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Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-0441

Qinglong Task Scheduler Auth Bypass Chain to RCE (CVE-2026-3965, CVE-2026-4047) — .fullgc Cryptomining Campaign

criticalACTIVE

An unidentified threat actor is chaining two unauthenticated authentication bypass vulnerabilities in the Qinglong open-source task scheduler (@whyour/qinglong, versions ≤ 2.20.1) to take over publicly exposed developer panels and deploy a multi-architecture cryptominer named .fullgc. CVE-2026-3965 (CWE-94, CVSS 9.3) abuses an Express.js URL rewrite that maps /open/* to /api/$1, exposing protected admin endpoints; CVE-2026-4047 (CWE-178, CVSS 9.3) bypasses the auth middleware via case-sensitivity mismatch (/aPi/...) so any privileged route can be reached unauthenticated.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0441, CVE-2026-3965, CVE-2026-4047
SeverityCRITICAL
CVSS9.3
EPSSCVE-2026-3965: 0.4% (39.7th percentile)
Malwarefullgc
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1036 Masquerading, T1053 Scheduled Task/Job, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1070 Indicator Removal, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1098 Account Manipulation, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1496 Resource Hijacking and 7 more in the attack flow
Target sectorstechnology, software-development, individual-developers, self-hosted-automation
Target regionsGlobal, China, East Asia, North America, Europe
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources10 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-05-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0441 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 20 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Qinglong config.sh Injection — curl + .fullgc + nohup Persistence (SPL)

Detects post-exploitation persistence: writes to Qinglong's /ql/data/config/config.sh containing the in-the-wild .fullgc cryptominer drop primitive (curl -fsSL piped to /ql/data/db/.fullgc, chmod +x, nohup) or any IOC strings (551911, fullgc, file.551911.xyz). Also detects execution of the resulting hidden dotfile under /ql/data/db/. Covers both file-write telemetry (Sysmon FileCreate / Linux file_event) and process-creation telemetry of the dropped binary.

Splunk SPL

index=endpoint sourcetype IN ("XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational","linux_secure","sysmon_linux","auditd","osquery","crowdstrike:event") earliest=-24h@h
| eval is_config_write=if(match(TargetFilename, "/ql/data/config/config\\.sh$") AND match(EventID, "^(11|FileCreate|file_event)$"), 1, 0)
| eval is_miner_path=if(match(Image, "/ql/data/db/\\.(fullgc|gc|compactor)") OR match(TargetFilename, "/ql/data/db/\\.(fullgc|gc|compactor)$"), 1, 0)
| eval is_drop_cmd=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)curl[^\n]*-(o|fsSL)[^\n]*/ql/data/db/\\.fullgc") OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)nohup[^\n]*/ql/data/db/\\.") OR match(CommandLine, "(?i)(551911|fullgc|file\\.551911\\.xyz)"), 1, 0)
| where is_config_write=1 OR is_miner_path=1 OR is_drop_cmd=1
| eval signal=case(is_config_write=1, "config.sh write", is_miner_path=1, ".fullgc dotfile execution", is_drop_cmd=1, "drop/persist command")
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(signal) as signals values(Image) as images values(CommandLine) as cmdlines values(ParentImage) as parents by host User
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
| sort - count

Microsoft KQL

let LookbackHours = 24h;
let ConfigWrites = DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackHours)
    | where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified")
    | where FolderPath endswith "/ql/data/config/config.sh" or (FileName == "config.sh" and FolderPath contains "/ql/data/config")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Signal = "config.sh write";
let MinerExec = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackHours)
    | where (FolderPath has "/ql/data/db/" and (FileName startswith ".fullgc" or FileName startswith ".gc" or FileName startswith ".compactor"))
        or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)curl[^\n]*-(o|fsSL)[^\n]*/ql/data/db/\.fullgc"
        or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)nohup[^\n]*/ql/data/db/\."
        or ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(551911|fullgc|file\.551911\.xyz)"
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType = "ProcessCreated", FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine = ProcessCommandLine, Signal = iff(FolderPath has "/ql/data/db/", ".fullgc dotfile execution", "drop/persist command");
union ConfigWrites, MinerExec
| summarize Count = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Signals = make_set(Signal, 5), CommandLines = make_set(InitiatingProcessCommandLine, 10), Parents = make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName, 10) by DeviceName
| order by Count desc

Sigma

title: Qinglong config.sh Injection and .fullgc Dotfile Execution
id: c0f1c0ca-0441-4502-9a44-2spl20260441
status: experimental
description: Detects post-exploitation persistence in the .fullgc cryptojacking campaign — writes to /ql/data/config/config.sh containing the curl/chmod/nohup drop primitive, creation or execution of hidden dotfile binaries under /ql/data/db/, or any IOC strings (551911, fullgc, file.551911.xyz).
references:
    - https://snyk.io/blog/qinglong-task-scheduler-rce-vulnerabilities/
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploit-rce-flaws-in-qinglong-task-scheduler-for-cryptomining/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-04-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.013
    - attack.t1053.003
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.004
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1564.001
    - attack.t1036.005
    - cve.2026.3965
    - cve.2026.4047
logsource:
    product: linux
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_miner_exec:
        Image|contains:
            - '/ql/data/db/.fullgc'
            - '/ql/data/db/.gc'
            - '/ql/data/db/.compactor'
    selection_drop_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'curl'
            - '/ql/data/db/.fullgc'
    selection_nohup_dotfile:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'nohup'
            - '/ql/data/db/.'
    selection_iocs:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'file.551911.xyz'
            - '551911.xyz'
            - '/fullgc/Linux_'
            - '/fullgc/Darwin_'
    condition: selection_miner_exec or selection_drop_cmd or selection_nohup_dotfile or selection_iocs
fields:
    - Image
    - CommandLine
    - ParentImage
    - User
    - ProcessId
falsepositives:
    - None expected — legitimate Qinglong does not ship a .fullgc binary, does not curl from .551911.xyz, and does not nohup hidden dotfiles
    - Authorized lab simulations of TL-2026-0441 (suppress by simulation marker if needed)
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • Authorized red-team or Threadlinqs TL-2026-0441 simulation runs that drop benign .fullgc.sim markers — exclude by simulation tag
  • Administrator-led config.sh edits that legitimately reference 'fullgc' string in comments (extremely rare; tune by author/host)
  • Backup/restore tools that touch config.sh during a known maintenance window

Tuning notes: Confirm your EDR/Sysmon coverage on Qinglong hosts captures /ql/data/ paths (often inside containers — ensure container-scoped telemetry is forwarded). For Docker-deployed Qinglong, the path may resolve to an overlay layer; add the host bind-mount path. Suppress known-good admin maintenance windows. If running Threadlinqs TL-2026-0441 simulations regularly, exclude by ProcessId of the simulation parent or by a marker file path.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Qinglong Auth Bypass Exploitation — Mixed-Case /aPi/ and /open/ Path PUT Requests (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Qinglong [indicator] Dotfile Drop and config.sh Tampering — Endpoint Telemetry (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • fullgc Cryptominer Egress and CPU-Resource Hijacking — Defender for Endpoint (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Qinglong CVE-2026-3965 — /open/ to /api/ URL-Rewrite Bypass (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Qinglong [indicator] Hidden Cryptominer Dotfile Execution (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Qinglong CVE-2026-4047 — Mixed-Case /aPi/ Path Auth-Middleware Bypass (Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Qinglong Auth Bypass Chain Exploitation — /open/ and /aPi/ Path Variants (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • fullgc Cryptominer C2 — Egress to [indicator] / [indicator] Infrastructure (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-05-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 20 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0441.

Sample indicators (1 of 20)

  • Domain: 551911[.]xyz

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 20 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

20 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

In-the-wild exploitation has been observed since 2026-02-07, with payloads served from file.551911.xyz to /ql/data/db/.fullgc on Linux x86_64, ARM64, and macOS.

The Qinglong Task Scheduler (@whyour/qinglong on npm; ~19k GitHub stars, ~3.2k forks) is a popular Node.js task automation panel used heavily by developers — particularly in the Chinese-language community — to run scheduled scripts. In early February 2026, Qinglong users began reporting a hidden process named .fullgc consuming 85-100% CPU on their hosts. The process name imitates Java's "Full GC" garbage collection logs to evade casual inspection.

Investigation by Snyk (disclosed 2026-02-26 and 2026-02-27, published 2026-03-12) identified two distinct authentication bypass primitives that together allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to achieve RCE on any Internet-exposed Qinglong instance running version 2.20.1 or older.

CVE-2026-3965 (CWE-94, Improper Control of Generation of Code, CVSS 9.3): Qinglong configures Express.js middleware that rewrites incoming /open/* requests to /api/$1 to expose a small set of public endpoints. The rewrite is performed BEFORE the authentication middleware decides whether the request is privileged, so the security middleware sees an /open/ path (treated as public) while the router resolves to a fully privileged /api/ endpoint. An attacker can therefore call PUT /open/user/init with a JSON body containing a new admin username/password and the panel will reinitialize its credentials, granting full administrative control. From the panel an attacker can register and execute arbitrary scripts.

CVE-2026-4047 (CWE-178, Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity, CVSS 9.3): The authentication middleware checks req.path.startsWith('/api/') in case-sensitive fashion, while the Express.js router matches routes case-insensitively on the same paths. By requesting /aPi/system/command-run (or any other capitalization variant) an attacker bypasses the middleware entirely and reaches the command execution endpoint with no authentication. A single PUT to /aPi/system/command-run with a JSON {"command":"..."} body executes shell commands on the host.

In the observed campaign, the attacker chains either bypass to inject into Qinglong's config.sh, which is executed by the panel on schedule. The injected payload uses uname to detect platform and architecture and downloads a matching cryptominer binary from https://file.551911.xyz/fullgc/$(uname -s)_$(uname -m), saving it to /ql/data/db/.fullgc, chmod +x'ing it, and running it via nohup so it survives session exit. Binaries are provided for Linux x86_64, Linux ARM64 (aarch64), and macOS variants. The miner contains persistence logic that restarts itself if killed.

Qinglong maintainers initially responded with PR #2924, attempting to block command-injection patterns (curl, wget, shell metacharacters) at an input-validation layer — a mitigation that did not fix the underlying auth bypass. The effective patch landed in PR #2941 (commit 6bec52dca158481258315ba0fc2f11206df7b719 / ce599d306f81e3ebb0f6eaa5b540d701a6d4085d), shipped in @whyour/qinglong 2.20.2-0. Many Internet-exposed instances likely remain unpatched given Qinglong's distribution as a self-hosted Docker/npm app and the gap between exploitation (2026-02-07) and effective fix release.

No formal threat-actor attribution exists. The infrastructure (.xyz domain, multi-architecture cryptominer, no espionage tooling) and target (Chinese-language developer community running Qinglong) are consistent with an opportunistic financially-motivated cryptojacking operator rather than an APT.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1036 Masquerading; T1070 Indicator Removal; T1564 Hide Artifacts

Persistence

T1053 Scheduled Task/Job; T1098 Account Manipulation; T1546 Event Triggered Execution

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Initial Access

T1078 Valid Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Discovery

T1082 System Information Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery

Impact

T1496 Resource Hijacking

Credential Access

T1555 Credentials from Password Stores; T1606 Forge Web Credentials

Reconnaissance

T1595 Active Scanning; T1596 Search Open Technical Databases

Timeline

  • First Qinglong users report a hidden .fullgc process consuming 85-100% CPU; in-the-wild exploitation of the auth bypass chain begins before any public disclosure.
  • Multiple Qinglong panel operators independently report the same .fullgc cryptominer behaviour across Linux x86_64, ARM64, and macOS hosts.
  • Qinglong community members request a public security warning from the maintainers after observing widespread compromise.
  • Further compromise reports surface; payload consistently sourced from locked-ioc-9 with platform-specific binaries.
  • CVE-2026-3965 (URL rewrite /open/* to /api/$1 auth bypass, CWE-94) discovered and reported to maintainers.
  • CVE-2026-4047 (case-sensitive auth middleware vs case-insensitive Express router, CWE-178) publicly reported via GitHub Issue #2934.
  • Qinglong maintainer publicly confirms both vulnerabilities and active exploitation.
  • PR #2924 attempts to block command-injection patterns at the input-validation layer; does not address the auth bypass and is superseded.
  • PR #2941 lands the actual auth-middleware fix (commits 6bec52dca158481258315ba0fc2f11206df7b719 and ce599d306f81e3ebb0f6eaa5b540d701a6d4085d), released as @whyour/qinglong 2.20.2-0.
  • Snyk publishes both CVE-2026-3965 and CVE-2026-4047 advisories with CVSS 9.3 (Critical).
  • BleepingComputer, Snyk Labs, and other outlets publish detailed campaign analysis; many Internet-exposed instances likely remain unpatched.
  • Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes TL-2026-0441 with full IOC, MITRE, and detection coverage.
  • As of 2026-05-29, the Qinglong auth-bypass chain (CVE-2026-3965/4047, CVSS 9.3) remains actively exploited: a fix shipped in v2.20.2-0 (PR #2941), but late-April reporting (BleepingComputer, Snyk, SC Media) confirms the .fullgc cryptomining campaign is ongoing with live locked-ioc-9 infra and many self-hosted panels unpatched. Not in CISA KEV; no takedown reported.

Sources cited

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Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.

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