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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-0364

CPUID Supply Chain Attack Delivers STX RAT via Trojanized CPU-Z, HWMonitor, and PerfMonitor Downloads

criticalMONITORING

On April 9, 2026, threat actors compromised cpuid.com at the API level, silently redirecting official CPU-Z, HWMonitor, HWMonitor Pro, and PerfMonitor downloads to trojanized binaries bundling STX RAT. The memory-only RAT uses DLL search order hijacking via CRYPTBASE.dll, establishes quad-persistence (registry run keys, scheduled tasks, COM TypeLib hijacking, PowerShell profile), and exfiltrates credentials via DNS-over-HTTPS through Cloudflare.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0364, CVE-2023-36025
Also known asCPUID Watering Hole Attack, CPU-Z Supply Chain Compromise, Operation CityOfSin
SeverityCRITICAL
Exploitation statusLinked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2023-36025 (added )
EPSSCVE-2023-36025: 88.0% (99.7th percentile)
Affected productsCPUID CPU-Z; CPUID HWMonitor; CPUID HWMonitor Pro; CPUID PerfMonitor; CPUID powerMAX
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-426, CWE-494, CWE-502
AttributionCityOfSin (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareBackdoor.Win64.Alien, STX RAT
ToolsSTX RAT C2 via Caddy + Cloudflare CDN fronting
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1055 Process Injection, T1056 Input Capture, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1090 Proxy, T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution and 7 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsretail, manufacturing, consulting, telecommunications, agriculture
Target regionsSouth America, Eastern Europe, Asia, Global
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-04-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0364 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 32 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: DNS-over-HTTPS C2 Resolution and STX RAT Callback — C2/Lateral Movement Phase

Detects network connections to known STX RAT C2 infrastructure including DNS-over-HTTPS resolution via Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) for supp0v3.com domains, and HTTPS callbacks to the production C2 endpoint welcome.supp0v3.com/d/callback. Also detects connections to the backend C2 server 147.45.178.61. The malware uses Cloudflare CDN fronting to mask C2 traffic as legitimate HTTPS.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1071.004, T1573.002, T1090.002
  • Data sources: dns, proxy, firewall, sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=proxy OR index=dns OR index=firewall sourcetype IN ("pan:traffic", "bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog", "squid:access", "stream:dns", "cisco:asa")
| where match(url, "(?i)supp0v3\.com") OR match(query, "(?i)supp0v3\.com") OR match(dest, "(?i)supp0v3\.com") OR dest_ip="147.45.178.61" OR dest_ip="95.216.51.236"
| eval c2_indicator=case(
    match(url, "(?i)/d/callback"), "CRITICAL — STX RAT C2 Callback",
    match(query, "(?i)welcome\.supp0v3\.com"), "CRITICAL — Production C2 Domain",
    match(query, "(?i)supp0v3\.com"), "HIGH — C2 Parent Domain",
    dest_ip="147.45.178.61", "HIGH — Backend C2 Server",
    dest_ip="95.216.51.236", "MEDIUM — Related Infrastructure",
    1=1, "MEDIUM — Associated IOC")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(src_ip) as source_ips values(url) as urls values(query) as dns_queries by c2_indicator, dest_ip
| sort -c2_indicator
| table c2_indicator, dest_ip, source_ips, urls, dns_queries, first_seen, last_seen, count

Microsoft KQL

let c2_domains = dynamic(["supp0v3.com", "welcome.supp0v3.com", "ai.supp0v3.com", "helloworld.supp0v3.com"]);
let c2_ips = dynamic(["147.45.178.61", "95.216.51.236"]);
union DeviceNetworkEvents, DnsEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (c2_domains) or RemoteIP in (c2_ips) or Name has_any (c2_domains)
| extend C2Indicator = case(
    RemoteUrl has "/d/callback", "CRITICAL — STX RAT C2 Callback",
    Name has "welcome.supp0v3.com" or RemoteUrl has "welcome.supp0v3.com", "CRITICAL — Production C2",
    RemoteIP == "147.45.178.61", "HIGH — Backend C2 Server",
    Name has "supp0v3.com" or RemoteUrl has "supp0v3.com", "HIGH — C2 Domain",
    "MEDIUM — Related Infrastructure")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Name, C2Indicator
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Sigma

title: STX RAT C2 Communication to supp0v3.com Infrastructure — C2 Phase
id: 7a910213-2c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d1e2f3a4b
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries or network connections to known STX RAT C2 infrastructure including supp0v3.com domains and backend server 147.45.178.61, used in CPUID supply chain attack for command and control via DNS-over-HTTPS and Cloudflare CDN fronting
references:
    - https://securelist.com/tr/cpu-z/119365/
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/securing-the-software-supply-chain-how-sentinelones-ai-edr-autonomously-blocked-the-cpu-z-watering-hole-cyber-attack/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/04/14
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.t1573.002
    - attack.t1090.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection_domain:
        QueryName|endswith:
            - '.supp0v3.com'
            - 'supp0v3.com'
    condition: selection_domain
falsepositives:
    - None expected — supp0v3.com is exclusively attacker-controlled infrastructure
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • None expected — supp0v3.com is exclusively attacker-controlled infrastructure

Tuning notes: This is an IOC-based detection with zero expected false positives. Add new C2 subdomains as they are discovered. Monitor for domain changes in future STX RAT variants. Consider also blocking the Cloudflare R2 distribution bucket domains (pub-*.r2.dev) if not used legitimately.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
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  • COM TypeLib Hijacking of IScriptControl GUID — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Regsvr32 SCT Scriptlet Execution and BinaryFormatter Deserialization Chain — C2/Lateral Movement Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Stdin-Piped PowerShell Execution via Console ReadToEnd — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Scheduled Task with Anomalous 68-Minute Interval and Extended Duration — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • PowerShell Profile Autorun Persistence and Credential Store Access — C2/Lateral Movement Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Sideloading via CPUID Binary — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • MSBuild Persistence with Inline C# Tasks from AppData — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-04-14, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 32 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0364.

Sample indicators (3 of 32)

  • IP address: 147.45.178[.]61
  • Domain: supp0v3[.]com
  • File hash: eff5ece65fb30b21a3ebc1ceb738556b774b452d13e119d5a2bfb489459b4a46

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 32 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

32 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Over 150 confirmed victims across retail, manufacturing, telecom, consulting, and agriculture sectors during a 19-hour operational window. Infrastructure linked to prior March 2026 FileZilla campaign and September 2025 .url exploit operations via shared C2 domain supp0v3.com and backend server 147.45.178.61.

A Russian-nexus threat actor compromised the CPUID website (cpuid.com) between April 9, 2026 at 15:00 UTC and April 10, 2026 at 10:00 UTC, exploiting a secondary backend API to replace legitimate download links with URLs pointing to trojanized installers hosted on attacker-controlled Cloudflare R2 infrastructure and compromised websites. The attack affected CPU-Z v2.19, HWMonitor v1.63, HWMonitor Pro v1.57, PerfMonitor v2.04, and powerMAX v1.00.

The trojanized packages bundled legitimate, CPUID-signed executables alongside a malicious CRYPTBASE.dll compiled in the Zig programming language. The attack leverages transitive DLL sideloading: when cpuz_x64.exe loads ADVAPI32.dll, Windows attempts to resolve CRYPTBASE.dll, loading the attacker's version from the application directory instead of System32.

Upon execution, CRYPTBASE.dll's DllMain suspends the legitimate application's main thread and spawns worker threads for payload execution. A 349KB colon-hex encoded shellcode payload in the .rdata section is decoded, then a reflective PE loader (out.dll) is loaded using position-independent shellcode. The loader performs DNS-over-HTTPS resolution via Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 resolver for welcome.supp0v3.com, then establishes an HTTPS C2 callback to https://welcome.supp0v3.com/d/callback with embedded campaign tracking (utm_source=CityOfSin). The C2 backend runs Caddy server behind Cloudflare CDN fronting.

The C2 response triggers a multi-stage payload chain: PowerShell is spawned with stdin-piped execution ([Console]::In.ReadToEnd() | Invoke-Expression) to evade command-line logging. This compiles a .NET DLL in-memory via csc.exe/cvtres.exe, which deploys four independent persistence mechanisms simultaneously:

1. Registry Run Keys: Random GUID-named entries under HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run launching MSBuild.exe with malicious .proj files containing inline C# tasks that decrypt XOR-encrypted shellcode from BuildCache.dat.

2. Scheduled Task: A task executing every 68 minutes with a 20-year duration at highest privilege, triggering MSBuild.exe with CommonBuild.proj.

3. COM TypeLib Hijacking: Hijacks the IScriptControl TypeLib GUID {EAB22AC0-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0B}, triggering when any application loads IScriptControl. The chain flows through ActiveX.sct to regsvr32.exe to Clippy.sct, which uses BinaryFormatter deserialization of an IPv6-encoded .NET assembly (Moniker.dll).

4. PowerShell Profile Autorun: Installs autorun.ps1 in the user's PowerShell directory with a hidden, bypass-execution-policy Run key.

STX RAT's capabilities include hidden VNC (invisible desktop sessions), keyboard/mouse injection, browser credential theft (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Brave), Windows Vault extraction, cryptocurrency wallet access, in-memory execution of additional payloads (EXE/DLL/PowerShell/shellcode), reverse proxy and tunneling, and custom encrypted C2 communication via DNS-over-HTTPS.

The threat actor (handle @d_coroner, campaign ID CityOfSin) has been operational since at least September 2025, conducting .url exploit campaigns targeting LibreOffice and Google Drive via CVE-2023-36025 SmartScreen bypass from the same 147.45.178.61 backend. The supp0v3.com domain was registered October 29, 2025, with the production C2 subdomain activated December 11, 2025. The same infrastructure was reused for a FileZilla supply chain campaign in March 2026, demonstrating poor operational security that enabled rapid attribution. The 147.45.178.61 backend (AS215540, Global Connectivity Solutions LLP, Frankfurt) presents a stolen VK.com wildcard TLS certificate and runs OpenSSH 9.6p1 Ubuntu with Apache httpd.

Kaspersky confirmed 150+ victims from their telemetry, primarily in Brazil, Russia, and China, with affected organizations spanning retail, manufacturing, consulting, telecommunications, and agriculture sectors. The victim profile skews toward IT professionals (system administrators, developers, security engineers) who routinely download hardware diagnostic tools, making this supply chain vector particularly effective for targeting privileged access holders. Post-infection access sales to ransomware affiliates typically activate within 60-90 days.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1055 Process Injection; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution; T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion; T1574 Hijack Execution Flow; T1620 Reflective Code Loading

Persistence

T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1546 Event Triggered Execution; T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

Credential Access

T1056 Input Capture; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Initial Access

T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

Remediation

Patches

  • Re-download CPU-Z, HWMonitor, HWMonitor Pro, and PerfMonitor from verified cpuid.com after April 10 2026
  • Verify all CPUID software downloads against official hashes published post-incident

Immediate actions

  • Block supp0v3.com and *.supp0v3.com at DNS and proxy layers
  • Block 147.45.178.61 at perimeter firewall
  • Block Cloudflare R2 distribution buckets: pub-45c2577dbd174292a02137c18e7b1b5a.r2.dev, pub-fd67c956bf8548b7b2cc23bb3774ff0c.r2.dev, pub-f3252d8370f34f0d9f3b3c427d3ac33c.r2.dev
  • Block distribution domains: cahayailmukreatif.web.id, transitopalermo.com, vatrobran.hr
  • Search fleet for CRYPTBASE.dll outside C:\Windows\System32
  • Hunt for process chain: cpuz_x64.exe spawning powershell.exe spawning csc.exe
  • Add all SHA256 hashes to EDR/AV block lists
  • Quarantine any systems that downloaded CPUID software between April 9-10 2026

Workarounds

  • Remove all four persistence mechanisms: registry Run keys with MSBuild/PowerShell, scheduled tasks, COM TypeLib GUID {EAB22AC0-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0B}, PowerShell profile autoruns
  • Delete persistence files: c_3791.proj, CommonBuild.proj, BuildCache.dat, ActiveX.sct, Clippy.sct, Moniker.dll, data.dat, autorun.ps1 from AppData directories
  • Use portable versions of hardware diagnostic tools from verified alternative sources until CPUID completes security review

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy behavioral EDR with reflective code loading detection
  • Monitor DNS-over-HTTPS traffic for anomalous resolution patterns
  • Implement application allowlisting to prevent DLL sideloading
  • Monitor for MSBuild.exe executing .proj files from AppData directories
  • Monitor registry Run keys for MSBuild/PowerShell persistence patterns
  • Hunt for scheduled tasks with 68-minute intervals or 20-year durations
  • Monitor COM TypeLib registry modifications for hijacking attempts
  • Credential rotation for all affected users within 30 days
  • Monitor for lateral movement and credential reuse for 60-90 days post-remediation

Affected and fixed versions

  • CPUID — CPU-Z
    Vulnerable versions: 2.19
    Fixed in: 2.19 (re-released post-incident)
  • CPUID — HWMonitor
    Vulnerable versions: 1.63
    Fixed in: 1.63 (re-released post-incident)
  • CPUID — HWMonitor Pro
    Vulnerable versions: 1.57
    Fixed in: 1.57 (re-released post-incident)
  • CPUID — PerfMonitor
    Vulnerable versions: 2.04
    Fixed in: 2.04 (re-released post-incident)
  • CPUID — powerMAX
    Vulnerable versions: 1.00

Timeline

  • Threat actor begins .url exploit campaigns using locked-ioc-22 backend targeting LibreOffice via CVE-2023-36025 SmartScreen bypass
  • C2 domain locked-ioc-27 registered; locked-ioc-20 staging/development server goes live at locked-ioc-22
  • helloworld.locked-ioc-27 testing subdomain activated for C2 infrastructure validation
  • locked-ioc-18 production C2 subdomain activated behind Cloudflare CDN fronting with Caddy backend
  • First locked-ioc-25 variant (v1, 2.2MB) compiled in Zig language appears in the wild
  • FileZilla supply chain campaign launched using identical C2 infrastructure (locked-ioc-27, locked-ioc-22) with version.dll sideloading
  • CPU-Z v2.19 officially signed by CPUID with Sectigo EV certificate — legitimate binary later abused in trojanized packages
  • powerMAX v1.00 trojanized package created and staged on Cloudflare R2 distribution infrastructure
  • CPUID website API compromised at 15:00 UTC; legitimate download links redirected to trojanized installers on R2 buckets and compromised hosting
  • Malicious download URLs removed from cpuid.com at approximately 10:00 UTC — 19-hour operational window closed
  • Kaspersky Securelist, eSentire, and multiple security vendors publish detailed technical analyses with IOCs and YARA rules
  • SentinelOne publishes comprehensive blog detailing autonomous EDR detection and full attack chain analysis
  • As of 2026-05-29, the 19-hour CPUID download compromise is closed/remediated (trojanized CPU-Z/HWMonitor no longer served), but the CityOfSin/@d_coroner actor, STX RAT tooling, and reused locked-ioc-27/locked-ioc-22 C2 remain live. The same operator ran parallel FileZilla and financial-sector campaigns with no public takedown or arrest, and likely sells access to ransomware affiliates.

Sources cited

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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