Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0389
AgingFly Malware Campaign (UAC-0247) Targeting Ukrainian Governments, Hospitals, and Defense Personnel
Ukraine's CERT-UA has attributed an active malware campaign tracked as UAC-0247 deploying a new C# toolset called AgingFly against Ukrainian local governments, hospitals, and members of the defense forces. The intrusion chain begins with humanitarian-aid themed phishing emails carrying malicious .lnk shortcuts that trigger PowerShell loaders, compile C# command handlers on the infected host, steal Chromium browser credentials via the open-source ChromElevator tool, decrypt WhatsApp data via ZAPiXDESK (ZAPiDESK), and use Telegram as a Command and Control channel.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0389 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | UAC-0247 Campaign, AgingFly, AgingFly Implant, CERT-UA 6288271 |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows; Google Chrome; Meta WhatsApp Desktop; Microsoft .NET Framework / .NET |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-506, CWE-434, CWE-20, CWE-77 |
| Attribution | UAC-0247 (medium confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Russia |
| Malware | AgingFly |
| Tools | Chisel, ChromElevator, Ligolo-ng, RustScan, Telegram Bot API, ZAPiXDESK |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1027.004 Compile After Delivery, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.003 Windows Command Shell, T1059.005 Visual Basic and 25 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government, local-government, healthcare, hospitals, defense, military, public-sector |
| Target regions | Ukraine, Eastern Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 10 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-04-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0389 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 24 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: AgingFly UAC-0247 — Non-Browser Process Contacting Telegram C2 (Command and Control)
Detects network connections to api.telegram.org or t.me originating from processes that are not legitimate web browsers or the Telegram Desktop client. AgingFly uses the Telegram Bot API as its primary SaaS C2 channel (T1102 Web Service / T1071.001 Web Protocols) and its in-host compiled .NET implant, PowerShell loaders, csc.exe outputs, or rundll32 surrogates will surface as the parent of these connections.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1102, T1102.002, T1071.001, T1041
- Data sources: sysmon, zeek, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, firewall_dns
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=3 (DestinationHostname="*api.telegram.org*" OR DestinationHostname="*t.me*" OR QueryName="api.telegram.org" OR QueryName="*.t.me")
| eval lc_image=lower(Image)
| search NOT lc_image IN ("*\\chrome.exe", "*\\msedge.exe", "*\\firefox.exe", "*\\brave.exe", "*\\opera.exe", "*\\safari.exe", "*\\telegram.exe", "*\\telegramdesktop.exe", "*\\updater.exe")
| eval is_script_host=if(match(lc_image,"(powershell|pwsh|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|csc\\.exe)"),1,0)
| eval is_user_writable=if(match(lc_image,"(\\\\temp\\\\|\\\\appdata\\\\|\\\\users\\\\public\\\\|\\\\programdata\\\\)"),1,0)
| eval risk=is_script_host+is_user_writable
| table _time, host, user, Image, CommandLine, DestinationHostname, DestinationIp, DestinationPort, risk, ProcessGuid
| sort - _timeMicrosoft KQL
union
(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("api.telegram.org", "t.me") or tostring(AdditionalFields) has_any ("api.telegram.org", "t.me")),
(DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse" and tostring(AdditionalFields) has_any ("api.telegram.org", "t.me"))
| extend lc = tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName)
| where lc !in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe", "opera.exe", "safari.exe", "telegram.exe", "telegramdesktop.exe", "updater.exe")
| extend is_script_host = iff(lc matches regex @"(powershell|pwsh|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|csc)", 1, 0)
| extend lc_path = tolower(InitiatingProcessFolderPath)
| extend is_user_writable = iff(lc_path matches regex @"(\\temp\\|\\appdata\\|\\users\\public\\|\\programdata\\)", 1, 0)
| extend risk = is_script_host + is_user_writable
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, risk
| order by Timestamp descSigma
title: AgingFly UAC-0247 Non-Browser Process Contacting Telegram C2
id: a0389003-e3f6-4d3c-c3f6-agingfly00003
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound network connections or DNS lookups to api.telegram.org or t.me originating from processes that are not browsers or the Telegram Desktop client — the AgingFly UAC-0247 Web Service C2 pattern.
references:
- https://cert.gov.ua/article/6288271
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/04/17
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1102
- attack.t1102.002
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: network_connection
detection:
target:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'api.telegram.org'
- 't.me'
browsers_and_telegram:
Image|endswith:
- '\chrome.exe'
- '\msedge.exe'
- '\firefox.exe'
- '\brave.exe'
- '\opera.exe'
- '\safari.exe'
- '\Telegram.exe'
- '\TelegramDesktop.exe'
condition: target and not browsers_and_telegram
falsepositives:
- Enterprise chat bots or alerting integrations that POST to Telegram Bot API from a server
- Browser extensions using native messaging hosts that proxy Telegram calls
level: highKnown false positives:
- Enterprise chat bots or alerting integrations that POST to Telegram Bot API from a server
- Browser extensions using native messaging hosts that proxy Telegram calls
- Sanctioned PowerShell-based automation that pushes notifications to Telegram channels
Tuning notes: Create an allowlist index of enterprise Telegram-integration hosts (notifier bots, SRE jump-hosts). Raise severity to critical when InitiatingProcess is PowerShell, csc.exe, or an unsigned .exe in %TEMP%. Cross-reference with SPL-002 hits for the same host within a 1-hour window to confirm the full compile-then-beacon kill chain.
- AgingFly UAC-0247 — MDE Parent-Child Chain Explorer to PowerShell to csc.exe (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- AgingFly UAC-0247 — ChromElevator Local State Read and WhatsApp Database Access (Post-Exploitation / Credential Access) · unlock with TL Creds
- AgingFly UAC-0247 — Freshly Compiled Binary In User TEMP Making Outbound Network Connection (C2) · unlock with TL Creds
- AgingFly UAC-0247 — PowerShell Add-Type In-Memory C# Compilation (Sigma / Script-Block) · unlock with TL Creds
- AgingFly UAC-0247 — Linux Compile-After-Delivery (gcc/cc Spawned by Bash Loader From Temp) · unlock with TL Creds
- AgingFly UAC-0247 — Chisel / Ligolo-ng / RustScan Lateral Movement Toolset (Lateral Movement / C2) · unlock with TL Creds
- AgingFly UAC-0247 — LNK Shortcut Spawning Hidden/Encoded PowerShell (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- AgingFly UAC-0247 — csc.exe Roslyn Compile-After-Delivery From Script Host (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-04-17, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 24 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0389.
Sample indicators (2 of 24)
- Domain:
api[.]telegram[.]org - Domain:
t[.]me
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 24 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
At least a dozen organizations have been impacted, with follow-on tooling including RustScan, Chisel, and Ligolo-ng enabling reconnaissance, tunneling, and lateral movement.
On 2026-04-17, Ukraine's Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) published advisory 6288271 detailing an active cyberespionage campaign tracked as UAC-0247. The campaign relies on a previously undocumented modular implant named AgingFly — a C# malware family that is delivered in partially-assembled source form and compiled on the victim host after execution, sharply reducing the static signatures available for defenders and traditional antivirus engines.
Infection begins with targeted phishing emails impersonating humanitarian-aid offers, a lure explicitly tailored to Ukrainian recipients in wartime conditions. Victims are induced to download or open a malicious Windows shortcut (.lnk) file; when executed, the shortcut invokes PowerShell, which retrieves follow-on loader stages. The loaders stage AgingFly source/assemblies on disk, invoke the in-box C# compiler (csc.exe / Roslyn) to produce a working implant, and then launch it. This 'Compile After Delivery' (T1027.004) design is deliberately chosen to frustrate signature-based detection and allow per-victim polymorphism.
Once running, AgingFly provides remote operators with a full-featured remote access capability: arbitrary command execution, file theft, screen capture, keystroke logging, and on-demand delivery of additional payloads. Operators update configuration and rotate command-and-control endpoints through Telegram, using the messaging platform's public API infrastructure as a resilient covert channel (T1102 Web Service). PowerShell scripts are used in-band to refresh C2 routing and pull next-stage tooling.
The campaign layers well-known open-source offensive tooling on top of the custom implant. Chromium browser credentials and cookies are exfiltrated using ChromElevator (xaitax/Chrome-App-Bound-Encryption-Decryption), a public PoC that defeats Chrome's App-Bound Encryption to recover saved passwords and session cookies. WhatsApp desktop databases are dumped and decrypted using ZAPiXDESK (kraftdenker/ZAPiXDESK), giving operators access to victim chat history. Network reconnaissance is performed with RustScan (bee-san/RustScan), while Ligolo-ng and Chisel (jpillora/chisel) provide reverse tunnels and pivoting across segmented Ukrainian government networks.
CERT-UA reports the campaign has already impacted at least a dozen Ukrainian organizations — local government bodies and hospitals are explicitly named, and intelligence indicators suggest members of the Ukrainian defense forces have also been targeted. SentinelLabs, in its Week 16 roundup, corroborates the CERT-UA findings and publishes an attack-chain diagram. The combination of Ukrainian-government targeting, espionage-grade tradecraft, exfiltration of WhatsApp/browser secrets and defense-sector interest is consistent with the broader pattern of Russia-aligned intrusion sets active in Ukraine since 2022; however, CERT-UA has not (as of publication) issued a specific nation-state attribution beyond the UAC-0247 cluster label.
Defenders should treat this campaign as an active, high-severity threat: it produces few traditional IOCs (the implant is recompiled per host, C2 rides on a legitimate SaaS, and most of the post-exploitation toolset is open-source). Detection must focus on behavioral telemetry — .lnk → PowerShell chains, csc.exe / Roslyn compilation from unusual parent processes, Chrome DPAPI / App-Bound key extraction, WhatsApp sqlite/cryptkey reads, and outbound traffic to api.telegram.org from non-browser processes.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging; T1113 Screen Capture; T1560 Archive Collected Data
Discovery
T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1027.004 Compile After Delivery; T1036 Masquerading; T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1059.005 Visual Basic; T1204 User Execution; T1204.002 Malicious File
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1102 Web Service; T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1573 Encrypted Channel
Credential Access
T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1552 Unsecured Credentials; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores; T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers
Initial Access
T1566 Phishing; T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment; T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
Lateral Movement
command-and-control
Resource Development
T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware; T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool
Remediation
Patches
- Ensure Chromium-based browsers are updated to versions enforcing App-Bound Encryption (Chrome 127+); ChromElevator targets older/unprotected profiles
- Patch WhatsApp Desktop to the latest version — legacy builds expose plaintext-accessible cryptkeys that ZAPiXDESK relies on
- Apply latest Microsoft .NET and Windows cumulative updates
Immediate actions
- Block execution of Windows .lnk attachments originating from email at mail gateway and EDR policy
- Alert on any non-browser process resolving or connecting to api.telegram.org or t.me
- Alert on csc.exe, csc.exe /target:exe, or Microsoft.CSharp.CSharpCodeProvider invocations with parents of powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or Office apps
- Block the public GitHub release assets of ChromElevator, ZAPiXDESK, Chisel, Ligolo-ng, and RustScan at web proxy if no legitimate business use
- Search historical telemetry for .lnk files dropped by email clients executing powershell.exe with encoded or downloader commands
- Hunt for Chrome DPAPI master key reads and App-Bound Encryption key file (Local State) reads by processes other than chrome.exe / msedge.exe
Workarounds
- Disable csc.exe / Roslyn compilation on endpoints that do not need it via Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) code-integrity policy
- Block execution of .lnk files from user-writable locations (Downloads, Outlook temp, Teams Downloads) using AppLocker / WDAC
- Restrict outbound access to api.telegram.org at corporate firewall for endpoints with no legitimate need
- Disable WhatsApp Desktop on high-sensitivity workstations or move chat to managed collaboration platforms
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy an EDR platform with in-memory .NET assembly inspection and script-block logging coverage
- Enable PowerShell module, script-block, and transcription logging across all Windows endpoints
- Enable Windows AMSI and ensure anti-tamper settings prevent AMSI bypass
- Roll out attack-surface-reduction (ASR) rules: Block executable content from email, Block Office children, Block JavaScript/VBScript launching executables
- Segment hospital and local-government networks and restrict outbound egress to a proxy-enforced allowlist to blunt Chisel/Ligolo-ng tunnels
- Mandate rotation of browser-saved credentials following any confirmed AgingFly incident and force SSO re-auth for all sensitive apps
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows
Vulnerable versions: 10; 11; Server 2016; Server 2019; Server 2022 - Google — Chrome
Vulnerable versions: <127 without App-Bound Encryption enforcement
Fixed in: 127+ - Meta — WhatsApp Desktop
Vulnerable versions: Legacy builds with accessible local crypt keys - Microsoft — .NET Framework / .NET
Vulnerable versions: All supported versions (csc.exe / Roslyn abused for in-host compilation)
Timeline
- Earliest suspected AgingFly / UAC-0247 activity based on CERT-UA victim telemetry — humanitarian-aid themed spearphishing emails delivered to Ukrainian local governments and hospitals
- At least a dozen Ukrainian organizations impacted; CERT-UA opens formal investigation into the UAC-0247 cluster
- Indicators emerge that members of Ukraine's defense forces are among the targeted victims, elevating strategic priority of the investigation
- CERT-UA investigators complete mapping of the AgingFly execution chain — .lnk -> PowerShell loaders -> in-host C# compilation -> RAT with Telegram C2, ChromElevator, ZAPiXDESK, RustScan, Ligolo-ng, Chisel
- Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes TL-2026-0389 with full MITRE ATT&CK mapping, IOCs, detections, and attack simulations
- SentinelLabs publishes a Week 16 roundup corroborating the CERT-UA findings and reproducing the attack-chain diagram
- CERT-UA publishes advisory article 6288271 detailing the UAC-0247 AgingFly malware campaign and TTPs
- As of 2026-05-29, the UAC-0247 AgingFly espionage campaign against Ukrainian government, hospitals, and defense personnel remains active and expanding, with CERT-UA (advisory 6288271) and corroborating reporting (BleepingComputer, Recorded Future, SOC Prime) describing ongoing March-April 2026 intrusions. No takedown, sinkhole, arrest, or patch exists; the C# implant uses behavioral-only detection and resilient Telegram/WebSocket C2, so the Russia-aligned actor stays a live threat.
Sources cited
- CERT-UA Advisory 6288271 — UAC-0247 / AgingFly Campaign CERT-UA · Government advisory · 2026-04-17
- Ligolo-ng — Kali Tools documentation kali.org · Vendor report · 2026-04-17
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1027.004 Compile After Delivery MITRE · Research · 2026-04-17
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1102 Web Service (Telegram C2) MITRE · Research · 2026-04-17
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1555.003 Credentials from Web Browsers MITRE · Research · 2026-04-17
- ChromElevator — Chrome App-Bound Encryption Decryption (xaitax) GitHub · Code repository · 2026-04-17
- ZAPiXDESK — WhatsApp Desktop data decryption (kraftdenker) GitHub · Code repository · 2026-04-17
- RustScan — Fast port scanner (bee-san) GitHub · Code repository · 2026-04-17
- Chisel — Fast TCP/UDP tunnel over HTTP (jpillora) GitHub · Code repository · 2026-04-17
- SentinelLabs — The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in Cybersecurity Week 16 SentinelOne · Blog · 2026-04-17
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.