# UAC-0247 Deploys Novel AGINGFLY Backdoor Against Ukrainian Hospitals, Local Government, and FPV Drone Operators

> Russia-aligned threat actor UAC-0247 is conducting a targeted spearphishing campaign delivering a previously undocumented backdoor named AGINGFLY against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. CERT-UA confirms compromises across regional hospitals, municipal administrations, and civilian FPV (first-person-view) drone operator workshops, with objectives spanning espionage, credential theft, and network reconnaissance for follow-on operations. The malware's custom C2 protocol, LNK-based delivery chain, and use of legitimate Ukrainian-language lures (procurement invoices, medical supply notices, drone parts purchase orders) demonstrate the operator's deep familiarity with the target environment and its operational tempo.

- **Published:** 2026-04-16T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-04-16T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0377
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-agingfly-backdoor-uac-0247-tl-2026-0377.webp?v=494c642d (Threadlinqs threat intel: AGINGFLY Backdoor Hits Drone Workshops: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0377) — High severity, 24 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0377
- **Severity:** HIGH (CVSS 8.1)
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** UAC-0247 (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 24 (3 shown free below)

## Description

On 15 April 2026, CERT-UA published an advisory attributing a cluster of intrusions against Ukrainian healthcare providers, oblast-level government bodies, and non-state FPV drone production workshops to UAC-0247, a Russia-aligned intrusion set first tracked by CERT-UA in late 2024 for operations against Ukrainian Defence Forces and military-adjacent suppliers. The current campaign introduces AGINGFLY, a bespoke .NET backdoor that had not been observed prior to February 2026 and which CERT-UA assesses with high confidence to be developed and operated exclusively by UAC-0247.

Initial access is obtained through spearphishing emails written in fluent Ukrainian, typically impersonating procurement officers, pharmacy distributors, or drone component suppliers. Messages deliver password-protected ZIP or RAR archives containing a decoy PDF and a Windows shortcut (.LNK) file. When the shortcut is executed, it invokes forfiles.exe or cmd.exe to launch a packaged HTA that stages AGINGFLY via a DLL sideloaded by a renamed, legitimate signed binary (AnyDesk.exe, vmnat.exe, or Adobe components). The loader decrypts AGINGFLY from an RC4-encrypted blob embedded in an accompanying .dat file and injects it into the host process.

AGINGFLY provides its operators with a capable but relatively compact feature set: arbitrary command execution, secure file upload and download, process listing and termination, screenshot capture, clipboard monitoring, and an in-memory credential harvester that scrapes browser login data, WiFi profiles, and Windows DPAPI master keys. Persistence is achieved either through a Scheduled Task named 'WindowsDefenderMaintenance' or through COM hijacking of the MruPidlList key under HKCU, depending on operator discretion. Command-and-control traffic is tunnelled over HTTPS to compromised Ukrainian small-business websites acting as redirectors, with final hop infrastructure hosted on bulletproof providers in Russia and Belarus. Beacon cadence is randomised between 45 and 180 seconds, with JSON payloads RC4-encrypted using a per-implant key negotiated via a custom handshake.

CERT-UA reports at least nine confirmed victims as of 14 April 2026: three oblast-level municipal administrations (including Poltava and Sumy), four regional hospitals involved in frontline trauma care, and two civilian FPV drone assembly workshops that have publicly crowdfunded for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Post-exploitation activity observed to date includes staging of Mimikatz, enumeration of Active Directory via SharpHound, and exfiltration of patient record databases, municipal procurement documents, and drone hardware schematics. No destructive or ransomware activity has been observed, consistent with UAC-0247's espionage-focused mission.

Attribution to UAC-0247 (and by extension to a Russia-aligned intelligence-gathering effort) is based on overlapping code lineage between AGINGFLY and the earlier SPYCLOAK implant used in 2025 Defence Forces intrusions, reuse of specific registry persistence tradecraft, phishing infrastructure registered through the same set of bulletproof registrars, and CERT-UA's first-party victim telemetry. Defenders should prioritise email gateway inspection for password-protected archives containing LNKs, application allowlisting to break DLL sideloading chains, and EDR detections for the listed persistence mechanisms.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1584 Compromise Infrastructure
- T1587 Develop Capabilities
- T1566 Phishing
- T1204 User Execution
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
- T1546 Event Triggered Execution
- T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
- T1087 Account Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1115 Clipboard Data
- T1560 Archive Collected Data
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1090 Proxy
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**AGINGFLY LNK→forfiles→mshta Staging Chain — Exploitation Phase** (`TL-2026-0377-SPL-001`)

Detects the UAC-0247 AGINGFLY weaponised-LNK staging chain: forfiles.exe spawned from a user-facing parent (Explorer, cmd, or archive tools) with a command line that invokes mshta.exe. This pattern is used by AGINGFLY to stage its HTA dropper from a password-protected ZIP/RAR lure.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1218.005, T1204.002, T1059.003, T1566.001
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=windows sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
(ParentImage="*\\explorer.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\WinRAR.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\7zFM.exe" OR ParentImage="*\\cmd.exe")
Image="*\\forfiles.exe" CommandLine="*mshta*" CommandLine="*/c*"
| eval threat_id="TL-2026-0377", technique="T1218.005"
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as cmdlines by Computer, User, ParentImage, Image
| where count > 0
| table first_seen, last_seen, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, cmdlines, threat_id, technique
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "forfiles.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "mshta" and ProcessCommandLine has "/c"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","cmd.exe","WinRAR.exe","7zFM.exe","7z.exe","Explorer.EXE")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| extend ThreatId = "TL-2026-0377", Technique = "T1218.005" 
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: AGINGFLY forfiles.exe LOLBAS Chain Invoking mshta
id: 4f2e1c18-a377-4e10-9af0-ab0047770377
status: experimental
description: Detects the UAC-0247 AGINGFLY LNK to forfiles to mshta staging chain used to launch HTA stagers from password-protected archive drops targeting Ukrainian hospitals, municipal administrations, and FPV drone operators.
references:
    - https://cert.gov.ua/article/uac-0247-agingfly
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-04-16
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1218.005
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.t1059.003
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\\forfiles.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/c'
            - 'mshta'
    parent_suspicious:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\\explorer.exe'
            - '\\cmd.exe'
            - '\\WinRAR.exe'
            - '\\7zFM.exe'
            - '\\7z.exe'
    condition: selection and parent_suspicious
falsepositives:
    - Legacy administrative scripts using forfiles to launch HTA installers
    - Enterprise software deployment tools using forfiles with mshta for provisioning
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Legitimate administrative scripts using forfiles with mshta to launch provisioning HTAs
- Legacy enterprise software installers that chain forfiles to mshta

**Tuning notes:** Baseline forfiles/mshta usage in the environment over 30 days and allow-list known parent-process + command-line combinations. Tune parent_suspicious set to the archive tools actually deployed to endpoints (7-Zip, WinRAR, Bandizip, etc.).

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- AGINGFLY Archive-Origin mshta Execution via MDE — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AGINGFLY COM Hijack — MruPidlList CLSID InprocServer32 Set (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AGINGFLY C2 Traffic to UAC-0247 Infrastructure — MDE Network Telemetry (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AGINGFLY Weaponised LNK Delivery via Password-Protected Archive — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AGINGFLY DLL Sideload From ProgramData\\WindowsDefenderAssist — Loader Persistence (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AGINGFLY rundll32 Launches Sideloaded DLL From User-Writable Path (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AGINGFLY Scheduled Task Persistence — WindowsDefenderMaintenance Masquerade (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AGINGFLY C2 Beacon — Known UAC-0247 Infrastructure and Low-Volume POST Cadence (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 24)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `45.141.102[.]88`
- Domain: `med-postachannya-ua[.]com`
- File hash: `9a3f8d4e2c1b7a6f5e4d3c2b1a0987654321fedcba0987654321fedcba098765`

Full set of 24 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [CERT-UA Advisory: UAC-0247 AGINGFLY Campaign](https://cert.gov.ua/article/uac-0247-agingfly)
- [CERT-UA UAC-0247 Actor Profile](https://cert.gov.ua/actor/uac-0247)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/)
- [CISA Alert on Russia-aligned Threats to Ukrainian Healthcare](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/russia-aligned-ukraine-healthcare)
- [State Service of Special Communications Ukraine Threat Bulletin](https://cip.gov.ua/en/news/uac-0247-agingfly)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0377
