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Threat reportMalwareTL-2026-0656

Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549 / Smoke Sandstorm) Fake Ebix Recruitment Portal — TOTPGuard.dll AppDomainManager Hijacking Sideloading Chain Delivering main.dll Implant

highACTIVE

IRGC-affiliated APT Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549 / Smoke Sandstorm) ran a LinkedIn recruitment lure impersonating headhunters for a fake 'Ebix' hiring portal (ebix[.]recruitment-flow[.]com), tricking aerospace and defense targets into downloading a fake 2FA app. The package pairs a renamed-legitimate Microsoft binary (ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe renamed to setup.exe) with a malicious setup.exe.config that forces the .NET runtime to load a custom AppDomainManager from TOTPGuard.dll, which AES-decrypts and drops the main.dll native implant beaconing to Azure-hosted (azurewebsites.net) C2.

Key facts

IdentifiersTL-2026-0656
Also known asNimbus Manticore Ebix Recruitment Campaign, TOTPGuard AppDomainManager Chain, 2FAGuard Implant
SeverityHIGH
Affected productsMicrosoft Windows (.NET CLR AppDomainManager configuration); Microsoft ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe (Visual Studio component, abused as signed host)
Weaknesses (CWE)CWE-426, CWE-427, CWE-494, CWE-829
AttributionUNC1549 (high confidence)
Nation-state nexusIran
ToolsSSL.com certs: Gray Matter Software S.R.L.; Kirubel Kerie Negeya
MITRE ATT&CK techniquesT1027 Obfuscated Files or Information, T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, T1053.005 Scheduled Task, T1057 Process Discovery, T1071.001 Web Protocols, T1082 System Information Discovery, T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer, T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, T1204.001 Malicious Link, T1204.002 Malicious File, T1518 Software Discovery and 9 more in the attack flow
MotivationESPIONAGE
Target sectorsaerospace, defense, aviation, telecommunications
Target regionsMiddle East, Europe, Africa, North America
Detection rules9 (1 shown free)
Sources6 cited sources

Detection coverage

As of 2026-06-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes 9 detection rule(s) for TL-2026-0656 across Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, covering 38 indicator(s) of compromise. The whole corpus is readable without an account. Every threat comes with one complete detection in Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL and Sigma, free for everyone; a free account adds daily TL Creds to unlock the rest. Paid plans add a larger daily allowance, correlation and the MCP server. Threadlinqs MCP server · View plans.

Free detection: Nimbus Manticore AppDomainManager Hijack via Renamed Signed Host — Exploitation Phase

Detects the Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549) initial execution: a renamed, validly-signed Microsoft ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe (delivered as setup.exe) running from a user-writable path so the malicious sibling setup.exe.config forces the CLR to load the attacker AppDomainManager assembly TOTPGuard (T1574.014).

  • Languages: Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
  • ATT&CK: T1574.014, T1036.005, T1204.002
  • Data sources: sysmon, windows_security
  • Severity: high
  • Confidence: high

Splunk SPL

index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 OriginalFileName="ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe" Image!="*\\ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe"
``` Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549): legitimate signed MS ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe renamed (typically to setup.exe) ```
``` and launched from a user-writable path so a sibling setup.exe.config forces the CLR AppDomainManager (TOTPGuard) hijack (T1574.014) ```
| eval user_writable=if(match(lower(Image),"\\\\(appdata|local\\\\temp|roaming|downloads|public)\\\\"),1,0)
| eval renamed_to_setup=if(match(lower(Image),"\\\\setup\\.exe$"),1,0)
| where user_writable=1 OR renamed_to_setup=1
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Image) as images values(CommandLine) as cmdlines values(ParentImage) as parents values(Hashes) as hashes by host,User
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| `comment("Signed Microsoft host executing under a non-original filename from a user path = AppDomainManager sideloading host")`

Microsoft KQL

DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
// Nimbus Manticore: the renamed signed host (setup.exe) loads the attacker AppDomainManager assembly TOTPGuard.dll (T1574.014)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "setup.exe"
| where FileName =~ "TOTPGuard.dll" or FolderPath has "TOTPGuard"
| where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe"
   or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any ("\\AppData\\", "\\Downloads\\", "\\Temp\\", "\\Public\\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp asc

Sigma

title: Nimbus Manticore Renamed ServiceHub Host with AppDomainManager Hijack Config
id: 7f3a1c08-2b94-4e15-9d6a-1a2b3c4d5e01
status: experimental
description: Detects the Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549 / Smoke Sandstorm) initial execution where a renamed, validly-signed Microsoft ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe (delivered as setup.exe) executes from a user-writable path alongside a malicious setup.exe.config that forces the .NET CLR to load the attacker AppDomainManager assembly TOTPGuard (TOTPGuardRunner), hijacking execution flow under cover of a trusted signed binary.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/2026/06/01/detecting-nimbus-manticore-and-their-sideloading-infection-chains/
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/fast-and-furious-nimbus-manticore-operations-during-the-iranian-conflict/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/014/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-06-02
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1574.014
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1204.002
    - detection.threat_hunting
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_signedhost:
        OriginalFileName: 'ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe'
    selection_renamed:
        Image|endswith: '\\setup.exe'
    filter_legit_path:
        Image|endswith: '\\ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe'
    selection_userpath:
        Image|contains:
            - '\\AppData\\Roaming\\'
            - '\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\'
            - '\\Downloads\\'
            - '\\Users\\Public\\'
    condition: selection_signedhost and (selection_renamed or selection_userpath) and not filter_legit_path
falsepositives:
    - Visual Studio servicing components legitimately copied by an installer (validate path and parent process)
level: high

Known false positives:

  • Visual Studio servicing components legitimately relocated by an installer — validate the executing path and parent process

Tuning notes: Baseline legitimate paths of ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe in your VS install footprint and exclude them; alert only on user-writable execution paths.

8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma) · unlock with TL Creds. Sign up free to unlock the detection rules or query them with the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple)
  • Nimbus Manticore TOTPGuard AppDomainManager Assembly Load — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Nimbus Manticore main.dll Drop to 2FAGuard AppData — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Nimbus Manticore Implant Outbound Azure C2 from Signed Host — C2/Lateral Movement Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Nimbus Manticore Renamed ServiceHub Host with AppDomainManager Hijack Config — Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Nimbus Manticore BackupCheck Task and 2FAGuard Implant Drop — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Nimbus Manticore main.dll Azure App Service C2 Beacon — C2/Lateral Movement Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Nimbus Manticore BackupCheck Logon Task Persistence — Post-Exploitation Phase · unlock with TL Creds
  • Nimbus Manticore Azure App Service C2 Beacon — C2/Lateral Movement Phase · unlock with TL Creds

Indicators of compromise

As of 2026-06-02, Threadlinqs Intelligence tracks 38 indicators of compromise for TL-2026-0656.

Sample indicators (3 of 38)

  • Domain: ebix[.]recruitment-flow[.]com
  • File hash: eee657ffdb2af8ed6412221e7d5fbf4f5742f2ac2c88f43f12db46af0697de71
  • Domain: globalitconsultants[.]azurewebsites[.]net

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR. Full set of 38 indicators: unlock with TL Creds.

38 indicators of compromise · unlock with TL Creds. Compare plans

Technical analysis

Targets aerospace and defense in the Middle East and Europe.

Nimbus Manticore — tracked by Google/Mandiant as UNC1549 and by Microsoft as Smoke Sandstorm — is an Iran-nexus (IRGC-affiliated) espionage actor that resurfaced during the Iranian conflict (Operation Epic Fury, the US military campaign against Iran launched 2026-02-28). This campaign, documented by Nextron Systems on 2026-06-01 and contextualized by Check Point Research on 2026-05-22, is a material escalation over the actor's earlier SQL Developer SEO-poisoning operation (TL-2026-0581): it introduces a new recruitment-portal initial-access vector and a new TOTPGuard.dll -> main.dll loader/implant pair.

INITIAL ACCESS & SOCIAL ENGINEERING: Operators impersonate recruiters on LinkedIn, dangling high-value (~$200,000 USD) aerospace/defense positions. Victims are steered to a fake Ebix hiring portal at hxxps://ebix[.]recruitment-flow[.]com/ (registered via Namecheap, fronted by Cloudflare). After a fake authentication step, the portal serves a '2FA application' as a ZIP archive (TOTPGuard.zip) containing the malware. Lure PDFs (fake Ebix and fake Airbus job descriptions) carry metadata Author 'Jerry' and Creator 'Microsoft Word LTSC'.

EXECUTION — APPDOMAINMANAGER HIJACKING (T1574.014): The ZIP contains three files: setup.exe (a renamed, validly-signed legitimate Microsoft ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe), TOTPGuard.dll (custom AppDomainManager, hidden attribute), and setup.exe.config (modified, hidden attribute). Rather than classic DLL search-order sideloading, the operators set the .NET probing path to the current directory and add binding directives in the .config that cause the CLR to resolve the attacker-controlled assembly named 'TOTPGuard' as the AppDomainManager for the legitimate signed host — execution flows into attacker code under cover of a trusted, signed Microsoft binary.

STAGER (TOTPGuard.dll): On launch, setup.exe shows a functional fake Ebix 2FA generator UI requesting a 'secret key' (input is irrelevant to execution — pure decoy). In the background the stager AES-decrypts an embedded payload using hardcoded key '1234567890123456' and IV 'abcdefghijklmnop', writes it to %AppData%\Roaming\2FAGuard\main.dll, copies setup.exe and setup.exe.config into the same directory, and creates a scheduled task named 'BackupCheck' that runs 'setup.exe doit' at logon. The stager leaks a PDB/development artifact string 'AppDomainInjection' and campaign constants 'MyCompany-Product-TOTP-Salt-2024!@#$', 'TOTPGuardRunner', and 'DailyTrigger'.

NATIVE IMPLANT (main.dll): A 64-bit Windows PE DLL whose single export 'CheckForUpdates' (resolved by ordinal 1) is the entry point. On the 'doit' code path the stager bypasses the 2FA GUI and LoadLibrary-loads main.dll from %AppData%\Roaming\2FAGuard\. The implant performs environmental guardrails (verifies its module name is setup.exe and that the parent process is NOT svchost.exe), anti-analysis (PEB NtGlobalFlag debugger detection, inline anti-debug, control-flow flattening with dynamically computed indirect jumps, opaque predicates, and heavy junk code), and runtime string protection (the related MiniFast lineage uses ROT13 and reversed-string transforms). It is functionally aligned with the actor's MiniFast/MiniBike backdoor family (17-opcode command set: directory listing, file ops, process enumeration, DLL loading, UAC elevation, persistence installation).

C2: The implant beacons over HTTPS to Azure App Service domains (azurewebsites.net) using JSON-formatted API calls and User-Agent 'Mozilla/5.0 ... Chrome/146.0.0.0 Safari/537.36'. Observed routes: POST /rg (initial handshake), POST /agent/init (victim registration), GET /agent/poll?token= (task retrieval), POST /agent/result (result upload), PUT /upload/ (file exfiltration). C2 domains follow a generic 'IT consultants / business checkers / exam joiners' naming pattern. Domains were registered roughly 10 days before the incident; TLS certificates were issued 2026-04-15. Check Point observed the actor abusing SSL.com certificates issued to 'Gray Matter Software S.R.L.' and 'Kirubel Kerie Negeya' across related infrastructure. Both vendors note strong indications of AI-assisted malware development (excessive error handling, verbose identifiers, modular organization, detailed error strings).

IMPACT: Successful compromise yields persistent, signed-binary-cloaked remote access on aerospace/defense engineering endpoints, enabling espionage-grade collection, file exfiltration, and follow-on tasking against sensitive defense programs in the Middle East and Europe.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques by tactic:

Defense Evasion

T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location; T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information; T1574.001 DLL; T1574.014 AppDomainManager; T1622 Debugger Evasion

Exfiltration

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Persistence

T1053.005 Scheduled Task

Discovery

T1057 Process Discovery; T1082 System Information Discovery; T1518 Software Discovery

Command and Control

T1071.001 Web Protocols; T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography

Execution

T1204.001 Malicious Link; T1204.002 Malicious File

Initial Access

T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

Resource Development

T1583 Acquire Infrastructure; T1583.006 Web Services; T1588.004 Digital Certificates

Reconnaissance

T1598 Phishing for Information

Remediation

Immediate actions

  • Block delivery domain ebix[.]recruitment-flow[.]com and all listed *.azurewebsites.net C2 domains at the proxy/DNS layer
  • Hunt for scheduled task 'BackupCheck' with argument 'doit' across the fleet
  • Hunt for %AppData%\Roaming\2FAGuard\ directory and main.dll on disk
  • Block/quarantine the listed SHA256 file hashes via EDR
  • Search for renamed ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe (setup.exe) executing with a sibling setup.exe.config from user-writable paths

Workarounds

  • Restrict execution of unsigned/renamed .config-paired binaries from user profile directories
  • Disable scheduled-task creation by non-admin users via GPO where feasible

Longer-term hardening

  • Deploy AppLocker/WDAC policies blocking execution from %TEMP%, %APPDATA%, %LOCALAPPDATA%, and Downloads
  • Enable .NET CLR AppDomainManager / config-file abuse telemetry and alert on signed binaries loading non-GAC AppDomainManager assemblies
  • Deploy EDR with behavioral detection for AppDomain hijacking and scheduled-task persistence
  • Block newly-registered domains (age < 30 days) for HR/recruiting and finance user populations
  • Security-awareness training on LinkedIn recruitment lures targeting aerospace/defense staff

Affected and fixed versions

  • Microsoft — Windows (.NET CLR AppDomainManager configuration)
    Vulnerable versions: Windows 10; Windows 11; Windows Server with .NET Framework
    Fixed in: N/A — abuse of legitimate .NET feature, not a patchable CVE
  • Microsoft — ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe (Visual Studio component, abused as signed host)
    Vulnerable versions: legitimate signed binary renamed to setup.exe
    Fixed in: N/A

Timeline

  • Operation Epic Fury (US military campaign against Iran) begins; Nimbus Manticore resurfaces with wartime tempo per Check Point Research.
  • TLS certificates for the Azure-hosted C2 domains issued, indicating staging of the recruitment-portal campaign infrastructure.
  • Delivery and C2 domains registered roughly 10 days before observed exploitation (newly-registered domains via Namecheap, fronted by Cloudflare).
  • Check Point Research publishes 'Fast and Furious — Nimbus Manticore Operations During the Iranian Conflict' documenting actor TTPs, AppDomain hijacking, and AI-assisted development.
  • Nextron Systems publishes full technical analysis of the fake Ebix recruitment portal -> TOTPGuard.dll AppDomainManager -> main.dll chain with complete IOC and YARA set.
  • Threadlinqs Intelligence publishes TL-2026-0656 with MITRE mapping, IOCs, and detection coverage for SOC/IR consumption.

Sources cited

More from UNC1549

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Drafted by the Threadlinqs research pipeline from 6 sources; published ; last updated —.

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