# CPUID Supply Chain Attack Delivers STX RAT via Trojanized CPU-Z, HWMonitor, and PerfMonitor Downloads

> On April 9, 2026, threat actors compromised cpuid.com at the API level, silently redirecting official CPU-Z, HWMonitor, HWMonitor Pro, and PerfMonitor downloads to trojanized binaries bundling STX RAT. The memory-only RAT uses DLL search order hijacking via CRYPTBASE.dll, establishes quad-persistence (registry run keys, scheduled tasks, COM TypeLib hijacking, PowerShell profile), and exfiltrates credentials via DNS-over-HTTPS through Cloudflare. Over 150 confirmed victims across retail, manufacturing, telecom, consulting, and agriculture sectors during a 19-hour operational window. Infrastructure linked to prior March 2026 FileZilla campaign and September 2025 .url exploit operations via shared C2 domain supp0v3.com and backend server 147.45.178.61.

- **Published:** 2026-04-14T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-04-14T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0364
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-stx-rat-cpuid-breach-tl-2026-0364.webp?v=ad722508 (Threadlinqs threat intel: STX RAT via Trojanized CPU-Z Downloads: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0364) — Critical severity, 32 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0364
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Category:** SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Status:** MONITORING
- **Actor:** CityOfSin (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 32 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2023-36025

## Description

A Russian-nexus threat actor compromised the CPUID website (cpuid.com) between April 9, 2026 at 15:00 UTC and April 10, 2026 at 10:00 UTC, exploiting a secondary backend API to replace legitimate download links with URLs pointing to trojanized installers hosted on attacker-controlled Cloudflare R2 infrastructure and compromised websites. The attack affected CPU-Z v2.19, HWMonitor v1.63, HWMonitor Pro v1.57, PerfMonitor v2.04, and powerMAX v1.00.

The trojanized packages bundled legitimate, CPUID-signed executables alongside a malicious CRYPTBASE.dll compiled in the Zig programming language. The attack leverages transitive DLL sideloading: when cpuz_x64.exe loads ADVAPI32.dll, Windows attempts to resolve CRYPTBASE.dll, loading the attacker's version from the application directory instead of System32.

Upon execution, CRYPTBASE.dll's DllMain suspends the legitimate application's main thread and spawns worker threads for payload execution. A 349KB colon-hex encoded shellcode payload in the .rdata section is decoded, then a reflective PE loader (out.dll) is loaded using position-independent shellcode. The loader performs DNS-over-HTTPS resolution via Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 resolver for welcome.supp0v3.com, then establishes an HTTPS C2 callback to https://welcome.supp0v3.com/d/callback with embedded campaign tracking (utm_source=CityOfSin). The C2 backend runs Caddy server behind Cloudflare CDN fronting.

The C2 response triggers a multi-stage payload chain: PowerShell is spawned with stdin-piped execution ([Console]::In.ReadToEnd() | Invoke-Expression) to evade command-line logging. This compiles a .NET DLL in-memory via csc.exe/cvtres.exe, which deploys four independent persistence mechanisms simultaneously:

1. Registry Run Keys: Random GUID-named entries under HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run launching MSBuild.exe with malicious .proj files containing inline C# tasks that decrypt XOR-encrypted shellcode from BuildCache.dat.

2. Scheduled Task: A task executing every 68 minutes with a 20-year duration at highest privilege, triggering MSBuild.exe with CommonBuild.proj.

3. COM TypeLib Hijacking: Hijacks the IScriptControl TypeLib GUID {EAB22AC0-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0B}, triggering when any application loads IScriptControl. The chain flows through ActiveX.sct to regsvr32.exe to Clippy.sct, which uses BinaryFormatter deserialization of an IPv6-encoded .NET assembly (Moniker.dll).

4. PowerShell Profile Autorun: Installs autorun.ps1 in the user's PowerShell directory with a hidden, bypass-execution-policy Run key.

STX RAT's capabilities include hidden VNC (invisible desktop sessions), keyboard/mouse injection, browser credential theft (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Brave), Windows Vault extraction, cryptocurrency wallet access, in-memory execution of additional payloads (EXE/DLL/PowerShell/shellcode), reverse proxy and tunneling, and custom encrypted C2 communication via DNS-over-HTTPS.

The threat actor (handle @d_coroner, campaign ID CityOfSin) has been operational since at least September 2025, conducting .url exploit campaigns targeting LibreOffice and Google Drive via CVE-2023-36025 SmartScreen bypass from the same 147.45.178.61 backend. The supp0v3.com domain was registered October 29, 2025, with the production C2 subdomain activated December 11, 2025. The same infrastructure was reused for a FileZilla supply chain campaign in March 2026, demonstrating poor operational security that enabled rapid attribution. The 147.45.178.61 backend (AS215540, Global Connectivity Solutions LLP, Frankfurt) presents a stolen VK.com wildcard TLS certificate and runs OpenSSH 9.6p1 Ubuntu with Apache httpd.

Kaspersky confirmed 150+ victims from their telemetry, primarily in Brazil, Russia, and China, with affected organizations spanning retail, manufacturing, consulting, telecommunications, and agriculture sectors. The victim profile skews toward IT professionals (system administrators, developers, security engineers) who routinely download hardware diagnostic tools, making this supply chain vector particularly effective for targeting privileged access holders. Post-infection access sales to ransomware affiliates typically activate within 60-90 days.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
- T1546 Event Triggered Execution
- T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1090 Proxy

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**DNS-over-HTTPS C2 Resolution and STX RAT Callback — C2/Lateral Movement Phase** (`TL-2026-0364-SPL-003`)

Detects network connections to known STX RAT C2 infrastructure including DNS-over-HTTPS resolution via Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) for supp0v3.com domains, and HTTPS callbacks to the production C2 endpoint welcome.supp0v3.com/d/callback. Also detects connections to the backend C2 server 147.45.178.61. The malware uses Cloudflare CDN fronting to mask C2 traffic as legitimate HTTPS.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.004, T1573.002, T1090.002
- **Data sources:** dns, proxy, firewall, sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy OR index=dns OR index=firewall sourcetype IN ("pan:traffic", "bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog", "squid:access", "stream:dns", "cisco:asa")
| where match(url, "(?i)supp0v3\.com") OR match(query, "(?i)supp0v3\.com") OR match(dest, "(?i)supp0v3\.com") OR dest_ip="147.45.178.61" OR dest_ip="95.216.51.236"
| eval c2_indicator=case(
    match(url, "(?i)/d/callback"), "CRITICAL — STX RAT C2 Callback",
    match(query, "(?i)welcome\.supp0v3\.com"), "CRITICAL — Production C2 Domain",
    match(query, "(?i)supp0v3\.com"), "HIGH — C2 Parent Domain",
    dest_ip="147.45.178.61", "HIGH — Backend C2 Server",
    dest_ip="95.216.51.236", "MEDIUM — Related Infrastructure",
    1=1, "MEDIUM — Associated IOC")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(src_ip) as source_ips values(url) as urls values(query) as dns_queries by c2_indicator, dest_ip
| sort -c2_indicator
| table c2_indicator, dest_ip, source_ips, urls, dns_queries, first_seen, last_seen, count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let c2_domains = dynamic(["supp0v3.com", "welcome.supp0v3.com", "ai.supp0v3.com", "helloworld.supp0v3.com"]);
let c2_ips = dynamic(["147.45.178.61", "95.216.51.236"]);
union DeviceNetworkEvents, DnsEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (c2_domains) or RemoteIP in (c2_ips) or Name has_any (c2_domains)
| extend C2Indicator = case(
    RemoteUrl has "/d/callback", "CRITICAL — STX RAT C2 Callback",
    Name has "welcome.supp0v3.com" or RemoteUrl has "welcome.supp0v3.com", "CRITICAL — Production C2",
    RemoteIP == "147.45.178.61", "HIGH — Backend C2 Server",
    Name has "supp0v3.com" or RemoteUrl has "supp0v3.com", "HIGH — C2 Domain",
    "MEDIUM — Related Infrastructure")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Name, C2Indicator
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: STX RAT C2 Communication to supp0v3.com Infrastructure — C2 Phase
id: 7a910213-2c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d1e2f3a4b
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries or network connections to known STX RAT C2 infrastructure including supp0v3.com domains and backend server 147.45.178.61, used in CPUID supply chain attack for command and control via DNS-over-HTTPS and Cloudflare CDN fronting
references:
    - https://securelist.com/tr/cpu-z/119365/
    - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/securing-the-software-supply-chain-how-sentinelones-ai-edr-autonomously-blocked-the-cpu-z-watering-hole-cyber-attack/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/04/14
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.004
    - attack.t1573.002
    - attack.t1090.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: dns_query
detection:
    selection_domain:
        QueryName|endswith:
            - '.supp0v3.com'
            - 'supp0v3.com'
    condition: selection_domain
falsepositives:
    - None expected — supp0v3.com is exclusively attacker-controlled infrastructure
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- None expected — supp0v3.com is exclusively attacker-controlled infrastructure

**Tuning notes:** This is an IOC-based detection with zero expected false positives. Add new C2 subdomains as they are discovered. Monitor for domain changes in future STX RAT variants. Consider also blocking the Cloudflare R2 distribution bucket domains (pub-*.r2.dev) if not used legitimately.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- CPUID Binary Spawning Suspicious PowerShell-to-CSC Process Chain — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- COM TypeLib Hijacking of IScriptControl GUID — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Regsvr32 SCT Scriptlet Execution and BinaryFormatter Deserialization Chain — C2/Lateral Movement Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Stdin-Piped PowerShell Execution via Console ReadToEnd — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Scheduled Task with Anomalous 68-Minute Interval and Extended Duration — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowerShell Profile Autorun Persistence and Credential Store Access — C2/Lateral Movement Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] Sideloading via CPUID Binary — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- MSBuild Persistence with Inline C# Tasks from AppData — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 32)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `147.45.178[.]61`
- Domain: `supp0v3[.]com`
- File hash: `eff5ece65fb30b21a3ebc1ceb738556b774b452d13e119d5a2bfb489459b4a46`

Full set of 32 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [SentinelOne: Securing the Software Supply Chain - CPU-Z Watering Hole](https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/securing-the-software-supply-chain-how-sentinelones-ai-edr-autonomously-blocked-the-cpu-z-watering-hole-cyber-attack/)
- [Kaspersky Securelist: CPU-Z & HWMonitor Watering Hole Attack](https://securelist.com/tr/cpu-z/119365/)
- [The Hacker News: CPUID Breach Distributes STX RAT](https://thehackernews.com/2026/04/cpuid-breach-distributes-stx-rat-via.html)
- [N3mes1s: CPU-Z 2.19 Supply Chain Attack Deep Analysis](https://gist.github.com/N3mes1s/b5b0b96782b9f832819d2db7c6684f84)
- [Help Net Security: Hackers Hijacked CPUID Downloads](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/04/13/cpuid-download-malware/)
- [Cyderes: Monitoring the Monitor - CPUID HWMonitor Supply Chain Hijack](https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/how-cpuids-hwmonitor-supply-chain-was-hijacked-to-deploy-stx-rat)
- [Security Affairs: CPUID Watering Hole Attack Spreads STX RAT](https://securityaffairs.com/190702/malware/cpuid-watering-hole-attack-spreads-stx-rat-malware.html)
- [SecurityOnline: The CPUID Watering Hole Attack](https://securityonline.info/cpuid-watering-hole-attack-cpu-z-hwmonitor-stx-rat/)
- [UV Cyber: Threat Advisory - CPUID Compromise](https://www.uvcyber.com/resources/reports/threat-advisory-cpuid-compromise)
- [CyberSecSentinel: CPUID Supply Chain Attack Delivers STX RAT](https://cybersecsentinel.com/cpuid-supply-chain-attack-delivers-stx-rat-via-trojanised-cpu-z-and-hwmonitor-downloads/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0364
