# Fox Tempest Malware-Signing-as-a-Service (MSaaS) — Microsoft DCU Disrupts signspace[.]cloud Operation Enabling Rhysida, INC, Qilin, Akira & Vanilla Tempest

> Fox Tempest is a financially motivated, Russian-speaking criminal enterprise that operated signspace[.]cloud, a Malware-Signing-as-a-Service (MSaaS) platform that abused Microsoft Artifact Signing (formerly Azure Trusted Signing) to mint short-lived (72-hour) fraudulent code-signing certificates for paying ransomware and infostealer affiliates. Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) disrupted the operation on 2026-05-19 after eight months of tracking, revoking 1,000+ certificates across hundreds of Azure tenants and subscriptions registered with stolen US/Canadian identities. Customers — including Vanilla Tempest, Storm-0501, Storm-2561, and Storm-0249 — used Fox Tempest-signed binaries to deliver Rhysida, INC, Qilin, Akira, and BlackByte ransomware as well as Oyster (Broomstick), Lumma Stealer, and Vidar via SEO poisoning, malvertising, and trojanized installers masquerading as AnyDesk, Microsoft Teams, PuTTY, and Webex.

- **Published:** 2026-05-19T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-05-19T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0533
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-fox-tempest-signing-service-tl-2026-0533.webp?v=6c9583b1 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Fox Tempest MSaaS Signing Takedown: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0533) — High severity, 22 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0533
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** MONITORING
- **Actor:** Fox Tempest (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 22 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Fox Tempest is the Microsoft Threat Intelligence cryptonym for a financially motivated, likely Russian-speaking cybercriminal group that built and operated a turnkey Malware-Signing-as-a-Service (MSaaS) platform hosted at signspace[.]cloud. The service was first offered in May 2025, picked up its first known affiliate customer (Vanilla Tempest) in June 2025, came under sustained Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracking in September 2025, and was disrupted by Microsoft DCU on 19 May 2026 — by which time over 1,000 fraudulent code-signing certificates had been issued through it.

The abuse target was Microsoft Artifact Signing (formerly Azure Trusted Signing), a cloud-managed signing service designed to give legitimate ISVs a Microsoft-rooted certificate chain (issuer 'Microsoft ID Verified CS EOC CA 01') with very short — 72 hour — leaf validity. Fox Tempest weaponized that design property: short-lived certs leave no useful long-lived revocation list to seed reputation systems on, while the chain to Microsoft's root made the signed binary appear high-trust to SmartScreen, EDR reputation lookups, application allowlisting (Software Restriction Policies, AppLocker, WDAC publisher rules), and analyst triage. To pass Trusted Signing identity validation, the operators acquired (very likely purchased on criminal markets) stolen identity documents from US- and Canada-based individuals and small businesses, used those identities to stand up hundreds of Azure tenants and subscriptions, and onboarded each to Trusted Signing as a separate 'publisher.' Each tenant became a disposable signing oracle: a customer's PE file went in, came back signed by a Microsoft-rooted leaf cert tied to a synthetic 'publisher' identity, and was burned within 72 hours.

The customer-facing portal at signspace[.]cloud was a full SaaS offering: an admin panel managing tooling and customer accounts, a customer upload interface for unsigned malicious binaries, a structured backend database tracking users and submissions, and configuration files linked to a GitHub repository named 'code-signing-service.' From May 2025 through February 2026 customers uploaded binaries directly through the web portal. From February 2026 onward, Fox Tempest matured the offering: customers were provisioned a pre-configured US-based Cloudzy VPS that handled upload, signing, and return of the binary, reducing operational friction and obscuring the link between portal and signing tenant. Pricing was tiered between USD 5,000 and USD 9,000 via a Google Form, with higher-paying customers receiving signing-queue priority. Sales and support were brokered on Telegram under the handle @arbadakarba2000 (channel name 'EV Certs for Sale by SamCodeSign'). Operator-facing documentation was bilingual English/Russian — the primary linguistic attribution signal — and cryptocurrency tracing tied wallets to known ransomware affiliate clusters, supporting the assessment that Fox Tempest is a well-resourced criminal enterprise with dedicated roles for infrastructure, customer ops, and finance.

Downstream impact spanned the top tier of the criminal ransomware ecosystem. Vanilla Tempest (the Rhysida operator) used Fox Tempest signatures from June 2025 onward to sign trojanized Microsoft Teams installers delivered via purchased Google/Bing advertisements; the loader stage was Oyster/Broomstick, terminating in Rhysida deployment. Storm-2561 used Fox Tempest-signed fake VPN clients distributed via SEO poisoning. Storm-0501 and Storm-0249 used Fox Tempest signatures across active intrusions ending in INC, Qilin, Akira, and BlackByte ransomware. Infostealer affiliates used the signing service to push Lumma Stealer and Vidar past SmartScreen and reputation gates. Microsoft estimates extortion proceeds attributable to Fox Tempest-signed campaigns 'in the millions' of US dollars, with confirmed victims across healthcare, education, government, and financial services in the United States, France, India, and China.

The full exploit chain, end to end: (1) An affiliate procures a binary (loader, dropper, or stage-two implant) and uploads it through signspace[.]cloud or the Cloudzy VM. (2) Fox Tempest's backend selects an unburned Azure tenant — registered with a stolen US/Canada identity and onboarded to Microsoft Artifact Signing — and submits a signing request, which Microsoft Artifact Signing fulfills against that tenant's policy. (3) A short-lived (72h) leaf certificate chained to 'Microsoft ID Verified CS EOC CA 01' is bound to the binary, which is returned to the customer. (4) The customer distributes the signed binary via SEO poisoning (typosquatted or SEO-stuffed download pages ranking for 'anydesk download,' 'putty,' 'webex installer,' 'microsoft teams,' free VPN clients) and/or malvertising (purchased Google Ads and Bing Ads redirecting through cloaked affiliate networks to the fake download). (5) Victim downloads, sees a Microsoft-rooted publisher signature, and runs the installer. (6) Loader (Oyster/Broomstick, or a stealer dropper) executes; Defender SmartScreen and many EDR reputation engines treat the binary as trusted on signature. (7) For ransomware tracks, the loader fetches second-stage tooling (Cobalt Strike, Sliver, or operator-specific implants), performs discovery and credential access, moves laterally, exfiltrates data, and detonates Rhysida/INC/Qilin/Akira/BlackByte. For stealer tracks, Lumma or Vidar harvests credentials, cookies, MFA tokens, and crypto wallets and exfiltrates to operator C2.

The Microsoft DCU disruption on 2026-05-19 included: revocation of 1,000+ certificates issued through Fox Tempest tenants, takedown of signspace[.]cloud, coordination with Cloudzy to identify and de-provision Fox Tempest-controlled VMs, and Defender signature pushes covering Oyster, Lumma, Vidar, Malcert, Rhysida, INC, Qilin, and BlackByte family detections plus a Vanilla Tempest activity-group profile. Defenders should treat any binary with a 'Microsoft ID Verified CS EOC CA 01' leaf signature between May 2025 and May 2026 as potentially abused unless explicitly attributable to a known legitimate ISV. Hunt for the published SignerSha-1 thumbprints, retro-hunt on the SHA-256, and audit signed-binary execution from user-writable paths and recent download locations. Long-term defenders should enforce publisher allowlisting (WDAC) against an explicit list of trusted publishers rather than relying on Microsoft chain trust alone, since Microsoft Artifact Signing assigns chain trust to any onboarded tenant.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- T1583.003 Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server
- T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services
- T1585.003 Establish Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- T1588.003 Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates
- T1588.004 Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates
- T1608.001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware
- T1608.006 Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
- T1608.004 Stage Capabilities: Drive-by Target
- T1586.002 Email Accounts
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
- T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
- T1553.003 Subvert Trust Controls: SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1036.001 Invalid Code Signature
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion
- T1555.003 Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
- T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Fox Tempest MSaaS — Signed Masquerade -> PowerShell/HTTP Beacon -> Ransomware Extension Storm (C2 / Impact)** (`TL-2026-0533-SPL-003`)

Two-part correlated detection covering the C2 + impact tail of the Fox Tempest customer chain: (1) PowerShell or rundll32 process descended from a signed installer in user-writable storage making outbound HTTPS via Invoke-WebRequest / Net.WebClient / Start-BitsTransfer / curl.exe (Oyster, Cobalt Strike, Sliver loader behavior); (2) a rapid file-rename burst in user-document directories where new file extensions match known Fox-Tempest-customer ransomware suffixes (.rhysida, .inc, .qilin, .akira, .blackbyte) or where a ransom-note filename pattern is dropped concurrently.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.001, T1105, T1059.001, T1486, T1041
- **Data sources:** sysmon, microsoft_defender_for_endpoint, edr_process_creation, edr_file_events, edr_network_events
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
(index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 (Image="*\\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\\pwsh.exe" OR Image="*\\rundll32.exe" OR Image="*\\curl.exe") (CommandLine="*Invoke-WebRequest*" OR CommandLine="*Net.WebClient*" OR CommandLine="*Start-BitsTransfer*" OR CommandLine="*DownloadString*" OR CommandLine="*-Uri*http*") (ParentImage="*\\AppData\\*" OR ParentImage="*\\Temp\\*" OR ParentImage="*\\Downloads\\*"))
OR
(index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=11 (TargetFilename="*.rhysida" OR TargetFilename="*.inc" OR TargetFilename="*.qilin" OR TargetFilename="*.akira" OR TargetFilename="*.blackbyte" OR TargetFilename="*CriticalBreachDetected*" OR TargetFilename="*How-To-Decrypt*"))
| eval stage=case(match(Image, "(powershell|pwsh|rundll32|curl)\\.exe$"), "c2_beacon", match(TargetFilename, "(\\.rhysida|\\.inc|\\.qilin|\\.akira|\\.blackbyte|CriticalBreachDetected|How-To-Decrypt)"), "ransom_impact", 1=1, "other")
| where stage!="other"
| bin _time span=10m
| stats values(stage) as stages dc(stage) as stage_count count by host User _time
| where stage_count>=1 AND count>=5
| sort - _time
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// Fox Tempest C2 beacon + ransomware impact - MDE
let beacon = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","rundll32.exe","curl.exe")
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Invoke-WebRequest","Net.WebClient","Start-BitsTransfer","DownloadString","-Uri http")
    | where InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any (@"\AppData\", @"\Temp\", @"\Downloads\")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, Stage="c2_beacon";
let impact = DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileRenamed")
    | where FileName endswith ".rhysida" or FileName endswith ".inc" or FileName endswith ".qilin"
         or FileName endswith ".akira" or FileName endswith ".blackbyte"
         or FileName has_any ("CriticalBreachDetected","How-To-Decrypt","!!!READ_ME")
    | summarize RenameCount=count(), Earliest=min(Timestamp) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, bin(Timestamp,5m)
    | where RenameCount >= 5
    | extend Stage="ransom_impact", Timestamp=Earliest;
beacon
| union (impact | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Stage, InitiatingProcessFileName)
| summarize Stages=make_set(Stage), Events=count(), Earliest=min(Timestamp) by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 30m)
| where Events >= 1
| order by Earliest desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Fox Tempest MSaaS - Signed-Installer Process Tree Beaconing + Rhysida-family Extension Storm
id: 5e3a1a8c-9d6c-4b1f-a2d1-fb1c533a0003
status: experimental
description: Two-part detection for the C2-and-impact tail of the Fox Tempest customer chain. Part A - PowerShell / rundll32 / curl outbound web request whose parent process resides in %APPDATA%, %TEMP%, or Downloads. Part B - rapid creation/rename of files with .rhysida / .inc / .qilin / .akira / .blackbyte extensions or CriticalBreachDetected-style ransom note drop.
references:
  - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/19/exposing-fox-tempest-a-malware-signing-service-operation/
  - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-319a
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/05/19
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.execution
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1071.001
  - attack.t1105
  - attack.t1486
  - attack.tool.oyster
  - attack.tool.cobalt_strike
  - attack.tool.sliver
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection_beacon_proc:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
      - '\curl.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'Invoke-WebRequest'
      - 'Net.WebClient'
      - 'Start-BitsTransfer'
      - 'DownloadString'
      - '-Uri http'
    ParentImage|contains:
      - '\AppData\'
      - '\Temp\'
      - '\Downloads\'
  selection_impact_file:
    TargetFilename|endswith:
      - '.rhysida'
      - '.inc'
      - '.qilin'
      - '.akira'
      - '.blackbyte'
    TargetFilename|contains:
      - 'CriticalBreachDetected'
      - 'How-To-Decrypt'
      - '!!!READ_ME'
  condition: selection_beacon_proc or selection_impact_file
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate PowerShell update scripts executed from %LOCALAPPDATA% (e.g., GitHub Desktop, VS Code installer post-install scripts).
  - Backup or DLP solutions that rename files in bulk - allowlist by InitiatingProcessFileName.
level: critical

```

**Known false positives:**

- PowerShell-based auto-update frameworks (Chocolatey, Squirrel) running from %LOCALAPPDATA% performing legitimate Invoke-WebRequest fetches.
- Backup software performing bulk-rename or extension-mapping operations - allowlist by signed backup vendor InitiatingProcessFileName.
- Security tooling (forensic triage scripts) intentionally invoking PowerShell from user-writable paths.

**Tuning notes:** Tune the impact-rename threshold (default >=5 in 5 minutes) upward in environments with heavy bulk-file workflows. Maintain an allowlist of update-framework parent processes (squirrel.exe, GitHubDesktop.exe, chocolatey upgrade) for the beacon stage. For highest fidelity, correlate Part A and Part B on the same DeviceName within a 30-minute window.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Fox Tempest MSaaS — Microsoft Artifact Signing Short-Validity Leaf Cert Hunt (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fox Tempest MSaaS — Oyster Loader Behavior + Run Key Persistence on MDE (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fox Tempest MSaaS — Lumma/Vidar Browser Credential-Store Access + Exfil (C2 / Collection) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fox Tempest MSaaS — First-Seen Microsoft Artifact Signing Publisher (Exploitation Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fox Tempest MSaaS — Egress to [indicator] / SamCodeSign Operator Infrastructure (Post-Exploitation Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fox Tempest MSaaS — Rhysida/INC/Qilin/Akira/BlackByte Ransomware Impact + Inhibit Recovery (Impact Sigma) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fox Tempest MSaaS — Short-Lived Microsoft-Rooted Signed PE Executed from User-Writable Path (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Fox Tempest MSaaS — HKCU Run Key Persistence Pointing at User-Writable Signed Installer (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 22)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `signspace[.]cloud`
- File hash: `dc0acb01e3086ea8a9cb144a5f97810d291020ce`
- File hash: `7e6d9dac619c04ae1b3c8c0906123e752ed66d63`

Full set of 22 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Exposing Fox Tempest: A malware-signing service operation](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/19/exposing-fox-tempest-a-malware-signing-service-operation/)
- [Microsoft Trusted Signing — Service Overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/trusted-signing/overview)
- [Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/digital-crimes-unit)
- [Vanilla Tempest activity group profile (Rhysida operator)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/threat-intelligence/)
- [Rhysida Ransomware — CISA #StopRansomware Advisory AA23-319A](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-319a)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1553.002 — Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1583.003 — Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1608.005 — Stage Capabilities: Link Target (SEO poisoning context)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/006/)
- [Oyster (Broomstick) backdoor analysis](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/06/17/malvertising-campaign-leads-to-execution-of-oyster-backdoor/)
- [Lumma Stealer technical overview](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/05/21/lumma-stealer-takedown/)
- [Cloudzy abuse reporting (Halcyon)](https://www.halcyon.ai/blog/cloudzy-with-a-chance-of-ransomware)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0533
