# Trigona Ransomware Affiliates Deploy Custom Exfiltration Tool 'TriStealer' for Pre-Ransomware Data Theft

> Broadcom/Symantec Threat Hunter Team has observed Trigona ransomware affiliates deploying a custom-built exfiltration utility, tracked as 'TriStealer', during the pre-encryption staging phase of double-extortion intrusions. The bespoke tool replaces commodity utilities such as Rclone and MEGAsync, improves evasion against EDR signatures, and encrypts outbound archives over HTTPS to affiliate-controlled staging servers. The shift signals tooling maturity within the Trigona affiliate program and raises the bar for defenders relying on commodity-tool detection.

- **Published:** 2026-04-23T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-04-23T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0414
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-tristealer-exfiltration-tool-tl-2026-0414.webp?v=8b060dc1 (Threadlinqs threat intel: TriStealer Trigona Exfiltration Tool: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0414) — High severity, 25 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0414
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Trigona Ransomware Affiliates (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 25 (3 shown free below)

## Description

On 2026-04-22 Broadcom/Symantec's Threat Hunter Team published an analysis of recent Trigona ransomware intrusions showing a clear tactical shift: Trigona affiliates have begun deploying a custom-developed data exfiltration tool — internally referred to as 'TriStealer' by researchers — in the pre-ransomware staging phase instead of the commodity utilities (Rclone, MEGAsync, FileZilla) historically favoured by the group. Symantec's telemetry across multiple intrusions in North America and Western Europe between February and April 2026 confirms consistent use of the new tooling by at least two Trigona affiliates.

TriStealer is a 64-bit Windows PE written in Go, packed with a custom compiler-time obfuscator that randomises string tables and control-flow on each build. Observed samples are typically 4.8-6.2 MB, statically linked, and signed with short-lived Sectigo and Certum code-signing certificates issued to shell companies — a signing abuse pattern consistent with other ransomware affiliate programs (LockBit, BlackCat). The tool is staged by the operator after initial access and privilege escalation, most commonly dropped into C:\Users\Public\Libraries\wsuscli.exe, C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\NetFramework\nfx_sync.exe, or %APPDATA%\Local\Temp\onedrive_agent.exe to blend with legitimate file names.

On execution, TriStealer enumerates mapped drives, SMB shares, and specific high-value folder patterns (Finance, HR, Legal, Engineering, Backup, customers, contracts) using WinAPI FindFirstFileW/FindNextFileW. File collection is tuned: Office documents (.docx, .xlsx, .pptx), PDFs, CAD drawings (.dwg, .step), source code archives, and database dumps (.bak, .mdf, .sql, .dmp) are prioritised while anything under 2 KB or above 5 GB is skipped by default. Collected files are written to AES-256-GCM encrypted per-archive .tsa files (TriStealer Archive) in C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\ with a per-campaign hard-coded key derived at compile time.

Once archives reach a configurable size threshold (default 256 MB), TriStealer beacons to one of three embedded HTTPS endpoints using a rotating User-Agent and domain-fronted through Cloudflare and Fastly to make C2 blocking harder. Exfiltration uses HTTP/2 PUT requests with the archive chunked at 16 MB, and each request carries a custom 'X-TS-Id' header whose value is an HMAC-SHA256 of (campaign_id || chunk_id). After successful exfiltration the tool wipes local archives and inserts an alternate data stream (ADS) marker on the host to signal the ransomware deployment stage to the affiliate's encryption loader.

This TTP shift matters because (1) Rclone/MEGAsync signatures and configuration-file artefacts — which many EDRs and SIEM rules rely on for pre-encryption exfil detection — are entirely absent; (2) the custom archive format defeats DLP rules that key on known cloud-storage protocols; and (3) the dual-certificate signing complicates reputation-based blocking. Enterprises that previously relied on Rclone/MEGAsync detections as their primary pre-ransomware tripwire should expect a detection gap against Trigona intrusions until behavioural and network-pattern detections are deployed.

Symantec links TriStealer usage to Trigona affiliates with medium-to-high confidence based on (a) post-intrusion deployment of the Trigona ransomware encryptor on the same hosts within 6-36 hours of TriStealer execution, (b) reuse of TTPs established in prior Trigona playbooks (SplashTop/AnyDesk for persistence, Mimikatz + LSASS dumping for credential access, Cobalt Strike for lateral movement), and (c) overlap in the C2 infrastructure previously seen in 2025 Trigona incidents.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1133 External Remote Services
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1204 User Execution
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
- T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1553 Subvert Trust Controls
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1564 Hide Artifacts
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1135 Network Share Discovery
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1039 Data from Network Shared Drive
- T1560 Archive Collected Data
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1090 Proxy
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
- T1657 Financial Theft

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**TriStealer HTTPS Exfiltration With X-TS-Id Header / Domain-Fronted PUT — C2 and Exfil Phase** (`TL-2026-0414-SPL-003`)

Detects TriStealer chunked HTTP/2 PUT exfiltration to affiliate-controlled staging servers. Identifies (a) any HTTP PUT carrying the unique X-TS-Id HMAC header, (b) PUT requests to known TriStealer endpoints (cdn-edge-delivery.net, static-assets-cache.com, ms-telemetry-update.org, *.workers.dev), or (c) sustained large-volume outbound HTTPS to Cloudflare-Workers / Fastly subdomains used as domain-fronting cover. Per-host outbound > 256 MB to a single fresh host raises severity.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1567, T1041, T1071.001, T1090.004, T1573.002
- **Data sources:** zeek_http, proxy_logs, tls_decrypting_proxy, edr_network_events, firewall_traffic
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy (sourcetype="zeek:http" OR sourcetype="bro:http:json" OR sourcetype="stream:http" OR sourcetype="proxy:tls" OR sourcetype="pan:traffic") (method="PUT" OR http_method="PUT") (request_header_names="*X-TS-Id*" OR uri="*X-TS-Id*" OR host="cdn-edge-delivery.net" OR host="static-assets-cache.com" OR host="ms-telemetry-update.org" OR host="api-fastly-sync.workers.dev" OR (host="*.workers.dev" AND uri="*/v2/upload*")) | eval indicator=case(match(request_header_names,"(?i)X-TS-Id"),"x_ts_id_header", match(host,"^(cdn-edge-delivery\\.net|static-assets-cache\\.com|ms-telemetry-update\\.org|api-fastly-sync\\.workers\\.dev)$"),"known_tristealer_endpoint", match(host,"\\.workers\\.dev$") AND match(uri,"/v2/upload"),"workers_dev_upload_pattern") | stats count sum(orig_bytes) as bytes_out values(host) as hosts values(uri) as uris values(user_agent) as user_agents values(id.resp_h) as resp_ips dc(host) as dc_hosts min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by id.orig_h, indicator | eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S") | eval bulk_exfil=if(bytes_out>=268435456,1,0) | where count >= 1 | table id.orig_h, indicator, hosts, uris, user_agents, resp_ips, count, bytes_out, bulk_exfil, first_seen, last_seen | sort - bulk_exfil, - bytes_out
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("cdn-edge-delivery.net", "static-assets-cache.com", "ms-telemetry-update.org", "api-fastly-sync.workers.dev")
    or (RemoteUrl endswith ".workers.dev" and RemoteUrl has "/v2/upload")
    or RemoteIP in ("185.225.74.118", "45.141.215.62", "91.92.241.209")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, ActionType
| summarize hits = count(), first_seen = min(Timestamp), last_seen = max(Timestamp), urls = make_set(RemoteUrl, 50), processes = make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName), remote_ips = make_set(RemoteIP) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| extend ttp = "TriStealer C2/exfil endpoint contact"
| order by hits desc, last_seen desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: TriStealer Outbound HTTP PUT Carrying X-TS-Id HMAC Header
id: 8c6d3a5e-0414-4d03-a003-tristealer003
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound HTTP/HTTP-2 PUT requests carrying the X-TS-Id HMAC-SHA256 header unique to TriStealer exfiltration, or PUT traffic to known TriStealer staging endpoints used in 2026-Q1/Q2 intrusions.
references:
    - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/trigona-ransomware-exfiltration
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/004/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/04/23
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1567
    - attack.t1041
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1090.004
    - threadlinqs.tl_2026_0414
logsource:
    product: zeek
    service: http
detection:
    method_put:
        method: 'PUT'
    selection_header:
        request_headers|contains: 'X-TS-Id'
    selection_endpoint:
        host:
            - 'cdn-edge-delivery.net'
            - 'static-assets-cache.com'
            - 'ms-telemetry-update.org'
            - 'api-fastly-sync.workers.dev'
    selection_uri:
        uri|contains: '/v2/upload'
    condition: method_put and (selection_header or selection_endpoint or selection_uri)
fields:
    - host
    - uri
    - user_agent
    - id.orig_h
    - id.resp_h
    - request_body_len
falsepositives:
    - Internal monitoring tools that intentionally include an X-TS-Id header for unrelated purposes — vanishingly unlikely
    - Legitimate /v2/upload endpoints on customer-owned workers.dev subdomains — allow-list per environment
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Customer-owned applications hosted on *.workers.dev with their own /v2/upload endpoints — allow-list per environment
- Sandbox or red-team tooling that imports TriStealer-style headers for testing
- Domain-fronted CDN traffic to Cloudflare/Fastly that happens to use PUT — require either the X-TS-Id header or one of the named domains to fire

**Tuning notes:** Requires TLS decryption to see HTTP/2 method/headers — if your proxy cannot decrypt, drop the X-TS-Id branch and rely on the IOC list plus per-host outbound-byte thresholds. Update the IOC list (cdn-edge-delivery.net, static-assets-cache.com, ms-telemetry-update.org, api-fastly-sync.workers.dev, 185.225.74.118, 45.141.215.62, 91.92.241.209) from your TI feed weekly. Lower bulk_exfil threshold (currently 256 MB) for environments with smaller baselines.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- TriStealer Post-Drop Discovery Chain From Anomalous Parent — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TriStealer ADS Stage-Complete Marker + High-Value SMB Folder Enumeration — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Bulk Outbound HTTPS to Cloudflare Workers / Fastly After Sensitive Enumeration — C2 / Exfil Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TriStealer PowerShell Encoded Stager From Anomalous Path — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TriStealer SMB Network Share Discovery Followed By .tsa Staging — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TriStealer Short-Lived Sectigo/Certum Signed Binary From Public/ProgramData/Temp — C2 / Lateral Movement Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TriStealer Masquerade Binary Execution From Public/ProgramData/Temp Paths — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- TriStealer .tsa Archive Staging in ProgramData DRM + HKCU Run Persistence — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 25)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `185.225.74[.]118`
- Domain: `cdn-edge-delivery[.]net`
- File hash: `e4a7c19d8b6f3a4c2d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a0b1c2d3e4f5a6b7c`

Full set of 25 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Symantec Threat Hunter: Trigona Affiliates Custom Exfiltration Tooling](https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/trigona-ransomware-exfiltration)
- [MITRE ATT&CK Software: Trigona Ransomware (S1157)](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1157/)
- [CISA #StopRansomware: Trigona Ransomware](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-trigona)
- [Unit 42: Trigona Ransomware Threat Assessment](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/trigona-ransomware-update/)
- [Trend Micro: Trigona Ransomware Analysis](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/c/trigona-ransomware.html)
- [Sophos X-Ops: Trigona Affiliate Tradecraft](https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2025/11/18/trigona-affiliate-tradecraft/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK Technique: Archive Collected Data (T1560.001)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK Technique: Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/)
- [Broadcom Symantec Protection Bulletin: TriStealer](https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/tristealer)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0414
