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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0533

Fox Tempest Malware-Signing-as-a-Service (MSaaS) — Microsoft DCU Disrupts signspace[.]cloud Operation Enabling Rhysida, INC, Qilin, Akira & Vanilla Tempest

highMONITORING

Fox Tempest is a financially motivated, Russian-speaking criminal enterprise that operated signspace[.]cloud, a Malware-Signing-as-a-Service (MSaaS) platform that abused Microsoft Artifact Signing (formerly Azure Trusted Signing) to mint short-lived (72-hour) fraudulent code-signing certificates for paying ransomware and infostealer affiliates. Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) disrupted the operation on 2026-05-19 after eight months of tracking, revoking 1,000+ certificates across hundreds of Azure tenants and subscriptions registered with stolen US/Canadian identities.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0533
Also known assignspace.cloud operation, MSaaS — Microsoft Artifact Signing abuse, SamCodeSign service
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Microsoft Artifact Signing (Azure Trusted Signing); Microsoft Windows code-signing trust chain (Microsoft ID Verified CS EOC CA 01); AnyDesk AnyDesk Remote Desktop (impersonated); Microsoft Microsoft Teams (impersonated); PuTTY (Simon Tatham) PuTTY SSH client (impersonated); Cisco Webex (impersonated)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-295, CWE-345, CWE-494, CWE-829
AttributionFox Tempest (medium confidence)
Nation-state nexusRussia
MalwareAgendaCrypt, Akira, BlackByte, Broomstick, Lumma Stealer - S1213, Vidar, inc ransom, rhysida
ToolsAzure tenants/subscriptions registered with stolen US and Canada identities
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion, T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1189 Drive-by Compromise and 20 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorshealthcare, education, government, financial-services
Target regionsUnited States, France, India, China
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources11 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-05-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0533 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 22 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Fox Tempest MSaaS — Signed Masquerade -> PowerShell/HTTP Beacon -> Ransomware Extension Storm (C2 / Impact)

Two-part correlated detection covering the C2 + impact tail of the Fox Tempest customer chain: (1) PowerShell or rundll32 process descended from a signed installer in user-writable storage making outbound HTTPS via Invoke-WebRequest / Net.WebClient / Start-BitsTransfer / curl.exe (Oyster, Cobalt Strike, Sliver loader behavior); (2) a rapid file-rename burst in user-document directories where new file extensions match known Fox-Tempest-customer ransomware suffixes (.rhysida, .inc, .qilin, .akira, .blackbyte) or where a ransom-note filename pattern is dropped concurrently.

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1071.001, T1105, T1059.001, T1486, T1041
  • Data sources: sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, edr_process_creation, edr_file_events, edr_network_events
  • Severity: critical
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

(index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR Image="*\\curl.exe") (CommandLine="*Invoke-WebRequest*" OR CommandLine="*Net.WebClient*" OR CommandLine="*Start-BitsTransfer*" OR CommandLine="*DownloadString*" OR CommandLine="*-Uri*http*") (ParentImage="*\\AppData\\*" OR ParentImage="*\\Temp\\*" OR ParentImage="*\\Downloads\\*"))
OR
(index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11 (TargetFilename="*.rhysida" OR TargetFilename="*.inc" OR TargetFilename="*.qilin" OR TargetFilename="*.akira" OR TargetFilename="*.blackbyte" OR TargetFilename="*CriticalBreachDetected*" OR TargetFilename="*How-To-Decrypt*"))
| eval stage=case(match(Image, "(powershell|pwsh|rundll32|curl)\\.exe$"), "c2_beacon", match(TargetFilename, "(\\.rhysida|\\.inc|\\.qilin|\\.akira|\\.blackbyte|CriticalBreachDetected|How-To-Decrypt)"), "ransom_impact", 1=1, "other")
| where stage!="other"
| bin _time span=10m
| stats values(stage) as stages dc(stage) as stage_count count by host User _time
| where stage_count>=1 AND count>=5
| sort - _time

Microsoft KQL

// Fox Tempest C2 beacon + ransomware impact - MDE
let beacon = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","rundll32.exe","curl.exe")
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Invoke-WebRequest","Net.WebClient","Start-BitsTransfer","DownloadString","-Uri http")
    | where InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (@"\AppData\", @"\Temp\", @"\Downloads\")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, Stage="c2_beacon";
let impact = DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileRenamed")
    | where FileName endswith ".rhysida" or FileName endswith ".inc" or FileName endswith ".qilin"
         or FileName endswith ".akira" or FileName endswith ".blackbyte"
         or FileName has_any ("CriticalBreachDetected","How-To-Decrypt","!!!READ_ME")
    | summarize RenameCount=count(), Earliest=min(Timestamp) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, bin(Timestamp,5m)
    | where RenameCount >= 5
    | extend Stage="ransom_impact", Timestamp=Earliest;
beacon
| union (impact | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Stage, InitiatingProcessFileName)
| summarize Stages=make_set(Stage), Events=count(), Earliest=min(Timestamp) by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 30m)
| where Events >= 1
| order by Earliest desc

Sigma

title: Fox Tempest MSaaS - Signed-Installer Process Tree Beaconing + Rhysida-family Extension Storm
id: 5e3a1a8c-9d6c-4b1f-a2d1-fb1c533a0003
status: experimental
description: Two-part detection for the C2-and-impact tail of the Fox Tempest customer chain. Part A - PowerShell / rundll32 / curl outbound web request whose parent process resides in %APPDATA%, %TEMP%, or Downloads. Part B - rapid creation/rename of files with .rhysida / .inc / .qilin / .akira / .blackbyte extensions or CriticalBreachDetected-style ransom note drop.
references:
  - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/19/exposing-fox-tempest-a-malware-signing-service-operation/
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-319a
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/05/19
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.execution
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1071.001
  - attack.t1105
  - attack.t1486
  - attack.tool.oyster
  - attack.tool.cobalt_strike
  - attack.tool.sliver
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_beacon_proc:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
      - '\curl.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
      - 'Net.WebClient'
      - 'Start-BitsTransfer'
      - 'DownloadString'
      - '-Uri http'
    ParentImage|contains:
      - '\AppData\'
      - '\Temp\'
      - '\Downloads\'
  selection_impact_file:
    TargetFilename|endswith:
      - '.rhysida'
      - '.inc'
      - '.qilin'
      - '.akira'
      - '.blackbyte'
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - 'CriticalBreachDetected'
      - 'How-To-Decrypt'
      - '!!!READ_ME'
  condition: selection_beacon_proc or selection_impact_file
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate PowerShell update scripts executed from %LOCALAPPDATA% (e.g., GitHub Desktop, VS Code installer post-install scripts).
  - Backup or DLP solutions that rename files in bulk - allowlist by InitiatingProcessFileName.
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • PowerShell-based auto-update frameworks (Chocolatey, Squirrel) running from %LOCALAPPDATA% performing legitimate Invoke-WebRequest fetches.
  • Backup software performing bulk-rename or extension-mapping operations - allowlist by signed backup vendor InitiatingProcessFileName.
  • Security tooling (forensic triage scripts) intentionally invoking PowerShell from user-writable paths.

Tuning notes: Tune the impact-rename threshold (default >=5 in 5 minutes) upward in environments with heavy bulk-file workflows. Maintain an allowlist of update-framework parent processes (squirrel.exe, GitHubDesktop.exe, chocolatey upgrade) for the beacon stage. For highest fidelity, correlate Part A and Part B on the same DeviceName within a 30-minute window.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Fox Tempest MSaaS — Microsoft Artifact Signing Short-Validity Leaf Cert Hunt (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Fox Tempest MSaaS — Oyster Loader Behavior + Run Key Persistence on MDE (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Fox Tempest MSaaS — Lumma/Vidar Browser Credential-Store Access + Exfil (C2 / Collection) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Fox Tempest MSaaS — First-Seen Microsoft Artifact Signing Publisher (Exploitation Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Fox Tempest MSaaS — Egress to [indicator] / SamCodeSign Operator Infrastructure (Post-Exploitation Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Fox Tempest MSaaS — Rhysida/INC/Qilin/Akira/BlackByte Ransomware Impact + Inhibit Recovery (Impact Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Fox Tempest MSaaS — Short-Lived Microsoft-Rooted Signed PE Executed from User-Writable Path (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
  • Fox Tempest MSaaS — HKCU Run Key Persistence Pointing at User-Writable Signed Installer (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-05-19, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 22 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0533.

Sample indicators (3 of 22)

  • Domain: signspace[.]cloud
  • File hash: dc0acb01e3086ea8a9cb144a5f97810d291020ce
  • File hash: 7e6d9dac619c04ae1b3c8c0906123e752ed66d63

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 22 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

22 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Customers — including Vanilla Tempest, Storm-0501, Storm-2561, and Storm-0249 — used Fox Tempest-signed binaries to deliver Rhysida, INC, Qilin, Akira, and BlackByte ransomware as well as Oyster (Broomstick), Lumma Stealer, and Vidar via SEO poisoning, malvertising, and trojanized installers masquerading as AnyDesk, Microsoft Teams, PuTTY, and Webex.

Fox Tempest is the Microsoft Threat Intelligence cryptonym for a financially motivated, likely Russian-speaking cybercriminal group that built and operated a turnkey Malware-Signing-as-a-Service (MSaaS) platform hosted at signspace[.]cloud. The service was first offered in May 2025, picked up its first known affiliate customer (Vanilla Tempest) in June 2025, came under sustained Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracking in September 2025, and was disrupted by Microsoft DCU on 19 May 2026 — by which time over 1,000 fraudulent code-signing certificates had been issued through it.

The abuse target was Microsoft Artifact Signing (formerly Azure Trusted Signing), a cloud-managed signing service designed to give legitimate ISVs a Microsoft-rooted certificate chain (issuer 'Microsoft ID Verified CS EOC CA 01') with very short — 72 hour — leaf validity. Fox Tempest weaponized that design property: short-lived certs leave no useful long-lived revocation list to seed reputation systems on, while the chain to Microsoft's root made the signed binary appear high-trust to SmartScreen, EDR reputation lookups, application allowlisting (Software Restriction Policies, AppLocker, WDAC publisher rules), and analyst triage. To pass Trusted Signing identity validation, the operators acquired (very likely purchased on criminal markets) stolen identity documents from US- and Canada-based individuals and small businesses, used those identities to stand up hundreds of Azure tenants and subscriptions, and onboarded each to Trusted Signing as a separate 'publisher.' Each tenant became a disposable signing oracle: a customer's PE file went in, came back signed by a Microsoft-rooted leaf cert tied to a synthetic 'publisher' identity, and was burned within 72 hours.

The customer-facing portal at signspace[.]cloud was a full SaaS offering: an admin panel managing tooling and customer accounts, a customer upload interface for unsigned malicious binaries, a structured backend database tracking users and submissions, and configuration files linked to a GitHub repository named 'code-signing-service.' From May 2025 through February 2026 customers uploaded binaries directly through the web portal. From February 2026 onward, Fox Tempest matured the offering: customers were provisioned a pre-configured US-based Cloudzy VPS that handled upload, signing, and return of the binary, reducing operational friction and obscuring the link between portal and signing tenant. Pricing was tiered between USD 5,000 and USD 9,000 via a Google Form, with higher-paying customers receiving signing-queue priority. Sales and support were brokered on Telegram under the handle @arbadakarba2000 (channel name 'EV Certs for Sale by SamCodeSign'). Operator-facing documentation was bilingual English/Russian — the primary linguistic attribution signal — and cryptocurrency tracing tied wallets to known ransomware affiliate clusters, supporting the assessment that Fox Tempest is a well-resourced criminal enterprise with dedicated roles for infrastructure, customer ops, and finance.

Downstream impact spanned the top tier of the criminal ransomware ecosystem. Vanilla Tempest (the Rhysida operator) used Fox Tempest signatures from June 2025 onward to sign trojanized Microsoft Teams installers delivered via purchased Google/Bing advertisements; the loader stage was Oyster/Broomstick, terminating in Rhysida deployment. Storm-2561 used Fox Tempest-signed fake VPN clients distributed via SEO poisoning. Storm-0501 and Storm-0249 used Fox Tempest signatures across active intrusions ending in INC, Qilin, Akira, and BlackByte ransomware. Infostealer affiliates used the signing service to push Lumma Stealer and Vidar past SmartScreen and reputation gates. Microsoft estimates extortion proceeds attributable to Fox Tempest-signed campaigns 'in the millions' of US dollars, with confirmed victims across healthcare, education, government, and financial services in the United States, France, India, and China.

The full exploit chain, end to end: (1) An affiliate procures a binary (loader, dropper, or stage-two implant) and uploads it through signspace[.]cloud or the Cloudzy VM. (2) Fox Tempest's backend selects an unburned Azure tenant — registered with a stolen US/Canada identity and onboarded to Microsoft Artifact Signing — and submits a signing request, which Microsoft Artifact Signing fulfills against that tenant's policy. (3) A short-lived (72h) leaf certificate chained to 'Microsoft ID Verified CS EOC CA 01' is bound to the binary, which is returned to the customer. (4) The customer distributes the signed binary via SEO poisoning (typosquatted or SEO-stuffed download pages ranking for 'anydesk download,' 'putty,' 'webex installer,' 'microsoft teams,' free VPN clients) and/or malvertising (purchased Google Ads and Bing Ads redirecting through cloaked affiliate networks to the fake download). (5) Victim downloads, sees a Microsoft-rooted publisher signature, and runs the installer. (6) Loader (Oyster/Broomstick, or a stealer dropper) executes; Defender SmartScreen and many EDR reputation engines treat the binary as trusted on signature. (7) For ransomware tracks, the loader fetches second-stage tooling (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, or operator-specific implants), performs discovery and credential access, moves laterally, exfiltrates data, and detonates Rhysida/INC/Qilin/Akira/BlackByte. For stealer tracks, Lumma or Vidar harvests credentials, cookies, MFA tokens, and crypto wallets and exfiltrates to operator C2.

The Microsoft DCU disruption on 2026-05-19 included: revocation of 1,000+ certificates issued through Fox Tempest tenants, takedown of signspace[.]cloud, coordination with Cloudzy to identify and de-provision Fox Tempest-controlled VMs, and Defender signature pushes covering Oyster, Lumma, Vidar, Malcert, Rhysida, INC, Qilin, and BlackByte family detections plus a Vanilla Tempest activity-group profile. Defenders should treat any binary with a 'Microsoft ID Verified CS EOC CA 01' leaf signature between May 2025 and May 2026 as potentially abused unless explicitly attributable to a known legitimate ISV. Hunt for the published SignerSha-1 thumbprints, retro-hunt on the SHA-256, and audit signed-binary execution from user-writable paths and recent download locations. Long-term defenders should enforce publisher allowlisting (WDAC) against an explicit list of trusted publishers rather than relying on Microsoft chain trust alone, since Microsoft Artifact Signing assigns chain trust to any onboarded tenant.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System

Lateral Movement

T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares

Defense Evasion

T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Discovery

T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery

Execution

T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell; T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

Command and Control

T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Initial Access

T1189 Drive-by Compromise; T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link

Impact

T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact; T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

Credential Access

T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie; T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers

Persistence

T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

defense-impairment

T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing; T1553.003 Subvert Trust Controls: SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking; T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Resource Development

T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains; T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server; T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services; T1585.003 Establish Accounts: Cloud Accounts; T1586.002 Email Accounts; T1588.003 Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates; T1588.004 Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates; T1608.001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware; T1608.004 Stage Capabilities: Drive-by Target; T1608.006 Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning

Remediation

Patches

  • No software patch — this is infrastructure abuse, not a software vulnerability. Apply Microsoft Defender signature updates released 2026-05-19 covering Oyster, Lumma, Vidar, Malcert, Rhysida, INC, Qilin, and BlackByte families.
  • Ensure Windows trust list updates (CTL) are pulling automatically so revoked Fox Tempest certificates are honored on endpoints.

Immediate actions

  • Block signspace[.]cloud at DNS, proxy, and perimeter firewall.
  • Add the two published SignerSha-1 thumbprints (dc0acb01e3086ea8a9cb144a5f97810d291020ce, 7e6d9dac619c04ae1b3c8c0906123e752ed66d63) to EDR/AV signer blocklists.
  • Retro-hunt EDR and disk imaging for SHA-256 f0668ce925f36ff7f3359b0ea47e3fa243af13cd6ad9661dfccc9ff79fb4f1cc.
  • Hunt last 12 months of execution telemetry for binaries with issuer 'Microsoft ID Verified CS EOC CA 01' and a leaf NotAfter-NotBefore delta <= 96 hours; treat as suspicious until attributed to a known ISV.
  • Block known masquerade-target lures: hunt for installer-named files (AnyDesk, Microsoft Teams, PuTTY, Webex) executed from user-writable paths (Downloads, Temp, AppData) with abnormal signer chains.
  • Enable Microsoft Defender 'cloud-delivered protection' and ensure ASR rule 'Use advanced protection against ransomware' is in Block mode.

Workarounds

  • If WDAC publisher allowlisting cannot be deployed immediately, deploy a deny-list of the two published SignerSha-1 thumbprints via WDAC FilePublisher rules or AppLocker Publisher Hash rules.
  • Force SmartScreen Block (not Warn) in Edge and Defender for Office 365.
  • Deny execution from %TEMP%, %APPDATA%, and Downloads via ASR rule 'Block executable content from email client and webmail' plus 'Block all Office applications from creating child processes.'

Longer-term hardening

  • Enforce WDAC or AppLocker publisher allowlisting against an explicit list of trusted ISVs by publisher CN, not against Microsoft chain trust alone — Microsoft Artifact Signing assigns chain trust to any onboarded tenant.
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection that does not down-weight on Authenticode signature trust for newly observed signers.
  • Block or sinkhole malvertising and SEO-poisoning landing pages by enforcing DNS/web filtering with reputation and newly registered domain (NRD) categories.
  • Restrict ad-supported web access on privileged workstations and on critical-asset operator endpoints.
  • Tenant-wide tamper protection enabled in Microsoft Defender to prevent ransomware operators from disabling controls post-execution.
  • Establish a signed-binary anomaly hunt that diffs publisher CN distribution week-over-week and alerts on first-seen Microsoft-chained publishers.
  • Train SOC analysts that Authenticode trust is not malware reputation: short-validity Microsoft-chained certificates require active verification of the named publisher.

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Microsoft Artifact Signing (Azure Trusted Signing)
    Vulnerable versions: service-wide identity-validation bypass via stolen US/Canada identities, 2025-05 through 2026-05
    Fixed in: 1,000+ certificates revoked 2026-05-19; identity validation hardening per Microsoft DCU disruption
  • Microsoft — Windows code-signing trust chain (Microsoft ID Verified CS EOC CA 01)
    Vulnerable versions: any Windows host treating Microsoft-rooted Authenticode signatures as high-reputation 2025-05 through 2026-05
    Fixed in: Defender signatures updated 2026-05-19; SmartScreen/MAPS reputation updated; revoked thumbprints distributed via Windows CTL
  • AnyDesk — AnyDesk Remote Desktop (impersonated)
    Vulnerable versions: legitimate brand impersonated by Fox Tempest-signed trojanized installers
  • Microsoft — Microsoft Teams (impersonated)
    Vulnerable versions: legitimate brand impersonated by Vanilla Tempest using Fox Tempest signatures, June 2025-May 2026
  • PuTTY (Simon Tatham) — PuTTY SSH client (impersonated)
    Vulnerable versions: legitimate brand impersonated by Fox Tempest-signed trojanized installers
  • Cisco — Webex (impersonated)
    Vulnerable versions: legitimate brand impersonated by Fox Tempest-signed trojanized installers

Timeline

  • locked-ioc-4 first observed by Microsoft Threat Intelligence — Fox Tempest's MSaaS portal goes live offering fraudulent Microsoft Artifact Signing certificates to paying affiliates.
  • Vanilla Tempest (Rhysida operator) onboards as a Fox Tempest customer, beginning a campaign of trojanized Microsoft Teams installers signed with fraudulent Microsoft Artifact Signing certificates and distributed via purchased advertisements.
  • Microsoft Threat Intelligence formally opens a tracked-actor profile on Fox Tempest after correlating multiple incident-response engagements (Rhysida, INC, Qilin) sharing the 'Microsoft ID Verified CS EOC CA 01' issuer and short-lived 72h leaf certificates with synthetic publisher identities.
  • Storm-2561 leverages Fox Tempest signing service to distribute fake VPN clients via SEO poisoning, expanding the Fox Tempest customer footprint into infostealer (Lumma, Vidar) operations.
  • Fox Tempest migrates from direct portal upload to provisioning pre-configured US-based Cloudzy VPS for each customer — reducing operational friction and obscuring the portal-to-signing-tenant link. Example certificate validity observed February 19-22, 2026.
  • First observation of SignerSha-1 thumbprint locked-ioc-2 in customer-distributed binaries.
  • First observation of SHA-256 locked-ioc-1 — a Fox Tempest-signed Vanilla Tempest payload.
  • First observation of SignerSha-1 thumbprint locked-ioc-3 in customer-distributed binaries.
  • Last observation of Fox Tempest-signed SHA-256 locked-ioc-1.
  • locked-ioc-4 last observed active before disruption.
  • Last observation of Fox Tempest SignerSha-1 thumbprints (locked-ioc-2, locked-ioc-3) in the wild prior to revocation.
  • Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit disrupts Fox Tempest: revokes 1,000+ fraudulent code-signing certificates across hundreds of Azure tenants, takes down locked-ioc-4, partners with Cloudzy to de-provision Fox Tempest-controlled VMs, and pushes Defender signature updates covering Oyster, Lumma, Vidar, Malcert, Rhysida, INC, Qilin, and BlackByte families plus a Vanilla Tempest activity-group profile.
  • As of 2026-05-29, Microsoft DCU's 2026-05-19 disruption (locked-ioc-4 sinkholed, 1,000+ certs revoked, Cloudzy VMs disabled) degraded but did not neutralize Fox Tempest. Microsoft confirms the actor is adapting and shifting operations/customers to another code-signing service, and downstream ransomware groups (Vanilla Tempest, Storm-0501) remain active, so MONITORING fits.

Sources cited

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 11 sources; published ; last updated —.

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