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Threat reportSupply ChainTL-2026-0641

codexui-android npm Supply Chain Attack — OpenAI Codex Auth Token Theft via sentry.anyclaw[.]store (friuns2 / BrutalStrike)

highACTIVE

The npm package codexui-android (27,000-29,000 weekly downloads), a remote web UI for OpenAI Codex by maintainer 'friuns'/'friuns2' (Igor Levochkin), was trojanized. From version 0.1.82, dist-cli/index.js reads ~/.codex/auth.json on module load, XOR-encrypts it with key 'anyclaw2026', base64-encodes it, and POSTs the full OAuth blob (access_token, refresh_token, id_token, account_id) to sentry.anyclaw[.]store/startlog.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0641
Also known ascodexui-android token theft, anyclaw Codex token stealer
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsfriuns2 (npm) codexui-android (npm package); BrutalStrike (Google Play) OpenClaw Codex Claude AI Agent (gptos.intelligence.assistant); BrutalStrike (Google Play) Codex (codex.app); OpenAI OpenAI Codex (auth.json OAuth tokens)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-506, CWE-522, CWE-1357, CWE-829
AttributionBrutalStrike (medium confidence)
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1005 Data from Local System, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036 Masquerading, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, T1071 Application Layer Protocol, T1195 Supply Chain Compromise, T1204 User Execution, T1528 Steal Application Access Token, T1552 Unsecured Credentials, T1560 Archive Collected Data, T1573 Encrypted Channel and 5 more in the attack flow
MotivationFINANCIAL
Target sectorstechnology, software-development, ai-ml, individual-developers, devops
Target regionsGlobal
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources7 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0641 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 17 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: codexui-android Token Stealer — C2/Exfiltration (SPL)

Detects the command-and-control/exfiltration phase of TL-2026-0641: the outbound HTTPS POST of the stolen, XOR+base64-encoded auth.json to the /startlog endpoint on *.anyclaw.store, and/or any request carrying the distinctive codexui/{version} User-Agent (a Sentry-telemetry masquerade fronted by Cloudflare).

Splunk SPL

index=proxy (sourcetype="squid:access" OR sourcetype="pan:traffic" OR sourcetype="zscalernss-web" OR sourcetype="bluecoat:proxysg:access:syslog" OR sourcetype="stream:http") (dest_host="*.anyclaw.store" OR dest_host="anyclaw.store" OR url="*anyclaw.store*" OR http_user_agent="codexui/*" OR uri_path="/startlog") | stats count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime values(url) AS urls values(http_user_agent) AS user_agents values(http_method) AS methods by src_ip dest_host | where (like(user_agents,"codexui/%") OR like(urls,"%anyclaw.store%")) | sort - count

Microsoft KQL

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl has "anyclaw.store" or RemoteUrl endswith "/startlog"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","node","pnpm.exe","python.exe","powershell.exe","curl.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc

Sigma

title: anyclaw Codex Token Exfiltration — sentry.anyclaw.store/startlog
id: a1f0c641-1003-4e21-9b51-0a1b2c3d4e03
status: experimental
description: Detects the credential exfiltration HTTPS POST of TL-2026-0641 — an outbound request to the /startlog endpoint on *.anyclaw.store and/or a request bearing the distinctive codexui/{version} User-Agent (Sentry-telemetry masquerade fronted by Cloudflare).
references:
    - https://www.aikido.dev/blog/codex-remote-ui-steals-ai-tokens
    - https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/openai-codex-authentication-tokens.html
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026/06/01
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1041
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1573.001
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    selection_host:
        cs-host|endswith: 'anyclaw.store'
    selection_uri:
        c-uri|contains: '/startlog'
    selection_ua:
        cs-User-Agent|startswith: 'codexui/'
    condition: (selection_host and selection_uri) or selection_ua
falsepositives:
    - None expected; anyclaw.store is attacker-controlled and the codexui/ User-Agent is unique to the malware
level: critical

Known false positives:

  • None expected — anyclaw.store is attacker-controlled and the codexui/ User-Agent is unique to the malware

Tuning notes: 172.64.80.1 is a shared Cloudflare anycast IP fronting the domain — match on hostname/SNI and the User-Agent, NOT the IP, to avoid blocking unrelated Cloudflare-hosted sites. Add *.anyclaw.store to DNS/proxy egress blocklists and alert on first-seen resolution of the domain.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • [indicator] Token Stealer — Exploitation (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Token Stealer — Post-Exploitation (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Token Stealer — C2/Exfiltration (KQL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Token Stealer — Exploitation (SIG) · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Token Stealer — Post-Exploitation (SIG) · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Token Stealer — C2/Exfiltration (SIG) · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Token Stealer — Exploitation (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds
  • [indicator] Token Stealer — Post-Exploitation (SPL) · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-01, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 17 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0641.

Sample indicators (2 of 17)

  • IP address: 172.64.80[.]1
  • Domain: anyclaw[.]store

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 17 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

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Technical analysis

Because the Codex refresh_token does not expire, the attacker gains persistent, silent account impersonation. The same actor ships Android apps (50,000+ installs) that drag the unpinned malicious npm build onto devices via a Termux/PRoot Node.js userland.

codexui-android is an npm package providing a remote web/Android UI for OpenAI Codex, published by maintainer 'friuns' (also 'friuns2', identified as Igor Levochkin; GitHub/Play Store developer alias 'BrutalStrike'). The package first appeared as version 0.1.72 on 2026-04-10 and accumulated 27,000-29,000 weekly downloads. Approximately one month after initial release, beginning with version 0.1.82, the maintainer introduced credential-stealing code into the npm distribution only — the malicious logic is absent from the public GitHub repository (friuns2/codex-mobile), present exclusively in the published npm tarball's compiled dist-cli output.

The malicious behavior triggers at module load with zero user interaction. The CLI entrypoint dist-cli/index.js begins with `import "./chunk-PUR7OUAG.js";`, which fires before any application logic. That chunk reads the OpenAI Codex credential file at ~/.codex/auth.json (honoring the $CODEX_HOME environment variable when set). The full authentication JSON — containing access_token, refresh_token, id_token, and the account identifier — is XOR-encrypted with the hardcoded ASCII key 'anyclaw2026', then base64-encoded, and exfiltrated via an HTTPS POST to https://sentry.anyclaw[.]store/startlog. The request carries a User-Agent header of the form `codexui/{package_version}`. All errors are silently suppressed so the theft is invisible to the user. The exfiltration domain is deliberately named to masquerade as legitimate Sentry telemetry traffic, reducing the chance of analyst or proxy suspicion.

The stolen refresh_token is the critical asset: OpenAI Codex refresh tokens do not expire, so a single capture grants the attacker indefinite, silent impersonation of the victim's Codex/OpenAI account — including the ability to mint fresh access tokens, consume the victim's API quota/billing, and read code and prompts sent to Codex.

Delivery is multi-platform. The actor's Android app 'OpenClaw Codex Claude AI Agent' (package id gptos.intelligence.assistant, 50,000+ installs, ~26 MB) extracts a Termux-derived Linux userland and runs Node.js under a PRoot sandbox, then executes `pnpm add codexui-android@latest` with no version pinning — so every install/update silently pulls the trojanized build. The in-app Codex sign-in writes auth.json inside that sandbox; the package then reads it back out and exfiltrates it. A second paid app, 'Codex' (package id codex.app, 10,000+ installs), ships the identical exfiltration chain, uses the Kotlin namespace app.anyclaw.*, and registers the OAuth callback scheme anyclaw://auth/codex-callback.

The controlling domain anyclaw[.]store was registered on 2026-04-12, just two days after the first package version and weeks before the malicious code shipped — undermining the maintainer's later claim that the npm account had been compromised by a third party. Aikido Security discovered and publicly disclosed the campaign on 2026-05-27; the following day the author claimed in a GitHub issue (friuns2/codex-mobile #198) to have lost npm account access, a response later edited/deleted. The Hacker News and multiple outlets reported the campaign on 2026-06-01. At time of reporting the malicious package versions remained live on npm. This is classified as malware/supply-chain compromise rather than a CVE-class vulnerability; no CVE is assigned.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Collection

T1005 Data from Local System; T1560 Archive Collected Data

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036 Masquerading

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Execution

T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter; T1204 User Execution

Command and Control

T1071 Application Layer Protocol; T1573 Encrypted Channel

Initial Access

T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

Credential Access

T1528 Steal Application Access Token; T1552 Unsecured Credentials

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1586 Compromise Accounts; T1587 Develop Capabilities; T1608 Stage Capabilities

defense-impairment

T1685 Disable or Modify Tools

Remediation

Patches

  • No vendor patch — remove the malicious package. Use only the clean upstream GitHub source if rebuilding, never the npm dist-cli build of affected versions

Immediate actions

  • Uninstall codexui-android immediately; treat any host that ran version >= 0.1.82 as compromised
  • Revoke and rotate all OpenAI/Codex credentials: sign out everywhere and re-authenticate to invalidate the stolen refresh_token, then delete and recreate ~/.codex/auth.json
  • Rotate any OpenAI API keys associated with the affected account and review billing/usage for anomalous Codex activity
  • Uninstall the Android apps 'OpenClaw Codex Claude AI Agent' (gptos.intelligence.assistant) and 'Codex' (codex.app)
  • Block sentry.anyclaw[.]store and *.anyclaw[.]store at DNS/proxy/egress perimeter

Workarounds

  • Set $CODEX_HOME to a directory outside any untrusted package's reach and audit file access to auth.json
  • Run Codex auth flows on hosts that do not execute community npm CLI tooling

Longer-term hardening

  • Pin npm/pnpm dependency versions and use lockfiles with integrity hashes; disable automatic 'latest' resolution in build/runtime scripts
  • Enforce npm install with --ignore-scripts where feasible and review packages that read credential files at module-load time
  • Deploy egress filtering and DNS monitoring to flag credential-file reads followed by outbound POSTs to newly-registered domains
  • Adopt short-lived/rotating tokens and bind tokens to device/session where the provider supports it

Affected and fixed versions

  • friuns2 (npm) — codexui-android (npm package)
    Vulnerable versions: 0.1.82; >=0.1.82 (malicious dist-cli build)
    Fixed in: clean GitHub source friuns2/codex-mobile (no malicious code)
  • BrutalStrike (Google Play) — OpenClaw Codex Claude AI Agent (gptos.intelligence.assistant)
    Vulnerable versions: all builds pulling codexui-android@latest
  • BrutalStrike (Google Play) — Codex (codex.app)
    Vulnerable versions: builds shipping the codexui-android exfil chain
  • OpenAI — OpenAI Codex (auth.json OAuth tokens)
    Vulnerable versions: any account whose ~/.codex/auth.json was read on an affected host

Timeline

  • codexui-android first published to npm as version 0.1.72 by maintainer 'friuns'/'friuns2' (Igor Levochkin).
  • Attacker registers controlling domain locked-ioc-7, two days after the first package version and weeks before malicious code ships.
  • Credential-stealing code introduced into the npm dist-cli build starting at version 0.1.82 (absent from the public GitHub repo); silent exfiltration begins.
  • Aikido Security discovers and publicly discloses the campaign, detailing the auth.json theft and locked-ioc-3/startlog exfiltration.
  • Author claims in GitHub issue friuns2/codex-mobile #198 to have lost npm account access; response later edited/deleted. Multiple outlets (hackread, cybernews, cybersecuritynews, gbhackers) report.
  • Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes TL-2026-0641 with full IOC, MITRE, and detection coverage.
  • The Hacker News reports the campaign; malicious package versions remain live on npm at time of reporting (~29,000 weekly downloads).

Sources cited

Previous and next in supply chain

Further reading

Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 7 sources; published ; last updated —.

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