# Tycoon 2FA Adopts OAuth 2.0 Device-Code Phishing — PhaaS Kit Hijacks Microsoft 365 Accounts via Microsoft Authentication Broker (AppId 29d9ed98) Through Trustifi Click-Tracking and Cloudflare Workers Delivery (eSentire TRU TL-2026-0522)

> Tycoon 2FA, the Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform that survived the March 2026 Microsoft/Europol coalition takedown, has been re-tooled to deliver OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628) phishing against Microsoft 365 tenants. The eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU) observed an April 29-30, 2026 campaign in which an invoice-themed lure travels through a Trustifi click-tracking URL, a disposable Cloudflare Workers subdomain, a four-layer AES-GCM/CBC encrypted in-browser delivery chain, and a fake "HumanCheck" Microsoft CAPTCHA before presenting the victim with an attacker-issued device_code they are instructed to paste into the genuine microsoft.com/devicelogin page. Once consent is granted, Microsoft issues access and refresh tokens for the Microsoft Authentication Broker first-party application (AppId 29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e) to the operator's Node.js polling backend on Alibaba Cloud (AS45102), which immediately fans out to Exchange Online, Microsoft Graph, and OneDrive without ever proxying the victim's password or MFA factor.

- **Published:** 2026-05-17T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-05-17T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0522
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-tycoon-2fa-device-code-phishing-tl-2026-0522.webp?v=a57ed153 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Tycoon 2FA OAuth Device-Code Phishing: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0522) — High severity, 27 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0522
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** PHISHING
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Tycoon 2FA operators
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 27 (3 shown free below)

## Description

## Overview

Tycoon 2FA is a high-volume Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform that has been tracked since 2023. Following a March 2026 Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit / Europol coalition takedown — conducted in collaboration with eSentire and other industry partners — the operators retained their source code and rebuilt on new infrastructure within weeks (Abnormal Security confirmed the rebound in early May 2026). The eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU) analyzed an active campaign in late April 2026 that demonstrates a fundamental tradecraft shift: the kit no longer attempts to proxy Microsoft credentials at all. Instead, it has been repurposed as a delivery framework for OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant phishing (also known as device-code phishing or DCP).

This is part of a broader ecosystem trend. Push Security reports OAuth device-code phishing volume has surged approximately 37x year-over-year and is now supported by at least ten PhaaS platforms and private kits; Proofpoint independently documents a parallel surge.

## Attack Chain

**Stage 0 — Lure delivery.** Victim receives an invoice-themed email containing a URL of the form `https://events.trustifi.com/api/o/v1/click/<MongoDB_ObjectId>/<recipient_hex>/...`. Trustifi is a legitimate enterprise email-security platform; its click-tracker is being abused as designed for reputation laundering. The first eight hex characters of the ObjectId encode the Unix timestamp at which the tracking record was created — the ObjectId `69f218d9bd8f28639a2460c7` from this campaign decodes to April 29, 2026 at 14:42:33 UTC. The third-party sending domain authenticated cleanly via SPF and DKIM but published no DMARC record, removing the recipient gateway's downstream sender-policy signal.

**Stage 1 — Cloudflare Workers handoff.** Trustifi issues an HTTP 307 redirect to a disposable `*.workers.dev` subdomain (observed: `cookies.28gholland.workers.dev`). The Worker returns an HTML page containing a base64-encoded AES-GCM-encrypted payload with the key, IV, and authentication tag inlined; decryption is performed in the victim's browser via SubtleCrypto and rendered into the DOM with `document.write()`. The unwrapper avoids literal `eval`/`atob` strings by reconstructing them from `.slice()` calls on dictionary words (a Tycoon 2FA fingerprint).

**Stage 2 — Anti-analysis gates.** The decrypted controller script performs four independent checks before rendering anything malicious:

1. *Headless / proxy detection* — `navigator.webdriver`, `window.callPhantom`, `window._phantom`, and `navigator.userAgent` substring "Burp". Positive match replaces the page with `about:blank`, blocking Selenium, Puppeteer, Playwright, PhantomJS, and Burp Suite traffic.
2. *Dev-tools suppression* — a keydown listener calls `preventDefault()` on F12, Ctrl+U, Ctrl+Shift+I/C/J/K, Ctrl+H, Cmd+Alt+I/C, Cmd+U; a `contextmenu` listener disables right-click.
3. *Debugger timing trap* — every 100 ms, the script measures the wall-clock delta around a bare `debugger;` statement. If a debugger pauses execution and the delta exceeds 100 ms, the page is redirected to legitimate `https://www.microsoft.com`. (Same construction documented in the eSentire April 2025 "Phish & Chips" blog.)
4. *ASN-based vendor filtering* — the script fetches `https://ipinfo.io/json` and compares `response.org` against a hardcoded 230-vendor blocklist covering AWS / GCP / Azure / Oracle / DigitalOcean / Hetzner / OVH / Vultr / Linode / Leaseweb / M247, VirusTotal / Hybrid Analysis / Any.Run / Joe Sandbox / Cuckoo / URLScan / Intezer, Proofpoint / Mimecast / Cloudflare / Zscaler / Forcepoint / Barracuda / Akamai / Fastly / Palo Alto / Fortinet / Cisco, Kaspersky / ESET / Bitdefender / Avast / AVG / Sophos / McAfee / Trend Micro / Symantec / G-Data / Avira, BrandVerity / RiskIQ / Netcraft / MarkMonitor / ZeroFox / Group-IB, GPTBot / ChatGPT / OpenAI / Claude / Anthropic / Perplexity / CCBot / Bytespider / PetalBot, NordVPN / ExpressVPN / Surfshark / ProtonVPN / CyberGhost / PIA / Mullvad / Windscribe, Bright Data / Luminati / Oxylabs / Smartproxy / SOAX. Any match redirects to `https://outlook.cloud.microsoft/mail/`.
5. *Time-bounded expiry* — `if (1780012800 < Math.floor(Date.now()/1000))` renders the literal string "Expired". The timestamp 1780012800 decodes to May 29, 2026 at 00:00:00 UTC, giving each deployed sample an approximately one-month operational tail.

**Stage 3 — HumanCheck + Check Domain branching.** The cleartext from Stage 2 is a Microsoft-branded fake CAPTCHA ("HumanCheck") page styled with the four Microsoft logo tile colors. The entire anti-analysis stack is repeated. On click, the page issues a GET to a Tycoon 2FA "Check Domain" — `https://shivacrio.com/bytecore~tx1j8` in this campaign — which the URLscan hunting regex published by TRU in April 2026 (`page.url:/.*\..*\.[a-z]{2,10}\/[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,20}[~!@$][a-zA-Z0-9]{1,20}/`) matches exactly. The behavior of the response has evolved: prior variants returned `0` or `1` and blocked outright on non-zero; this variant interprets the response as a fork — `0` proceeds to the device-code lure (`document.write(atob('<base64_voicemail_lure>'))`), non-zero renders a complete benign "NexusCore" fictional-registrar decoy site. Decoy-on-detection preserves operational secrecy that hard-blocking surrenders.

**Stage 4 — Device-code lure.** Victims who pass the Check Domain are shown a Microsoft 365 voicemail-themed page ("Voicemail_Message.mp3"). A spinner displays while the operator backend contacts Microsoft's `/devicecode` endpoint to obtain a fresh `device_code` / `user_code` pair. The page then displays the user code with a "Copy Code" button and a three-step instruction list. Clicking Copy Code places the code on the clipboard and opens `https://microsoft.com/devicelogin` in a popup. The victim pastes the code, signs in normally, satisfies any MFA challenge (phone-app push), and clicks Continue on the consent prompt — at which point Microsoft issues access and refresh tokens to the operator's polling client via `/organizations/oauth2/v2.0/token`. The victim is then cosmetically redirected to `https://outlook.cloud.microsoft/mail/` (their real inbox), leaving no apparent indicator of compromise.

**Stage 5 — Operator backend communication.** All POSTs go to `https://fijothi.com/dhkjCVBfLnfbhFjpYPoDKNMmLIQjNkGLMQPMQUBJFWELKIYHJHWDIESXVUZHHJNFTNMW<random>` — a fixed 68-character static path prefix followed by a per-request `randexp.js`-generated routing suffix matched against five hardcoded regular expressions. The starting bytes of the suffix act as a route discriminator: `codeemailtoken` (76|80) bootstraps the session, `emailtokencookie` (41|42) requests a fresh `device_code`, `emailtoken` (49|52) submits a harvested email, `checkemailtoken` (65|74) generic poll, `checkemailtokencookie` (67|86) the five-second-interval polling loop. Every request body is encrypted with CryptoJS AES-CBC using `key = iv = '1234567890123456'`, PKCS#7 padding, wrapper functions `encryptData()` / `decryptData()` — byte-for-byte identical to the encryption layer documented in the April 2025 "Phish & Chips" and April 2026 infrastructure-update blogs. The kit also calls `https://api.ipbase.com/v1/json/` for victim IP/country enrichment, joining `ipinfo.io`, `api.ipapi.is`, and `get.geojs.io` on TRU's list of legitimate IP-intelligence services abused by Tycoon 2FA.

## Why Device-Code Phishing Defeats MFA

The OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant (RFC 8628) was designed for input-constrained devices (smart TVs, CLI tools, IoT appliances) where typing credentials is impractical. The protocol is intentionally indirect: the device asks the IdP for a short user-facing code, the user enters that code from a different browser, signs in normally, and the IdP returns tokens to the original device. **There is no cryptographic binding between the device that requested the code and the user's identity.** Anyone who initiates a device-code grant for a Microsoft first-party AppId can collect the resulting tokens from any user who consents.

The phish does not bypass MFA — it changes what MFA is being used to authorize. The user thinks they are approving access for a voicemail player; they are actually approving token issuance to an attacker-controlled device.

## The Microsoft Authentication Broker Pivot

The OAuth client the operator impersonates is **Microsoft Authentication Broker — AppId `29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e`** — a Microsoft first-party application. There are two consequences for defenders:

1. The application appears in Entra telemetry as a normal Microsoft app, not an unknown third-party OAuth app, so it does not trigger unverified-publisher detections that catch many OAuth phishing campaigns.
2. Microsoft Authentication Broker is a *broker* application — the token issued at consent can be exchanged for tokens scoped to other Microsoft resources (Exchange Online, Microsoft Graph, OneDrive for Business) without further user interaction. **One consent unlocks a token chain across the entire Microsoft 365 surface area.**

Network captures show the consent prompt advertises Microsoft Authentication Broker, but the subsequent `/authorize` request carries a different resource AppId — `9199bf20-a13f-4107-85dc-02114787ef48` (One Outlook Web) — confirming the broker-to-resource exchange.

## Operator Telemetry Footprint

Observed operator activity against the compromised identity (from Entra sign-in logs):

| Phase | Source IP | User-Agent | Event |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial credential attempt | 47.90.180.205 (AS45102) | — | email/password submitted to Microsoft Authentication Broker; Entra returns errorCode 50199 ("user confirmation is required"); operator pivots to device-code grant |
| Device-code consent | 47.90.180.205 (AS45102) | — | `AuthenticationProtocol = deviceCode` succeeds; tokens issued; MFA requirement satisfied by claim in token |
| Immediate post-consent | 47.90.180.205 (AS45102) | `node` | three near-simultaneous non-interactive token uses against Exchange Online (x2) and Microsoft Graph (x1) within two seconds |
| Sustained use | 47.252.11.99 (AS45102) | `undici` | nine non-interactive sign-in events against Exchange Online and Microsoft Graph over ~3 hours; all return errorCode 50173 ("the provided grant has expired due to it being revoked") — IR team had revoked the refresh-token chain but operator automation continued retrying |

The long-tail retry pattern is a strong post-compromise detection signal even after token revocation. `undici` is the modern Node.js native HTTP client library (the implementation behind global `fetch` in Node 18+); the bare `node` UA is the default for `node-fetch` and similar libraries when no explicit User-Agent header is set. Both are signatures of a Node.js automation backend. This is an evolution from the `axios/1.x` UA fingerprint documented across prior credential-relay-variant Tycoon 2FA reporting — defenders should now watch for all three (`axios/*`, `undici`, `node`) against the Microsoft Authentication Broker AppId in non-interactive sign-in logs.

AS45102 (Alibaba (US) Technology Co., Ltd.) has been observed as an active operator-side ASN across both the credential-relay and device-code variants of Tycoon 2FA since approximately April 10, 2026, and should be treated as an addition to (not replacement of) the post-takedown watchlist: AS9009 (M247), AS214238 (HOST TELECOM), AS62240 (Clouvider), AS204957 (GREEN FLOID), AS395092 (Shock Hosting), AS215540 (GLOBAL CONNECTIVITY SOLUTIONS).

## Continuity Fingerprints

Multiple independent source-code fingerprints carry over from prior Tycoon 2FA kits and together constitute strong attribution evidence:

- **Check Domain URL grammar** — word + separator (`~`, `!`, `@`, `$`) + alnum suffix; matches the URLscan regex unchanged across variants.
- **CryptoJS AES routine** — AES-CBC / PKCS#7 / key=IV=`1234567890123456` / wrappers `encryptData`/`decryptData` — byte-for-byte identical since April 2025.
- **Anti-debug stack** — headless detection, key-suppression list, debugger timing trap with redirect on detection — identical implementation, repeated at multiple chain layers for defense in depth.
- **String-fragment reconstruction** of `eval`/`atob` from `.slice()` calls on dictionary words.
- **Byte-prefix route discriminator** architecture.

These are not generic phishing-kit techniques. The kit codebase persisted intact across the March 2026 international law-enforcement disruption.

## Defensive Posture

The single most impactful control is a Microsoft Entra Conditional Access policy that blocks the OAuth Device Code authentication flow for end-users, scoping it only to explicitly defined developer or device-onboarding scenarios — this eliminates the entire attack class for affected users. Companion controls: restrict user consent to verified publishers (require admin consent for third-party apps), enable Continuous Access Evaluation so revocations propagate near-real-time, enforce Device Compliance policies (attacker-controlled devices are unenrolled), and treat supplier email-authentication posture (DMARC) as part of vendor-risk management.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1587 Develop Capabilities
- T1566 Phishing
- T1199 Trusted Relationship
- T1204 User Execution
- T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
- T1606 Forge Web Credentials
- T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
- T1622 Debugger Evasion
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1550 Use Alternate Authentication Material
- T1684.001 Impersonation
- T1526 Cloud Service Discovery
- T1114 Email Collection
- T1530 Data from Cloud Storage
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1102 Web Service
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1090 Proxy
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
- T1531 Account Access Removal

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Tycoon 2FA — Operator ASN Authenticating to Microsoft Identity Platform (C2/Lateral Movement)** (`TL-2026-0522-SPL-003`)

Detects authentication to login.microsoftonline.com/organizations/oauth2/v2.0/token from the Tycoon 2FA operator-ASN watchlist (AS45102 Alibaba US — confirmed hosts 47.90.180.205, 47.252.11.99; plus post-takedown shift ASNs AS9009 M247, AS214238 HOST TELECOM, AS62240 Clouvider, AS204957 GREEN FLOID, AS395092 Shock Hosting, AS215540 GCS) when combined with Node.js/undici/axios user agents. Identifies the operator C2 polling backend issuing token requests, regardless of the consent victim.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.001, T1090, T1528, T1583.003
- **Data sources:** azure_ad_signin_logs, aad_non_interactive_signin, asn_threat_intel_feed
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=azure_ad sourcetype IN ("azure:aad:signin","azure:aad:noninteractivesignin")
| eval ua_lower=lower(UserAgent)
| where match(ua_lower,"node|undici|axios\/1\.")
| eval threat_ip_match = case(
    cidrmatch("47.90.0.0/16", IPAddress), "AS45102_alibaba",
    IPAddress IN ("47.90.180.205","47.252.11.99"), "AS45102_known",
    1=1, null())
| lookup asn_watchlist asn AS asn_name OUTPUT asn_label
| where isnotnull(threat_ip_match) OR asn_label IN ("AS45102","AS9009","AS214238","AS62240","AS204957","AS395092","AS215540")
| stats count values(UserPrincipalName) as upns values(AppId) as app_ids values(IPAddress) as src_ips by asn_label, UserAgent, ResourceDisplayName
| eval threat_id="TL-2026-0522", detection_id="TL-2026-0522-SPL-003"
| table _time threat_id detection_id asn_label src_ips upns app_ids UserAgent count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let opIPs = dynamic(["47.90.180.205", "47.252.11.99"]);
let opASNs = dynamic(["45102", "9009", "214238", "62240", "204957", "395092", "215540"]);
union SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where UserAgent has_any ("node", "undici") or UserAgent matches regex @"axios/1\."
| extend AutonomousSystemNumber = tostring(parse_json(tostring(NetworkLocationDetails))[0].networkType)
| where IPAddress in (opIPs)
    or ipv4_is_in_range(IPAddress, "47.90.0.0/16")
    or AutonomousSystemNumber in (opASNs)
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, AppId, AppDisplayName, ResourceDisplayName, IPAddress, AutonomousSystemNumber, UserAgent, ResultType
| extend threat_id = "TL-2026-0522", detection_id = "TL-2026-0522-SPL-003"
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Tycoon 2FA Operator ASN Authenticating to Microsoft Identity Platform
id: 7f3a2b1e-0522-4d03-g007-tycoon2faasn
status: experimental
description: Authentication to Microsoft Identity Platform from the Tycoon 2FA operator-ASN watchlist (AS45102 Alibaba US plus post-takedown shift ASNs) using Node.js HTTP-client user-agents identifies the operator C2 polling backend.
references:
  - https://www.esentire.com/blog/tycoon-2fa-oauth-device-code-phishing
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-05-17
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1071.001
  - attack.t1090
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.t1528
logsource:
  product: m365
  service: signinlogs
detection:
  selection_ua:
    UserAgent|contains:
      - 'node'
      - 'undici'
      - 'axios/1.'
  selection_ip:
    IPAddress:
      - '47.90.180.205'
      - '47.252.11.99'
  condition: selection_ua and selection_ip
falsepositives:
  - Corporate-approved automation hosted in Alibaba Cloud — very unusual; allow-list by service principal
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Corporate workloads legitimately hosted in Alibaba Cloud (very unusual for M365 auth — allow-list by service principal)
- Penetration test infrastructure reusing the ASN watchlist

**Tuning notes:** Maintain ASN lookup table updated from the post-takedown watchlist (AS45102, AS9009, AS214238, AS62240, AS204957, AS395092, AS215540). Add new ASNs from eSentire TRU updates. Auto-revoke all sessions on hit (SOAR pivot to revokeSignInSessions for the impacted UPN).

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Tycoon 2FA — Broker-to-Resource Token Fanout Post-Device-Code (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tycoon 2FA — Broker-to-One-Outlook Token Exchange Without Interactive Sign-In (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tycoon 2FA — Cloudflare Workers + Trustifi Click-Tracking Delivery Chain (C2 / Delivery Infrastructure) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tycoon 2FA — Check Domain URL Grammar in Proxy / Web Telemetry (Exploitation Delivery) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tycoon 2FA — Inbox-Rule Hide + Mass External Forward Post Device-Code (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tycoon 2FA — Geolocation API Beaconing from User Endpoint Browser (C2 Reconnaissance) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tycoon 2FA — OAuth Device-Code Consent Against Microsoft Authentication Broker (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Tycoon 2FA — Sustained Refresh-Token Retry After Revocation (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 27)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `47.90.180[.]205`
- Domain: `fijothi[.]com`
- URL: `hxxps://events[.]trustifi[.]com/api/o/v1/click/69f218d9bd8f28639a2460c7/`

Full set of 27 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Tycoon 2FA Operators Adopt OAuth Device Code Phishing (eSentire TRU)](https://www.esentire.com/blog/tycoon-2fa-operators-adopt-oauth-device-code-phishing)
- [Tycoon2FA hijacks Microsoft 365 accounts via device-code phishing (BleepingComputer, Bill Toulas)](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/tycoon2fa-hijacks-microsoft-365-accounts-via-device-code-phishing/)
- [Phish & Chips: Serving Up Tycoon 2FA's Secrets (eSentire TRU, April 2025)](https://www.esentire.com/blog/phish-chips-serving-up-tycoon-2fas-secrets)
- [Tycoon 2FA Infrastructure Update: Threat Actors Adapt Following Global Coalition Takedown (eSentire TRU)](https://www.esentire.com/blog/tycoon-2fa-infrastructure-update-threat-actors-adapt-following-global-coalition-takedown)
- [Microsoft Announces Disruption of Tycoon 2FA in Coordination with Industry Partners (eSentire)](https://www.esentire.com/blog/microsoft-announces-disruption-of-tycoon-2fa-in-coordination-with-industry-partners)
- [Token tactics: How to prevent, detect, and respond to cloud token theft (Microsoft Security)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/11/16/token-tactics-how-to-prevent-detect-and-respond-to-cloud-token-theft/)
- [Conditional Access: Authentication flows (Microsoft Learn)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/policy-block-authentication-flows)
- [Tycoon 2FA: an in-depth analysis (Sekoia Threat Intelligence)](https://blog.sekoia.io/tycoon-2fa-an-in-depth-analysis-of-the-latest-version-of-the-aitm-phishing-kit/)
- [RFC 8628 — OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant (IETF)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628)
- [eSentire IOC repository — Tycoon 2FA (GitHub)](https://github.com/eSentire/iocs/tree/main/Tycoon2FA)
- [Tycoon 2FA IOC list — 2026-03-23 (eSentire)](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/eSentire/iocs/main/Tycoon2FA/Tycoon2fa-iocs-03-23-2026.txt)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0522
