasoft.com.ua and subdomains used for Base32-encoded DNS tunneling exfiltration in Operation GhostMail campaign
references:
    - https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-ghostmail-zimbra-xss-russian-apt-ukraine/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-03-21
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.t1041
    - cve.2025.66376
logsource:
    category: dns
detection:
    selection_c2_domain:
        query|endswith:
            - '.zimbrasoft.com.ua'
            - 'zimbrasoft.com.ua'
    selection_long_subdomain:
        query|re: '^[a-z0-9-]{20,}\.i\.zimbrasoft\.com\.ua'
    condition: selection_c2_domain or selection_long_subdomain
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely — zimbrasoft.com.ua is a known APT28 C2 domain with no legitimate use
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Unlikely — zimbrasoft.com.ua is a confirmed APT28 C2 domain with no legitimate business purpose

Tuning notes: This is IOC-based and high confidence. For broader coverage, also monitor for any DNS query patterns with unusually long Base32-encoded subdomains to any .ua domain. Add additional C2 subdomains as they are discovered.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Zimbra XSS Exploitation — Browser Network Connections to Operation GhostMail C2 · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zimbra Application-Specific Password Creation and IMAP Enablement — Persistence Establishment · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zimbra Bulk Email Archive Export via [indicator] — Data Exfiltration · unlock with TL Creds
  • Operation GhostMail HTML Email with Obfuscated JavaScript Stealer Payload · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zimbra Browser Autocomplete DOM Injection for Credential Harvesting · unlock with TL Creds
  • DNS Exfiltration via Base32-Encoded Subdomain Queries — Generic DNS Tunneling Detection · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zimbra CSS @import XSS Payload Delivery in Email — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Zimbra SOAP API Abuse — Credential Theft and Persistence via Application Password Creation · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-11-09, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 66 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0266.

Sample indicators (3 of 66)

  • IP address: 37.120.247[.]228
  • Domain: zimbrasoft[.]com[.]ua
  • File hash: c010f64080b0b0997b362a8e6b9c618e

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 66 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

66 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

CVE-2025-66376 is a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) Classic UI caused by inadequate sanitization of CSS @import directives within HTML email content. The vulnerability affects ZCS versions 10.0.0 through 10.0.17 and 10.1.0 through 10.1.12, and was patched in versions 10.0.18 and 10.1.13 released on November 6, 2025.

The exploit mechanism leverages malicious CSS @import tokens embedded in HTML email bodies to bypass Zimbra's existing input filtering. When a victim opens the crafted email in the Zimbra Classic Web Client, the browser processes the @import directives, which can fetch external stylesheets or execute embedded JavaScript payloads. This creates a zero-click exploitation scenario — no user interaction is required beyond viewing the email in the webmail interface.

Seqrite Labs identified an active exploitation campaign dubbed Operation GhostMail, attributed to APT28 (Fancy Bear/UAC-0001) with medium confidence. The campaign targeted Ukraine's State Hydrology Agency (critical infrastructure) beginning January 22, 2026, using a compromised student email account from the National Academy of Internal Affairs (NAVS) as the delivery mechanism. The phishing email was crafted as a legitimate-looking internship inquiry.

The attack payload is a multi-stage JavaScript stealer hidden in a display:none div element, obfuscated with Base64 and XOR encoding (key: twichcba5e). Upon execution, the payload performs parallel data harvesting via Zimbra SOAP API calls including: identity scraping (GetIdentitiesRequest), server configuration dumping (GetInfoRequest), backup 2FA code theft (GetScratchCodesRequest), application-specific password creation (CreateAppSpecificPasswordRequest with name ZimbraWeb), mobile device enumeration (GetDeviceStatusRequest), OAuth consumer listing (GetOAuthConsumersRequest), browser password manager injection via autocomplete DOM manipulation, IMAP protocol enablement (ModifyPrefsRequest), and export of 90 days of email archives via the /home/~/?fmt=tgz endpoint.

Exfiltration occurs over dual channels: HTTPS POST requests to /v/p (structured data beacons) and /v/d (binary uploads), and DNS tunneling using Base32-encoded data in subdomain queries to the C2 infrastructure at zimbrasoft.com.ua. The C2 domains follow a pattern of js-[a-z0-9]{12}.i.zimbrasoft.com.ua, registered on January 20, 2026.

Persistence is achieved through creation of an application-specific password that survives credential resets, and enabling IMAP for ongoing mailbox access. The stolen session tokens (ZMBAuthToken) remain valid for approximately 90 days, providing extended unauthorized access.

CISA added CVE-2025-66376 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on March 18, 2026, with a remediation deadline of April 1, 2026 for federal agencies under BOD 22-01. Organizations running vulnerable Zimbra versions should immediately update to 10.0.18 or 10.1.13, or transition users to the Modern UI which uses a distinct rendering architecture unaffected by this flaw.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Command and Control

T1001 Data Obfuscation; T1071.004 Application Layer Protocol: DNS; T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy; T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding; T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1074.002 Data Staged: Remote Data Staging; T1113 Screen Capture; T1114.002 Email Collection: Remote Email Collection; T1119 Automated Collection; T1560 Archive Collected Data; T1560.001 Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility

defense-evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1564 Hide Artifacts

Defense Evasion

T1027.010 Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation; T1027.013 Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File; T1027.017 Obfuscated Files or Information: SVG Smuggling; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1684.001 Impersonation

exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Exfiltration

T1048.002 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol; T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol

execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

Execution

T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript; T1204 User Execution

discovery

T1069 Permission Groups Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1087 Account Discovery; T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery

command-and-control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1102 Web Service

Initial Access

T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application; T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment; T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

Discovery

T1087.003 Account Discovery: Email Account; T1518 Software Discovery; T1526 Cloud Service Discovery

persistence

T1098 Account Manipulation

Persistence

T1098.001 Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials; T1556.006 Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication

Credential Access

T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying; T1187 Forced Authentication; T1552 Unsecured Credentials; T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

credential-access

T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception; T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores; T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle

collection

T1114 Email Collection; T1185 Browser Session Hijacking; T1213 Data from Information Repositories

initial-access

T1189 Drive-by Compromise; T1566 Phishing

lateral-movement

T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material

defense-impairment

T1556 Modify Authentication Process

resource-development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1586 Compromise Accounts

Resource Development

T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains; T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server; T1584.003 Compromise Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server; T1584.004 Compromise Infrastructure: Server; T1586.002 Compromise Accounts: Email Accounts; T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware; T1587.004 Develop Capabilities: Exploits; T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool

Reconnaissance

T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information; T1589.001 Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials

reconnaissance

T1598 Phishing for Information

Remediation

Patches

  • Zimbra Collaboration Suite 10.0.18 (released 2025-11-06)
  • Zimbra Collaboration Suite 10.1.13 (released 2025-11-06)

Immediate actions

  • Update Zimbra Collaboration Suite to version 10.0.18 or 10.1.13 immediately
  • Transition all users from Classic UI to Modern UI as interim mitigation
  • Block C2 domain zimbrasoft.com.ua and all subdomains at DNS and perimeter firewalls
  • Revoke all application-specific passwords and regenerate 2FA backup codes
  • Invalidate all active Zimbra session tokens (ZMBAuthToken) organization-wide
  • Search email logs for messages containing CSS @import directives in HTML bodies

Workarounds

  • Migrate users to Zimbra Modern UI which uses distinct rendering architecture unaffected by this vulnerability
  • Disable Classic UI access at the server level if Modern UI migration is feasible
  • Implement web application firewall rules to detect and block CSS @import injection attempts

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy Content Security Policy (CSP) headers on Zimbra webmail to restrict inline script execution
  • Implement email gateway filtering to strip or quarantine emails with embedded CSS @import directives
  • Enable audit logging for Zimbra SOAP API calls especially CreateAppSpecificPasswordRequest and ModifyPrefsRequest
  • Deploy DNS monitoring for Base32-encoded subdomain query patterns indicating DNS exfiltration
  • Conduct threat hunt for IOCs associated with Operation GhostMail across email infrastructure

Affected and fixed versions

  • Zimbra — Zimbra Collaboration Suite
    Vulnerable versions: 10.0.0 - 10.0.17; 10.1.0 - 10.1.12
    Fixed in: 10.0.18; 10.1.13

Timeline

Last updated · 9 updates · revalidated 9× · latest source

Showing the 20 most recent tracked events.

  • Zimbra releases patched versions 10.0.18 and 10.1.13 fixing CVE-2025-66376 with dedicated CSS parsing that strips @import declarations, url() functions, and legacy expression() properties
  • Following the November 2025 silent patch, actors pivot to distributing phishing from compromised legitimate email accounts (including at locked-ioc-37 and locked-ioc-40) to keep reaching unpatched or delayed-patch victims.
  • Zimbra Collaboration Suite 10.0 reaches end-of-life, receiving no further security updates and leaving unmigrated instances permanently exposed to CVE-2025-66376.
  • CVE-2025-66376 officially published in NVD with CVSS 7.2 HIGH rating and CWE-79 classification
  • APT28 registers C2 domain locked-ioc-23 and establishes exfiltration infrastructure with subdomain pattern js-[a-z0-9]{12}.i.locked-ioc-23 via ua.drs registrar
  • Operation GhostMail actors also attack a Ukrainian maritime-sector agency alongside the State Hydrology Agency, using compromised student-account phishing to deliver the CVE-2025-66376 payload.
  • APT28 launches Operation GhostMail spearphishing campaign against Ukraine State Hydrology Agency using compromised NAVS student email account as delivery mechanism
  • locked-ioc-25 first seen as Flowerbed C2 domain (locked-ioc-31 followed on 5 Feb).
  • locked-ioc-31, the latest-identified TA488 C2 domain in the campaign, first observed active.
  • Proofpoint's last observed TA488 activity window closes around this date, with tracked campaign infrastructure reported dismantled — later contradicted by the 2026-07-23 report of continued Laundry Bear exploitation.
  • Seqrite Labs publishes comprehensive technical analysis of Operation GhostMail detailing APT28 exploitation of CVE-2025-66376 with full IOCs, attack chain, and MITRE mapping
  • CISA adds CVE-2025-66376 to Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, mandating federal agency remediation by April 1, 2026 under BOD 22-01
  • Last observed activity for locked-ioc-25 and locked-ioc-31; several other Flowerbed domains were last seen on 18 Mar 2026, the day of the CISA KEV addition.
  • CISA BOD 22-01 remediation deadline for federal agencies to patch or mitigate CVE-2025-66376
  • As of 2026-05-29, CVE-2025-66376 is patched (ZCS 10.0.18/10.1.13, Nov 2025) yet remains in CISA KEV and exploitable on unpatched Classic-UI Zimbra servers, with 10,000+ instances reportedly exposed. The Operation GhostMail campaign appears concluded, but actor APT28 stays fully active (PRISMEX, Storm-2754, account compromises through Apr-May 2026), so residual risk persists.
  • Zimbra Collaboration Suite 10.1.20 stands as the current supported release recommended for all upgrades.
  • Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 publishes detailed technical analysis of the campaign under tracking designation CL-STA-1114, including a fuller C2 IP/domain list (9 IPs, ~35.4-day domain rotation cycle).
  • CISA, jointly with U.K., European, Australian, and New Zealand agencies, publishes advisory AA26-204A formally attributing the CVE-2025-66376 exploitation campaign to Russian state-supported cyber actors.
  • BleepingComputer reports Laundry Bear (Void Blizzard) continues exploiting unpatched Zimbra servers for email theft, targeting Defense Industrial Base, government, energy, and NATO/Ukraine-priority sectors — contradicting the prior assessment that active exploitation had concluded.
  • Proofpoint discloses that TA488/LAUNDRY BEAR has pivoted the same half-click exploitation tradecraft to a new Microsoft Outlook Web Access XSS flaw (CVE-2026-42897) on on-premises Exchange Server, deploying the OWAReaper browser implant against government, telecom, financial, hospitality and aerospace targets.

Update history

Sources cited

More from APT28

Other reports on CVE-2025-66376

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated .

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