Threat reportZero-DayTL-2026-0465
PAN-OS User-ID Authentication Portal RCE Zero-Day (CVE-2026-0300) — Active Exploitation on PA-Series & VM-Series Firewalls
Palo Alto Networks disclosed CVE-2026-0300, an unauthenticated stack buffer overflow in the PAN-OS User-ID Authentication Portal (Captive Portal) reachable via the data-plane HTTPS service that grants attackers root code execution on PA-Series and VM-Series next-generation firewalls. Limited but confirmed in-the-wild exploitation has been observed against Internet-exposed portals; Shadowserver tracks over 5,800 exposed VM-Series instances, the majority in Asia and North America.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0465, CVE-2026-0300 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | PAN-SA-2026-0300, Operation PortalSlip, Authentication Portal Zero-Day |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| CVSS | 10 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2026-0300 (added ) |
| EPSS | CVE-2026-0300: 31.7% (98.2th percentile) |
| Affected products | Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS (PA-Series hardware firewalls); Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS (VM-Series virtual firewalls); Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access (customer-managed Authentication Portal) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-120, CWE-121, CWE-787, CWE-119 |
| Attribution | CL-STA-1132 (medium confidence) |
| Malware | PORTALHIJACK |
| Tools | Cobalt Strike, Cobalt Strike 4.10 with custom Malleable C2 profile mimicking Palo Alto Networks update traffic |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003 OS Credential Dumping, T1018 Remote System Discovery, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1059.004 Unix Shell, T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1090.004 Proxy: Domain Fronting, T1133 External Remote Services and 16 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | espionage |
| Target sectors | government, financial, telecommunications, energy, healthcare, technology, defense, managed-service-providers |
| Target regions | Asia, North America, Europe |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 10 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-05-06, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0465 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 25 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: PORTALHIJACK Outbound C2 to Known IOC Infrastructure
Detects outbound network connections from internal hosts (especially PAN-OS firewalls) to the IP addresses, domains and URLs published as PORTALHIJACK and Cobalt Strike C2 infrastructure for CVE-2026-0300 in-the-wild exploitation. Joins firewall traffic logs with DNS resolution logs to surface both direct-IP and DNS-resolved beacons.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1573.002, T1090.004, T1041
- Data sources: pan_os_traffic_logs, dns_query_logs, zeek, firewall_traffic
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
(index=network sourcetype IN ("pan:traffic","cisco:asa","firewall:traffic","zeek:conn")
(dest IN ("45.155.205.106","91.92.245.182","194.165.16.77","167.71.224.115","23.95.89.214")
OR url IN ("https://panupdate-cdn.com/portal/auth/loader.bin","https://pan-osupdate.net/api/v1/heartbeat")
OR query IN ("panupdate-cdn.com","pan-osupdate.net","update-paloalto.xyz")))
OR (index=dns sourcetype IN ("pan:dns","bind:query","zeek:dns","stream:dns")
query IN ("panupdate-cdn.com","pan-osupdate.net","update-paloalto.xyz","*.panupdate-cdn.com","*.pan-osupdate.net","*.update-paloalto.xyz"))
| eval ioc=coalesce(dest, query, url)
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(src) as internal_hosts values(ioc) as iocs values(http_user_agent) as user_agents by sourcetype
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| sort - countMicrosoft KQL
let ioc_ips = dynamic(["45.155.205.106","91.92.245.182","194.165.16.77","167.71.224.115","23.95.89.214"]);
let ioc_domains = dynamic(["panupdate-cdn.com","pan-osupdate.net","update-paloalto.xyz"]);
let ioc_urls = dynamic(["https://panupdate-cdn.com/portal/auth/loader.bin","https://pan-osupdate.net/api/v1/heartbeat"]);
let net_hits = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteIP in (ioc_ips) or RemoteUrl in (ioc_urls) or RemoteUrl has_any (ioc_domains)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, LocalIP, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType, signal="network";
let dns_hits = DnsEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where Name has_any (ioc_domains)
| project Timestamp=TimeGenerated, DeviceName=Computer, LocalIP=ClientIP, RemoteIP=IPAddresses, RemoteUrl=Name, RemotePort=int(0), InitiatingProcessFileName=tostring(""), ActionType=tostring(QueryType), signal="dns";
union net_hits, dns_hits
| summarize hits=count(), first_seen=min(Timestamp), last_seen=max(Timestamp), iocs=make_set(coalesce(RemoteUrl, RemoteIP)), processes=make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName) by DeviceName, signal
| order by hits descSigma
title: PORTALHIJACK C2 Beacon to Known CVE-2026-0300 Infrastructure
id: 7c1f2b40-6a90-4f1d-9d40-2b39c0a51d03
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS lookups or network connections from internal hosts to the published PORTALHIJACK / Cobalt Strike C2 IPs, domains and URLs associated with CVE-2026-0300 in-the-wild exploitation.
references:
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2026/05/06/portalhijack-pan-os-zero-day/
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/cve-2026-0300-pan-os-portal
- https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0300
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/05/06
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1573.002
- attack.t1090.004
- attack.t1041
- cve.2026.0300
logsource:
category: dns
product: zeek
detection:
dns_ioc:
query|endswith:
- 'panupdate-cdn.com'
- 'pan-osupdate.net'
- 'update-paloalto.xyz'
net_ioc:
dst_ip:
- '45.155.205.106'
- '91.92.245.182'
- '194.165.16.77'
- '167.71.224.115'
- '23.95.89.214'
url_ioc:
url:
- 'https://panupdate-cdn.com/portal/auth/loader.bin'
- 'https://pan-osupdate.net/api/v1/heartbeat'
condition: dns_ioc or net_ioc or url_ioc
falsepositives:
- DNS sinkhole or threat-intel research traffic deliberately resolving the IOC domains
- Authorised purple-team beacon emulation runs (cross-reference with simulation log)
level: critical
Known false positives:
- Threat-intel sinkhole or research traffic deliberately resolving IOC domains
- Authorised purple-team simulation runs (correlate with TL-2026-0465-SIM-* harness)
- Security tooling vendor lookups validating the IOC list
Tuning notes: Whitelist the source IPs of any sinkhole, threat-intel platform, or sandbox detonation host that is expected to resolve these domains. Promote any hit originating from a PAN-OS firewall to immediate critical, since the firewall management plane should never reach external typosquats.
- PAN-OS Authentication Portal Exploit Pattern in DeviceNetworkEvents — CVE-2026-0300 · unlock with TL Creds
- Anomalous userid-authd Child Process and Log Truncation on PAN-OS — Post-Exploit · unlock with TL Creds
- PAN-OS Outbound HTTPS to PORTALHIJACK Infrastructure within 60 Seconds of Inbound Portal POST · unlock with TL Creds
- Sigma — CVE-2026-0300 Exploitation Pattern in Web Logs · unlock with TL Creds
- Sigma — PORTALHIJACK Persistence Artefacts on PAN-OS Appliance · unlock with TL Creds
- Sigma — Outbound DNS / HTTPS to PORTALHIJACK and Cobalt Strike Infrastructure · unlock with TL Creds
- PAN-OS Authentication Portal Oversized POST — CVE-2026-0300 Exploitation Attempt · unlock with TL Creds
- PORTALHIJACK Implant File Drop on PAN-OS Appliance — Post-Exploit Persistence · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-05-06, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 25 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0465.
Sample indicators (3 of 25)
- IP address:
45.155.205[.]106 - Domain:
panupdate-cdn[.]com - File hash:
a3f1c9e84b2d76e0c4b8a5d29f1e0b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d7e8f9a
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 25 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
No patch is available; PAN-OS 11.2, 11.1, 11.0, 10.2 and 10.1 are all affected, and the only mitigations are restricting the Authentication Portal to trusted zones, disabling it entirely, or applying the published Threat Prevention signatures.
CVE-2026-0300 is a pre-authentication memory-corruption vulnerability in the User-ID Authentication Portal (also referred to as the Captive Portal / authd front-end) component of PAN-OS, the operating system that powers Palo Alto Networks PA-Series hardware and VM-Series virtual next-generation firewalls. The flaw resides in the HTTP request parsing routine that handles the Layer-7 redirection and form-based login pages served by the firewall when the Authentication Portal is enabled in a security policy. A specially crafted multi-part HTTP/HTTPS request to the portal endpoint causes a stack buffer overflow inside the userid-authd helper process, which runs with root privileges and is reachable on whichever data-plane interface the portal is bound to (frequently a Layer-3 interface facing untrusted users for Captive Portal workflows). Successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution as root inside the management/data-plane control namespace of PAN-OS, allowing the attacker to read all firewall configuration including IPSec / GlobalProtect pre-shared keys and certificate private keys, modify rule bases, mint persistent credentials, pivot through site-to-site tunnels, and stage second-stage implants on the device.
Palo Alto Networks PSIRT confirmed limited active exploitation in the wild beginning in late April 2026 after telemetry partners and at least one large enterprise reported anomalous outbound shell-like traffic from Authentication Portal services. The attack chain observed in current campaigns proceeds in three stages: (1) reconnaissance scanning for /global-protect/portal/login.esp, /authentication/login.esp and /sslvpn/HwInit.esp endpoints to fingerprint Authentication Portal-enabled firewalls; (2) exploitation via a single oversized HTTP POST to the redirect parameter that triggers the overflow and pivots execution to a return-oriented-programming chain crafted against PAN-OS userland binaries; (3) deployment of a Bash dropper that writes a small ELF stager (PORTALHIJACK) to /opt/pancfg/runtime/portal/ and re-launches it under the legitimate panio process tree to blend with normal portal activity. The stager establishes outbound HTTPS C2 over TCP/443 using domain-fronting through legitimate CDN edges, pulls a second-stage Cobalt Strike beacon, exfiltrates running-config.xml plus panrc credentials, and clears /var/log/cms.log, /var/log/wf-monitor.log and the authd portal access log to remove evidence.
No patched PAN-OS image is available at the time of disclosure. Palo Alto Networks has released Threat Prevention signature 95720 (and follow-on signatures 95721/95722 for variants) as a virtual patch when the firewall has Threat Prevention licensed and SSL inbound inspection enabled for the portal interface. Vendor guidance prioritises (a) confirming whether the Authentication Portal is enabled and which interfaces serve it, (b) restricting access to internal trusted zones using the dedicated Authentication Portal interface zoning, (c) temporarily disabling the Authentication Portal entirely where business workflow allows, and (d) ensuring Threat Prevention with the new signatures is applied. CISA is expected to add CVE-2026-0300 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue with a 14-day federal remediation deadline. Defenders should treat any Internet-exposed PAN-OS firewall with the Authentication Portal enabled as potentially compromised until forensic triage of the configuration, log files, and management plane processes is complete.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1003 OS Credential Dumping; T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
Discovery
T1018 Remote System Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1059.004 Unix Shell
Privilege Escalation
T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Command and Control
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1090.004 Proxy: Domain Fronting; T1572 Protocol Tunneling; T1573.002 Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
Initial Access
T1133 External Remote Services; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Impact
T1498 Network Denial of Service
Persistence
T1505.003 Server Software Component: Web Shell; T1543 Create or Modify System Process
Lateral Movement
T1534 Internal Spearphishing; T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
Resource Development
T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1608 Stage Capabilities
Reconnaissance
T1595 Active Scanning; T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning
Collection
T1602 Data from Configuration Repository
defense-impairment
T1685 Disable or Modify Tools; T1685.006 Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
Remediation
Patches
- No fixed PAN-OS image available at disclosure (2026-05-06). Palo Alto Networks has committed to releasing PAN-OS 11.2.5-h1, 11.1.7-h2, 11.0.10-h3, 10.2.13-h4 and 10.1.16-h5 as the first fixed images. Monitor https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0300 for release timing.
- Apply Threat Prevention content release 8911-9301 or later, which contains signatures 95720, 95721 and 95722 covering known exploit variants
Immediate actions
- Identify all firewalls with the Authentication Portal enabled: run 'show running authentication-portal' and 'show user authentication-portal' across the fleet via Panorama
- Restrict the Authentication Portal interface to trusted internal zones only; remove it from any Internet-facing or untrusted-zone interface
- Where business workflow permits, disable the Authentication Portal entirely until a fixed PAN-OS image is released
- Block source IPs 45.155.205.106, 91.92.245.182, 194.165.16.77, 167.71.224.115 and 23.95.89.214 at upstream filtering points
- Block DNS resolution for panupdate-cdn[.]com, pan-osupdate[.]net and update-paloalto[.]xyz
- Apply Threat Prevention signatures 95720, 95721 and 95722 with the action set to reset-both on all portal-serving interfaces
- Capture a forensic snapshot (tech-support file plus running-config plus management-plane process listing) before any remediation if compromise is suspected
Workarounds
- Disable the Authentication Portal in the rulebase or remove the portal interface from the network configuration entirely
- Restrict the portal to trusted zones using a dedicated source-zone match in the Authentication policy and remove any any-source-zone references
- Add an Authentication Portal-specific Security policy that allows access only from internal user subnets and denies all other traffic
- If portal access from the Internet is unavoidable, place the firewall behind an upstream WAF or reverse proxy that can enforce request size limits below the overflow threshold (observed at >8192 bytes in the redirect parameter)
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy out-of-band management for all Palo Alto Networks firewalls so that User-ID, Authentication Portal and management interfaces are never exposed to untrusted networks
- Enable SSL Inbound Inspection on Authentication Portal interfaces so future Threat Prevention signatures can decrypt and inspect portal payloads
- Forward all PAN-OS system, traffic, threat and authd logs to an external SIEM with retention of at least 365 days and immutable storage
- Implement automated configuration drift detection (eg. via Panorama API or Expedition) so unauthorised changes to portal settings or admin accounts are flagged within minutes
- Subscribe Authentication Portal-serving firewalls to Advanced Threat Prevention for inline ML-based detection of anomalous portal traffic
Affected and fixed versions
- Palo Alto Networks — PAN-OS (PA-Series hardware firewalls)
Vulnerable versions: 11.2.0 through 11.2.4; 11.1.0 through 11.1.7; 11.0.0 through 11.0.10; 10.2.0 through 10.2.13; 10.1.0 through 10.1.16
Fixed in: 11.2.5-h1 (pending); 11.1.7-h2 (pending); 11.0.10-h3 (pending); 10.2.13-h4 (pending); 10.1.16-h5 (pending) - Palo Alto Networks — PAN-OS (VM-Series virtual firewalls)
Vulnerable versions: 11.2.0 through 11.2.4; 11.1.0 through 11.1.7; 11.0.0 through 11.0.10; 10.2.0 through 10.2.13; 10.1.0 through 10.1.16
Fixed in: 11.2.5-h1 (pending); 11.1.7-h2 (pending); 11.0.10-h3 (pending); 10.2.13-h4 (pending); 10.1.16-h5 (pending) - Palo Alto Networks — Prisma Access (customer-managed Authentication Portal)
Vulnerable versions: Customer-managed Prisma Access tenants using Authentication Portal feature
Fixed in: Vendor-managed mitigation rolled out 2026-05-05; customer-managed instances follow PAN-OS schedule
Timeline
- Earliest known exploitation telemetry: anomalous outbound HTTPS beacons from PAN-OS authd processes observed by a North American financial services CSIRT
- Asian telecommunications provider reports unauthorized configuration changes on Internet-facing VM-Series firewalls and forwards artefacts to PAN PSIRT
- Palo Alto Networks PSIRT triages reports and confirms a reproducible stack buffer overflow in the Authentication Portal HTTP request parser
- PAN-OS engineering reproduces unauthenticated root code execution via crafted POST to portal endpoint; CVE-2026-0300 reserved with MITRE
- Multiple incident response firms (Volexity, Mandiant, Unit 42) corroborate active exploitation against government and managed-service-provider targets in three regions
- Palo Alto Networks rolls out vendor-side mitigation for cloud-managed Prisma Access tenants and stages Threat Prevention signatures 95720/95721/95722
- Palo Alto Networks commits to first fixed PAN-OS images (11.2.5-h1, 11.1.7-h2, 11.0.10-h3, 10.2.13-h4, 10.1.16-h5); release timing pending QA
- CISA issues Alert AA26-126A and signals imminent KEV listing with a 14-day federal remediation deadline
- Public advisory PAN-SA-2026-0300 published; BleepingComputer, Unit 42 and Shadowserver report; ~5,800 exposed VM-Series instances catalogued
- As of 2026-05-29, CVE-2026-0300 remains a live threat: it is in CISA KEV and the PAN vendor advisory still marks exploit maturity "ATTACKED" with ongoing in-the-wild root RCE against internet-exposed PAN-OS Authentication Portals. Fixed images shipped May 13-28, 2026, but exploitation continues and the ~5,800 exposed instances are not all patched.
Sources cited
- PAN-SA-2026-0300: Authentication Portal Stack Buffer Overflow (CVE-2026-0300) Palo Alto Networks · Advisory · 2026-05-06
- CVE-2026-0300 — NVD NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2026-05-06
- CISA Alert AA26-126A: Active Exploitation of CVE-2026-0300 in PAN-OS CISA · Government advisory · 2026-05-06
- Unit 42 Threat Brief: Active Exploitation of PAN-OS Authentication Portal Unit 42 · Vendor report · 2026-05-06
- Shadowserver Dashboard — Exposed PAN-OS Authentication Portals dashboard.shadowserver.org · Research · 2026-05-06
- Volexity: Initial Analysis of PORTALHIJACK Implant Deployed via CVE-2026-0300 volexity.com · Research · 2026-05-06
- Mandiant: Tracking In-the-Wild Exploitation of PAN-OS Authentication Portal Google Cloud · Research · 2026-05-06
- Palo Alto Networks Live Community — CVE-2026-0300 Mitigation Workflow Palo Alto Networks · Vendor report · 2026-05-06
- Threat Prevention Content Release 8911-9301 (signatures 95720/95721/95722) Palo Alto Networks · Vendor report · 2026-05-06
- Palo Alto Networks warns of firewall RCE zero-day exploited in attacks BleepingComputer · News · 2026-05-06
Previous and next in zero day
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 10 sources; published ; last updated —.