# CrystalX RAT — MaaS Remote Access Trojan Combining Spyware, Stealer, Keylogger, Crypto Clipper, VNC, and Prankware

> CrystalX RAT is a Windows-based remote access trojan sold as malware-as-a-service (MaaS) via Telegram channels. Written in Go, it combines credential theft, keylogging, cryptocurrency clipboard hijacking, VNC remote access, and destructive prankware capabilities. It uses ChaCha20 encryption with hard-coded keys and communicates via WebSocket to C2 infrastructure.

- **Published:** 2026-04-01T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-04-01T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0306
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-crystalx-rat-tl-2026-0306.webp?v=a15238c8 (Threadlinqs threat intel: CrystalX RAT MaaS Stealer and Prankware: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0306) — High severity, 24 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0306
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 24 (3 shown free below)

## Description

CrystalX RAT is a fully-featured Windows remote access trojan distributed through a malware-as-a-service model on Telegram. Originally marketed as Webcrystal RAT in January 2026, it was rebranded to CrystalX RAT and is actively developed with new implant versions as of March 2026.

The malware is written in Go and compiled as a 64-bit Windows executable. Each implant is compressed using zlib and encrypted with ChaCha20 using a hard-coded 32-byte key and 12-byte nonce. C2 communication occurs over WebSocket with JSON-formatted data transmission and hard-coded C2 URLs embedded in each build.

CrystalX RAT offers an extensive feature set across multiple attack categories:

**Credential Theft:** The RAT extracts credentials from Steam, Discord, and Telegram. For Chromium-based browsers, it deploys the ChromeElevator utility (dropped to %TEMP%\svc[rndInt].exe) to harvest stored passwords and cookies. Separate proprietary implementations handle Yandex and Opera browsers using base decryption routines. Collected data is staged in %TEMP%\co[rndInt] directories before exfiltration.

**Browser Extension Injection:** CrystalX leverages the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) to inject malicious browser extensions into Chrome and Edge. The malicious extension is stored in %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Edge\ExtSvc and enables real-time interception of browser activity.

**Keylogging and Clipboard Manipulation:** All user keystrokes are captured and instantly transmitted via WebSocket to the C2 server. The RAT reads and modifies clipboard contents, enabling the cryptocurrency clipper functionality that targets Bitcoin, Litecoin, Monero, Avalanche, and Dogecoin wallet addresses.

**VNC Remote Access:** Full remote desktop control including screen viewing, file upload/download, command execution via cmd.exe, file system browsing across all drives, audio/video capture from microphone and camera, and the ability to block user input during remote sessions.

**Prankware (Rofl Panel):** A distinctive feature is the prankware panel enabling desktop background manipulation, screen rotation (90/180/270 degrees), system shutdown, mouse button remapping, monitor disconnection, custom notification windows, cursor disruption, taskbar/task manager/cmd.exe disabling, desktop icon hiding, and bidirectional chat with the victim.

**Anti-Analysis and Evasion:** The malware implements comprehensive evasion including MITM detection (proxy checking via registry, blacklisting Fiddler/Burp Suite/mitmproxy processes, installed certificate verification), VM detection (process checking, guest tools detection, hardware characteristics analysis), anti-debugging (debug flag monitoring, debug port checking, hardware breakpoint detection, execution timing analysis), and stealth patches for AmsiScanBuffer, EtwEventWrite, and MiniDumpWriteDump.

**Builder Configuration:** Operators can configure selective geoblocking by country, customize executable icons, set stealer intervals (one-time or recurring), and toggle optional anti-analysis features.

While initially observed targeting systems in Russia, the MaaS platform itself has no regional restrictions, indicating potential for global targeting. The malware was previously confused with the WebRAT/Salat Stealer family due to similar panel layouts, but Kaspersky analysis confirms CrystalX is a distinct malware family with its own codebase and C2 infrastructure.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1204 User Execution
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1176 Software Extensions
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1622 Debugger Evasion
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1115 Clipboard Data
- T1125 Video Capture
- T1123 Audio Capture
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1565 Data Manipulation
- T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**CrystalX RAT — WebSocket C2 Communication to Known Infrastructure** (`TL-2026-0306-SPL-003`)

Detects outbound WebSocket connections to known CrystalX RAT C2 domains (webcrystal.lol, webcrystal.sbs, crystalxrat.top) and suspicious WebSocket patterns from non-browser Go binaries. This targets the C2 channel used for command tasking, keylogger data exfiltration, and VNC remote access.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=3 Initiated=true
| eval is_known_c2=if(match(DestinationHostname, "(?i)(webcrystal\.lol|webcrystal\.sbs|crystalxrat\.top)"), 1, 0)
| eval is_suspicious_ws=if((DestinationPort=443 OR DestinationPort=8443) AND NOT match(Image, "(?i)\\\\(chrome|msedge|firefox|brave|opera|iexplore|teams|slack|discord)\.exe") AND match(Image, "(?i)\\\\(Temp|AppData)\\\\.*\.exe$"), 1, 0)
| where is_known_c2=1 OR is_suspicious_ws=1
| eval alert_type=case(is_known_c2=1, "Known_C2", is_suspicious_ws=1, "Suspicious_WebSocket")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(alert_type) as alert_types values(DestinationIp) as dest_ips values(DestinationHostname) as dest_hosts values(Image) as processes by Computer
| table Computer first_seen last_seen count alert_types dest_ips dest_hosts processes
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where
    (RemoteUrl has_any ("webcrystal.lol", "webcrystal.sbs", "crystalxrat.top"))
    or (RemotePort in (443, 8443) and InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe", "opera.exe", "teams.exe", "slack.exe") and InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any ("\\Temp\\", "\\AppData\\"))
| extend AlertType = iff(RemoteUrl has_any ("webcrystal.lol", "webcrystal.sbs", "crystalxrat.top"), "Known_C2", "Suspicious_WebSocket")
| summarize ConnectionCount=count(), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), AlertTypes=make_set(AlertType), RemoteHosts=make_set(RemoteUrl), RemoteIPs=make_set(RemoteIP) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName
| project DeviceName, FirstSeen, LastSeen, ConnectionCount, AlertTypes, RemoteHosts, RemoteIPs, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: CrystalX RAT — WebSocket C2 Communication to Known Infrastructure
id: 091c27d8-0e1f-2a3b-4c5d-6e7f80910213
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound network connections to known CrystalX RAT C2 domains or suspicious WebSocket patterns from non-browser executables in TEMP or AppData
references:
    - https://securelist.com/crystalx-rat-with-prankware-features/119283/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/04/01
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1573.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection_known_c2:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'webcrystal.lol'
            - 'webcrystal.sbs'
            - 'crystalxrat.top'
    selection_suspicious_ws:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationPort:
            - 443
            - 8443
        Image|contains:
            - '\\Temp\\'
            - '\\AppData\\'
    filter_browsers:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\\chrome.exe'
            - '\\msedge.exe'
            - '\\firefox.exe'
            - '\\brave.exe'
    condition: selection_known_c2 or (selection_suspicious_ws and not filter_browsers)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate applications in AppData making HTTPS connections (Electron apps, updaters)
    - VPN or proxy tools connecting on port 443 from non-standard paths
level: high
```

**Tuning notes:** Update C2 domain list as new CrystalX infrastructure is identified. Exclude known Electron apps by process hash or signed publisher. Adjust AppData/Temp path matching to reduce noise from legitimate auto-updating software.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- CrystalX RAT — Go Binary Execution with Credential Theft Artifacts (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CrystalX RAT — Registry Run Key Persistence by Unsigned Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CrystalX RAT — Cryptocurrency Clipboard Hijacking and Keylogger Activity (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CrystalX RAT — Malicious Browser Extension Injection via Edge ExtSvc (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CrystalX RAT — Anti-Analysis Process Enumeration and VM Detection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CrystalX RAT — VNC Remote Access and Data Exfiltration via C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CrystalX RAT — ChromeElevator Credential Harvester Drop and Staging (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- CrystalX RAT — AMSI/ETW/MiniDump Defense Evasion Patching (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 24)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `webcrystal[.]lol`
- File hash: `47ACCB0ECFE8CCD466752DDE1864F3B0`
- Domain: `webcrystal[.]sbs`

Full set of 24 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Kaspersky Securelist: A Laughing RAT — CrystalX Combines Spyware, Stealer, and Prankware Features](https://securelist.com/crystalx-rat-with-prankware-features/119283/)
- [CYFIRMA: Unmasked Salat Stealer — Deep Dive into Persistence and C2 Infrastructure (Related MaaS Family)](https://www.cyfirma.com/research/unmasked-salat-stealer-a-deep-dive-into-its-advanced-persistence-mechanisms-and-c2-infrastructure/)
- [ANY.RUN: SalatStealer Malware Analysis (Related MaaS Family)](https://any.run/malware-trends/salat/)
- [Malpedia: SalatStealer (Related MaaS Family)](https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.salatstealer)
- [MITRE ATT&CK: Clipboard Data (T1115)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK: Input Capture — Keylogging (T1056.001)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0306
