# UAT-10362 Deploys LucidRook Lua-Based Malware Against Taiwanese NGOs and Universities

> China-nexus threat actor UAT-10362 conducts spear-phishing campaigns against Taiwanese NGOs and universities using LucidRook, a novel Lua 5.4.8-based stager embedded in a 64-bit DLL with Rust-compiled libraries. The tiered toolkit includes LucidPawn (geofenced dropper targeting zh-TW locales) and LucidKnight (Gmail-based recon exfiltrator), leveraging DLL side-loading via masqueraded DISM binaries and compromised FTP servers for C2.

- **Published:** 2026-04-09T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-04-09T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0345
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-lucidrook-lua-stager-tl-2026-0345.webp?v=ddba9efe (Threadlinqs threat intel: LucidRook Lua Stager Hits Taiwan NGOs: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0345) — High severity, 35 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0345
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** UAT-10362 (China)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 35 (3 shown free below)

## Description

UAT-10362 is a previously undocumented China-nexus threat cluster first observed in October 2025 conducting targeted spear-phishing campaigns against Taiwanese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and suspected universities. The actor deploys a sophisticated tiered malware toolkit consisting of LucidRook, LucidPawn, and LucidKnight, designed for targeted intelligence collection against civil society and academic institutions in Taiwan.

LucidRook is the primary stager: a 64-bit Windows DLL (~1.6MB, 3,800+ functions) that embeds a full Lua 5.4.8 interpreter alongside Rust-compiled libraries. It masquerades as a COM DLL via a DllGetClassObject export and downloads staged Lua bytecode payloads from compromised FTP servers. The stager implements a safe mode that disables package.loadlib and omits the debug library to harden against analysis. String obfuscation uses a two-stage scheme: per-string arithmetic address calculation followed by XOR decryption with a seed|mask key reconstruction. Host reconnaissance collects user accounts, computer names, driver information, installed applications, and running processes, encrypting results with an embedded RSA public key and packaging into password-protected ZIP archives (archive4.zip) uploaded to FTP C2.

LucidPawn serves as the initial dropper, sharing LucidRook''s COM DLL masquerade technique and obfuscation scheme. It performs geofencing via GetUserDefaultUILanguage(), checking for Traditional Chinese (0x0404/zh-TW) with a 0xF7FF mask that also accepts zh-HK (0x0C04), ensuring execution only on Taiwanese or Hong Kong systems. LucidPawn sends a DNS beacon to an Out-of-band Application Security Testing (OAST) service at d.2fcc7078.digimg.store to verify network connectivity, then decrypts AES-encrypted embedded binaries, establishes persistence via Startup folder LNK files, and launches LucidRook via DLL side-loading.

LucidKnight is a companion 64-bit Windows DLL reconnaissance tool with embedded Rust components. It collects computer name, OS version, processor architecture, CPU usage, running processes, and installed software, writing to four TXT files encrypted with a separate RSA public key. Exfiltration occurs via Gmail SMTP using the lettre Rust crate: the sender account fexopuboriw972@gmail.com transmits encrypted archive.zip to the temporary address crimsonanabel@powerscrews.com with a Traditional Chinese subject line.

Two distinct infection chains deliver the malware. The LNK-based vector uses password-protected RAR archives containing LNK files with substituted PDF icons and hidden directories nested four levels deep. The LNK targets the Pester framework Build.bat (a LOLBAS technique) to execute PowerShell, which launches the legitimate DISM binary index.exe. DLL search order hijacking loads the malicious DismCore.dll (LucidPawn), which decrypts embedded binaries to %APPDATA%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Apps, renames the legitimate DISM executable to msedge.exe for persistence, and opens decoy documents. The EXE-based vector distributes 7-Zip archives containing Cleanup.exe, a .NET dropper masquerading as a Trend Micro product with a falsified compilation timestamp (2065-01-12). It Base64-decodes embedded files, drops the DISM executable and LucidRook stager to C:\ProgramData, creates a Startup LNK for persistence, and displays a fake cleanup completed message.

C2 infrastructure leverages two compromised FTP servers (1.34.253.131 and 59.124.71.242) belonging to Taiwanese printing companies whose FTP credentials were publicly exposed on their corporate websites. FTP operations use binary/passive mode with plaintext authentication. The actor generates different passwords and payloads per target using the shared C2 infrastructure, with payload archives protected by unique passwords and RSA encryption. The OAST service at dnslog.ink provides DNS beaconing without dedicated infrastructure.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1204 User Execution
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1564 Hide Artifacts
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- T1588 Obtain Capabilities

## Free detection (Splunk SPL)

**DLL Side-Loading via DISM Masquerade Binary** (`TL-2026-0345-SPL-001`)

Detects execution of a renamed or masquerading dism.exe binary loading a non-standard DLL from a user-writable directory. UAT-10362 abuses DLL side-loading by placing a malicious dismcore.dll alongside a copied dism.exe in %APPDATA% or %TEMP% to bootstrap the LucidRook stager.

- **Language:** Splunk SPL
- **ATT&CK:** T1574.002, T1036.005
- **Data sources:** Endpoint Detection (Sysmon), Windows Process Creation, Windows Image Load Events
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=windows sourcetype=sysmon (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=7)
| eval proc_name=lower(OriginalFileName), image_path=lower(Image)
| where (proc_name="dism.exe" OR like(image_path, "%dism.exe"))
  AND NOT like(image_path, "%\\windows\\system32\\%")
  AND NOT like(image_path, "%\\windows\\syswow64\\%")
  AND NOT like(image_path, "%\\windows\\winsxs\\%")
| join ProcessGuid type=inner
  [search index=windows sourcetype=sysmon EventCode=7
   | where NOT like(lower(ImageLoaded), "%\\windows\\%")
     AND (like(lower(ImageLoaded), "%dismcore.dll") OR like(lower(ImageLoaded), "%dismapi.dll"))
   | fields ProcessGuid, ImageLoaded, SignatureStatus]
| eval risk_score=if(SignatureStatus!="Valid", 95, 70)
| table _time, Computer, User, Image, ImageLoaded, SignatureStatus, ParentImage, CommandLine, risk_score
| sort -risk_score
```

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Suspicious DLL Side-Loading from User-Writable Paths (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Anti-Analysis and VM Detection via WMI and Registry Enumeration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Staged Data Collection and Encrypted Archive Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DISM Binary Execution from Non-Standard Directory (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Shared Library Hijack with Cron Persistence on Linux (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DNS-over-HTTPS C2 Communication from Non-Browser Process (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Lua 5.4 Runtime Artifacts and In-Memory Stager Execution (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- DNS-over-HTTPS C2 Beaconing and Geofenced Data Exfiltration (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 35)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `1.34.253[.]131`
- Domain: `d[.]2fcc7078[.]digimg[.]store`
- File hash: `d49761cdbea170dd17255a958214db392dc7621198f95d5eb5749859c603100a`

Full set of 35 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Cisco Talos: New Lua-based malware LucidRook observed in targeted attacks against Taiwanese organizations](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-lua-based-malware-lucidrook/)
- [Cisco Talos IOCs: LucidRook indicators](https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/IOCs/blob/main/2026/04/new-lua-based-malware-lucidrook.txt)
- [The Hacker News: UAT-10362 Targets Taiwanese NGOs with LucidRook Malware](https://thehackernews.com/2026/04/uat-10362-targets-taiwanese-ngos-with.html)
- [CybersecurityNews: Hackers Use Fake Security Software to Deliver LucidRook](https://cybersecuritynews.com/hackers-use-fake-security-software-to-deliver-lucidrook/)
- [GBHackers: LucidRook in Taiwan Cyberattacks](https://gbhackers.com/lucidrook-in-taiwan-cyberattacks/)
- [BackBox News: LucidRook observed in targeted attacks against Taiwanese organizations](https://news.backbox.org/2026/04/08/new-lua-based-malware-lucidrook-observed-in-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-organizations/)
- [Malware.news: LucidRook Lua-based malware analysis](https://malware.news/t/new-lua-based-malware-lucidrook-observed-in-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-organizations/105850)
- [CyberPress: Fake Security Tools Used To Spread LucidRook](https://cyberpress.org/fake-security-spreads-lucidrook/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0345
