# GTIG AI Threat Tracker (May 2026) — First AI-Developed Zero-Day Exploit (2FA Bypass), PROMPTFLUX/HONESTCUE/CANFAIL/LONGSTREAM/PROMPTSPY AI-Enabled Malware, and APT27/APT45/UNC2814/UNC5673/UNC6201/TeamPCP AI-Augmented Operations

> Google Threat Intelligence Group's May 11, 2026 AI Threat Tracker documents the first identified threat-actor use of an AI-developed zero-day exploit — a Python script that bypassed two-factor authentication on an unnamed open-source web-based system administration tool via a semantic logic flaw, planned for mass exploitation by a criminal actor and disrupted by GTIG. The report also enumerates five AI-enabled malware families (PROMPTFLUX dynamic source-code mutation, HONESTCUE VBScript just-in-time evasion, CANFAIL/LONGSTREAM Russia-nexus AI-generated decoy code targeting Ukraine, and the PROMPTSPY Android backdoor's GeminiAutomationAgent autonomous UI-driving module), AI-augmented operations by PRC-nexus APT27/UNC2814/UNC5673/UNC6201 and DPRK-nexus APT45 (including expert-persona jailbreaking, recursive PoC validation, ORB fleet-management development, and obfuscated LLM-access middleware), TeamPCP (UNC6780) supply-chain compromises of Trivy/Checkmarx/LiteLLM/BerriAI deploying SANDCLOCK credential stealer, and Operation Overload's pro-Russia AI voice-cloning IO campaign.

- **Published:** 2026-05-11T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-05-11T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0495
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-gtig-ai-threat-tracker-tl-2026-0495.webp?v=56a93d0f (Threadlinqs threat intel: GTIG AI Threat Tracker May 2026: Analysis & Hunting (TL-2026-0495) — High severity, 27 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0495
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** APT27 (China, North Korea, Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (2 shown free below)

## Description

On May 11, 2026, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) published its Q2 2026 AI Threat Tracker, the first authoritative confirmation that a threat actor has weaponized a zero-day vulnerability developed with the assistance of a large language model. The exploit — a Python script bypassing two-factor authentication on a popular, intentionally unnamed open-source web-based system administration tool — targeted a semantic logic flaw in which a developer hardcoded a trust assumption that contradicted the application's own 2FA enforcement logic. Such high-level reasoning bugs are precisely the class of flaw modern frontier LLMs excel at surfacing and which traditional static-analysis and fuzzing tooling consistently misses. The script bore unmistakable AI authorship markers: an abundance of educational docstrings, a hallucinated CVSS score in inline comments, textbook Pythonic structure characteristic of LLM training-data style, detailed help menus, and a clean ANSI color class implementation. A prominent cyber-crime threat actor was preparing a mass-exploitation campaign against vulnerable internet-exposed instances; GTIG independently discovered the script, disrupted operator infrastructure, and pursued responsible disclosure with the affected vendor. Google explicitly ruled out Gemini as the originating LLM but did not name the specific model used.

The tracker further documents five AI-enabled malware families. PROMPTFLUX (VT hash eb0687daed29f3651c61b0a2aa4a0cdcf2049a1ebae2e15e2dd9326471d318a1) calls the Gemini API at runtime to mutate its own source code on demand, enabling polymorphic evasion of static signature engines. HONESTCUE (VT collection malware--77a0b844-02bb-563c-b8fd-304f93e11ef1) likewise queries Gemini to generate fresh VBScript obfuscation and evasion routines per execution. CANFAIL (VT collection malware--30f26e32-0393-5023-92ef-f677f1def61c) and LONGSTREAM (VT collection malware--6cae6e39-72de-5b9e-aebe-47243e3dc63a) — both attributed to suspected Russia-nexus actors targeting Ukrainian organizations — embed AI-generated benign-looking decoy logic, with LONGSTREAM samples containing 32+ repeated daylight-saving-time queries and other inert administrative tasks specifically intended to dilute analyst attention and frustrate behavioral analytics; LLM-authored developer comments in CANFAIL explicitly annotate the inert padding. PROMPTSPY (Android), previously documented by ESET, now features a GeminiAutomationAgent module that calls generativelanguage.googleapis.com with the gemini-2.5-flash-lite model to autonomously navigate device UI. The agent serializes the live Android Accessibility-API view hierarchy into XML, supplies a benign-persona hardcoded prompt designed to defeat safety filters, and returns structured JSON CLICK/SWIPE actions with precise spatial coordinates derived by the model from in-prompt geometric reasoning; complementary modules implement reverse-TCP tunneling, FCM-based relaunch, dynamic VNC-relay and Gemini API key updates, biometric-replay attacks, and an AppProtectionDetector that draws an invisible overlay over the system uninstall button.

Five nation-state and uncategorized clusters are profiled. APT27 (PRC) used Gemini to accelerate development of a fleet-management application underpinning an ORB (operational relay box) network supporting MOBILE_WIFI and ROUTER device types, 4G/5G SIM-card residential-IP rotation, and a maxHops=3 multi-hop proxy topology. APT45 (DPRK) issued thousands of repetitive prompts to recursively analyze CVEs and validate PoC exploits, and is observed using OpenClaw and OneClaw agentic frameworks plus disposable vulnerable test environments. UNC2814 (PRC) leveraged expert-persona prompting (senior security auditor / C/C++ binary security expert) against TP-Link router firmware and Odette File Transfer Protocol implementations seeking pre-auth RCE primitives. UNC5673 (PRC; overlap with TEMP.Hex) targets South and Southeast Asian governments and operates obfuscated LLM-access middleware including Claude-Relay-Service and CLIProxyAPI for account pooling across Gemini, Claude, and OpenAI. UNC6201 (PRC) operationalized a GitHub-hosted Python script automating account registration, CAPTCHA bypass, SMS verification, and immediate cancellation to industrialize free/trial premium-LLM access. Cyber-crime cluster TeamPCP (UNC6780), in late March 2026, compromised maintainer accounts and pushed malicious pull requests into the Trivy, Checkmarx, LiteLLM, and BerriAI GitHub repositories, deploying the SANDCLOCK credential stealer to harvest AWS keys and GitHub tokens from victim build environments — the LiteLLM compromise is particularly impactful because the package functions as a multi-provider AI gateway and the stolen API secrets enable downstream access to victim AI systems, with TeamPCP partnering with ransomware and data-extortion crews for monetization.

Finally, Operation Overload, an ongoing pro-Russia information operation, has incorporated AI voice cloning to impersonate real journalists in fabricated video montages spliced with legitimate news footage, distributed across both digital platforms and printed posters, with secondary observed AI-IO activity attributed to actors in Iran, China, and Saudi Arabia. Across all clusters, the tracker emphasizes a structural shift: threat actors are professionalizing access to premium-tier AI through middleware, automated registration pipelines, and account aggregation — the productization of LLM abuse as a service layer underneath traditional cyber operations.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1592 Gather Victim Host Information
- T1591 Gather Victim Org Information
- T1587 Develop Capabilities
- T1588 Obtain Capabilities
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1566 Phishing
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
- T1056 Input Capture
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1564 Hide Artifacts
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1090 Proxy
- T1102 Web Service
- T1568 Dynamic Resolution
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1531 Account Access Removal

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**SANDCLOCK-style CI Credential Harvest in Build Environment — Post-Exploitation Phase** (`TL-2026-0495-SPL-002`)

Detects recursive grep / findstr / Select-String commands scanning CI/CD workspaces for AWS access keys (AKIA-prefixed), GitHub personal access tokens (ghp_-prefixed), OpenAI API keys (sk--prefixed), and npm tokens (npm_-prefixed). Matches the SANDCLOCK credential-stealer behavior delivered through TeamPCP/UNC6780 supply-chain compromises of Trivy, Checkmarx, LiteLLM, and BerriAI repositories in late March 2026.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1552.001, T1195.001, T1195.002, T1027
- **Data sources:** sysmon, auditd, defender_for_endpoint, osquery, windows_security_4688
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=endpoint sourcetype IN ("WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational","sysmon","linux:audit","linux_secure","osquery_process_events") EventCode IN (1, 4688) OR action=execve
(Image="*\\grep*" OR Image="*/grep" OR Image="*\\findstr.exe" OR Image="*\\rg.exe" OR Image="*/rg" OR Image="*\\select-string*" OR Image="*/ag" OR CommandLine="*grep*" OR CommandLine="*findstr*" OR CommandLine="*Select-String*")
| eval cl=lower(CommandLine)
| where (match(cl,"-r\\b") OR match(cl,"/s\\b") OR match(cl,"-recurse")) AND (match(cl,"akia[0-9a-z]{16}") OR match(cl,"ghp_[a-z0-9]{20,}") OR match(cl,"sk-[a-z0-9]{20,}") OR match(cl,"npm_[a-z0-9]{20,}") OR match(cl,"aws_secret_access_key") OR match(cl,"github_token"))
| eval ci_context=if(match(lower(ParentImage),"(node|runner|agent|jenkins|gitlab|buildkite|circleci|drone|tekton|argo)") OR match(lower(CurrentDirectory),"(_work|workspace|builds|/var/lib/gitlab-runner)"),1,0)
| stats count values(Image) as scanner values(ParentImage) as parent values(CurrentDirectory) as cwd values(User) as user min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen by Computer, ParentProcessGuid
| where count >= 1
| eval first_seen=strftime(first_seen,"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"), last_seen=strftime(last_seen,"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S")
| sort - count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let token_patterns = dynamic(["AKIA","ghp_","sk-","npm_","AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY","GITHUB_TOKEN"]);
let scanners = dynamic(["grep","grep.exe","findstr.exe","rg","rg.exe","ag","Select-String","sls"]);
let recursive_flags = dynamic([" -r "," -R "," -rEhn "," /s "," -Recurse"," --include"]);
let ci_hints = dynamic(["_work","workspace","runner","jenkins","gitlab-runner","buildkite","circleci","github-actions","actions-runner"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ (scanners) or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("grep","findstr","Select-String")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (recursive_flags)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (token_patterns)
| extend ci_signal = iff(InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (ci_hints) or FolderPath has_any (ci_hints) or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (ci_hints), true, false)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, ci_signal
| summarize hits = count(), first_seen=min(Timestamp), last_seen=max(Timestamp), parents=make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName,8), cmdlines=make_set(ProcessCommandLine,8) by DeviceName, AccountName, ci_signal
| where hits >= 1
| order by hits desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: SANDCLOCK-style Recursive Credential Pattern Scan in CI Workspace
id: 04952001-1552-0001-0001-tl20260495cred
status: experimental
description: Detects recursive grep / findstr / Select-String / ripgrep commands across build directories searching for AWS, GitHub, OpenAI, and npm token patterns — the SANDCLOCK credential-stealer post-compromise harvest delivered via TeamPCP/UNC6780 supply-chain attacks on Trivy, Checkmarx, LiteLLM, and BerriAI in late March 2026.
references:
    - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ai-vulnerability-exploitation-initial-access/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-05-11
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1195.001
    - attack.t1195.002
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1027
logsource:
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_image:
        Image|endswith:
            - '/grep'
            - '\grep.exe'
            - '\findstr.exe'
            - '/rg'
            - '\rg.exe'
            - '/ag'
    selection_recursive:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -r '
            - ' -R '
            - ' -rEhn '
            - ' /s '
            - ' -Recurse'
    selection_tokens:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'AKIA'
            - 'ghp_'
            - 'sk-'
            - 'npm_'
            - 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY'
            - 'GITHUB_TOKEN'
    filter_legit_scanners:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\trufflehog'
            - '\gitleaks'
            - '\detect-secrets'
    condition: selection_image and selection_recursive and selection_tokens and not filter_legit_scanners
falsepositives:
    - Approved secret-scanning tooling (TruffleHog, gitleaks, detect-secrets) run by sanctioned CI policy
    - Developer manually grepping local sources for accidental credential commits during cleanup
level: high

```

**Known false positives:**

- Approved secret-scanning tools (TruffleHog, gitleaks, detect-secrets) executed under sanctioned CI pipelines
- Developer manually grepping for credentials during pre-commit hygiene
- Compliance audit jobs that legitimately enumerate token patterns

**Tuning notes:** Allowlist your approved secret-scanners by ParentImage / hash. On Linux build runners, ensure /var/log/audit/audit.log captures execve with full command line (auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve). Pair with a follow-up alert for outbound HTTPS POSTs from the same runner within 60s of the harvest. For GitHub Actions / GitLab Runner fleets, consider scoping by runner-label CIDR rather than by image alone.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- AI-Authored 2FA-Bypass Exploit Markers in Inbound Auth Requests — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- HKCU Run-Key Persistence Pointing at TEMP Polymorphic Script — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Android Accessibility Service + Gemini API Egress (PROMPTSPY GeminiAutomationAgent) — C2 Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AI-Authored Exploit Script File on Disk — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- AI-Authored Decoy Code Marker on Disk (CANFAIL / LONGSTREAM) — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Outbound TLS to LLM-Relay Middleware Infrastructure (Claude-Relay-Service / CLIProxyAPI) — C2 Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- 2FA-Bypass Trust Header on Admin Login Endpoint — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- PowerShell / Scripting Host Outbound Beacon to Gemini API — C2 Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (2 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `generativelanguage[.]googleapis[.]com`
- File hash: `eb0687daed29f3651c61b0a2aa4a0cdcf2049a1ebae2e15e2dd9326471d318a1`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Adversaries Leverage AI for Vulnerability Exploitation, Augmented Operations, and Initial Access](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ai-vulnerability-exploitation-initial-access/)
- [Google: Hackers used AI to develop zero-day exploit for web admin tool](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/google-hackers-used-ai-to-develop-zero-day-exploit-for-web-admin-tool/)
- [VirusTotal — PROMPTFLUX sample](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/eb0687daed29f3651c61b0a2aa4a0cdcf2049a1ebae2e15e2dd9326471d318a1)
- [VirusTotal Collection — HONESTCUE malware](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/collection/malware--77a0b844-02bb-563c-b8fd-304f93e11ef1/iocs)
- [VirusTotal Collection — CANFAIL malware (Russia-nexus, Ukraine targeting)](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/collection/malware--30f26e32-0393-5023-92ef-f677f1def61c/iocs)
- [VirusTotal Collection — LONGSTREAM malware (Russia-nexus, Ukraine targeting)](https://www.virustotal.com/gui/collection/malware--6cae6e39-72de-5b9e-aebe-47243e3dc63a/iocs)
- [MITRE ATLAS — Adversarial Threat Landscape for AI Systems](https://atlas.mitre.org/)
- [Google Secure AI Framework (SAIF)](https://safety.google/cybersecurity-advancements/saif/)
- [Coalition for Secure AI (CoSAI)](https://www.coalitionforsecureai.org/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0495
