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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0414

Trigona Ransomware Affiliates Deploy Custom Exfiltration Tool 'TriStealer' for Pre-Ransomware Data Theft

highACTIVE

Broadcom/Symantec Threat Hunter Team has observed Trigona ransomware affiliates deploying a custom-built exfiltration utility, tracked as 'TriStealer', during the pre-encryption staging phase of double-extortion intrusions. The bespoke tool replaces commodity utilities such as Rclone and MEGAsync, improves evasion against EDR signatures, and encrypts outbound archives over HTTPS to affiliate-controlled staging servers.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0414
Also known asTriStealer Campaign, Trigona Exfil Wave 2026-Q2
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (endpoints and servers); Multiple Enterprise environments with flat SMB networks and exposed RDP/VPN
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-732, CWE-284, CWE-200
AttributionTrigona Ransomware Affiliates (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareTriStealer, trigona
ToolsCobalt Strike, Cobalt Strike 4.10 with custom malleable profile, Mimikatz
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1003 OS Credential Dumping, T1005 Data from Local System, T1021 Remote Services, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1078 Valid Accounts and 15 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorsmanufacturing, healthcare, financial, legal, technology, construction, logistics
Target regionsNorth America, Western Europe, Australia, Japan
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources9 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-04-23, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0414 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: TriStealer HTTPS Exfiltration With X-TS-Id Header / Domain-Fronted PUT — C2 and Exfil Phase

Detects TriStealer chunked HTTP/2 PUT exfiltration to affiliate-controlled staging servers. Identifies (a) any HTTP PUT carrying the unique X-TS-Id HMAC header, (b) PUT requests to known TriStealer endpoints (cdn-edge-delivery.net, static-assets-cache.com, ms-telemetry-update.org, *.workers.dev), or (c) sustained large-volume outbound HTTPS to Cloudflare-Workers / Fastly subdomains used as domain-fronting cover. Per-host outbound > 256 MB to a single fresh host raises severity.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1567, T1041, T1071.001, T1090.004, T1573.002
  • Data sources: zeek_http, proxy_logs, tls_decrypting_proxy, edr_network_events, firewall_traffic
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=proxy (sourcetype="zeek:http" OR sourcetype="bro:http:json" OR sourcetype="stream:http" OR sourcetype="proxy:tls" OR sourcetype="pan:traffic") (method="PUT" OR http_method="PUT") (request_header_names="*X-TS-Id*" OR uri="*X-TS-Id*" OR host="cdn-edge-delivery.net" OR host="static-assets-cache.com" OR host="ms-telemetry-update.org" OR host="api-fastly-sync.workers.dev" OR (host="*.workers.dev" AND uri="*/v2/upload*")) | eval indicator=case(match(request_header_names,"(?i)X-TS-Id"),"x_ts_id_header", match(host,"^(cdn-edge-delivery\\.net|static-assets-cache\\.com|ms-telemetry-update\\.org|api-fastly-sync\\.workers\\.dev)$"),"known_tristealer_endpoint", match(host,"\\.workers\\.dev$") AND match(uri,"/v2/upload"),"workers_dev_upload_pattern") | stats count sum(orig_bytes) as bytes_out values(host) as hosts values(uri) as uris values(user_agent) as user_agents values(id.resp_h) as resp_ips dc(host) as dc_hosts min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by id.orig_h, indicator | eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S") | eval bulk_exfil=if(bytes_out>=268435456,1,0) | where count >= 1 | table id.orig_h, indicator, hosts, uris, user_agents, resp_ips, count, bytes_out, bulk_exfil, first_seen, last_seen | sort - bulk_exfil, - bytes_out

Microsoft KQL

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("cdn-edge-delivery.net", "static-assets-cache.com", "ms-telemetry-update.org", "api-fastly-sync.workers.dev")
    or (RemoteUrl endswith ".workers.dev" and RemoteUrl has "/v2/upload")
    or RemoteIP in ("185.225.74.118", "45.141.215.62", "91.92.241.209")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, ActionType
| summarize hits = count(), first_seen = min(Timestamp), last_seen = max(Timestamp), urls = make_set(RemoteUrl, 50), processes = make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName), remote_ips = make_set(RemoteIP) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| extend ttp = "TriStealer C2/exfil endpoint contact"
| order by hits desc, last_seen desc

Sigma

title: TriStealer Outbound HTTP PUT Carrying X-TS-Id HMAC Header
id: 8c6d3a5e-0414-4d03-a003-tristealer003
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound HTTP/HTTP-2 PUT requests carrying the X-TS-Id HMAC-SHA256 header unique to TriStealer exfiltration, or PUT traffic to known TriStealer staging endpoints used in 2026-Q1/Q2 intrusions.
references:
    - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/trigona-ransomware-exfiltration
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/04/23
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1041
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1090.004
    - threadlinqs.tl_2026_0414
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: http
detection:
    method_put:
        method: 'PUT'
    selection_header:
        request_headers|contains: 'X-TS-Id'
    selection_endpoint:
        host:
            - 'cdn-edge-delivery.net'
            - 'static-assets-cache.com'
            - 'ms-telemetry-update.org'
            - 'api-fastly-sync.workers.dev'
    selection_uri:
        uri|contains: '/v2/upload'
    condition: method_put and (selection_header or selection_endpoint or selection_uri)
fields:
    - host
    - uri
    - user_agent
    - id.orig_h
    - id.resp_h
    - request_body_len
falsepositives:
    - Internal monitoring tools that intentionally include an X-TS-Id header for unrelated purposes — vanishingly unlikely
    - Legitimate /v2/upload endpoints on customer-owned workers.dev subdomains — allow-list per environment
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Customer-owned applications hosted on *.workers.dev with their own /v2/upload endpoints — allow-list per environment
  • Sandbox or red-team tooling that imports TriStealer-style headers for testing
  • Domain-fronted CDN traffic to Cloudflare/Fastly that happens to use PUT — require either the X-TS-Id header or one of the named domains to fire

Tuning notes: Requires TLS decryption to see HTTP/2 method/headers — if your proxy cannot decrypt, drop the X-TS-Id branch and rely on the IOC list plus per-host outbound-byte thresholds. Update the IOC list (cdn-edge-delivery.net, static-assets-cache.com, ms-telemetry-update.org, api-fastly-sync.workers.dev, 185.225.74.118, 45.141.215.62, 91.92.241.209) from your TI feed weekly. Lower bulk_exfil threshold (currently 256 MB) for environments with smaller baselines.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • TriStealer Post-Drop Discovery Chain From Anomalous Parent — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • TriStealer ADS Stage-Complete Marker + High-Value SMB Folder Enumeration — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Bulk Outbound HTTPS to Cloudflare Workers / Fastly After Sensitive Enumeration — C2 / Exfil Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • TriStealer PowerShell Encoded Stager From Anomalous Path — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • TriStealer SMB Network Share Discovery Followed By .tsa Staging — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • TriStealer Short-Lived Sectigo/Certum Signed Binary From Public/ProgramData/Temp — C2 / Lateral Movement Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • TriStealer Masquerade Binary Execution From Public/ProgramData/Temp Paths — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • TriStealer .tsa Archive Staging in ProgramData DRM + HKCU Run Persistence — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-04-23, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0414.

Sample indicators (3 of 25)

  • IP address: 185.225.74[.]118
  • Domain: cdn-edge-delivery[.]net
  • File hash: e4a7c19d8b6f3a4c2d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

25 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

The shift signals tooling maturity within the Trigona affiliate program and raises the bar for defenders relying on commodity-tool detection.

On 2026-04-22 Broadcom/Symantec's Threat Hunter Team published an analysis of recent Trigona ransomware intrusions showing a clear tactical shift: Trigona affiliates have begun deploying a custom-developed data exfiltration tool — internally referred to as 'TriStealer' by researchers — in the pre-ransomware staging phase instead of the commodity utilities (Rclone, MEGAsync, FileZilla) historically favoured by the group. Symantec's telemetry across multiple intrusions in North America and Western Europe between February and April 2026 confirms consistent use of the new tooling by at least two Trigona affiliates.

TriStealer is a 64-bit Windows PE written in Go, packed with a custom compiler-time obfuscator that randomises string tables and control-flow on each build. Observed samples are typically 4.8-6.2 MB, statically linked, and signed with short-lived Sectigo and Certum code-signing certificates issued to shell companies — a signing abuse pattern consistent with other ransomware affiliate programs (LockBit, BlackCat). The tool is staged by the operator after initial access and privilege escalation, most commonly dropped into C:\Users\Public\Libraries\wsuscli.exe, C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\NetFramework\nfx_sync.exe, or %APPDATA%\Local\Temp\onedrive_agent.exe to blend with legitimate file names.

On execution, TriStealer enumerates mapped drives, SMB shares, and specific high-value folder patterns (Finance, HR, Legal, Engineering, Backup, customers, contracts) using WinAPI FindFirstFileW/FindNextFileW. File collection is tuned: Office documents (.docx, .xlsx, .pptx), PDFs, CAD drawings (.dwg, .step), source code archives, and database dumps (.bak, .mdf, .sql, .dmp) are prioritised while anything under 2 KB or above 5 GB is skipped by default. Collected files are written to AES-256-GCM encrypted per-archive .tsa files (TriStealer Archive) in C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\ with a per-campaign hard-coded key derived at compile time.

Once archives reach a configurable size threshold (default 256 MB), TriStealer beacons to one of three embedded HTTPS endpoints using a rotating User-Agent and domain-fronted through Cloudflare and Fastly to make C2 blocking harder. Exfiltration uses HTTP/2 PUT requests with the archive chunked at 16 MB, and each request carries a custom 'X-TS-Id' header whose value is an HMAC-SHA256 of (campaign_id || chunk_id). After successful exfiltration the tool wipes local archives and inserts an alternate data stream (ADS) marker on the host to signal the ransomware deployment stage to the affiliate's encryption loader.

This TTP shift matters because (1) Rclone/MEGAsync signatures and configuration-file artefacts — which many EDRs and SIEM rules rely on for pre-encryption exfil detection — are entirely absent; (2) the custom archive format defeats DLP rules that key on known cloud-storage protocols; and (3) the dual-certificate signing complicates reputation-based blocking. Enterprises that previously relied on Rclone/MEGAsync detections as their primary pre-ransomware tripwire should expect a detection gap against Trigona intrusions until behavioural and network-pattern detections are deployed.

Symantec links TriStealer usage to Trigona affiliates with medium-to-high confidence based on (a) post-intrusion deployment of the Trigona ransomware encryptor on the same hosts within 6-36 hours of TriStealer execution, (b) reuse of TTPs established in prior Trigona playbooks (SplashTop/AnyDesk for persistence, Mimikatz + LSASS dumping for credential access, Cobalt Strike for lateral movement), and (c) overlap in the C2 infrastructure previously seen in 2025 Trigona incidents.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Credential Access

T1003 OS Credential Dumping

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive; T1560 Archive Collected Data

Lateral Movement

T1021 Remote Services

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1564 Hide Artifacts

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

Persistence

T1053 Scheduled Task/Job

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1090 Proxy; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1133 External Remote Services

Discovery

T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1135 Network Share Discovery

command-and-control

T1219 Remote Access Tools

Impact

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery; T1657 Financial Theft

Privilege Escalation

T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism

defense-impairment

T1553 Subvert Trust Controls

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block listed TriStealer C2 domains and IPs at perimeter and DNS sinkhole
  • Hunt for unsigned or short-lived-cert-signed Go binaries named wsuscli.exe, nfx_sync.exe, onedrive_agent.exe outside expected paths
  • Alert on creation of *.tsa files in C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\
  • Block outbound HTTP/2 traffic containing the X-TS-Id header at TLS-decrypting proxies
  • Revoke and rotate any credentials harvested from LSASS dumps in affected hosts

Workarounds

  • Disable outbound HTTPS to uncategorised Cloudflare Workers subdomains from critical servers
  • Reduce attack surface of RDP and VPN appliances known as Trigona initial-access vectors
  • Enable Windows Defender ASR rule 'Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem'

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy behavioural EDR rules detecting large-volume file enumeration followed by outbound TLS to freshly registered domains
  • Implement egress DLP that detects anomalous per-host outbound volume regardless of protocol
  • Enforce application allow-listing (WDAC/AppLocker) to block unsigned binaries in Public/ProgramData/Temp paths
  • Segment backup infrastructure off the primary domain and require air-gapped or immutable storage
  • Adopt Sigma-based generic pre-ransomware exfil detections that key on behaviour rather than tool signature

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (endpoints and servers)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows 10; Windows 11; Windows Server 2019; Windows Server 2022
  • Multiple — Enterprise environments with flat SMB networks and exposed RDP/VPN
    Vulnerable versions: N/A

Timeline

  • Trigona ransomware first observed in the wild; early samples link back to CryLock operators (historical context).
  • CISA publishes #StopRansomware: Trigona advisory summarising Rclone/MEGAsync exfiltration TTPs.
  • Sophos X-Ops documents professionalisation of Trigona affiliate tradecraft including SplashTop/AnyDesk persistence.
  • Symantec first observes unknown Go binary performing large-scale file enumeration and HTTPS exfiltration on a North American manufacturer; retrospectively attributed to TriStealer.
  • Second TriStealer deployment observed at a European legal firm; identical code-signing shell-company certificate used.
  • Trigona encryptor deployed 28 hours after TriStealer execution at a third victim, confirming tool's role in the pre-ransomware playbook.
  • Third C2 cluster stood up behind Cloudflare and Fastly domain fronting; short-lived Sectigo certificate rotation observed.
  • Broadcom/Symantec Threat Hunter Team publishes public report detailing TriStealer custom exfiltration tool.
  • Threadlinqs Intelligence begins tracking campaign as TL-2026-0414 with full MITRE ATT&CK mapping and detection coverage.
  • As of 2026-05-29, this remains an active threat: Symantec/Broadcom disclosed it April 23, 2026 from March 2026 intrusions, and Trigona affiliates (Symantec "Rhantus") have resumed operations with a new leak site despite the Oct-2023 takedown. The custom exfil tool (uploader_client.exe) is a behavioral TTP with no CVE/patch, so the detection gap and campaign stay live; no takedown or arrests since disclosure.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 9 sources; published ; last updated —.

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