Threat reportVulnerabilityTL-2026-0604
Windows Kernel CVE-2026-40369 — NtQuerySystemInformation ProbeForWrite Bypass Enables Arbitrary Kernel Memory Increment → SYSTEM LPE from Browser Sandboxes (Ori Nimron)
CVE-2026-40369 is a critical Windows kernel untrusted-pointer-dereference vulnerability (CWE-822) in ntoskrnl.exe's ExpGetProcessInformation, reachable via NtQuerySystemInformation information class 253 (SystemProcessInformationExtension). When the syscall is invoked with OutputBufferLength=0, the kernel's ProbeForWrite validation is bypassed and a user-supplied pointer is dereferenced for a write, yielding a 100%-deterministic single-syscall arbitrary kernel-memory-increment primitive.
Key facts
| Identifiers | TL-2026-0604, CVE-2026-40369 |
|---|---|
| Also known as | Ori Nimron ProbeForWrite Bypass, NtQuerySystemInformation Class 253 Zero-Length Bug, ExpGetProcessInformation Increment Primitive |
| Severity | CRITICAL |
| CVSS | 7.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) |
| Exploitation status | Public proof-of-concept exploit for a linked CVE |
| EPSS | CVE-2026-40369: 0.3% (24.6th percentile) |
| Affected products | Microsoft Windows 11 24H2; Microsoft Windows 11 25H2; Microsoft Windows 11 26H1; Microsoft Windows Server 2025 |
| Weaknesses (CWE) | CWE-822 |
| MITRE ATT&CK techniques | T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, T1012 Query Registry, T1055 Process Injection, T1057 Process Discovery, T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1106 Native API, T1134 Access Token Manipulation, T1134.001 Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft, T1134.002 Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token, T1134.004 Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing, T1189 Drive-by Compromise and 2 more in the attack flow |
| Motivation | UNKNOWN |
| Target sectors | government, financial, healthcare, technology, defense, manufacturing, education, energy, telecommunications, retail |
| Target regions | Global, North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Latin America, Africa |
| Detection rules | 9 (1 shown free) |
| Sources | 8 cited sources |
Detection coverage
As of 2026-05-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0604 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 16 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.
Free detection: CVE-2026-40369 Exploitation — NtQuerySystemInformation Class 253 Zero-Length ProbeForWrite Bypass
Detects the unique Ori Nimron trigger shape for CVE-2026-40369: NtQuerySystemInformation invoked with SystemInformationClass=253 (0xFD, SystemProcessInformationExtension) and SystemInformationLength=0. Under this exact input the kernel ExpGetProcessInformation handler skips ProbeForWrite on the user-supplied OUT pointer and then performs an InterlockedIncrement against it, yielding a single-syscall arbitrary kernel +4 primitive. Targets ETW Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls (or equivalent EDR syscall-audit feed) and scopes to browser renderer/utility child processes that have no legitimate need for SystemProcessInformationExtension.
- Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- ATT&CK: T1068, T1211, T1106
- Data sources: windows_kernel_audit_api_calls, etw, sysmon, edr_syscall_audit
- Severity: critical
- Confidence: high
Splunk SPL
index=windows sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls" syscall="NtQuerySystemInformation" SystemInformationClass=253 SystemInformationLength=0
| eval parent_lower=lower(ParentImage), image_lower=lower(Image)
| where (like(parent_lower, "%\\chrome.exe") OR like(parent_lower, "%\\msedge.exe") OR like(parent_lower, "%\\firefox.exe")) OR (like(image_lower, "%\\chrome.exe") OR like(image_lower, "%\\msedge.exe") OR like(image_lower, "%\\firefox.exe"))
| eval cve="CVE-2026-40369", primitive="ArbitraryKernelIncrement", trigger="SystemProcessInformationExtension/Length=0"
| stats count min(_time) as first_seen max(_time) as last_seen values(ProcessId) as pids values(IntegrityLevel) as integrity values(SystemInformationPtr) as kernel_ptrs by host, Image, ParentImage, cve, primitive, trigger
| where count >= 1Microsoft KQL
// CVE-2026-40369 — NtQuerySystemInformation class 253 zero-length probe (KQL)
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType in ("SyscallAudit", "ApiCallAudit", "NtQuerySystemInformationCall")
| extend Payload=parse_json(AdditionalFields)
| extend SyscallName=tostring(Payload.syscall), InfoClass=toint(Payload.SystemInformationClass), InfoLen=toint(Payload.SystemInformationLength), InfoPtr=tostring(Payload.SystemInformationPtr)
| where SyscallName == "NtQuerySystemInformation" and InfoClass == 253 and InfoLen == 0
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe") or InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessIntegrityLevel, InfoClass, InfoLen, InfoPtr, ReportId
| extend CVE="CVE-2026-40369", Primitive="ArbitraryKernelIncrement"Sigma
title: CVE-2026-40369 NtQuerySystemInformation Class 253 Zero-Length ProbeForWrite Bypass
id: a40369d1-0001-4001-8001-000000000001
status: experimental
description: Detects the Ori Nimron CVE-2026-40369 trigger — SystemProcessInformationExtension (class 253 / 0xFD) invoked with SystemInformationLength=0 from a Chromium, Edge, or Firefox renderer/utility process. This exact input shape bypasses ProbeForWrite in ntoskrnl!ExpGetProcessInformation, yielding a single-syscall arbitrary kernel memory increment primitive.
references:
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40369
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-40369
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1068/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/05/27
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1068
- attack.t1211
- attack.t1106
- cve.2026.40369
logsource:
product: windows
category: api_call
detection:
selection_syscall:
syscall: NtQuerySystemInformation
SystemInformationClass: 253
SystemInformationLength: 0
selection_browser_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\chrome.exe'
- '\msedge.exe'
- '\firefox.exe'
condition: selection_syscall and selection_browser_parent
fields:
- Image
- ParentImage
- IntegrityLevel
- SystemInformationClass
- SystemInformationLength
- SystemInformationPtr
falsepositives:
- EDR or kernel telemetry products legitimately enumerating SystemProcessInformationExtension (extremely rare from a browser renderer)
- Microsoft diagnostic tooling running with a browser parent during support sessions
level: criticalKnown false positives:
- EDR products performing kernel-mode system enumeration via class 253 from a browser-parented diagnostic helper
- Microsoft Customer Support diagnostic tools temporarily reparented under a browser session
Tuning notes: Allowlist authorized EDR vendor binaries (e.g., MsSense.exe, CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor) by SHA256 or signer if they ever invoke class 253. Exclude verified Microsoft-signed diagnostic helpers. Tighten by requiring renderer ParentImage to be a browser AND the calling Image to be a child of that browser. If you do not have native syscall telemetry, instrument with Sysmon + ETW Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Audit-API-Calls or use an EDR that exposes syscall arguments. Threshold should remain count >= 1 — a single zero-length class-253 call from a renderer is exploit-grade evidence.
- CVE-2026-40369 Exploitation Crash Telltale — ntoskrnl!ExpGetProcessInformation BugCheck · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2026-40369 Post-Exploitation — LSASS Memory Access from Browser-Descended Process · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2026-40369 C2 Egress — Long-Lived HTTPS Beacon From SYSTEM-Integrity Browser Descendant · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2026-40369 Exploitation — Anomalous NtQuerySystemInformation SystemProcessInformationExtension Call · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2026-40369 Post-Exploitation — Sudden Process Integrity Uplift to SYSTEM Without Re-Creation · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2026-40369 C2 / Implant — Cobalt Strike or Sliver Named-Pipe Created by Browser-Descended SYSTEM Process · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2026-40369 Post-Exploitation — SYSTEM-Integrity Child of Sandboxed Browser Renderer (Token Theft) · unlock with TL Creds
- CVE-2026-40369 Lateral Movement — SMB Admin Share / Remote Service Creation From Newly Elevated Browser Descendant · unlock with TL Creds
Indicators of compromise
As of 2026-05-27, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 16 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0604.
Technical analysis
Discovered by Ori Nimron and patched on 2026-05-12, the bug affects Windows 11 24H2/25H2/26H1 and Server 2025, is not gated by Win32k lockdown or integrity-level checks, and is therefore reachable from Chrome, Edge, and Firefox renderer sandboxes — making it a high-value building block for browser-escape chains that culminate in SYSTEM-level privilege escalation.
## Overview
CVE-2026-40369 is an untrusted pointer dereference (CWE-822) in the Windows kernel's ExpGetProcessInformation routine inside ntoskrnl.exe. The vulnerability is reachable through NtQuerySystemInformation when called with SystemInformationClass=253 (SystemProcessInformationExtension) and SystemInformationLength=0. Under this specific input shape, the kernel skips its ProbeForWrite validation on the SystemInformation OUT parameter and proceeds to dereference the user-supplied pointer as a write target. Because the operation performed inside the vulnerable code path is an interlocked add/increment against a counter field, the attacker obtains a deterministic, race-free, single-syscall arbitrary-kernel-memory-increment primitive.
The issue was reported by security researcher Ori Nimron and addressed by Microsoft in the May 2026 Patch Tuesday cumulative updates (build floors: 24H2 10.0.26100.8390, 25H2 10.0.26200.8390, 26H1 10.0.28000.2113, Server 2025 10.0.26100.32772). Microsoft assigned a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.8 (Local/Low complexity/Low privileges/No UI/High C-I-A); Threadlinqs Intelligence rates the threat CRITICAL because the syscall is not subject to Win32k lockdown, integrity-level checks, or browser sandbox policy restrictions, meaning a content-process compromise in any major browser can pivot directly through this primitive into a full kernel compromise without additional friction.
## Root Cause
Inside `ExpGetProcessInformation`, the SystemProcessInformationExtension (class 253) handler dispatches based on the caller-supplied `SystemInformationLength`. The intended invariant is that any non-NULL `SystemInformation` pointer must be validated with `ProbeForWrite(SystemInformation, Length, Alignment)` before any write occurs. The defective branch, however, is taken when `Length == 0`: the code skips ProbeForWrite (because the length is zero and the developer assumed no write would occur) but still performs an `InterlockedIncrement` (or equivalent atomic add) against a fixed offset inside the buffer to update an internal counter / version field. The increment is executed at `SystemInformation + offset` against the raw user pointer, which the kernel never validated. By choosing `SystemInformation` to point at any kernel virtual address, the attacker forces a 4-byte (DWORD) increment to that target.
The primitive is exceptionally clean: it is single-syscall, deterministic on every Windows build between Windows 11 24H2 RTM and 25H2 (prior to the May 2026 patch), requires no race window, no heap manipulation, no spray, no information leak prerequisite, and does not depend on any sensitive APIs that browser sandboxes block. The only constraints are (a) the write is an addition, not an arbitrary write, and (b) the offset is fixed by the SystemProcessInformationExtension layout.
## Exploitation Chain
1. **Initial Trigger.** The attacker (running in a low-privilege or sandboxed context such as a Chromium renderer) constructs a call: `NtQuerySystemInformation(0xFD /*SystemProcessInformationExtension*/, TargetKernelAddress, 0, &ReturnLength)` and obtains a +4-byte increment at `TargetKernelAddress + KnownOffset`.
2. **Bootstrapping Arbitrary Read via CmpLayerVersions.** Ori Nimron's chain corrupts the registry configuration manager's `CmpLayerVersions` table — a globally referenced kernel structure whose entries include length/pointer fields the kernel later treats as trustworthy when servicing registry layer queries. By incrementing the high bits of an entry's pointer field byte-by-byte, the attacker redirects subsequent reads through `NtQueryKey`-class APIs (or related registry hive APIs) to user-controlled memory, transforming the increment primitive into an arbitrary kernel read primitive.
3. **EPROCESS Walk & KASLR Defeat.** With arbitrary read, the attacker locates the kernel base, walks `PsActiveProcessHead` to enumerate the EPROCESS list, and identifies the System (PID 4) process and the attacker's own EPROCESS.
4. **Token Replacement / SYSTEM Privilege.** The increment primitive (now combined with the read) is used to either replace the attacker process's `Token` pointer with System's token, or to manipulate the token's `Privileges` and `IntegrityLevel` fields. The result is a SYSTEM-integrity, full-privilege process.
5. **Browser-Sandbox Reach.** Because `NtQuerySystemInformation` is not on the Win32k lockdown list, is not blocked by AppContainer / Restricted Token policies in default Chrome/Edge/Firefox sandbox profiles, and does not require an integrity check beyond the existing token, a compromised renderer can call it directly. This vulnerability therefore lifts the privilege ceiling of any RCE-in-renderer exploit from sandbox-confined to SYSTEM in a single syscall + kernel-read chain.
## Defensive Considerations
Detection should focus on (a) anomalous NtQuerySystemInformation invocations with SystemInformationClass=253 and SystemInformationLength=0 originating from browser renderer processes (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe child processes, or content/utility processes), (b) BSODs or memory-corruption symptoms following such calls on unpatched hosts, and (c) post-exploitation behaviors typical of token theft — sudden integrity-level uplift of a child renderer process, parent/child mismatches where a normally Low-integrity process spawns a SYSTEM-integrity child, and subsequent LSASS / registry hive access from previously sandboxed PIDs. EDR vendors that perform kernel-callback-based syscall monitoring (PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, ObRegisterCallbacks for token-pointer changes) can flag the token-swap stage even when the primitive itself is missed.
The definitive mitigation is the May 2026 cumulative update; no reliable runtime workaround exists short of disabling the affected browsers or running them under HVCI/VBS with the latest kernel patches applied. Windows Defender Application Guard, with its Hyper-V isolation, contains the post-exploitation blast radius but does not block the primitive itself.
MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:
Credential Access
T1003.001 OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
Discovery
T1012 Query Registry; T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery
Defense Evasion
T1055 Process Injection; T1134 Access Token Manipulation; T1211 Exploitation for Stealth
Privilege Escalation
T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation; T1134.001 Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft; T1134.002 Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token; T1134.004 Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing
Execution
T1106 Native API; T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
Initial Access
Remediation
Patches
- Microsoft Security Update KB for CVE-2026-40369 — May 2026 Patch Tuesday (2026-05-12). Build floors: Windows 11 24H2 ≥ 10.0.26100.8390; Windows 11 25H2 ≥ 10.0.26200.8390; Windows 11 26H1 ≥ 10.0.28000.2113; Windows Server 2025 ≥ 10.0.26100.32772.
- Google Chrome stable channel update (post-2026-05-12) — incorporates renderer-side mitigations and warns telemetry on suspicious syscall patterns.
- Microsoft Edge stable channel update (post-2026-05-12).
- Mozilla Firefox ESR/Stable update (post-2026-05-12).
Immediate actions
- Deploy the May 2026 cumulative update across all Windows 11 24H2/25H2/26H1 and Windows Server 2025 endpoints (minimum builds: 24H2 10.0.26100.8390, 25H2 10.0.26200.8390, 26H1 10.0.28000.2113, Server 2025 10.0.26100.32772).
- Force all major browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) to their latest stable channel and require restart after deployment to ensure sandbox brokers are running patched binaries.
- Enable Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity (HVCI) and Virtualization-Based Security (VBS) on all eligible endpoints — does not block the primitive but raises post-exploitation cost (token theft becomes detectable via Credential Guard telemetry).
- In high-assurance environments, deploy Windows Defender Application Guard or browser-in-Hyper-V isolation modes to contain renderer compromise.
Workarounds
- No reliable in-product workaround exists — the affected syscall cannot be disabled without breaking core OS functionality (Task Manager, perf counters, EDR products).
- Compensating controls: enforce browser-in-isolation (WDAG / Sandboxie+ / Hyper-V VM browsing), restrict execution of unsigned binaries, and apply WDAC to limit attacker tooling staging.
- Detect-and-respond: deploy the Sigma/SPL/KQL rules below until patching is complete.
Longer-term hardening
- Adopt EDR products with kernel-callback-based token integrity monitoring (ObRegisterCallbacks on EPROCESS Token field changes) capable of detecting cross-process token swaps independent of the kernel primitive used.
- Standardize on Microsoft-signed browsers and enforce application allowlisting via Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to prevent untrusted browser builds from reaching the syscall.
- Implement EDR detections for anomalous NtQuerySystemInformation invocations from non-system, non-EDR processes (especially child renderer processes) and for sudden integrity-level uplifts on existing PIDs.
- Subscribe to MSRC and CISA KEV feeds and integrate same-day patch SLAs for kernel LPEs with browser-sandbox reachability.
Affected and fixed versions
- Microsoft — Windows 11 24H2
Vulnerable versions: x64 < 10.0.26100.8390; arm64 < 10.0.26100.8390
Fixed in: 10.0.26100.8390 - Microsoft — Windows 11 25H2
Vulnerable versions: x64 < 10.0.26200.8390; arm64 < 10.0.26200.8390
Fixed in: 10.0.26200.8390 - Microsoft — Windows 11 26H1
Vulnerable versions: x64 < 10.0.28000.2113; arm64 < 10.0.28000.2113
Fixed in: 10.0.28000.2113 - Microsoft — Windows Server 2025
Vulnerable versions: < 10.0.26100.32772
Fixed in: 10.0.26100.32772
Timeline
- Security researcher Ori Nimron identifies anomalous behavior in NtQuerySystemInformation class 253 during kernel fuzzing of SystemProcessInformationExtension code paths.
- Nimron isolates the ProbeForWrite bypass: ExpGetProcessInformation skips pointer validation when SystemInformationLength == 0, then performs an InterlockedIncrement against the user-supplied pointer — confirming arbitrary kernel memory increment primitive.
- Coordinated disclosure: Nimron submits the vulnerability and PoC chain (CmpLayerVersions corruption → arbitrary read → EPROCESS walk → token replacement) to the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC).
- MITRE/Microsoft assign CVE-2026-40369 and classify the weakness as CWE-822 (Untrusted Pointer Dereference).
- Microsoft releases fix in the May 2026 Patch Tuesday cumulative update for Windows 11 24H2 (10.0.26100.8390), 25H2 (10.0.26200.8390), 26H1 (10.0.28000.2113), and Server 2025 (10.0.26100.32772). NVD publishes the CVE with CVSS 7.8.
- NVD completes analysis: vulnerability marked as Analyzed with CVSS v3.1 vector AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H and impact 5.9, exploitability 1.8.
- Cyber Security News publishes Nimron's technical writeup, revealing browser-sandbox reachability and the full exploit chain — elevating community awareness and detection-rule development urgency.
- As of 2026-05-29, CVE-2026-40369 was patched by Microsoft on 2026-05-12 with no in-the-wild exploitation reported and no CISA KEV listing. It remains a live concern because Ori Nimron's full weaponized exploit is public on GitHub, Microsoft rated it "Exploitation More Likely," and unpatched Win11/Server 2025 hosts stay browser-sandbox-escape exploitable.
Sources cited
- NVD — CVE-2026-40369 NVD (NIST) · Advisory · 2026-05-14
- Microsoft MSRC — CVE-2026-40369 Update Guide Microsoft Security Response Center · Vendor report · 2026-05-12
- MITRE CWE-822 — Untrusted Pointer Dereference MITRE · Research · 2026-05-12
- Microsoft Docs — NtQuerySystemInformation Routine Microsoft · Vendor report · 2026-05-12
- Microsoft Docs — ProbeForWrite Kernel Routine Microsoft · Vendor report · 2026-05-12
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation MITRE · Research · 2026-05-12
- MITRE ATT&CK — T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft MITRE · Research · 2026-05-12
- Cyber Security News — Windows Kernel Vulnerability Allows Attackers to Modify Kernel Memory Counters cybersecuritynews.com · Blog · 2026-05-27
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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 8 sources; published ; last updated —.