Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-0556
Megalodon GitHub Actions Supply Chain Campaign — 5,561 Repositories Compromised, @tiledesk/tiledesk-server npm Backdoor (CI Credential Harvester)
Between 11:36-17:48 UTC on 2026-05-18, an automated supply chain campaign codenamed 'Megalodon' pushed 5,718 malicious commits to 5,561 GitHub repositories, injecting two GitHub Actions workflow variants ('SysDiag' mass and 'Optimize-Build' targeted) that beacon to 216.126.225.129:8443 and exfiltrate CI environment variables, AWS/GCP/Azure cloud credentials, OIDC tokens, SSH keys, and developer secrets.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0556 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Megalodon, Megalodon GitHub Actions Worm, Tiledesk npm Supply Chain Compromise |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| Affected products | Tiledesk @tiledesk/tiledesk-server (npm); GitHub GitHub Actions (workflow trust model); Community 5,561 public GitHub repositories (identified by SafeDep) |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-506, CWE-829, CWE-494, CWE-1357, CWE-1395 |
| Malware | Megalodon |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1057 Process Discovery, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1083 File and Directory Discovery, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1119 Automated Collection, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information and 17 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | FINANCIAL |
| Target sectors | technology, software-development, open-source, saas, cloud-services, devops |
| Target regions | Global |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-05-21, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0556 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 28 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: Megalodon CI Credential Harvest — OIDC Mint + IMDS + Secret-File Read on Actions Runner (Post-Exploitation)
Detects the Megalodon payload's credential-harvest sequence on a GitHub Actions runner: enumeration of ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL/TOKEN to mint an OIDC ID token, followed by AWS IMDSv2 (169.254.169.254 with X-aws-ec2-metadata-token header) and/or GCP metadata (metadata.google.internal with Metadata-Flavor: Google) queries, gcloud auth print-access-token execution, and reads of ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_*, ~/.npmrc, ~/.docker/config.json and /proc/*/environ within a tight window (T1552.001/.004/.005, T1528). Production-grade for Splunk Enterprise Security with Sysmon/auditd on self-hosted runners.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1552.001, T1552.004, T1552.005, T1528, T1083, T1119
- Data sources: sysmon, linux_auditd, edr_process, edr_file
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=sysmon (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" OR sourcetype="linux:auditd") (EventCode=1 OR EventCode=3 OR EventCode=11 OR type="EXECVE" OR type="PATH")
| eval cmdblob=lower(coalesce(CommandLine, proctitle, ProcessCommandLine, ""))
| eval path_read=lower(coalesce(TargetFilename, name, ""))
| eval is_oidc_req=if(match(cmdblob, "actions_id_token_request_url|actions_id_token_request_token"), 1, 0)
| eval is_aws_imds=if(match(cmdblob, "169\.254\.169\.254") OR match(cmdblob, "x-aws-ec2-metadata-token"), 1, 0)
| eval is_gcp_metadata=if(match(cmdblob, "metadata\.google\.internal") OR match(cmdblob, "metadata-flavor:\s*google"), 1, 0)
| eval is_gcloud_token=if(match(cmdblob, "gcloud\s+auth\s+print-access-token"), 1, 0)
| eval is_secret_file=if(match(path_read, "\.aws/credentials|\.aws/config|\.ssh/id_(rsa|ed25519|ecdsa)|\.npmrc|\.netrc|\.docker/config\.json|kubeconfig|/proc/\d+/environ"), 1, 0)
| eval is_regex_sweep=if(match(cmdblob, "akia\[0-9a-z\]\{16\}|ghp_\[a-za-z0-9\]\{36\}|aiza\[0-9a-za-z_-\]\{35\}|-----begin.*private key-----"), 1, 0)
| eval is_runner=if(match(cmdblob, "github_actions=true|/_work/_actions|runner\.worker|actions-runner"), 1, 0)
| bin _time span=2m
| stats values(host) as host, values(user) as user, values(ProcessId) as pids, values(Image) as images, sum(is_oidc_req) as oidc_req, sum(is_aws_imds) as aws_imds, sum(is_gcp_metadata) as gcp_metadata, sum(is_gcloud_token) as gcloud_token, sum(is_secret_file) as secret_file_reads, sum(is_regex_sweep) as regex_sweep, sum(is_runner) as runner_context by host, _time
| eval indicators_hit=(if(oidc_req>0,1,0))+(if(aws_imds>0,1,0))+(if(gcp_metadata>0,1,0))+(if(gcloud_token>0,1,0))+(if(secret_file_reads>=3,1,0))+(if(regex_sweep>0,1,0))
| where indicators_hit >= 3 AND runner_context > 0
| sort - indicators_hit, - _timeMicrosoft KQL
// Megalodon credential harvest sequence on Actions runner
let window = 2m;
let RunnerProcs = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("GITHUB_ACTIONS=true", "/_work/_actions", "actions-runner", "Runner.Worker")
| project HostBase = DeviceName, Pid = ProcessId, RunnerTs = Timestamp;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| extend Cmd = tolower(ProcessCommandLine)
| extend IsOidcReq = Cmd has_any ("actions_id_token_request_url", "actions_id_token_request_token")
| extend IsAwsImds = Cmd has "169.254.169.254" or Cmd has "x-aws-ec2-metadata-token"
| extend IsGcpMeta = Cmd has "metadata.google.internal" or Cmd matches regex @"metadata-flavor:\s*google"
| extend IsGcloudToken = Cmd matches regex @"gcloud\s+auth\s+print-access-token"
| extend IsRegexSweep = Cmd matches regex @"akia\[0-9a-z\]\{16\}|ghp_\[a-za-z0-9\]\{36\}|aiza\[0-9a-za-z_-\]\{35\}|-----begin.*private key-----"
| where IsOidcReq or IsAwsImds or IsGcpMeta or IsGcloudToken or IsRegexSweep
| join kind=inner (RunnerProcs) on $left.DeviceName == $right.HostBase
| where abs(datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, RunnerTs)) < 1800
| summarize OidcReq = countif(IsOidcReq), AwsImds = countif(IsAwsImds), GcpMeta = countif(IsGcpMeta), GcloudToken = countif(IsGcloudToken), RegexSweep = countif(IsRegexSweep), Cmds = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 20) by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, window)
| extend SecretReads = toscalar(DeviceFileEvents | where Timestamp > ago(24h) | where FolderPath matches regex @"\.aws[/\\]credentials|\.ssh[/\\]id_(rsa|ed25519|ecdsa)|\.npmrc|\.netrc|\.docker[/\\]config\.json|kubeconfig" | summarize count())
| extend IndicatorsHit = toint(OidcReq>0) + toint(AwsImds>0) + toint(GcpMeta>0) + toint(GcloudToken>0) + toint(RegexSweep>0) + toint(SecretReads>=3)
| where IndicatorsHit >= 3
| order by IndicatorsHit desc, Timestamp descSigma
title: Megalodon CI Credential Harvest — OIDC Mint Plus IMDS Plus Secret File Read on Actions Runner
id: 6a0f4d15-meg0-4002-bbbb-megalodon0556
status: experimental
description: Detects an Actions runner process subtree that reads ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL/TOKEN to mint a GitHub OIDC token and within a short window queries the AWS IMDSv2 (169.254.169.254) or GCP metadata server (metadata.google.internal) and/or reads credential files (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_*, ~/.npmrc, ~/.docker/config.json) — the Megalodon credential-harvest chain.
references:
- https://safedep.io/research/megalodon-github-actions-supply-chain
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/05/21
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1552.001
- attack.t1552.004
- attack.t1552.005
- attack.t1528
- attack.t1083
- attack.tool.megalodon
logsource:
product: linux
category: process_creation
detection:
runner_context:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'GITHUB_ACTIONS=true'
- '/_work/_actions'
- 'actions-runner'
- 'Runner.Worker'
oidc_req:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL'
- 'ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN'
imds_aws:
CommandLine|contains:
- '169.254.169.254'
- 'X-aws-ec2-metadata-token'
imds_gcp:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'metadata.google.internal'
- 'Metadata-Flavor: Google'
gcloud_token:
CommandLine|contains: 'gcloud auth print-access-token'
secret_files:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/.aws/credentials'
- '/.ssh/id_rsa'
- '/.ssh/id_ed25519'
- '/.npmrc'
- '/.docker/config.json'
- '/proc/'
condition: runner_context and (oidc_req and (imds_aws or imds_gcp or gcloud_token or secret_files)) | timeframe: 2m
fields:
- host
- user
- process
- parent_process
- CommandLine
falsepositives:
- Legitimate AWS CLI / Terraform / SDK workflows that call IMDSv2 — exclude when only IMDS hits fire without OIDC token request
- Authorized Vault agent or workload-identity helpers running on the runner — allowlist by parent process / service account
level: highKnown false positives:
- Legitimate AWS CLI / Terraform / SDK workflows that call IMDSv2 without OIDC token mint — exclude when oidc_req is absent
- Authorized Vault agent or workload-identity helpers — allowlist by parent process or service account
- Cloud-native CI helpers (e.g., gha-runner-scale-set hooks) that legitimately read instance metadata
Tuning notes: Tighten the 2-minute window if your runners produce dense process events (drop to 60s) or widen if Sysmon throttles. Require runner_context=true to suppress non-CI hosts. Exclude approved IaC tools (terraform, packer) by parent_process_name. Increase the secret_file_reads threshold (default >=3) for noisy build agents that legitimately read credential stores per job.
- Megalodon Throwaway Author Workflow Commit (Exploitation — Sentinel) · unlock with TL Creds
- Megalodon Runner Secret-Scrape + Base64 Payload Exec (Post-Exploitation — Defender XDR) · unlock with TL Creds
- Megalodon Federated Cloud Identity Abuse — AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity From GitHub Actions Token Issuer (C2/Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
- Megalodon Workflow File Injection — Base64 Bash + Elevated Token Permissions (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Megalodon Payload Behavior — OIDC Token Request + Cloud Metadata Query (Post-Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Megalodon Downstream Propagation — @tiledesk/tiledesk-server Backdoored Version Install (C2/Lateral Movement) · unlock with TL Creds
- Megalodon SysDiag Workflow Injection — pull_request_target + id-token:write (Exploitation) · unlock with TL Creds
- Megalodon C2 Beacon — TLS Egress to [indicator]:8443 (Command & Control) · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-05-21, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 28 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0556.
Sample indicators (2 of 28)
- IP address:
216.126.225[.]129 - File hash:
acac5a9854650c4ae2883c4740bf87d34120c038
Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 28 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.
Technical analysis
Downstream compromise of Tiledesk's release pipeline propagated the backdoor into npm releases @tiledesk/tiledesk-server 2.18.6-2.18.12. Discovered by SafeDep's Malysis engine.
## Overview
Megalodon is a six-hour, fully automated GitHub Actions supply chain campaign observed on 2026-05-18 in which throwaway GitHub accounts pushed 5,718 malicious commits across 5,561 public repositories, embedding two distinct GitHub Actions workflow variants that exfiltrate CI environment secrets and short-lived cloud credentials to a single hard-coded C2 endpoint (216.126.225.129:8443). The campaign was discovered by SafeDep's Malysis engine after the base64-encoded payload was bundled into an npm release of @tiledesk/tiledesk-server (a popular open-source customer support / messaging server), confirming downstream propagation from the GitHub Actions worm into the public npm ecosystem.
## Attack Chain
**1. Resource development.** The operator(s) provisioned a fleet of throwaway GitHub accounts whose usernames follow a randomized 8-character pattern, paired with two boilerplate commit author identities (build-system@noreply.dev / ci-bot@automated.dev) and four rotating author display names (build-bot, auto-ci, ci-bot, pipeline-bot). A single dedicated VPS at 216.126.225.129 was stood up on TCP/8443 to receive exfiltration traffic.
**2. Initial access via workflow injection.** Targeted repositories were selected en masse (likely via GitHub code search and language filters). For each repo, the worm pushed a malicious commit whose message imitated routine CI hygiene work — 'ci: add build optimization step' or 'chore: optimize pipeline runtime' — to evade casual review. Two workflow variants were observed:
- **SysDiag (mass variant)** — written to `.github/workflows/ci.yml`, triggered on `push` and `pull_request_target`. The `pull_request_target` trigger is critical because it runs with the base repository's secrets and write tokens even when fired by an untrusted fork PR, a recurring high-severity GitHub Actions footgun. - **Optimize-Build (targeted variant)** — uses `workflow_dispatch` so the workflow lies dormant and is only triggered manually by the attacker on chosen victims. This gives Megalodon on-demand re-entry into the victim's CI without producing noisy automatic runs.
**3. Elevated permission grant.** Both variants explicitly request `permissions: id-token: write` and `actions: read`. The id-token write capability is what lets the workflow mint a GitHub OIDC ID token that can be exchanged for short-lived cloud credentials in AWS (`sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity`), GCP (Workload Identity Federation), and Azure (federated credentials) — i.e. cloud identity impersonation without ever needing a long-lived secret in the repo.
**4. Payload execution.** Each workflow embeds a base64-encoded bash payload (~111 lines decoded) that performs:
- Enumeration of every `env` variable in the Actions runner, plus `/proc/*/environ` and PID 1 environment data to capture secrets injected by parent processes. - Collection of all AWS access keys, secret keys, and session tokens from every configured profile (`~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.aws/config`). - Queries of cloud instance metadata services: AWS IMDSv2, GCP metadata, Azure IMDS to lift instance role credentials. - `gcloud auth print-access-token` to obtain GCP user / service-account tokens. - Minting of a GitHub OIDC token via the `ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL` / `ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN` runner variables, POSTed alongside the harvested bundle so the operator can later impersonate the repo's federated cloud identity. - Collection of SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/id_*`), Docker auth configs (`~/.docker/config.json`), `.npmrc`, `.netrc`, Kubernetes kubeconfigs, Vault tokens, and Terraform credentials. - A source-tree grep across 30+ regex patterns matching generic API keys, JWTs, PEM-encoded private keys, database connection strings, and known cloud-provider token formats (AWS AKIA*, ASIA*, Google AIza*, GitHub ghp_*, Slack xox*).
**5. Exfiltration.** All collected secrets are bundled and POSTed over TLS to `https://216.126.225.129:8443/`. The use of a raw IP plus a high port avoids reliance on disposable DNS infrastructure and removes the latency of domain takedown.
**6. npm propagation (Tiledesk).** Tiledesk's own release pipeline ran a compromised workflow, which caused the obfuscated payload to be embedded inside the bundled artifact published to npm. Versions 2.18.6 through 2.18.12 of `@tiledesk/tiledesk-server` ship with the payload, turning every CI/CD pipeline that installs Tiledesk into a downstream victim of the same credential harvester — a textbook case of a CI-borne worm crossing ecosystem boundaries from GitHub Actions into npm.
## Impact
- 5,561 GitHub repositories carry at least one Megalodon commit; many are dependencies of other projects, so the actual cloud-credential blast radius is materially larger than the headline repo count. - Any organization that ran a Megalodon-poisoned workflow with `id-token: write` between 11:36 UTC and ~18:30 UTC on 2026-05-18 must assume their federated AWS/GCP/Azure roles (and any role those roles can chain to) are compromised. OIDC tokens are short-lived but their exchanged STS / SA credentials can persist for hours. - All organizations consuming `@tiledesk/tiledesk-server@>=2.18.6 <=2.18.12` from npm must treat every secret available to their build agent — including production deploy credentials — as exposed.
## Attribution
No confirmed nation-state attribution. The combination of mass automation, ecosystem-agnostic credential targeting, a single hard-coded C2, and the inclusion of OIDC token theft for cloud impersonation is consistent with financially-motivated supply chain operators (cryptojacking / cloud-resource fraud / extortion) rather than espionage actors, who typically prefer narrower, lower-noise targeting. Attribution confidence: LOW.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System; T1119 Automated Collection
Defense Evasion
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Exfiltration
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel; T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
Discovery
T1057 Process Discovery; T1083 File and Directory Discovery; T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution
Command and Control
T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1571 Non-Standard Port; T1573 Encrypted Channel
Initial Access
T1078 Valid Accounts; T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
Impact
Persistence
T1505 Server Software Component; T1546 Event Triggered Execution
Credential Access
T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552 Unsecured Credentials; T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Resource Development
T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1585 Establish Accounts; T1586 Compromise Accounts; T1587 Develop Capabilities
defense-impairment
Remediation
Patches
- Tiledesk: install only @tiledesk/tiledesk-server versions outside the 2.18.6-2.18.12 range; await a vendor-issued clean release with provenance.
- GitHub: no platform patch available — this abuses documented Actions features; mitigation is policy-level.
Immediate actions
- Block egress to 216.126.225.129 (all ports, especially TCP/8443) at perimeter firewalls, EDR/network sensors, and cloud VPC NACLs.
- Audit every GitHub Actions run between 2026-05-18T11:36Z and 2026-05-18T19:00Z for workflow files matching `.github/workflows/ci.yml` modified by unknown author identities (build-bot, auto-ci, ci-bot, pipeline-bot, build-system@noreply.dev, ci-bot@automated.dev).
- Revert or revoke commit acac5a9854650c4ae2883c4740bf87d34120c038 wherever present and force-push history to remove it from default branches.
- Rotate every secret that was available to a Megalodon-poisoned runner: GitHub Actions repository/organization secrets, AWS IAM access keys, AWS STS session tokens issued via OIDC, GCP service-account keys and short-lived OIDC tokens, Azure federated credentials, npm publish tokens, Docker registry credentials, SSH deploy keys, Vault tokens, and any Terraform state credentials.
- Quarantine and remove @tiledesk/tiledesk-server versions 2.18.6, 2.18.7, 2.18.8, 2.18.9, 2.18.10, 2.18.11, and 2.18.12 from internal registries and lockfiles. Pin to 2.18.5 or wait for a clean post-2.18.12 release.
- Inspect cloud audit logs (AWS CloudTrail, GCP Cloud Audit Logs, Azure Activity Log) for `AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity`, federated-token, and identity-impersonation events sourced from GitHub Actions runners during and after the campaign window.
Workarounds
- Where rapid policy change is infeasible, set repository-level `permissions: contents: read` at the workflow root and explicitly opt in to `id-token: write` only in the narrow job that needs it.
- Force `pull_request_target` workflows to check out the PR head with `actions/checkout` only after manual approval, and never run code from the PR head when secrets are exposed.
Longer-term hardening
- Disallow the `pull_request_target` trigger combined with `id-token: write` in all org-wide GitHub Actions policies; allow it only via explicit per-repo exception with reviewed reusable workflows.
- Enable GitHub Actions 'Required workflows' / 'Allowed actions' policies at the organization level so unreviewed third-party actions cannot run.
- Replace long-lived cloud keys in CI with OIDC federation that is narrowly scoped per workflow path AND per branch (sub claim conditions), so a malicious workflow on a non-release branch cannot mint production credentials.
- Deploy a workflow-file integrity monitor (e.g., GitHub branch protection requiring code review on `.github/workflows/**`, plus an out-of-band repo audit) to detect unauthorized workflow additions.
- Adopt npm package provenance / Sigstore attestations and enforce them at install time so unsigned or non-attested releases are rejected by build agents.
- Implement egress allowlisting on self-hosted Actions runners so beacons to arbitrary IPs (e.g., raw 216.126.225.129:8443) fail closed.
Affected and fixed versions
- Tiledesk — @tiledesk/tiledesk-server (npm)
Vulnerable versions: 2.18.6; 2.18.7; 2.18.8; 2.18.9; 2.18.10; 2.18.11; 2.18.12 - GitHub — GitHub Actions (workflow trust model)
Vulnerable versions: all - Community — 5,561 public GitHub repositories (identified by SafeDep)
Vulnerable versions: any branch containing commit acac5a9854650c4ae2883c4740bf87d34120c038 or equivalent SysDiag/Optimize-Build workflow
Timeline
- 17:48 UTC — Mass-push activity ceases after 5,718 malicious commits across 5,561 repositories. Some Optimize-Build (workflow_dispatch) variants remain dormant for on-demand re-entry.
- Compromised Tiledesk build pipeline executes a Megalodon workflow during a routine release, embedding the obfuscated payload into the npm artifact for @tiledesk/tiledesk-server (subsequently propagated through versions 2.18.6-2.18.12).
- 11:36 UTC — First Megalodon commit observed on GitHub; throwaway accounts begin pushing SysDiag / Optimize-Build workflow injections at high volume.
- SafeDep pivots from the npm payload to GitHub and identifies the 5,561-repo mass-injection campaign, correlating commit metadata, workflow content, and shared C2 endpoint.
- SafeDep's Malysis engine flags the base64-encoded payload embedded in a bundled workflow file inside @tiledesk/tiledesk-server@2.18.12, surfacing the npm-side compromise.
- SafeDep publishes preliminary campaign analysis naming the campaign 'Megalodon', documenting the SysDiag / Optimize-Build variants and C2 at locked-ioc-7:8443.
- Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes TL-2026-0556 with full MITRE mapping, IOC set, detections, and simulation guidance.
- Cyber Security News publishes a public summary of the Megalodon campaign citing SafeDep's findings.
- As of 2026-05-29, Megalodon remains active: it is now attributed to TeamPCP/UNC6780, whose 20+ supply-chain waves (npm/PyPI/GitHub Actions, GitHub internal breach, Mini Shai-Hulud) continued through late May. Dormant workflow_dispatch backdoors persist, C2 locked-ioc-7 has no confirmed takedown, and no clean Tiledesk release past 2.18.12 exists.
Sources cited
- CISA — Defending Continuous Integration / Continuous Delivery (CI/CD) Pipelines CISA · Government advisory · 2023-06-28
- SafeDep Malysis — Megalodon Campaign Analysis safedep.io · Research · 2026-05-20
- GitHub Security Lab — pull_request_target Security Considerations GitHub · Vendor report · 2020-04-13
- GitHub Docs — Configuring OpenID Connect in cloud providers GitHub · Vendor report · 2024-01-01
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1195.002 Supply Chain Compromise: Software Supply Chain MITRE · Research · 2024-10-15
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1552.001 Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files MITRE · Research · 2024-10-15
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1528 Steal Application Access Token MITRE · Research · 2024-10-15
- Megalodon Malware Compromised 5,500+ GitHub Repos Within 6 Hours cybersecuritynews.com · News · 2026-05-22
Previous and next in supply chain
- Nx Console VS Code Extension Backdoored (v18.95.0) — TeamPCP Mini Shai-Hulud Pivot from TanStack npm Worm to GitHub Internal Repository Breach (CVE-2026-48027) Previous report
- DPRK npm Supply Chain Attack — terminal-logger-utils Abuses Hugging Face (Lordplay/system-releases) to Deliver Node.js SEA Keylogger/Infostealer/RAT Next report
Further reading
Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.