# GreyVibe — Russian-Aligned AI-Assisted Espionage vs Ukraine: LegionRelay/PhantomRelay PowerShell RATs & FallSpy Android Spyware (WithSecure)

> GreyVibe is a likely Russian-aligned threat cluster targeting Ukrainian and Ukraine-related military, government, civilian, and business entities since at least August 2025 (disclosed by WithSecure in January 2026). The actor makes extensive use of generative-AI tools (ChatGPT, Google Gemini, Ideogram AI) to mass-produce convincing phishing lures and to assist development of custom obfuscators and malware, deploying the LegionRelay and PhantomRelay PowerShell RATs on Windows and the FallSpy spyware on Android across five named campaigns.

- **Published:** 2026-05-28T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-05-28T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0622
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-greyvibe-legionrelay-rat-tl-2026-0622.webp?v=f107e349 (Threadlinqs threat intel: GreyVibe LegionRelay and FallSpy: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0622) — High severity, 34 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0622
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** GreyVibe (Russia)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 34 (3 shown free below)

## Description

GreyVibe is a threat cluster, tracked by WithSecure and disclosed publicly in 2026, that conducts espionage-oriented operations against Ukrainian and Ukraine-related organizations across the military, government, civilian, and business sectors. Activity dates to at least August 2025 and continued into 2026. Attribution to a Russian-speaking, likely Russian-aligned operator rests on the language used in the malware control panels, comments in code artifacts, and command-and-control (C2) server clocks configured to UTC+3 (Moscow time). WithSecure assesses the group lacks the operational discipline of a mature nation-state service — notably uploading development and test samples to public scanning platforms — and likely blends state-aligned tasking with current or former cybercriminal operators. A unique ISO builder links early/test samples to former TrickBot members (UAC-0098), who targeted Ukraine at the outset of the full-scale invasion.

A defining trait of GreyVibe is the operational use of generative AI. WithSecure attributes the volume, diversity, and polish of the actor's lures to ChatGPT, Google Gemini, and Ideogram AI, which were used to generate realistic decoy documents, imagery, and social-engineering content, and to assist in writing malware and the group's custom obfuscators. The custom tooling family includes the LOOKVALPS (PowerShell) and LOOKVALJS / TEASOUPJS (JavaScript) loaders and the DAYLIGHT script obfuscator — code WithSecure assesses was likely produced with LLM assistance.

The intrusion set is organized into five campaigns. PhantomMail uses spear-phishing emails that deliver malicious ZIP/RAR archives via Google Drive and 4sync links, opening decoy PDFs or fake error messages while staging loaders; observed lures impersonated Ukrainian government, emergency (DSNS), telecom, and energy (Centrenergo) entities, with Ukrainian-language filenames such as 'форма акта перевірки.XLS.js'. PhantomClick employs fake CAPTCHA/ClickFix pages disguised as Zoom (zoomconference.app/.click) and LAPAS (lapas.live) sites, using bogus Cloudflare verification prompts to trick victims into pasting and running self-infecting commands. PrincessClub stands up fake Ukrainian adult/dating websites that deliver FallSpy Android spyware and PhantomRelay/LegionRelay Windows malware, operated with fake female Telegram personas (e.g. vikagogogo111) and WebRTC-based live video calls that capture victim audio/video. DroneLink uses fake Ukrainian military charity sites themed around FPV drones and UAVs (frontforce.org, ukrguard.org), sharing infrastructure and tooling with PrincessClub. Nebo presents fake Russian military communications (СПО НЕБО) login pages to convince Ukrainian military personnel they are accessing a Russian military terminal.

LegionRelay is a PowerShell RAT supporting file theft, screenshot capture, browser credential theft, Telegram and WhatsApp data exfiltration, and RDP access setup. It persists via scheduled tasks masquerading as legitimate software ('Adobe working', 'AMD Checker', 'BackUp checker') and drops its client to paths such as C:\ProgramData\AMD\amd.ps1. It uses a Telegram dead-drop resolver (t.me/s/sdgsersergser) and HTTP C2 over port 8000 (e.g. 194.87.128.243:8000).

PhantomRelay is a second PowerShell RAT supporting system fingerprinting, dynamic script loading, and arbitrary PowerShell/Windows command execution. Observed in V1, V2, and a 'Lite' variant, it persists via watchdog scripts (SysCheckupService.ps1, RzUpdateManager.ps1) and scheduled tasks impersonating system/Razer services, staging under %ProgramData%\WindowSystem and %LOCALAPPDATA%\Razer Update. PhantomRelayLite has also been seen in broader cybercrime activity, including Teams vishing and KongTuke-style delivery, indicating tool overlap between espionage and criminal use. RAT client and watchdog scripts are frequently obfuscated with DAYLIGHT.

FallSpy is Android spyware used in the PrincessClub and Nebo campaigns purely for intelligence collection: it harvests contact lists, call logs, device and network information, location data, media files, and SIM information. It is delivered as themed APKs (dating, mapping, 'Elite Dance Studio', cloud-storage, and fake NEBO military-terminal apps). A cryptocurrency miner was additionally deployed on some compromised Windows machines, indicating opportunistic monetization alongside espionage. Collectively GreyVibe presents a cross-platform (Windows + Android), AI-accelerated threat to Ukrainian defense and government targets, with a large, well-documented IOC footprint published by WithSecure.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1587 Develop Capabilities
- T1588 Obtain Capabilities
- T1585 Establish Accounts
- T1566 Phishing
- T1189 Drive-by Compromise
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1204 User Execution
- T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1036 Masquerading
- T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1113 Screen Capture
- T1123 Audio Capture
- T1125 Video Capture
- T1119 Automated Collection
- T1071 Application Layer Protocol
- T1102 Web Service
- T1219 Remote Access Tools
- T1021 Remote Services
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1496 Resource Hijacking
- T1636 Protected User Data
- T1430 Location Tracking
- T1533 Data from Local System

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**GreyVibe PowerShell C2 — TCP/8000 HTTP Beacon, Telegram Dead-Drop & RDP Enablement — C2/Lateral Movement** (`TL-2026-0622-SPL-003`)

Detects GreyVibe LegionRelay/PhantomRelay command-and-control: PowerShell-initiated outbound connections to documented HTTP C2 over the non-standard TCP/8000 (194.87.128.243, 89.125.189.118, 91.149.221.124), PowerShell resolving the Telegram dead-drop resolver t.me/s/sdgsersergser, and the RAT enabling RDP (fDenyTSConnections) to support hands-on lateral movement.

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1071.001, T1102.001, T1041, T1021.001
- **Data sources:** sysmon, edr, proxy, firewall
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" (EventCode=3 Image="*\\powershell.exe" (DestinationPort=8000 OR DestinationIp="194.87.128.243" OR DestinationIp="89.125.189.118" OR DestinationIp="91.149.221.124")) OR (EventCode=1 Image="*\\powershell.exe" (CommandLine="*t.me/s/*" OR CommandLine="*sdgsersergser*" OR CommandLine="*fDenyTSConnections*"))
| eval c2_indicator=case(DestinationPort=8000 OR like(DestinationIp,"194.87.128.243"),"HTTP-C2-TCP8000", like(CommandLine,"%t.me/s/%") OR like(CommandLine,"%sdgsersergser%"),"Telegram-DeadDrop-Resolver", like(CommandLine,"%fDenyTSConnections%"),"RDP-Enablement", true(),"GreyVibe-C2")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DestinationIp) as dest_ips values(DestinationPort) as dest_ports values(CommandLine) as command_lines by host, User, c2_indicator
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| `comment("GreyVibe TL-2026-0622 — LegionRelay/PhantomRelay C2 and RDP lateral movement")`
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where RemotePort == 8000 or RemoteIP in ("194.87.128.243", "89.125.189.118", "91.149.221.124")
| extend C2Indicator = "HTTP-C2-TCP8000"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, C2Indicator, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| union (
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") or FileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("t.me/s/", "sdgsersergser", "fDenyTSConnections")
    | extend C2Indicator = iff(ProcessCommandLine has "fDenyTSConnections", "RDP-Enablement", "Telegram-DeadDrop-Resolver")
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, C2Indicator, RemoteIP = "", RemotePort = 0, RemoteUrl = "", InitiatingProcessCommandLine = ProcessCommandLine
)
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: GreyVibe PowerShell C2 Beacon TCP/8000 and Telegram Dead-Drop Resolver
id: c3f5e0d4-6b7a-4e9c-a023-4f5a6b1c3e66
status: experimental
description: Detects GreyVibe LegionRelay/PhantomRelay C2 via PowerShell outbound to TCP/8000 documented C2 hosts and Telegram dead-drop resolver access (WithSecure, Jan 2026).
references:
    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/greyvibe-hackers-use-chatgpt-gemini-to-power-cyberattacks/
    - https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/iocs/blob/master/GREYVIBE/greyvibe_iocs.csv
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/05/28
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.t1102.001
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1041
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection_port:
        Initiated: 'true'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        DestinationPort: 8000
    selection_ip:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationIp:
            - '194.87.128.243'
            - '89.125.189.118'
            - '91.149.221.124'
    condition: selection_port or selection_ip
falsepositives:
    - Internal development services bound to TCP/8000 contacted by PowerShell (verify destination is external/untrusted)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Internal dev/test web services listening on TCP/8000 contacted by PowerShell (confirm the destination IP is external and untrusted)
- Legitimate access to t.me by PowerShell-based automation (rare)

**Tuning notes:** Refresh the C2 IP list from the WithSecure GreyVibe IOC feed regularly. Alert on TCP/8000 from powershell.exe to ANY external host even if the IP is not yet known-bad. Pair with registry monitoring of HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\fDenyTSConnections to catch RDP enablement preceding lateral movement.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- GreyVibe RAT Browser Credential & Screenshot Collection — Exploitation/Collection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GreyVibe PhantomRelay Watchdog & System Fingerprinting — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GreyVibe Phishing-Lure & ClickFix Loader Network Activity — C2/Delivery (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GreyVibe ClickFix/Fake-CAPTCHA Clipboard Execution Chain — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GreyVibe DAYLIGHT-Obfuscated PowerShell & Dynamic IEX Script Loading — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GreyVibe FallSpy Android Spyware Collection & C2 Exfil — C2/Collection (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GreyVibe LegionRelay/PhantomRelay PowerShell RAT Execution from Masqueraded Path — Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- GreyVibe Scheduled-Task Persistence Masquerading as AMD/Razer/Adobe Services — Post-Exploitation (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 34)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- IP address: `193.233.23[.]81`
- Domain: `zoomconference[.]app`
- File hash: `63047083db26ec6a8aa2d0d008ca4c067855a952a89f9e3e878b2215e26841cf`

Full set of 34 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [GreyVibe hackers use ChatGPT, Gemini to power cyberattacks](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/greyvibe-hackers-use-chatgpt-gemini-to-power-cyberattacks/)
- [WithSecure Labs — GreyVibe IOCs](https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/iocs/blob/master/GREYVIBE/greyvibe_iocs.csv)
- [WithSecure Labs (vendor research portal)](https://labs.withsecure.com/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK — Enterprise Matrix](https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK — Mobile Matrix](https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/mobile/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK — T1059.001 PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0622
