# Screening Serpens (UNC1549) 2026 Espionage Campaign — Six New RATs (MiniUpdate & MiniJunk V2) via AppDomainManager Hijacking

> Iran-nexus APT Screening Serpens (UNC1549 / Smoke Sandstorm / Iranian Dream Job / Nimbus Manticore) ran a February-to-April 2026 espionage campaign aligned with the Middle East regional conflict that began Feb 28, 2026, targeting aerospace, defense, telecom and technology professionals across the United States, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and at least two additional Middle Eastern entities. Unit 42 documented six new RAT variants split across two malware families — MiniUpdate (UpdateChecker.dll) and MiniJunk V2 (unbcl.dll) — delivered via recruitment-themed spear-phishing archives (Hiring Portal.zip, Portable Platform.zip) and executed via DLL sideloading on legitimate signed binaries. The critical TTP evolution is AppDomainManager hijacking: the operators abuse .NET CLR initialization via XML .config directives (etwEnable=false, bypassTrustedAppStrongNames=true, publisherPolicy=no, probing privatePath) to disable EDR telemetry and force local DLL sideloading before the host application's main() function ever executes.

- **Published:** 2026-05-22T12:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-05-22T12:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0562
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-screening-serpens-unc1549-rats-tl-2026-0562.webp?v=8b8ebc51 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Screening Serpens UNC1549 Six New RATs: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0562) — High severity, 54 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0562
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** APT
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** Screening Serpens (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 54 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Screening Serpens (tracked by Mandiant/Google TIG as UNC1549, Microsoft as Smoke Sandstorm, ClearSky as Iranian Dream Job, and Check Point as Nimbus Manticore) is an Iran-nexus espionage cluster active since at least 2022 with strong overlaps with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) intelligence requirements. The 2026 campaign documented by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (published 2026-05-22) covers mid-February through mid-April 2026 and overlaps in time with the Middle East regional conflict that began on Feb 28, 2026. Across this window Unit 42 identified six new RAT variants split between two distinct malware families: four MiniUpdate variants (US, Israel, UAE, and a second Middle East target) and two MiniJunk V2 variants (a Middle East target and a US target). All campaigns followed the actor's signature "Iranian Dream Job" social-engineering playbook — spoofed recruitment portals impersonating global air carriers, video-conferencing vendors, and legitimate employment websites, with tailored fake job-requisition PDFs (e.g. "Senior Software Engineer Job ID JR205894.pdf") used as decoys while a parallel sideloading chain executes in the background.

The MiniUpdate family ships as a multi-stage .NET loader chain. Stage 1 — InitInstall.dll — is triggered before the host setup.exe's main() runs by way of an AppDomainManager hijack defined in setup.exe.config. InitInstall.dll decrypts an embedded payload using reverse-byte + ROT13, displays a borderless transparent spinner window to mask background activity, drops the payload under %LOCALAPPDATA%\bin\update (renaming setup.exe→update.exe, UpdateConfig.xml→update.exe.config, and copying Updater.dll plus UpdateChecker.dll), and creates a Task Scheduler entry ("WindowsSecurityUpdate") that fires daily at 09:30 local time. Stage 2 — Updater.dll, again loaded via a second AppDomainManager hijack from update.exe.config — performs anti-analysis: it confirms the current process name is update.exe and that its parent is svchost.exe (i.e. that it was launched by Task Scheduler), silently terminating in any sandbox or interactive context. It then resolves the path to UpdateChecker.dll and invokes the CheckForUpdates export. Stage 3 — UpdateChecker.dll — is the actual MiniUpdate RAT. It polls the C2 over HTTPS GET to /agent/poll, processes a 16-opcode (18 in the April variants) command dispatcher with base64-encoded binary commands, and was observed signed with code-signing certificates impersonated from legitimate software vendors. MiniUpdate operators rotate three to five Azure-hosted domains per target (e.g. buisness-centeral.azurewebsites[.]net for US/Israel, PremierHealthAdvisory[.]com / PremierHealthAdvisory.azurewebsites[.]net for the UAE health-sector target, Ramiltonsfinance[.]com / Ramiltonsfinance.azurewebsites[.]net for the Middle East finance-sector target).

MiniJunk V2 is the evolved iteration of the MiniJunk family previously documented by Check Point Research in late 2025. The initial archive (Portable Platform.zip, March 2026 US campaign) bundles a legitimate Microsoft Setup.exe with three hidden files; the hidden uevmonitor.dll is sideloaded into Setup.exe and drops a renamed legitimate Microsoft binary SoftwareLicencing.exe alongside the malicious unbcl.dll into AppData, then registers a "Synchronize OS" scheduled task for persistence and displays a decoy "Meeting Room URL" prompt to justify the foreground process to the victim. SoftwareLicencing.exe sideloads unbcl.dll — a heavily obfuscated RAT padded with junk code (the family's namesake) and using mixed-bit-arithmetic / XOR string protection. The RAT decrypts five Azure-hosted C2 domains (licencemanagers.azurewebsites[.]net, LicenceSupporting.azurewebsites[.]net, PeerDistSvcManagers.azurewebsites[.]net, ThemesManagers.azurewebsites[.]net, ThemesProviderManagers.azurewebsites[.]net — all mimicking Windows service names), spoofs Microsoft Edge in its User-Agent, and communicates via three API endpoints: /api/app/check (beacon), /api/app/update (command pull), /api/app/comment (exfiltration). The US MiniJunk V2 variant includes Connection.dll with a hardcoded activation gate that no-ops the implant until after 2026-03-27 13:30:00 UTC — a deliberate sandbox-evasion timer matching the deployment window.

The critical TTP evolution across both families is the AppDomainManager hijack delivered through XML .config files. Four directives are weaponised together: <etwEnable enabled="false"/> blinds Event Tracing for Windows, the primary EDR telemetry source for managed-code execution; <bypassTrustedAppStrongNames enabled="true"/> disables strong-name signature verification so the tampered InitInstall.dll/uevmonitor.dll loads silently into a signed host process; <publisherPolicy apply="no"/> prevents the CLR from redirecting to patched assembly versions; <requiredRuntime safemode="true" imageVersion="v4.0.30319"/> pins the runtime to a known version for reliability; and <probing privatePath="./"/> forces local-directory DLL resolution to guarantee the sideload. The CLR's appDomainManagerType / appDomainManagerAssembly hooks ensure that MyAppDomainManager (the actor's custom AppDomainManager type) loads and runs first — before the host application's main() — placing the entire initial-access stage inside an environment where ETW is already disabled. Unit 42 frames this as "execution entirely within a blinded environment."

C2 infrastructure is heavily compartmentalised: 3-5 unique Azure-hosted domains per target/variant, deliberate misspellings of business names (buisness-centeral, recreuitment), sector-themed lookalike domains (health, finance, business central, transportation), and payload staging through legitimate cloud services (ONLYOFFICE DocSpace at docspace-y4cumb.onlyoffice[.]com and docspace-twpf0e.onlyoffice[.]com, and filemail[.]com). User-Agents are tuned per family: Chrome 146.0.0.0 for MiniUpdate and Edge 144.0.0.0 for MiniJunk V2. Attribution to Screening Serpens / UNC1549 is moderate-high confidence based on the identical recruitment-lure playbook, archive naming consistency ("Hiring Portal.zip"), reuse of the AppDomainManager + DLL sideloading chain across both families, junk-code padding consistent with prior MiniJunk samples, sectoral targeting aligned to IRGC priorities (aerospace, defense, telecom), and temporal alignment with the Feb 28 conflict onset.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1589 Gather Victim Identity Information
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1583.006 Web Services
- T1587.001 Malware
- T1588.003 Code Signing Certificates
- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1574.014 AppDomainManager
- T1685 Disable or Modify Tools
- T1553.002 Code Signing
- T1553 Subvert Trust Controls
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1027.001 Binary Padding
- T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1497.001 System Checks
- T1497.003 Time Based Checks
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1120 Peripheral Device Discovery
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1102.002 Bidirectional Communication
- T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Screening Serpens (UNC1549) C2 Beacon — MiniUpdate /agent/poll and MiniJunk V2 /api/app/* to Azure Lookalike Domains** (`TL-2026-0562-SPL-003`)

Detects HTTPS C2 beaconing from infected hosts to UNC1549's 2026 Azure App Service infrastructure (and .com lookalikes) using the documented MiniUpdate endpoint /agent/poll (Chrome 146.0.0.0 UA) or the MiniJunk V2 endpoints /api/app/check, /api/app/update, /api/app/comment (Edge 144.0.0.0 UA). Includes the canonical lookalike domain list (buisness-centeral, premierhealthadvisory, ramiltonsfinance, licencemanagers, peerdistsvcmanagers, themesmanagers, themesprovidermanagers) and a generic Azure-misspelling fallback.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.001, T1102.002, T1573.001, T1568
- **Data sources:** proxy, zeek_http, edr_network, dns, firewall
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=proxy (sourcetype="bro:http:json" OR sourcetype="corelight:http" OR sourcetype="pan:traffic" OR sourcetype="squid:access" OR sourcetype="ms:o365:management") (uri_path="/agent/poll" OR uri_path="/api/app/check" OR uri_path="/api/app/update" OR uri_path="/api/app/comment") (dest_host="*.azurewebsites.net" OR dest_host="buisness-centeral*" OR dest_host="premier*healthadvisory*" OR dest_host="ramilton*finance*" OR dest_host="licencemanagers*" OR dest_host="licencesupporting*" OR dest_host="peerdistsvcmanagers*" OR dest_host="themesmanagers*" OR dest_host="themesprovidermanagers*" OR dest_host="nanomatrix.azurewebsites.net" OR dest_host="quantumweave.azurewebsites.net" OR dest_host="elementshift.azurewebsites.net")
| eval malware_family=case(match(uri_path, "^/agent/poll$"), "MiniUpdate", match(uri_path, "^/api/app/(check|update|comment)$"), "MiniJunk V2", true(), "Unknown")
| eval ua_match=case(malware_family="MiniUpdate" AND match(http_user_agent, "Chrome/146\.0\.0\.0"), "expected", malware_family="MiniJunk V2" AND match(http_user_agent, "Edg/144\.0\.0\.0"), "expected", true(), "unexpected")
| stats count as beacon_count dc(dest_host) as distinct_domains values(dest_host) as domains values(uri_path) as endpoints values(http_user_agent) as user_agents min(_time) as first_beacon max(_time) as last_beacon by src_ip src_host
| where beacon_count >= 2
| eval first_beacon=strftime(first_beacon, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"), last_beacon=strftime(last_beacon, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
| eval threat_id="TL-2026-0562", actor="Screening Serpens (UNC1549)", technique="T1071.001,T1102.002"
| table first_beacon last_beacon src_ip src_host beacon_count distinct_domains domains endpoints user_agents actor technique threat_id
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
// Screening Serpens MiniUpdate + MiniJunk V2 C2 beacon detection
let miniupdate_path = dynamic(["/agent/poll"]);
let minijunk_paths = dynamic(["/api/app/check", "/api/app/update", "/api/app/comment"]);
let known_c2_domains = dynamic([
    "buisness-centeral.azurewebsites.net",
    "buisness-centeral-transportation.azurewebsites.net",
    "buisness-centeral-transportation.com",
    "premierhealthadvisory.azurewebsites.net",
    "premier-healthadvisory.azurewebsites.net",
    "premierhealthadvisory.com",
    "ramiltonsfinance.azurewebsites.net",
    "ramiltons-finance.azurewebsites.net",
    "ramiltonsfinance.com",
    "licencemanagers.azurewebsites.net",
    "licencesupporting.azurewebsites.net",
    "peerdistsvcmanagers.azurewebsites.net",
    "themesmanagers.azurewebsites.net",
    "themesprovidermanagers.azurewebsites.net",
    "nanomatrix.azurewebsites.net",
    "quantumweave.azurewebsites.net",
    "elementshift.azurewebsites.net"
]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess" or ActionType == "HttpConnectionInspected"
| extend uri = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).uri), ua = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).user_agent)
| where RemoteUrl in~ (known_c2_domains) or uri in~ (miniupdate_path) or uri in~ (minijunk_paths)
| extend MalwareFamily = case(
    uri == "/agent/poll", "MiniUpdate",
    uri in~ (minijunk_paths), "MiniJunk V2",
    RemoteUrl has_any ("buisness-centeral", "premierhealthadvisory", "ramiltonsfinance"), "MiniUpdate",
    RemoteUrl has_any ("licencemanagers", "licencesupporting", "peerdistsvcmanagers", "themesmanagers", "themesprovidermanagers"), "MiniJunk V2",
    "Unknown")
| extend UAExpected = case(
    MalwareFamily == "MiniUpdate" and ua has "Chrome/146.0.0.0", "expected",
    MalwareFamily == "MiniJunk V2" and ua has "Edg/144.0.0.0", "expected",
    "unexpected")
| summarize BeaconCount=count(), Domains=make_set(RemoteUrl), Endpoints=make_set(uri), UserAgents=make_set(ua), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, MalwareFamily
| where BeaconCount >= 2
| extend ThreatId = "TL-2026-0562", Actor = "Screening Serpens (UNC1549)"
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Screening Serpens MiniUpdate / MiniJunk V2 C2 Beacon
id: c4e21d76-8a9b-4f6c-92d3-5e7f1c8a3b62
status: experimental
description: Detects HTTPS C2 beacons matching UNC1549's 2026 MiniUpdate and MiniJunk V2 RAT signatures — the MiniUpdate /agent/poll endpoint with a Chrome 146.0.0.0 User-Agent or the MiniJunk V2 /api/app/check, /api/app/update, /api/app/comment endpoints with an Edge 144.0.0.0 User-Agent — destined to the documented Azure App Service lookalike domains and their .com twins.
references:
  - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-iran-apt-screening-serpens/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/002/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-05-22
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1071.001
  - attack.t1102.002
  - attack.t1573.001
  - attack.g1041
logsource:
  category: proxy
detection:
  miniupdate_path:
    cs-uri-stem|endswith: '/agent/poll'
    cs(User-Agent)|contains: 'Chrome/146.0.0.0'
  minijunk_paths:
    cs-uri-stem|endswith:
      - '/api/app/check'
      - '/api/app/update'
      - '/api/app/comment'
    cs(User-Agent)|contains: 'Edg/144.0.0.0'
  known_c2_domains:
    cs-host:
      - 'buisness-centeral.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'buisness-centeral-transportation.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'buisness-centeral-transportation.com'
      - 'premierhealthadvisory.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'premier-healthadvisory.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'premierhealthadvisory.com'
      - 'ramiltonsfinance.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'ramiltons-finance.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'ramiltonsfinance.com'
      - 'licencemanagers.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'licencesupporting.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'peerdistsvcmanagers.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'themesmanagers.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'themesprovidermanagers.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'nanomatrix.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'quantumweave.azurewebsites.net'
      - 'elementshift.azurewebsites.net'
  condition: miniupdate_path or minijunk_paths or known_c2_domains
falsepositives:
  - None known. Listed domains are attacker-controlled lookalikes (misspellings) with no legitimate use.
  - The /agent/poll and /api/app/* paths are not used by any common business application combined with the listed UA versions.
level: critical
```

**Known false positives:**

- Internal Azure-hosted business apps using /api/app/* paths — exclude legitimate corporate tenants from the azurewebsites.net match
- Penetration-test traffic to spun-up Azure sites mimicking the actor (suppress per known engagement)

**Tuning notes:** Maintain the lookalike domain list as a living indicator set — refresh when Unit 42 publishes new variants. The UA-version pair (Chrome 146.0.0.0 / Edg 144.0.0.0) is a strong companion signal but the implant authors will rotate UA strings; treat the path + lookalike-domain match as the durable primary signal. If you have JA3/JA4 TLS fingerprints, layer them on for additional confidence.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Screening Serpens (UNC1549) Signed Binary Sideloading [indicator] / [indicator] (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Screening Serpens (UNC1549) MiniUpdate Parent-Process Anti-Sandbox & Activation Gate (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Screening Serpens (UNC1549) DNS Lookup to Azure Lookalike C2 Infrastructure (C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Screening Serpens (UNC1549) Spear-Phishing Archive Extraction — [indicator] / [indicator] (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Screening Serpens (UNC1549) ETW Disable via AppDomainManager .config (Post-Exploitation / Defense Evasion) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Screening Serpens (UNC1549) MiniJunk V2 C2 — Edge 144 User-Agent to Azure Service-Name Lookalike (C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Screening Serpens (UNC1549) AppDomainManager Hijack — Weaponized .exe.config Drop (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Screening Serpens (UNC1549) Scheduled Task Persistence — WindowsSecurityUpdate / Synchronize OS (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 54)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `licencemanagers[.]azurewebsites[.]net`
- URL: `hxxps://2117[.]filemail[.]com/api/file/get?filekey=T0EnWQ6NugHkW_kLfDxPBEw_um6NSkg9ZwNRQ_5lrKrLLUo35pV8m3TKv1LqF3zZzdUm`
- File hash: `44f4f7aca7f1d9bfdaf7b3736934cbe19f851a707662f8f0b0c49b383e054250`

Full set of 54 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Tracking Iranian APT Screening Serpens' 2026 Espionage Campaigns](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-iran-apt-screening-serpens/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1574.014 — AppDomainManager Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/014/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1574.001 — DLL Search Order Hijacking (Sideloading)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK G1041 — UNC1549 Group Page](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1041/)
- [Mandiant: Suspected Iranian Cyber Espionage Campaign Targets Aerospace, Aviation and Defense (UNC1549)](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/iranian-cyber-espionage-aerospace-defense/)
- [Check Point Research: Nimbus Manticore Deploys New Malware Targeting Europe](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/nimbus-manticore-deploys-new-malware-targeting-europe/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0562
