# Famous Chollima (DPRK) Compromises Packagist Package roberts/leads dev Branch — tailwind.js Node.js Loader Uses TRON/Aptos/BNB Blockchain Dead-Drop C2 (EtherHiding-style)

> North Korean state-sponsored actor Famous Chollima compromised the development branch (dev-drewroberts/feature/test-case) of the legitimate PHP Packagist package roberts/leads, hiding an obfuscated JavaScript loader inside a fake tailwind.js Tailwind CSS config concealed behind off-screen whitespace. Under Node.js the loader fetches XOR-encrypted second-stage payloads from public blockchain dead-drops on TRON, Aptos, and BNB Smart Chain (no traditional C2 domain), decrypts them with hardcoded XOR keys, runs them via eval(), and spawns a hidden child process (windowsHide:true) that harvests .env files, SSH keys, cloud/CI secrets, and tokens. Developers are lured into installing the poisoned dev version through fake interview and onboarding tasks. Socket.dev disclosed it and the malicious dev version has been removed from Packagist.

- **Published:** 2026-06-01T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-06-01T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0638
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-famous-chollima-packagist-compromise-tl-2026-0638.webp?v=f395717a (Threadlinqs threat intel: WageMole Packagist Dev-Branch Loader: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0638) — High severity, 22 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0638
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** SUPPLY_CHAIN
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** WageMole (North Korea)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 22 (3 shown free below)

## Description

On 2026-06-01 Socket.dev disclosed a targeted software supply-chain compromise attributed to the North Korean state-sponsored intrusion set Famous Chollima (the developer-lure cluster also tracked as Contagious Interview, Wagemole, Nickel Tapestry, Purple Bravo, Storm-1877, and UNC5342/UNC5267, operating within the broader Lazarus collective). Rather than publishing a typosquatted package, the actor compromised a development branch of a legitimate, trusted PHP package — roberts/leads — by pushing a malicious commit (6c5c3c7655ce76399af11126b7e9a9058eb2e45d) to the branch drewroberts/feature/test-case, surfaced on Packagist as the installable version dev-drewroberts/feature/test-case. This keeps the published stable releases clean while weaponizing the dev channel that targeted developers are socially engineered into installing.

The malicious logic is hidden in a file named tailwind.js, masquerading as a Tailwind CSS configuration. The attacker placed the obfuscated JavaScript far to the right of the line, behind a large block of blank space so it remains invisible during casual code review or diff inspection. The file is benign to a CSS toolchain but, when evaluated by Node.js during a build step, transforms into a full malware loader. The loader carries hardcoded XOR keys — first stage 2[gWfGj;<:-93Z^C and second stage m6:tTh^D)cBz?NM] — and an embedded campaign marker, global['!']='9-0264-2', a known identifier tied to prior Famous Chollima operations and the basis for linking this activity to the DEV#POPPER RAT, OmniStealer, and BeaverTail malware families.

The defining tradecraft is the command-and-control mechanism: instead of contacting an attacker-owned domain or IP, the loader reads attacker-staged data directly from public blockchain ledgers — TRON, Aptos, and BNB Smart Chain — using each chain's public RPC/read APIs. This is an EtherHiding-style dead-drop resolver: the encrypted second-stage payload is stored inside blockchain transaction records, the loader retrieves the blob, XOR-decrypts it with the hardcoded keys, and executes the result in-process via eval(). On TRON the first-stage dead-drop is wallet TMfKQEd7TJJa5xNZJZ2Lep838vrzrs7mAP and the second-stage is TXfxHUet9pJVU1BgVkBAbrES4YUc1nGzcG; on Aptos the first-stage fallback account is 0xbe037400670fbf1c32364f762975908dc43eeb38759263e7dfcdabc76380811e and the second-stage fallback is 0x3f0e5781d0855fb460661ac63257376db1941b2bb522499e4757ecb3ebd5dce3. Because the payloads live on decentralized ledgers, the infrastructure cannot be domain-blocked, sinkholed, or taken down, and reads blend in as ordinary Web3/RPC traffic.

Post-execution, the loader spawns a hidden process via child_process.spawn with windowsHide set to true to avoid a visible console window, then the staged payload enumerates and exfiltrates developer secrets: environment variables holding cloud credentials and CI/CD tokens, .env files, SSH private keys, and other stored tokens. This is consistent with Famous Chollima's financially motivated objective — credential and cryptocurrency theft to generate sanctions-evading revenue for the DPRK — and with the group's evolution from inserting fake employees into companies to luring individual engineers with fake job offers, technical assessments, and onboarding tasks. The campaign was deliberately scoped to target one developer at a time rather than cause noisy, widespread infection.

The combination of (1) compromise of a trusted package's dev branch, (2) loader concealment behind whitespace in a fake build-tool config, (3) blockchain dead-drop C2 across three chains with XOR-encrypted multi-stage payloads, and (4) eval()-based in-memory execution makes this both highly evasive and operationally resilient. There is no CVE; the vulnerability is trust in unpinned dev-branch dependencies and execution of untrusted build configuration. Following Socket's disclosure the malicious dev version was removed from Packagist, but the staged blockchain payloads and the actor's broader infrastructure remain available, and the TTP pattern is expected to recur against other ecosystems.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1586 Compromise Accounts
- T1585 Establish Accounts
- T1608 Stage Capabilities
- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
- T1566 Phishing
- T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1204 User Execution
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1564 Hide Artifacts
- T1620 Reflective Code Loading
- T1552 Unsecured Credentials
- T1083 File and Directory Discovery
- T1005 Data from Local System
- T1102 Web Service
- T1573 Encrypted Channel
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Node Hidden Child Process + Developer Secret Harvest (Post-Exploitation)** (`TL-2026-0638-SPL-002`)

Detects a Node.js parent spawning a hidden child process (Start-Process -WindowStyle Hidden / windowsHide:true analogue) and touching developer credential material — .env, id_rsa, .ssh, .aws, .npmrc, CI tokens. This is the post-exploitation secret-harvest stage of the Famous Chollima tailwind.js loader after it XOR-decrypts and eval()s the blockchain second stage (DEV#POPPER / OmniStealer / BeaverTail).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1564.003, T1140, T1620, T1552.001, T1552.004, T1005
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security, edr
- **Severity:** critical
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

```spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 ParentImage="*\\node.exe" (CommandLine="*.env*" OR CommandLine="*id_rsa*" OR CommandLine="*id_ed25519*" OR CommandLine="*.ssh*" OR CommandLine="*.aws*" OR CommandLine="*.npmrc*" OR CommandLine="*credentials*") | eval hidden_window=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)-WindowStyle\s+Hidden") OR match(CommandLine,"(?i)CREATE_NO_WINDOW") OR match(CommandLine,"(?i)windowsHide"),1,0) | eval secret_access=if(match(CommandLine,"(?i)\.env|id_rsa|id_ed25519|\.ssh|\.aws|\.npmrc|credentials"),1,0) | where secret_access=1 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime values(CommandLine) as child_cmdlines values(Image) as child_images by host, User, ParentImage | convert ctime(firstTime) | sort - count
```

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
let secretFiles = dynamic([".env", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", ".ssh", ".aws", ".npmrc", "credentials"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe", "node")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (secretFiles)
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("WindowStyle Hidden", "CREATE_NO_WINDOW", "windowsHide")
| join kind=leftouter (
    DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(24h)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe", "node")
    | where FileName has_any (secretFiles)
    | summarize SecretFilesTouched = make_set(FolderPath, 20) by DeviceId
) on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SecretFilesTouched
| sort by Timestamp desc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Node-Spawned Hidden Child Process Reading Developer Secrets (DEV#POPPER / BeaverTail — Campaign 9-0264-2)
id: 6276071e-3203-4f2f-a8c6-7db1176de636
status: experimental
description: Detects a Node.js process spawning a hidden child (child_process.spawn windowsHide:true / CREATE_NO_WINDOW) and accessing developer credential material (.env, id_rsa, .ssh, cloud/CI tokens), the post-exploitation secret-harvest behavior of the Famous Chollima tailwind.js loader after XOR-decrypting and eval()-ing a blockchain dead-drop second stage.
references:
    - https://cybersecuritynews.com/famous-chollima-hackers-target-php-developers/
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/adversaries/famous-chollima/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/01
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1564.003
    - attack.t1140
    - attack.t1620
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1552.001
    - attack.t1552.004
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1005
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\\node.exe'
            - '\\node'
    selection_secret:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.env'
            - 'id_rsa'
            - '.ssh'
            - 'id_ed25519'
            - 'credentials'
            - '.aws'
            - '.npmrc'
    condition: selection_parent and selection_secret
falsepositives:
    - dotenv-cli, ssh-agent helpers, or deployment scripts legitimately launched by a Node build reading .env. Correlate with the build-config trigger and blockchain-RPC detections before escalating.
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- dotenv-cli, ssh-agent, or deployment scripts legitimately launched by a Node build reading .env
- Secret-management tooling invoked from Node during authorized CI runs

**Tuning notes:** Exclude sanctioned secret-management binaries and known CI service accounts. Treat as critical when the same node parent also triggered SPL-001 (build-config execution) and SPL-003 (blockchain RPC); a node parent reading id_rsa with a hidden window and no approved use case should page immediately.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Build-Tool Config Code Execution via Node — Defender (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Node Hidden Child + Credential File Access — Defender (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Node Blockchain RPC Beaconing — EtherHiding Dead-Drop C2 Defender (C2/Exfil) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma — Node Loader From Build-Tool Config (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma — Node Hidden Child Reading Developer Secrets (Post-Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Sigma — Node Outbound to Blockchain RPC (EtherHiding Dead-Drop C2) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- [indicator] Node Loader Trigger — Build-Tool Config Execution (Exploitation) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Node Outbound to Blockchain RPC — EtherHiding Dead-Drop C2 (C2/Exfil) (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 22)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- File hash: `96afdba882046385242cbed46871e41147c8055c5d9eff7460847b2c01a77dc3`
- File hash: `522b28a2f78771715497ba53729d4ab9a50e982322c391379f3bddf7c8cb363f`
- File hash: `6c5c3c7655ce76399af11126b7e9a9058eb2e45d`

Full set of 22 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Famous Chollima Hackers Target PHP Developers Using Compromised Packagist Package](https://cybersecuritynews.com/famous-chollima-hackers-target-php-developers/)
- [Affected Packagist package — roberts/leads](https://packagist.org/packages/roberts/leads)
- [Affected repository — github.com/roberts/leads](https://github.com/roberts/leads)
- [Famous Chollima Adversary Profile — CrowdStrike](https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/adversaries/famous-chollima/)
- [Socket.dev Threat Research — DPRK developer-targeting supply-chain campaigns](https://socket.dev/blog/malicious-postinstall-hook-found-across-700-github-repos)
- [North Korea Weaponizes Blockchain (EtherHiding) for Stealth Hacks, Poses as Job Recruiters](https://cryptonews.com/news/north-korea-weaponizes-blockchain-for-stealth-hacks-poses-as-job-recruiters/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0638
