# PowMix Botnet Targets Czech Workforce via LNK-Triggered PowerShell Loader with Heroku C2

> Cisco Talos discovered PowMix, a previously undocumented PowerShell botnet operating since December 2025, targeting Czech organizations across HR, legal, and recruitment sectors. The botnet delivers via phishing emails containing malicious ZIP archives with LNK shortcuts that trigger a PowerShell loader, bypass AMSI via AmsiUtils reflection, and execute PowMix entirely in memory using Heroku-hosted HTTPS C2 infrastructure with XOR-encrypted communications.

- **Published:** 2026-04-16T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-04-16T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0375
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-powmix-powershell-botnet-tl-2026-0375.webp?v=00eef7a2 (Threadlinqs threat intel: PowMix Botnet Abuses Heroku C2: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0375) — High severity, 28 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0375
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** PowMix Operators
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 28 (3 shown free below)

## Description

PowMix is a previously undocumented PowerShell-based botnet discovered by Cisco Talos Intelligence, actively targeting Czech organizations since at least December 2025. The campaign focuses on the Czech workforce across human resources, legal, and recruitment sectors, using sophisticated phishing lures themed around EDEKA brand impersonation, Czech Data Protection Act compliance documentation, compensation data, and job recruitment postings spanning IT, finance, and logistics roles.

The infection chain begins with phishing emails delivering malicious ZIP archives containing Windows shortcut (LNK) files alongside legitimate-looking decoy documents. When a victim executes the LNK file, it triggers a PowerShell loader that copies the ZIP archive to the ProgramData directory. The loader then searches the ZIP binary data for a specific marker string 'zAswKoK', extracting the embedded PowMix payload positioned after this marker — a technique for concealing malicious code within ZIP file structures previously observed in the related ZipLine campaign.

Before executing the payload, the loader performs an AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass using .NET reflection to set the AmsiUtils.amsiInitFailed field to true, effectively disabling Windows antimalware scanning for the current PowerShell process. The PowMix botnet code is then executed entirely in memory via Invoke-Expression (IEX), leaving minimal forensic artifacts on disk.

PowMix establishes persistence through Windows scheduled tasks configured to run daily at 11:00 AM. The scheduled task name is a hex-encoded string derived from the CRC32 hash of the BotID combined with a configuration hash, making each persistence entry unique per infection. The task launches explorer.exe with a path to the malicious LNK file, re-triggering the infection chain on each execution.

The command-and-control infrastructure leverages Heroku, a legitimate Platform-as-a-Service provider, to host HTTPS C2 endpoints. PowMix implements randomized beaconing with initial intervals of 0-261 seconds and subsequent intervals of 1075-1450 seconds, making detection through network timing analysis difficult. The bot embeds its BotID within URL paths that mimic legitimate REST API calls, blending C2 traffic with normal web application traffic. All communications are encrypted using XOR with hardcoded keys (including HpSWSb, qDQyxQE, bKUxmhyAe, HymzqLse, KsEYwmgSF, ujCPOEPU). The bot uses a Chrome User-Agent string and is proxy-aware, allowing it to operate in corporate environments with web proxies.

PowMix supports three primary commands from the C2 server: #KILL for self-deletion and cleanup of all persistence artifacts, #HOST for C2 domain migration via encrypted configuration updates enabling infrastructure rotation, and arbitrary PowerShell execution via IEX for flexible post-exploitation activities.

Significant TTP overlaps exist with the ZipLine campaign documented by Check Point Research in August 2025, which deployed the MixShell malware. Both campaigns share ZIP-based payload concealment using marker strings (ZipLine uses 'xFIQCV', PowMix uses 'zAswKoK'), scheduled task persistence mechanisms, CRC32-based BotID generation algorithms, AMSI bypass via AmsiUtils reflection, and abuse of Heroku infrastructure for C2 communications. This overlap suggests PowMix may represent an evolution or regional variant of the same threat actor toolset, potentially linked to the financially motivated cluster tracked as UNK_GreenSec by Proofpoint.

Cisco Talos has released ClamAV signatures (Lnk.Trojan.PowMix-10059735-0, Txt.Trojan.PowMix-10059742-0, Txt.Trojan.PowMix-10059778-0, Win.Trojan.PowMix-10059728-0) and Snort rule SID 66118 to detect PowMix activity.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1566 Phishing
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1204 User Execution
- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1102 Web Service
- T1008 Fallback Channels
- T1132 Data Encoding
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1489 Service Stop

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**PowMix AMSI Bypass via AmsiUtils Reflection — Exploitation** (`TL-2026-0375-SPL-001`)

Detects PowerShell script block logging events containing AmsiUtils.amsiInitFailed reflection pattern used by PowMix botnet loader to disable Windows AMSI scanning before executing the in-memory payload via Invoke-Expression. This is the critical defense evasion step in the PowMix exploitation chain.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1685, T1059.001, T1620
- **Data sources:** powershell_script_block, windows_powershell_operational
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational" EventCode=4104 ScriptBlockText="*AmsiUtils*" ScriptBlockText="*amsiInitFailed*" | eval threat_id="TL-2026-0375", threat_name="PowMix AMSI Bypass" | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(ComputerName) as hosts values(UserID) as users by ScriptBlockText | where count > 0 | table first_seen last_seen hosts users count ScriptBlockText threat_id threat_name
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("PowerShellCommand", "AmsiNotification")
| where AdditionalFields has "AmsiUtils" and AdditionalFields has "amsiInitFailed"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, AdditionalFields
| extend ThreatId = "TL-2026-0375", DetectionName = "PowMix AMSI Bypass via AmsiUtils Reflection"
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: PowMix AMSI Bypass via AmsiUtils Reflection
id: f7a1b2c3-d4e5-4f6a-b7c8-d9e0f1a2b3c4
status: experimental
description: Detects PowerShell script blocks containing AmsiUtils.amsiInitFailed reflection pattern used by PowMix botnet to disable AMSI before in-memory payload execution
references:
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/powmix-botnet-targets-czech-workforce/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/04/16
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1685
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1620
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: ps_script
    definition: PowerShell Script Block Logging must be enabled (Event ID 4104)
detection:
    selection:
        ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
            - 'AmsiUtils'
            - 'amsiInitFailed'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers testing AMSI bypass techniques in controlled lab environments
    - Authorized red team exercises using known AMSI bypass patterns
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Security researchers testing AMSI bypass techniques in controlled lab environments
- Authorized red team exercises using known AMSI bypass patterns

**Tuning notes:** Exclude known security tool service accounts and authorized red team accounts. Add parent process chain analysis to filter legitimate security testing frameworks. Consider correlating with process creation events to identify the full exploitation chain.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- PowMix LNK-Triggered PowerShell Loader from ProgramData — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowMix Explorer.exe LNK Re-Execution from ProgramData via Scheduled Task — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowMix Non-Browser Chrome User-Agent to Heroku Infrastructure — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowMix ZIP Marker String Payload Extraction via PowerShell — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowMix Daily Scheduled Task Persistence with Hex-Encoded Name — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowMix XOR-Encrypted C2 Beaconing to Heroku Subdomains — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowMix CRC32-Hex Named Scheduled Task with Explorer LNK Launch — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowMix Heroku HTTPS C2 Beaconing with REST API URL Pattern — C2 (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 28)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `erpapp-901-53f1ea72f036[.]herokuapp[.]com`
- File hash: `7f0395176e16d30025d9b31b9d0e6cced2cb583aea9b2ac4b5a72ddfe6cd2399`
- Domain: `crmassets-4a69a8e2b3ee[.]herokuapp[.]com`

Full set of 28 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Cisco Talos: PowMix botnet targets Czech workforce](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/powmix-botnet-targets-czech-workforce/)
- [Cisco Talos IOCs - PowMix Botnet](https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/IOCs/blob/main/2026/04/powmix-botnet-targets-czech-workforce.txt)
- [Check Point Research: ZipLine Phishing Campaign](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/zipline-phishing-campaign/)
- [The Hacker News: MixShell Malware Delivered via Contact Forms](https://thehackernews.com/2025/08/mixshell-malware-delivered-via-contact.html)
- [The Register: ZipLine attack uses Contact Us forms](https://www.theregister.com/2025/08/26/zipline_phishing_campaign/)
- [Dark Reading: ZipLine Phishers Flip Script](https://www.darkreading.com/cyberattacks-data-breaches/zipline-phishers-victims-email-first)
- [GBHackers: ZipLine Campaign Targets Manufacturing Firms](https://gbhackers.com/new-zipline-campaign-targets-critical-manufacturing-firms/)
- [Industrial Cyber: ZipLine phishing uses social engineering](https://industrialcyber.co/manufacturing/zipline-phishing-campaign-uses-social-engineering-to-target-manufacturing-critical-supply-chains/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK: Scheduled Task/Job](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK: Disable or Modify Tools - AMSI Bypass](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0375
