# Zimbra Collaboration Suite Stored XSS via CSS @import Active Exploitation (CVE-2025-66376) — Operation GhostMail

> A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in Zimbra Collaboration Suite Classic UI (CVE-2025-66376) allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript via malicious CSS @import directives in HTML emails. Added to CISA KEV on March 18, 2026, the flaw is actively exploited by APT28 in Operation GhostMail targeting Ukrainian government entities for credential theft, session hijacking, and 90-day email exfiltration.

- **Published:** 2026-03-21T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-11-09T03:11:54.412Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0266
- **ID:** TL-2026-0266
- **Severity:** CRITICAL (CVSS 7.2)
- **Category:** VULNERABILITY
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** APT28 (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 66 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2025-66376

## Description

CVE-2025-66376 is a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) Classic UI caused by inadequate sanitization of CSS @import directives within HTML email content. The vulnerability affects ZCS versions 10.0.0 through 10.0.17 and 10.1.0 through 10.1.12, and was patched in versions 10.0.18 and 10.1.13 released on November 6, 2025.

The exploit mechanism leverages malicious CSS @import tokens embedded in HTML email bodies to bypass Zimbra's existing input filtering. When a victim opens the crafted email in the Zimbra Classic Web Client, the browser processes the @import directives, which can fetch external stylesheets or execute embedded JavaScript payloads. This creates a zero-click exploitation scenario — no user interaction is required beyond viewing the email in the webmail interface.

Seqrite Labs identified an active exploitation campaign dubbed Operation GhostMail, attributed to APT28 (Fancy Bear/UAC-0001) with medium confidence. The campaign targeted Ukraine's State Hydrology Agency (critical infrastructure) beginning January 22, 2026, using a compromised student email account from the National Academy of Internal Affairs (NAVS) as the delivery mechanism. The phishing email was crafted as a legitimate-looking internship inquiry.

The attack payload is a multi-stage JavaScript stealer hidden in a display:none div element, obfuscated with Base64 and XOR encoding (key: twichcba5e). Upon execution, the payload performs parallel data harvesting via Zimbra SOAP API calls including: identity scraping (GetIdentitiesRequest), server configuration dumping (GetInfoRequest), backup 2FA code theft (GetScratchCodesRequest), application-specific password creation (CreateAppSpecificPasswordRequest with name ZimbraWeb), mobile device enumeration (GetDeviceStatusRequest), OAuth consumer listing (GetOAuthConsumersRequest), browser password manager injection via autocomplete DOM manipulation, IMAP protocol enablement (ModifyPrefsRequest), and export of 90 days of email archives via the /home/~/?fmt=tgz endpoint.

Exfiltration occurs over dual channels: HTTPS POST requests to /v/p (structured data beacons) and /v/d (binary uploads), and DNS tunneling using Base32-encoded data in subdomain queries to the C2 infrastructure at zimbrasoft.com.ua. The C2 domains follow a pattern of js-[a-z0-9]{12}.i.zimbrasoft.com.ua, registered on January 20, 2026.

Persistence is achieved through creation of an application-specific password that survives credential resets, and enabling IMAP for ongoing mailbox access. The stolen session tokens (ZMBAuthToken) remain valid for approximately 90 days, providing extended unauthorized access.

CISA added CVE-2025-66376 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on March 18, 2026, with a remediation deadline of April 1, 2026 for federal agencies under BOD 22-01. Organizations running vulnerable Zimbra versions should immediately update to 10.0.18 or 10.1.13, or transition users to the Modern UI which uses a distinct rendering architecture unaffected by this flaw.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1586 Compromise Accounts
- T1566 Phishing
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
- T1098 Account Manipulation
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1564 Hide Artifacts
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1069 Permission Groups Discovery
- T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery
- T1114 Email Collection
- T1185 Browser Session Hijacking
- T1213 Data from Information Repositories
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
- T1598 Phishing for Information
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1556 Modify Authentication Process
- T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle
- T1102 Web Service
- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1204 User Execution
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1584.004 Compromise Infrastructure: Server
- T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1110.003 Brute Force: Password Spraying

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Operation GhostMail Dual-Channel Exfiltration — DNS Tunneling and HTTPS Beacons to APT28 C2** (`TL-2026-0266-SPL-003`)

Detects dual-channel exfiltration associated with Operation GhostMail: DNS tunneling via Base32-encoded subdomain queries to i.zimbrasoft.com.ua and HTTPS POST requests to /v/p (structured data) and /v/d (binary uploads) endpoints on APT28 C2 infrastructure. Also detects bulk email archive export via Zimbra /home/~/?fmt=tgz endpoint.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.004, T1071.001, T1041, T1048, T1114.002
- **Data sources:** dns_logs, proxy_logs, zimbra_audit_log, network_traffic
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=dns sourcetype="stream:dns" OR sourcetype="bro:dns:json" OR sourcetype="infoblox:dns" query="*.i.zimbrasoft.com.ua" OR query="*zimbrasoft.com.ua" | eval subdomain_length=len(mvindex(split(query,"."),0)) | eval is_base32=if(match(mvindex(split(query,"."),0),"^[A-Z2-7]+=*$"),1,0) | where subdomain_length > 20 OR is_base32=1 OR query="*zimbrasoft.com.ua" | stats count AS dns_queries dc(query) AS unique_queries values(query) AS queried_domains values(src_ip) AS source_hosts earliest(_time) AS first_seen latest(_time) AS last_seen by src_ip | append [search index=proxy sourcetype="bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog" OR sourcetype="squid:access" (url="*/v/p" OR url="*/v/d") dest="*zimbrasoft.com.ua" | stats count AS http_posts values(url) AS urls values(src_ip) AS source_hosts by dest] | table first_seen last_seen source_hosts queried_domains dns_queries unique_queries urls
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let dns_exfil = DnsEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Name has "zimbrasoft.com.ua"
| extend SubdomainLength = strlen(tostring(split(Name, ".")[0]))
| where SubdomainLength > 20 or Name has "i.zimbrasoft.com.ua"
| summarize DNSQueryCount = count(), UniqueQueries = dcount(Name), Queries = make_set(Name, 50) by ClientIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h);
let https_exfil = CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has "zimbrasoft.com.ua" and (RequestURL has "/v/p" or RequestURL has "/v/d")
| summarize HTTPPostCount = count(), URLs = make_set(RequestURL) by SourceIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h);
let email_export = ZimbraAuditLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestURL has "/home/" and RequestURL has "fmt=tgz"
| summarize ExportCount = count() by SourceIP, TargetUser, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h);
dns_exfil
| join kind=fullouter (https_exfil) on $left.ClientIP == $right.SourceIP
| join kind=fullouter (email_export) on $left.ClientIP == $right.SourceIP
| project TimeGenerated, ClientIP, DNSQueryCount, UniqueQueries, HTTPPostCount, ExportCount, Queries, URLs
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Operation GhostMail C2 Communication — DNS Tunneling to zimbrasoft.com.ua
id: c3e5f7a9-2d4b-6e8f-0a1c-3e5f7a9b1c3d
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries to APT28 C2 domain zimbrasoft.com.ua and subdomains used for Base32-encoded DNS tunneling exfiltration in Operation GhostMail campaign
references:
    - https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-ghostmail-zimbra-xss-russian-apt-ukraine/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-03-21
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
    - attack.t1041
    - cve.2025.66376
logsource:
    category: dns
detection:
    selection_c2_domain:
        query|endswith:
            - '.zimbrasoft.com.ua'
            - 'zimbrasoft.com.ua'
    selection_long_subdomain:
        query|re: '^[a-z0-9-]{20,}\.i\.zimbrasoft\.com\.ua'
    condition: selection_c2_domain or selection_long_subdomain
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely — zimbrasoft.com.ua is a known APT28 C2 domain with no legitimate use
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Unlikely — zimbrasoft.com.ua is a confirmed APT28 C2 domain with no legitimate business purpose

**Tuning notes:** This is IOC-based and high confidence. For broader coverage, also monitor for any DNS query patterns with unusually long Base32-encoded subdomains to any .ua domain. Add additional C2 subdomains as they are discovered.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Zimbra XSS Exploitation — Browser Network Connections to Operation GhostMail C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Zimbra Application-Specific Password Creation and IMAP Enablement — Persistence Establishment (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Zimbra Bulk Email Archive Export via [indicator] — Data Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Operation GhostMail HTML Email with Obfuscated JavaScript Stealer Payload (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Zimbra Browser Autocomplete DOM Injection for Credential Harvesting (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DNS Exfiltration via Base32-Encoded Subdomain Queries — Generic DNS Tunneling Detection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Zimbra CSS @import XSS Payload Delivery in Email — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Zimbra SOAP API Abuse — Credential Theft and Persistence via Application Password Creation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 66)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `37.120.247[.]228`
- Domain: `zimbrasoft[.]com[.]ua`
- File hash: `c010f64080b0b0997b362a8e6b9c618e`

Full set of 66 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [CISA KEV Catalog - CVE-2025-66376](https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog)
- [Zimbra Security Advisories](https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Security_Advisories)
- [Operation GhostMail: Russian APT Exploits Zimbra Webmail to Target Ukraine State Agency](https://www.seqrite.com/blog/operation-ghostmail-zimbra-xss-russian-apt-ukraine/)
- [Russian APT targets Ukraine via Zimbra XSS flaw CVE-2025-66376](https://securityaffairs.com/189673/security/russian-apt-targets-ukraine-via-zimbra-xss-flaw-cve-2025-66376.html)
- [Russian hackers exploit Zimbra flaw in Ukrainian govt attacks](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/russian-apt28-military-hackers-exploit-zimbra-flaw-in-ukrainian-govt-attacks/)
- [CISA orders feds to patch Zimbra XSS flaw exploited in attacks](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/cisa-orders-feds-to-patch-zimbra-xss-flaw-exploited-in-attacks/)
- [Russian APT Exploits Zimbra Vulnerability Against Ukraine](https://www.securityweek.com/russian-apt-exploits-zimbra-vulnerability-against-ukraine/)
- [Operation GhostMail Analysis - SecPod Blog](https://www.secpod.com/blog/operation-ghostmail-analysis-of-russian-apt-exploitation-of-zimbra-xss/)
- [CVE-2025-66376 - Stored XSS in Zimbra ZCS Classic UI](https://cvereports.com/reports/CVE-2025-66376)
- [CISA Warns of Zimbra Collaboration Suite Vulnerability Exploited in Attacks](https://cybersecuritynews.com/zimbra-vulnerability-exploited-attacks/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0266
