# Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549 / Smoke Sandstorm) Fake Ebix Recruitment Portal — TOTPGuard.dll AppDomainManager Hijacking Sideloading Chain Delivering main.dll Implant

> IRGC-affiliated APT Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549 / Smoke Sandstorm) ran a LinkedIn recruitment lure impersonating headhunters for a fake 'Ebix' hiring portal (ebix[.]recruitment-flow[.]com), tricking aerospace and defense targets into downloading a fake 2FA app. The package pairs a renamed-legitimate Microsoft binary (ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe renamed to setup.exe) with a malicious setup.exe.config that forces the .NET runtime to load a custom AppDomainManager from TOTPGuard.dll, which AES-decrypts and drops the main.dll native implant beaconing to Azure-hosted (azurewebsites.net) C2. Targets aerospace and defense in the Middle East and Europe.

- **Published:** 2026-06-02T00:00:00Z
- **Last reviewed:** 2026-06-02T00:00:00Z
- **Canonical:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0656
- **Card image:** https://intel.threadlinqs.com/og/threat/threat-intel-nimbus-manticore-totpguard-chain-tl-2026-0656.webp?v=c58da6d1 (Threadlinqs threat intel: Nimbus Manticore TOTPGuard Sideloading: Detection & IOCs (TL-2026-0656) — High severity, 38 IOCs, 9 detection rules.)
- **ID:** TL-2026-0656
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Category:** MALWARE
- **Status:** ACTIVE
- **Actor:** UNC1549 (Iran)
- **Detections:** 9 (1 shown free below) · **IOCs:** 38 (3 shown free below)

## Description

Nimbus Manticore — tracked by Google/Mandiant as UNC1549 and by Microsoft as Smoke Sandstorm — is an Iran-nexus (IRGC-affiliated) espionage actor that resurfaced during the Iranian conflict (Operation Epic Fury, the US military campaign against Iran launched 2026-02-28). This campaign, documented by Nextron Systems on 2026-06-01 and contextualized by Check Point Research on 2026-05-22, is a material escalation over the actor's earlier SQL Developer SEO-poisoning operation (TL-2026-0581): it introduces a new recruitment-portal initial-access vector and a new TOTPGuard.dll -> main.dll loader/implant pair.

INITIAL ACCESS & SOCIAL ENGINEERING: Operators impersonate recruiters on LinkedIn, dangling high-value (~$200,000 USD) aerospace/defense positions. Victims are steered to a fake Ebix hiring portal at hxxps://ebix[.]recruitment-flow[.]com/ (registered via Namecheap, fronted by Cloudflare). After a fake authentication step, the portal serves a '2FA application' as a ZIP archive (TOTPGuard.zip) containing the malware. Lure PDFs (fake Ebix and fake Airbus job descriptions) carry metadata Author 'Jerry' and Creator 'Microsoft Word LTSC'.

EXECUTION — APPDOMAINMANAGER HIJACKING (T1574.014): The ZIP contains three files: setup.exe (a renamed, validly-signed legitimate Microsoft ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe), TOTPGuard.dll (custom AppDomainManager, hidden attribute), and setup.exe.config (modified, hidden attribute). Rather than classic DLL search-order sideloading, the operators set the .NET probing path to the current directory and add binding directives in the .config that cause the CLR to resolve the attacker-controlled assembly named 'TOTPGuard' as the AppDomainManager for the legitimate signed host — execution flows into attacker code under cover of a trusted, signed Microsoft binary.

STAGER (TOTPGuard.dll): On launch, setup.exe shows a functional fake Ebix 2FA generator UI requesting a 'secret key' (input is irrelevant to execution — pure decoy). In the background the stager AES-decrypts an embedded payload using hardcoded key '1234567890123456' and IV 'abcdefghijklmnop', writes it to %AppData%\Roaming\2FAGuard\main.dll, copies setup.exe and setup.exe.config into the same directory, and creates a scheduled task named 'BackupCheck' that runs 'setup.exe doit' at logon. The stager leaks a PDB/development artifact string 'AppDomainInjection' and campaign constants 'MyCompany-Product-TOTP-Salt-2024!@#$', 'TOTPGuardRunner', and 'DailyTrigger'.

NATIVE IMPLANT (main.dll): A 64-bit Windows PE DLL whose single export 'CheckForUpdates' (resolved by ordinal 1) is the entry point. On the 'doit' code path the stager bypasses the 2FA GUI and LoadLibrary-loads main.dll from %AppData%\Roaming\2FAGuard\. The implant performs environmental guardrails (verifies its module name is setup.exe and that the parent process is NOT svchost.exe), anti-analysis (PEB NtGlobalFlag debugger detection, inline anti-debug, control-flow flattening with dynamically computed indirect jumps, opaque predicates, and heavy junk code), and runtime string protection (the related MiniFast lineage uses ROT13 and reversed-string transforms). It is functionally aligned with the actor's MiniFast/MiniBike backdoor family (17-opcode command set: directory listing, file ops, process enumeration, DLL loading, UAC elevation, persistence installation).

C2: The implant beacons over HTTPS to Azure App Service domains (azurewebsites.net) using JSON-formatted API calls and User-Agent 'Mozilla/5.0 ... Chrome/146.0.0.0 Safari/537.36'. Observed routes: POST /rg (initial handshake), POST /agent/init (victim registration), GET /agent/poll?token= (task retrieval), POST /agent/result (result upload), PUT /upload/ (file exfiltration). C2 domains follow a generic 'IT consultants / business checkers / exam joiners' naming pattern. Domains were registered roughly 10 days before the incident; TLS certificates were issued 2026-04-15. Check Point observed the actor abusing SSL.com certificates issued to 'Gray Matter Software S.R.L.' and 'Kirubel Kerie Negeya' across related infrastructure. Both vendors note strong indications of AI-assisted malware development (excessive error handling, verbose identifiers, modular organization, detailed error strings).

IMPACT: Successful compromise yields persistent, signed-binary-cloaked remote access on aerospace/defense engineering endpoints, enabling espionage-grade collection, file exfiltration, and follow-on tasking against sensitive defense programs in the Middle East and Europe.

## MITRE ATT&CK

- T1598 Phishing for Information
- T1583 Acquire Infrastructure
- T1583.006 Web Services
- T1588.004 Digital Certificates
- T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
- T1204.002 Malicious File
- T1204.001 Malicious Link
- T1053.005 Scheduled Task
- T1574.014 AppDomainManager
- T1574.001 DLL
- T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
- T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- T1622 Debugger Evasion
- T1082 System Information Discovery
- T1057 Process Discovery
- T1518 Software Discovery
- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography
- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

## Free detection (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma)

**Nimbus Manticore AppDomainManager Hijack via Renamed Signed Host — Exploitation Phase** (`TL-2026-0656-SPL-001`)

Detects the Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549) initial execution: a renamed, validly-signed Microsoft ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe (delivered as setup.exe) running from a user-writable path so the malicious sibling setup.exe.config forces the CLR to load the attacker AppDomainManager assembly TOTPGuard (T1574.014).

- **Languages:** Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma
- **ATT&CK:** T1574.014, T1036.005, T1204.002
- **Data sources:** sysmon, windows_security
- **Severity:** high
- **Confidence:** high

### Splunk SPL

````spl
index=sysmon sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1 OriginalFileName="ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe" Image!="*\\ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe"
``` Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549): legitimate signed MS ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe renamed (typically to setup.exe) ```
``` and launched from a user-writable path so a sibling setup.exe.config forces the CLR AppDomainManager (TOTPGuard) hijack (T1574.014) ```
| eval user_writable=if(match(lower(Image),"\\\\(appdata|local\\\\temp|roaming|downloads|public)\\\\"),1,0)
| eval renamed_to_setup=if(match(lower(Image),"\\\\setup\\.exe$"),1,0)
| where user_writable=1 OR renamed_to_setup=1
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Image) as images values(CommandLine) as cmdlines values(ParentImage) as parents values(Hashes) as hashes by host,User
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| `comment("Signed Microsoft host executing under a non-original filename from a user path = AppDomainManager sideloading host")`
````

### Microsoft KQL

```kql
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
// Nimbus Manticore: the renamed signed host (setup.exe) loads the attacker AppDomainManager assembly TOTPGuard.dll (T1574.014)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "setup.exe"
| where FileName =~ "TOTPGuard.dll" or FolderPath has "TOTPGuard"
| where InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe"
   or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any ("\\AppData\\", "\\Downloads\\", "\\Temp\\", "\\Public\\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp asc
```

### Sigma

```yaml
title: Nimbus Manticore Renamed ServiceHub Host with AppDomainManager Hijack Config
id: 7f3a1c08-2b94-4e15-9d6a-1a2b3c4d5e01
status: experimental
description: Detects the Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549 / Smoke Sandstorm) initial execution where a renamed, validly-signed Microsoft ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe (delivered as setup.exe) executes from a user-writable path alongside a malicious setup.exe.config that forces the .NET CLR to load the attacker AppDomainManager assembly TOTPGuard (TOTPGuardRunner), hijacking execution flow under cover of a trusted signed binary.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/2026/06/01/detecting-nimbus-manticore-and-their-sideloading-infection-chains/
    - https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/fast-and-furious-nimbus-manticore-operations-during-the-iranian-conflict/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/014/
author: Threadlinqs Team
date: 2026-06-02
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1574.014
    - attack.t1036.005
    - attack.t1204.002
    - detection.threat_hunting
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_signedhost:
        OriginalFileName: 'ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe'
    selection_renamed:
        Image|endswith: '\\setup.exe'
    filter_legit_path:
        Image|endswith: '\\ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe'
    selection_userpath:
        Image|contains:
            - '\\AppData\\Roaming\\'
            - '\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\'
            - '\\Downloads\\'
            - '\\Users\\Public\\'
    condition: selection_signedhost and (selection_renamed or selection_userpath) and not filter_legit_path
falsepositives:
    - Visual Studio servicing components legitimately copied by an installer (validate path and parent process)
level: high
```

**Known false positives:**

- Visual Studio servicing components legitimately relocated by an installer — validate the executing path and parent process

**Tuning notes:** Baseline legitimate paths of ServiceHub.VSDetouredHost.exe in your VS install footprint and exclude them; alert only on user-writable execution paths.

### 8 more detection rules (Splunk SPL, Microsoft KQL, Sigma), unlock with TL Creds

- Nimbus Manticore TOTPGuard AppDomainManager Assembly Load — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Nimbus Manticore main.dll Drop to 2FAGuard AppData — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Nimbus Manticore Implant Outbound Azure C2 from Signed Host — C2/Lateral Movement Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Nimbus Manticore Renamed ServiceHub Host with AppDomainManager Hijack Config — Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Nimbus Manticore BackupCheck Task and 2FAGuard Implant Drop — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Nimbus Manticore main.dll Azure App Service C2 Beacon — C2/Lateral Movement Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Nimbus Manticore BackupCheck Logon Task Persistence — Post-Exploitation Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)
- Nimbus Manticore Azure App Service C2 Beacon — C2/Lateral Movement Phase (locked: unlock with TL Creds)

Sign up free to unlock the detection rules: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup

## Sample indicators (3 of 38)

Defanged, TLP:CLEAR.

- Domain: `ebix[.]recruitment-flow[.]com`
- File hash: `eee657ffdb2af8ed6412221e7d5fbf4f5742f2ac2c88f43f12db46af0697de71`
- Domain: `globalitconsultants[.]azurewebsites[.]net`

Full set of 38 indicators unlocks with TL Creds: https://threadlinqs.com/tl-creds

## Sources

- [Detecting Nimbus Manticore and their sideloading infection chains](https://www.nextron-systems.com/2026/06/01/detecting-nimbus-manticore-and-their-sideloading-infection-chains/)
- [Fast and Furious - Nimbus Manticore Operations During the Iranian Conflict](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/fast-and-furious-nimbus-manticore-operations-during-the-iranian-conflict/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1574.014 — Hijack Execution Flow: AppDomainManager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/014/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1573.001 — Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Encryption](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/001/)
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1053.005 — Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/)

## Full data

The other 8 detection rules (Splunk SPL / Microsoft KQL / Sigma) unlock with TL Creds; a free account includes daily creds: https://threadlinqs.com/?modal=signup
Indicator values unlock with TL Creds, at a lower price on Red and Purple; AI agents can query rules and IOCs through the Threadlinqs MCP server (Purple): https://intel.threadlinqs.com/mcp

Canonical: https://intel.threadlinqs.com/threat/TL-2026-0656
