# Weaponizing Trust Signals: Claude Code Lures and GitHub Release Payloads Deliver Vidar Stealer v18.7 + GhostSocks

> Financially motivated threat actors weaponized the 2026-03-31 Anthropic Claude Code npm packaging incident by standing up trojanized GitHub repositories branded 'leaked-claude-code' within 24 hours. The distribution hub github.com/leaked-claude-code/leaked-claude-code (owned by account idbzoomh1) served 7z archives containing a Rust-compiled dropper (TradeAI.exe / ClaudeCode_x64.exe) that installs Vidar Stealer v18.7 and GhostSocks SOCKS5 proxy malware. The Claude Code lure is one rotation in a broader campaign active since February 2026 that has impersonated 25+ software brands across 38 archives with 22 payload variants, abusing GitHub Releases as a trusted malware delivery channel.

- **Published:** 2026-04-21T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-04-21T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0403
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-vidar-claude-code-lure-tl-2026-0403.webp?v=7bb7615e (Threadlinqs threat intel: Vidar Stealer v18.7 Claude Code Lures: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0403) — High severity, 20 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0403
- **Severity:** HIGH (CVSS 8.1)
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** MONITORING
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 20

## Description

On 2026-03-31 Anthropic published a malformed Claude Code npm package that briefly exposed approximately 512,000 lines of internal TypeScript source via a 59.8 MB source map. Within 24 hours a threat actor using GitHub account 'idbzoomh1' created a public repository at github.com/leaked-claude-code/leaked-claude-code framed as a re-hosting of the 'leaked' Claude Code source. The repository README and releases lured visitors to download 7z archives that, instead of the advertised TypeScript, contained a Rust-compiled Windows PE dropper delivered under multiple filenames including TradeAI.exe and ClaudeCode_x64.exe.

Upon execution, the dropper decrypts and stages two payloads: Vidar Stealer v18.7 (a mature subscription-based infostealer) and GhostSocks (a Go-compiled SOCKS5 residential-proxy implant that converts victim machines into exit nodes for the operator's proxy service). Vidar v18.7 retains the family's signature dead-drop-resolver technique, using attacker-controlled Steam and Telegram profile pages to host obfuscated strings that resolve the current C2 endpoint, giving the operator cheap and resilient C2 rotation without DNS registration. Vidar harvests browser credentials, cookies, autofill data, cryptocurrency wallets (desktop and browser extensions), MFA/2FA tokens, FTP and email client credentials, Telegram and Discord session artifacts, screenshots, and system fingerprinting data before packaging the logs and exfiltrating them over HTTPS to the rotating C2. GhostSocks then establishes a persistent outbound SOCKS5 tunnel that the operator or downstream customer can relay traffic through, enabling follow-on fraud, account takeover, and anonymized access operations against the victim's IP reputation.

Trend Micro, Zscaler ThreatLabz, and SOC Prime independently track this Claude Code lure as one rotation in a broader rotating-brand campaign running continuously since February 2026. Trend Micro fingerprinted 25+ impersonated software brands across 38 distinct GitHub archive drops, paired with at least 22 payload variants of the Vidar + GhostSocks combo. Lures rotate to whatever news cycle favors them: trading and AI tooling ('TradeAI'), crypto wallets, VPNs, productivity apps, and now the Anthropic packaging incident. By 2026-04-07 the leaked-claude-code repository had accumulated 838 stars, 1,060 forks, and 533 confirmed payload downloads, and the operator had not been suspended by GitHub at the time of the initial Trend Micro publication.

The campaign is notable for weaponizing legitimate developer trust signals: (1) GitHub Releases are commonly whitelisted by endpoint and proxy policies; (2) the github.com TLS-fronted download URL passes most reputation checks; (3) star and fork counts are inflated by the operator's botnet to signal legitimacy; and (4) the timing of the Claude Code lure, within 24 hours of a real Anthropic incident, exploits defender and developer curiosity at its peak. Defenders should treat any 'leaked source' repository appearing immediately after a public incident as high-risk, inspect GitHub Release asset hashes against known-good artifacts, and instrument egress monitoring for the dead-drop-resolver beacons (Steam and Telegram profile fetches from non-browser processes) that are characteristic of Vidar v18.7.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services
- T1585.001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts
- T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware
- T1588.001 Obtain Capabilities: Malware
- T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1027.002 Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1115 Clipboard Data
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver
- T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Claude Code Lure — Password-Protected 7z Extraction of leaked-claude-code Archive (Exploitation)** (`TL-2026-0403-SPL-001`)

Detects execution of 7z.exe/7zG.exe/7zFM.exe extracting an archive whose name matches the leaked-claude-code / TradeAI / ClaudeCode_x64 lure patterns with a -p password supplied on the command line. This is the initial-access primitive of the TL-2026-0403 campaign where victims download a password-protected 7z from github.com/leaked-claude-code Releases and extract using the plaintext password from the repo README. The password-on-CLI pattern defeats gateway AV and is a high-fidelity indicator of the lure.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1566.002, T1204.002, T1027.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr_process_creation
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
  (Image="*\\7z.exe" OR Image="*\\7zG.exe" OR Image="*\\7zFM.exe")
  (CommandLine="*claude-code-leaked*" OR CommandLine="*ClaudeCode_x64*" OR CommandLine="*TradeAI*")
  CommandLine="* -p*"
| eval lure_family=case(
    match(CommandLine,"(?i)claude-code-leaked"),"leaked-claude-code",
    match(CommandLine,"(?i)ClaudeCode_x64"),"ClaudeCode_x64",
    match(CommandLine,"(?i)TradeAI"),"TradeAI",
    true(),"unknown")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(CommandLine) as cmdlines values(ParentImage) as parents by host, user, lure_family
| table first_seen last_seen host user lure_family count cmdlines parents
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("7z.exe","7zG.exe","7zFM.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("claude-code-leaked","ClaudeCode_x64","TradeAI")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"\s-p\S"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath
| extend LureFamily = case(
    ProcessCommandLine has "claude-code-leaked", "leaked-claude-code",
    ProcessCommandLine has "ClaudeCode_x64", "ClaudeCode_x64",
    ProcessCommandLine has "TradeAI", "TradeAI",
    "unknown")
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Claude Code Lure — Password-Protected 7z Extraction (TL-2026-0403)
id: 7a1cdb01-0403-4a12-a101-claudecode0403a
status: experimental
description: Detects 7z extraction of an archive named like claude-code-leaked*.7z / TradeAI*.7z / ClaudeCode_x64*.7z using a password supplied on the command line — the initial-access primitive of the leaked-claude-code GitHub Release lure campaign.
references:
    - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/26/d/weaponizing-trust-claude-code-lures-and-github-release-payloads.html
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/claude-code-leak-used-to-push-infostealer-malware-on-github/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-04-21
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1566.002
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1027.002
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_image:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\7z.exe'
            - '\7zG.exe'
            - '\7zFM.exe'
    selection_lure:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'claude-code-leaked'
            - 'ClaudeCode_x64'
            - 'TradeAI'
    selection_pw:
        CommandLine|contains: ' -p'
    condition: selection_image and selection_lure and selection_pw
falsepositives:
    - Security researchers intentionally detonating labelled samples in a sandbox
    - Incident responders extracting a captured archive for analysis
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Security researchers detonating labelled samples in sandboxes
- Incident responders extracting captured archives during analysis
- Developers with a legitimate archive that coincidentally contains the token 'TradeAI'

**Tuning notes:** Exclude known DFIR/forensics workstations by hostname or account. If 7-Zip is rare in the environment, drop the lure-name filter and alert on any password-protected extraction from user-writable paths. Consider enriching with download source (SmartScreen/EDR referrer) to correlate to github.com/leaked-claude-code/*.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Rust-Compiled Dropper Execution From User Archive Path — TradeAI/ClaudeCode_x64 (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Vidar Stealer Credential Log Staged in User Temp Path (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Dropper HTTPS Exfiltration to Non-CDN Host After Dead-Drop Resolver Fetch (C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GitHub Release Download From [indicator] or Known Rotating-Brand Lure Repository (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Rust-Compiled Dropper Spawning Masquerading PowerShell/Cmd Child (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GhostSocks Residential-Proxy Beacon — Sustained SOCKS5 From Unsigned User-Land Binary (C2/Lateral Movement) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Vidar Dead-Drop Resolver — Non-Browser Process Fetching Steam or Telegram Profile (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GhostSocks SOCKS5 Outbound Tunnel From Non-Browser User-Land Binary (C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sources

- [Weaponizing Trust Signals: Claude Code Lures and GitHub Release Payloads](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/26/d/weaponizing-trust-claude-code-lures-and-github-release-payloads.html)
- [Claude Code Packaging Error Remains a Lure in an Active Campaign](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/26/d/claude-code-remains-a-lure-what-defenders-should-do.html)
- [Claude Code leak used to push infostealer malware on GitHub](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/claude-code-leak-used-to-push-infostealer-malware-on-github/)
- [Anthropic Claude Code Leak - Zscaler ThreatLabz](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/anthropic-claude-code-leak)
- [Claude Code Lures: GitHub Releases Drop Vidar & GhostSocks](https://socprime.com/active-threats/claude-code-lures-turn-github-releases-into-a-malware-delivery-channel/)
- [Fake Claude Code source downloads actually delivered malware](https://www.theregister.com/2026/04/02/trojanized_claude_code_leak_github/)
- [Claude Code leak GitHub malware (Help Net Security)](https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/04/03/claude-code-leak-github-malware/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK: T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/001/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK: T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Software Supply Chain](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0403
