Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-0497
Unit 42 Deep Dive: Advanced AD CS Exploitation — Certificate Template Misuse (ESC1) and Shadow Credentials via msDS-KeyCredentialLink (CVE-2022-26923, Fog Ransomware, Fighting Ursa)
Unit 42 (Palo Alto Networks) published a comprehensive technical deep-dive cataloguing Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) abuse techniques including ESC1 certificate template misconfigurations and Shadow Credential / Key Trust attacks via the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute (CVE-2022-26923). The research confirms active exploitation by Fog ransomware affiliates (DFIR Report telemetry) and Russian GRU-linked Fighting Ursa (APT28 / Forest Blizzard), enabled by mature open-source tooling (Certify, Certipy supporting ESC1–ESC16, Whisker, pyWhisker, PKINITtools).
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0497, CVE-2022-26923 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Certifried, AD CS ESC1, Shadow Credentials Attack, Key Trust Abuse, Certified Pre-Owned |
| Severity | HIGH |
| CVSS | 8.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
| Exploitation status | Linked CVE exploited in the wild; Listed in CISA KEV: CVE-2022-26923 (added ) |
| EPSS | CVE-2022-26923: 83.5% (99.6th percentile) |
| Affected products | Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services; Microsoft Active Directory Certificate Services; Microsoft Windows Domain Controller |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-295, CWE-287, CWE-269 |
| Attribution | APT28, Fog Ransomware (high confidence) |
| Nation-state nexus | Russia |
| Malware | Fog Ransomware |
| Tools | Certify.exe, Certipy, Cobalt Strike, PKINITtools, Rubeus - S1071, Whisker.exe, pyWhisker |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003 OS Credential Dumping, T1021 Remote Services, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1069 Permission Groups Discovery, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1087 Account Discovery, T1098 Account Manipulation, T1136 Create Account, T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application, T1213 Data from Information Repositories, T1482 Domain Trust Discovery and 6 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | ESPIONAGE |
| Target sectors | government, defense, energy, financial, healthcare, manufacturing, technology, managed_service_providers, education |
| Target regions | North America, Europe, United Kingdom, Ukraine, NATO Member States |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 15 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-05-11, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0497 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 22 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: AD CS ESC1 - Certificate Issuance With Attacker-Supplied SAN UPN (SPL)
Detects canonical ESC1 abuse on an Enterprise CA: a certificate request/issuance event (Windows Security 4886 received / 4887 approved) where the requesting principal's account name does not match the UPN supplied in the certificate Subject Alternative Name. This is the exploitation-phase signal that an attacker with enrollment rights on a vulnerable template (ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT + Client Authentication EKU + no manager approval) is minting a certificate as a high-privilege impersonation target such as Domain Admin or krbtgt.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1649, T1078.002, T1068
- Data sources: windows_security, adcs_audit, splunk_ms_windows
- Severity: high
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" (EventCode=4886 OR EventCode=4887) host=*CA* earliest=-24h
| rex field=Message "Requester:\s+(?<requester>[^\r\n]+)"
| rex field=Message "Subject:\s+[^\r\n]*?CN=(?<subject_cn>[^,\r\n]+)"
| rex field=Message "Attributes:[\s\S]*?upn=(?<san_upn>[^&\r\n\s]+)"
| rex field=Message "Certificate Template:\s+(?<template>[^\r\n]+)"
| eval requester_sam=mvindex(split(requester,"\\\\"),-1)
| eval requester_user=lower(mvindex(split(requester_sam,"@"),0))
| eval san_user=lower(mvindex(split(san_upn,"@"),0))
| where isnotnull(san_upn) AND requester_user!=san_user
| eval risk="ESC1 SAN spoof - requester=".requester_user." san_upn=".san_upn
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(template) as templates values(host) as ca_hosts by requester, san_upn, risk
| where count>=1Microsoft KQL
// Reference KQL for the same hunt (Microsoft Sentinel SecurityEvent on CA forwarders)
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where EventID in (4886, 4887)
| extend Requester = tostring(extract(@"Requester:\s+([^\r\n]+)", 1, EventData))
| extend SanUpn = tolower(tostring(extract(@"upn=([^&\r\n\s]+)", 1, EventData)))
| extend Template = tostring(extract(@"Certificate Template:\s+([^\r\n]+)", 1, EventData))
| extend RequesterUser = tolower(extract(@"\\([^@\s]+)", 1, Requester))
| extend SanUser = tolower(extract(@"([^@\s]+)", 1, SanUpn))
| where isnotempty(SanUpn) and RequesterUser != SanUser
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Requester, SanUpn, Template, EventIDSigma
title: AD CS ESC1 - Certificate Issuance With Attacker-Supplied SAN UPN
id: 2c30ef74-0497-4c01-8a51-1aa90b97f001
status: experimental
description: Detects ESC1 abuse where an Enterprise CA issues (or receives a request for) a certificate whose Subject Alternative Name UPN does not match the requesting principal. Canonical Certipy/Certify SAN spoofing pattern producing certificates usable for PKINIT TGT impersonation.
references:
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/active-directory-certificate-services-exploitation/
- https://specterops.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/05/11
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1649
- attack.t1078.002
- cve.2022.26923
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4886
- 4887
filter_match:
Requester|contains: SubjectAltName
condition: selection and not filter_match
fields:
- Requester
- SubjectAltName
- CertificateTemplate
- SerialNumber
falsepositives:
- Helpdesk or PKI operators legitimately enrolling certificates on behalf of other users via the Enrollment Agent template
- Automated joiner/mover workflows that enrol certificates with delegated SANs
level: highKnown false positives:
- Enrollment Agent template usage where helpdesk staff legitimately request certificates on behalf of other users
- Automated identity-lifecycle tooling that enrolls SAN UPNs different from the service account performing the request
- Smartcard rollout workflows in environments using Enroll-on-Behalf-Of (EOBO)
Tuning notes: Exclude approved Enrollment Agents (members of the Enroll-on-Behalf-Of group) from the requester field. Restrict matches to templates with Client Authentication EKU (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) or Smartcard Logon EKU (1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2). Raise severity to critical when the SAN UPN resolves to a Tier 0 account (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, krbtgt) or a domain controller computer object. Baseline 4886/4887 volume per template for 14 days before alerting to suppress legitimate bulk renewal noise.
- AD CS ESC1 - Certificate Request With Spoofed SAN UPN (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Shadow Credentials - msDS-KeyCredentialLink LDAP Write (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Suspicious PKINIT TGT Issuance - DeviceLogonEvents Correlation (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
- Sigma - AD CS ESC1 Native LOLBIN Certificate Submission (certreq/certutil) · unlock with TL Creds
- Sigma - Shadow Credentials Tooling Process (Whisker / pyWhisker / [indicator] shadow) · unlock with TL Creds
- Sigma - Suspicious Computer Account Creation By Non-Helpdesk User (MAQ Abuse Precursor) · unlock with TL Creds
- Shadow Credentials - msDS-KeyCredentialLink Write by Non-Tier-0 Principal (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
- PKINIT TGT Issued With Certificate For Account Lacking WHfB/Smartcard (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-05-11, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 22 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0497.
Technical analysis
AD CS abuse converts a single low-privilege foothold into full domain compromise with minimal native detection coverage.
Unit 42's May 2026 publication consolidates four years of AD CS attack research into a single operational reference for defenders, documenting how attackers exploit certificate-based authentication to achieve domain dominance. The article focuses on two primary attack classes — Certificate Template Misconfigurations (the SpecterOps ESC1–ESC16 taxonomy from Schroeder and Christensen's 2021 'Certified Pre-Owned' whitepaper) and Shadow Credentials / Key Trust abuse — and confirms both vectors are in active use by financially-motivated ransomware crews and state-sponsored intrusion sets. ESC1 (the canonical certificate template misconfiguration) requires a template that (a) permits client authentication EKUs, (b) allows the requester to supply the Subject Alternative Name (msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag = ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT / CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT 0x1), (c) does not require manager approval, and (d) is published on an Enterprise CA with broad enrollment rights. An attacker with enrollment rights requests a certificate while setting the SAN to a high-privilege UPN (e.g. Domain Admin or krbtgt), then uses PKINITtools / Rubeus to perform PKINIT authentication with the resulting certificate, receiving a TGT as the impersonated principal. Certify (.NET) and Certipy (Python) are the de facto offensive tooling — Certipy 4.x supports ESC1 through ESC16 enumeration and exploitation in a single binary. Shadow Credentials abuse the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute introduced for Windows Hello for Business Key Trust. Any principal with GenericWrite or GenericAll over a target object (user or computer) can write a self-generated public key into the target's msDS-KeyCredentialLink, then authenticate as that target via PKINIT — effectively persistent credential theft without a password reset and without triggering DCSync. The Whisker (.NET) and pyWhisker tools automate the attack chain. CVE-2022-26923 ('Certifried', disclosed by Oliver Lyak / IFsec Labs and patched May 2022) is the underlying domain controller validation flaw that elevated these primitives to full domain compromise. Prior to KB5014754, certificate-based authentication mapped UPN/dNSHostName from the certificate to an AD object without strong binding — an authenticated user who controlled a computer account (default MachineAccountQuota = 10 in most domains) could set its dNSHostName to that of a domain controller, request a certificate via the default Machine template, and authenticate as the DC. The fix introduced strong certificate mapping via the SID security extension (szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT) and Full Enforcement Mode enabled by default in February 2025 (KB5014754 timeline). Active exploitation has been documented across the threat landscape. The DFIR Report's Fog ransomware case studies (2024–2025) detail post-compromise tradecraft where affiliates pivot from initial access (often SonicWall SSL VPN CVE-2024-40766 or Veeam CVE-2024-40711) into Certipy enumeration, identify a vulnerable ESC1 template, mint a certificate as Domain Admin, perform DCSync, and deploy Fog ransomware. Rapid7's August 2024 IR engagement (referenced by Unit 42) documented a social-engineering campaign delivering update6.exe — a wrapper that attempted CVE-2022-26923 exploitation against unpatched domains. Palo Alto attributes parallel AD CS abuse to Fighting Ursa (overlapping with Microsoft's Forest Blizzard and CrowdStrike's Fancy Bear — GRU Unit 26165 / APT28), targeting government, defense, and energy verticals in Europe and North America. Detection is constrained because the underlying Windows events (4768 TGT request, 4886 certificate issuance, 4887 CA certificate request approved) are high-volume and lack native correlation with anomalous SANs or KeyCredentialLink modifications. Defenders should baseline 4886/4887 by template, alert on issuance of certificates with mismatched SAN UPNs, monitor msDS-KeyCredentialLink writes (4662 with the appropriate property GUID 5b47d60f-6090-40b2-9f37-2a4de88f3063), and enforce KB5014754 Full Enforcement Mode. Microsoft's StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement registry key under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc must be set to 2 (Full Enforcement).
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1003 OS Credential Dumping; T1558 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets; T1606 Forge Web Credentials; T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Lateral Movement
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Privilege Escalation
T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Discovery
T1069 Permission Groups Discovery; T1087 Account Discovery; T1482 Domain Trust Discovery
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Persistence
T1098 Account Manipulation; T1136 Create Account
Collection
T1213 Data from Information Repositories
Impact
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
lateral-movement
T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
defense-impairment
Remediation
Patches
- Apply Windows KB5014754 (May 10, 2022) to all domain controllers — addresses CVE-2022-26923
- Apply February 2025 update enabling Full Enforcement Mode by default
- Apply KB5019966/KB5020805 series cumulative updates for certificate mapping hardening
Immediate actions
- Enable StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement Full Enforcement Mode (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc\StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 2)
- Audit all certificate templates for ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag combined with Client Authentication EKU and broad enrollment rights — remove or restrict immediately
- Set MachineAccountQuota to 0 via Default Domain Controllers Policy to prevent computer-account-based ESC primitives
- Disable msDS-KeyCredentialLink writes from non-privileged principals; audit existing values on Tier 0 assets and remove stale entries
- Run Certipy 'find -vulnerable' or Locksmith against the environment to identify ESC1-ESC16 exposures before adversaries do
Workarounds
- If immediate patching is not possible, manually configure StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement registry value to 1 (Compatibility) and prepare for 2 (Full Enforcement)
- Block PKINIT pre-authentication for service accounts that do not require certificate logon
- Restrict 'Enroll' and 'Autoenroll' permissions on all templates to specifically scoped groups (no Authenticated Users, Domain Users, or Domain Computers)
Longer-term hardening
- Deploy ADCS-specific SIEM content for Event IDs 4886, 4887, 4768 with certificate template and SAN context
- Implement tiered administration with PAW workstations for CA management; remove CA admin rights from Tier 1/2 accounts
- Migrate to short-lived (24-hour) certificates with automatic enrollment, eliminating long-lived credentials
- Establish CA-specific HSM-backed signing keys and offline root CA architecture
- Conduct quarterly purple team exercises targeting ESC1, ESC4, ESC8 (NTLM relay to AD CS), and Shadow Credentials
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Active Directory Domain Services
Vulnerable versions: Windows Server 2008 R2; Windows Server 2012; Windows Server 2012 R2; Windows Server 2016; Windows Server 2019; Windows Server 2022
Fixed in: All supported versions with KB5014754 (May 2022) plus February 2025 Full Enforcement Mode - Microsoft — Active Directory Certificate Services
Vulnerable versions: All Enterprise CA deployments with misconfigured certificate templates (ESC1-ESC16)
Fixed in: Hardened template configurations; templates audited per SpecterOps guidance - Microsoft — Windows Domain Controller
Vulnerable versions: Domain Controllers running KDC without StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement Full Enforcement
Fixed in: DCs with StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement = 2 and KB5014754 applied
Timeline
- SpecterOps researchers Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen publish 'Certified Pre-Owned' whitepaper introducing ESC1-ESC8 taxonomy for AD CS abuse
- Dirk-jan Mollema releases PKINITtools providing Linux PKINIT authentication primitives enabling Certipy ecosystem
- Elad Shamir releases Whisker .NET tool automating msDS-KeyCredentialLink (Shadow Credentials) abuse
- Microsoft discloses CVE-2022-26923 ('Certifried') with CVSS 8.8 and releases KB5014754 introducing certificate mapping hardening
- Oliver Lyak releases Certipy 4.0 supporting ESC1-ESC11 enumeration and exploitation in a single Python binary
- CISA adds CVE-2022-26923 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog with September 8, 2022 federal remediation deadline
- Rapid7 incident response documents social-engineering campaign delivering locked-ioc-3 wrapper that attempted CVE-2022-26923 exploitation against unpatched victim domains
- DFIR Report publishes Fog ransomware case study detailing Certipy-based ESC1 abuse for post-compromise privilege escalation to domain admin
- Microsoft enables StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement Full Enforcement Mode by default on supported Windows domain controllers, closing CVE-2022-26923 attack path for patched environments
- Unit 42 telemetry attributes ongoing AD CS template abuse and Shadow Credentials operations to Fighting Ursa (APT28 / Forest Blizzard / GRU Unit 26165) targeting European defense and energy sectors
- Unit 42 publishes consolidated AD CS exploitation deep-dive cataloguing ESC1-ESC16 abuse, Shadow Credentials techniques, and confirming active financially-motivated and state-sponsored exploitation
- As of 2026-05-29, AD CS abuse (ESC1, Shadow Credentials, ESC1-ESC16) remains actively exploited via maintained tooling (Certipy/Certify/Whisker) by Fog ransomware and APT28/Fighting Ursa, who run live 2026 campaigns. CVE-2022-26923 is patched (KB5014754, Feb 2025 Full Enforcement) yet stays in CISA KEV; the config-driven attack surface is unpatchable and persists.
Sources cited
- MSRC CVE-2022-26923 Security Advisory Microsoft Security Response Center · Advisory · 2022-05-10
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities — CVE-2022-26923 CISA · Government advisory · 2022-08-18
- NVD CVE-2022-26923 NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2022-05-10
- Inside AD CS Escalation: Unpacking Advanced Misuse Techniques and Tools (Unit 42) Unit 42 · Research · 2026-05-11
- Certified Pre-Owned: Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services (SpecterOps) specterops.io · Research · 2021-06-17
- KB5014754 — Certificate-based authentication changes on Windows domain controllers Microsoft · Vendor report · 2022-05-10
- MITRE ATT&CK T1649 Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates MITRE · Research · 2022-10-19
- Certipy — AD CS Enumeration and Abuse Tool GitHub · Proof of concept · 2022-08-01
- Certify — .NET AD CS Tool (GhostPack) GitHub · Proof of concept · 2021-06-17
- Whisker — Shadow Credentials Tool (Eladshamir) GitHub · Proof of concept · 2021-10-25
- pyWhisker — Python Shadow Credentials GitHub · Proof of concept · 2022-01-15
- PKINITtools — Linux PKINIT Implementation (dirkjanm) GitHub · Proof of concept · 2021-08-20
- Locksmith — AD CS Defensive Audit Tool GitHub · Code repository · 2023-03-15
- The DFIR Report: Fog Ransomware Cases (AD CS Abuse Chains) thedfirreport.com · Blog · 2024-11-04
- Rapid7 IR Disclosure: update6.exe Social Engineering Campaign Targeting CVE-2022-26923 Rapid7 · Blog · 2024-08-20
More from APT28
- APT and Financial Attacks on Industrial Organizations in Q1 2026 (Kaspersky ICS CERT): Operation Neusploit (CVE-2026-21509/CVE-2026-21513), Poland Energy Wipers, TGR-STA-1030, MuddyWater, LockBit 5.0, Diesel Vortex
- APT28 PixyNetLoader Campaign Update: PNG-steganography loader delivering Covenant Grunt against Ukrainian military logistics
- APT28 (Fancy Bear) Espionage Campaign Against European Defense Contractors Using Hookedge Backdoor
- APT28 (GRU Unit 26165) exploits TP-Link and MikroTik routers to enable DNS hijacking and AitM credential theft (CVE-2023-50224) - FrostArmada / Operation Masquerade
- Weekly threat digest (week ending 2026-06-07): PAN-OS GlobalProtect CVE-2026-0257 exploitation, React2Shell CVE-2025-55182 abuse by APT-C-26, and npm/state-actor campaigns
- AI-Powered Polymorphic Malware Queries LLMs at Runtime to Evade Signature Detection: PROMPTFLUX and PROMPTSTEAL/LAMEHUG (APT28)
Previous and next in vulnerability
- Microsoft Semantic Kernel Prompt-Injection-to-RCE & Arbitrary File Write — CVE-2026-26030 (InMemoryVectorStore eval) + CVE-2026-25592 (SessionsPythonPlugin) Previous report
- SAP May 2026 HotNews — CVE-2026-34263 Commerce Cloud Unauthenticated RCE & CVE-2026-34260 S/4HANA Enterprise Search SQL Injection (CVSS 9.6) Next report
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 15 sources; published ; last updated —.